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Experts warn that conflict, poor governance could complicate MENA’s response to coronavirus

This piece was originally published on the thearabweekly website https://thearabweekly.com/

TUNIS/BEIRUT – As the coronavirus spreads across the MENA region, experts warned that conflict, a lack of preparedness and poor governance could impair efforts to curb outbreaks.

“The MENA region is not in an ideal situation to deal with this disease, mainly because of the conflicts and turmoil in the region,” said Harith Hasan, a senior fellow and researcher at Carnegie Middle East.

“In most countries of the region, you have the problem of state functionality. In some countries, it is failed states and inability to provide societies with a considerable degree of governance, competence and performance. Therefore, there is a problem of trust.

“When we listen to people in some of those countries we see that people find it difficult to trust what the governments are saying, partly because there is a history of governments not saying the truth, avoiding transparency.”

Experts said they are concerned about the response of leaders in Iran, which has one of the biggest clusters of coronavirus cases outside of China, where the disease originated. Analysts said the Tehran government downplayed the number of cases — declared at 388, with 34 dead — and failed to take effective measures to prevent its proliferation. Iranian authorities dismissed a BBC Persia report, based on a survey of Iranian hospitals, that put the death toll at least 210.

Elie Abouaoun, director of the MENA Programme at the United States Institute for Peace, said it is “poor governance” rather than a lack of financial resources that poses the greatest problem for countries dealing with the health crisis.

“The relatively poor response to the COVID-19 outbreak in most of the MENA countries has to do much more with the poor governance rather than availability of financial resources,” Abouaoun said. “As a matter of fact, responding to this type of outbreak is not too resource-intensive, especially for the scale we have seen in the MENA countries…

“The failure is, from my perspective, more in the lack of preparedness to deal with such situations. Whereas in some cases, ongoing military conflicts can hinder contingency planning efforts, many of the countries reporting COVID-19 patients should have figured out plans for a concerted interagency response that includes awareness, data-driven public communication, more effective border and travellers management and providing quick and effective health care to patients.

“Most of this did not happen or happened in the most random fashion reflecting a combination of incompetence, corruption, lack of organisation and crippled public administration.”

Abouaoun pointed out that the “inability of the Iranian authorities to effectively mitigate the effect of the outbreak could, to a large extent, have been seen in any other country in the MENA.” However, he added, “challenges” such as incompetence, corruption, lack of organisation and crippled public administration “are certainly more serious in Iran.”

Coronavirus has reached at least ten countries in the MENA region, with the most cases reported in Iran, Kuwait and Bahrain. In Iran, senior government officials have tested positive for the virus. Lebanon, which has four cases of the virus, closed schools until March 8 as a precautionary measure.

Hasan argued that, while most MENA countries face greater obstacles than countries in more developed areas, it is important not to place them all in the same basket or assume that better-equipped countries will be able to rein in the virus.

“I think it is much more difficult in the case of the Middle East to deal with coronavirus for many reasons: The geopolitical conflicts in the region, the problem of the failed states, of incompetent governments in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, et cetera, and the economic crises,” Hasan said.

“The economic situation in most of the region’s countries has been worsening in the last few years partly because of the drop in oil prices and because of corruption and demographic growth.”

Still, “other governments in other parts of the world are not prepared to face this completely different challenge,” he added.

“I live in Italy now, a country that has become the epicentre of the virus in Europe, and, although Italy is much better prepared than most of the Middle Eastern countries, still the government is struggling to find a way to contain the virus and to convince people that they are doing the right things.”

Hasan also noted the common challenge posed by the outbreak despite uneven means between the countries of MENA.

“It is something completely different than what the region has faced before,” he said. “It is an enemy that is different from any other enemy in a region that is full of enemies. Even countries with (financial) means, like Kuwait or Bahrain, are finding some difficulties in containing the virus.”

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Aoun’s claims of international financial support under scrutiny

This piece was originally published on the thearabweekly website https://thearabweekly.com/

TUNIS – Amid Lebanon’s economic crisis, President Michel Aoun reassured a nervous public that several countries, especially France, were standing by to aid the embattled country.

However, given the relatively fresh status of Lebanon’s government, only voted in on February 11, as well as concerns about the independence of a government seen as being too close to the country’s political class, analysts questioned how willing the international community might be to help Lebanon’s beleaguered economy.

Tackling corruption is central to any discussion on Lebanon’s political or economic future. Transparency International ranks Lebanon 137th out of the 180 countries surveyed.

Lebanon’s system of government, by which positions and ministries are divided along party and sectarian lines, has proven fertile breeding ground for graft, with parties providing services and positions in return for political support.

This system has undermined the credibility of Lebanon’s political class, with each party’s exploitation of its clientelist base seen as contributors to the crisis. The appointment of a new government had been intended to establish a body capable of undertaking wholesale reforms. However, analysts already question its proximity to the country’s existing parties and their leaders.

Looming over all negotiations is the prospect of the $1.2 billion Eurobond repayment