“Defeating the Russians will require a completely different level of support that not all Western countries seem to envisage at this stage unless Russia moves on to directly provoke a NATO member state.”
This piece was originally published on the kurdistan24 website https://www.kurdistan24.net/
ERBIL (Kurdistan 24) – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could develop into the largest conflict seen in Europe since the Second World War. But the war’s effects will not be limited to Europe. Middle East countries have deep ties in trade, tourism, and defense with both sides. Turkey lies at the geographic center of the conflict. Kyiv has called on Ankara to close off the Turkish Straits to the Black Sea to the Russian Navy. The war also turned the spotlight on Arab Gulf states as oil surged past $100 on Thursday for the first time since 2014.
Dr. Elie Abouaoun, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programs at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), discussed some of the implications of this war in Europe on the Middle East with Kurdistan 24.
“Defeating the Russians will require a completely different level of support that not all Western countries seem to envisage at this stage unless Russia moves on to directly provoke a NATO member state.”
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has now been ongoing for almost a week, with Ukrainians showing heroic resistance. Answering Kurdistan 24’s questions about how much longer Ukraine can resist this Russian aggression and the significance of the military aid Ukraine is receiving from friendly countries, Abouaoun said that there are multiple variables that could affect how fast the Russian armed forces can advance into that country.
“Resistance to the invasion depends first and foremost on the speed and level of support provided by the West to the Ukrainian armed forces and the emerging popular resistance units,” he said. “It also depends on the impact of the sanctions on Russia itself, including on the morale of its soldiers if and when domestic pressure reaches a critical level.”
He added that it will also “be affected by how far other countries can go in supporting or countering the invasion (i.e., Belorussia’s readiness to go into a full-fledged war, Turkey’s expected enactment of the Montreux Convention…etc.) and how far NATO countries will accept Russia’s massive deployment of its military on the borders with some member states (i.e. deploying Russian troops on the borders between Ukraine and Poland to cut off supplies to Ukraine).”
“A war of attrition in Ukraine could ‘sink Russia in a quagmire.”
Abouaoun pointed out that what is clear so far is that the Ukrainians proved to be more resilient than expected and that Russia’s calculations were not all necessarily accurate.
“So far, the Western countries’ military aid to Ukraine seems to be swift enough to delay the Russian invasion,” he said. “However, defeating the Russians will require a completely different level of support that not all Western countries seem to envisage at this stage unless Russia moves on to directly provoke a NATO member state.”
“However, the likely scenario of an attrition war – through guerilla-like popular resistance – will sink Russia in a quagmire once its conventional warfare becomes obsolete,” he added.
“The sanctions need to be constantly evaluated for impact and be as focused as possible targeting the pillars of Putin’s temple.”
Regarding the economic and financial sanctions, the U.S., UK, Canada, and E.U. states are imposing on Russia, Abouaoun underlined that Russia’s political regime is not one where public opinion actually shapes military or political decisions.
“However, if the sanctions target specific centers of power within the establishment supporting Putin domestically, then the pressure on him might reach a critical level, pushing him to revisit some of his assumptions,” he said. “So far, there are no indications that the domestic pressure is strong enough to dissuade Putin from carrying on with his war, which is why some of the sanctions are – and should remain- focused on specific institutions or figures in Russia.”
Unfortunately, he added, the previous experience with sanctions is that with time, targeted “entities – governmental or non-governmental – adapt to the sanctions and find ways to circumvent them, and with the help of China, this scenario is not to be completely excluded in the case of Russia.”
“Therefore, the sanctions regime needs to be constantly evaluated for impact and be as focused as possible targeting the pillars of Putin’s temple,” he said.
“Shortages and higher prices of oil will increase the risks of social unrest, add pressure on governments, and put the security actors and communities in direct confrontation.”
The Middle East countries will feel the effects of the war in Europe. It is expected that the war will impact food and grain supplies to some Middle East countries such as Syria and Egypt.
“As both Ukraine and Russia are major suppliers of wheat to many countries in the region, it is not hard to foresee how this war will cause shortages and spikes in prices,” said Abouaoun. “On the other hand, the surge in oil prices is obviously not good news for many oil importers in the region, where oil and its derivatives continue to be subsidized by states, most of which have already fragile economies.”
“Shortages and higher prices will increase the risks of social unrest, add pressure on governments lacking legitimacy in general, and put the security actors and communities in direct confrontation when the relations between both are already strained,” he added.
“Assad is carefully watching the outcome of this war and will be emboldened by a Russian victory.”
Political observers believe the war in Europe might further empower Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and will more likely have implications for Israel-Russia security coordination in Syria.
Abouaoun argued that while it is indisputable that Russia has immense military capacities and that fighting in Ukraine does not mean withdrawing from Syria, Russia will nonetheless have to revisit the level of its political and military investments in Syria.
“Assad is carefully watching the outcome of this war and will be emboldened by a Russian victory; however, if the scenario of an attrition war materializes, then he will be in a weaker position as the Russian focus will pivot from Syria to Ukraine,” he said. “This would not be a game-changer in Syria for two main reasons: the Iranians continue to be strong enough to defend Assad; and the anti-Assad forces have lost support, momentum, and resources and cannot threaten the regime anymore; so a Ukrainian ‘forever war’ means a weaker Assad who will have to bear the brunt of a low-intensity conflict without being in an existential danger.”
“Russia wants Israel to refrain from supporting Ukraine while Israel tends to sympathize with Ukraine and its young President who even has some family ties with Israel.”
On the Israel-Russia side, Abouaoun pointed out that the recent days highlighted, if anything, the delicate and dilemmatic position of Israel vis-à-vis the U.S., Ukraine, and Russia.
“Israel initially tried to strike the balance between Russia and Ukraine in order to preserve its freedom to act in Syria against the Iranians and their proxies, as well as the other terrorist groups planning to target Israel out of Syria,” he said. “The current rules of engagement in Syria between Russia and Israel remain of great relevance to the Israelis; however, the level of mutual frustration between Russia and Israel is increasing as Russia wants Israel to refrain from supporting Ukraine while Israel tends to sympathize with Ukraine and its young President who even has some family ties with Israel.”
Abouaoun believes there is no immediate impact of this specific conflict on Iran’s posture in the Middle East.
“Russia’s influence in Iraq is insignificant so even a weaker Russia will not have a major impact on the core issues Iraq is currently grappling with.”
“Iran already feels slightly more comfortable with the progress of the Vienna talks and given that the U.S. agreed to partial relief, through waivers or other actions, of some sanctions,” he said. “Iran’s most hawkish foes in the Gulf have reconsidered their positions in the last few months, choosing a path of détente with the Iranians rather than confrontation.”
“Overall, the pressure on Iran from other regional powers has decreased,” he added. “To the joy of the Iranians, the possibilities of escalation in the Middle East remain highly unlikely as the U.S. and other European countries are busy with the Ukraine crisis.”
“Russia’s influence in Iraq is insignificant so even a weaker Russia will not have a major impact on the core issues Iraq is currently grappling with.”
Abouaoun doesn’t expect this war in Europe to have any impact on the government formation in Baghdad or on the relations between Baghdad and Erbil.
“The dynamics underlying the process of government formation in Baghdad are distinct with no direct influence of the Russian-Ukrainian war,” he said. “Same applies to the Baghdad-Erbil relations.”
“Russia’s influence in Iraq is insignificant so even a weaker Russia will not have a major impact on the core issues Iraq is currently grappling with,” he added.
“If the conflict continues and becomes a protracted one, it will be hard for the Middle Eastern countries to remain on the fence.”
Abouaoun went on to state that if the conflict continues and becomes a protracted one, it will be hard for the Middle Eastern countries to remain on the fence.
“While public statements of Middle Eastern countries, in general, tried to be balanced – with the notable exception of Lebanon’s support of Ukraine and a predictable support to Russia from Syria – many of the decisions taken by other countries reflect a preference towards one of the protagonists,” he said. “The UAE’s refusal to condemn the invasion casts a doubt about the solidity of the strategic relations between UAE and the U.S. Qatar’s polite ‘decline’ to reroute gas supplies to Europe plays to the advantage of Russia.”
“As stated before, both Turkey and Israel’s hearts are leaning towards Ukraine, so the neutrality seen so far is not intractable,” he added.
“The E.U. decision to close its airspace to Russian airplanes – will affect tourists coming from these two countries; however, not all countries in the Middle East relied on Russian tourists.”
Recent reports say escalating war may see tourism revenue dry up and direct flights canceled for some of the most popular Russian tourist spots in the Middle East. While Abouaoun agrees, he believes that the impact will be significantly different from one country to another.
“Obviously, the Russia-Ukraine war, including the E.U. decision to close its airspace to Russian airplanes – will affect tourists coming from these two countries; however, not all countries in the Middle East relied on Russian tourists,” he said. “So, the impact will be significantly different from one country to another.”
“As the war in Europe continues, it has yet to be seen whether Turkey will deny Russian warships passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.”
The war might have implications for the Black Sea, too. Most immediately, it may impact what ships will be allowed to transit between that sea and the Mediterranean. As the war in Europe continues, it has yet to be seen whether Turkey will deny Russian warships passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.
Abouaoun believes that it is unlikely for Turkey to opt for a direct confrontation with Russia.
“Thus, Turkey will continue to hedge, while deciding to implement the Montreux convention which grants Turkey control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, allows Turkey to ban ships not based in the Black Sea during times of war,” he said.
“So, now, Turkey has the discretionary power to limit the transit of Russian (and Ukrainian) warships and civilian vessels between the Mediterranean to the Black Sea except those returning to their registered base.”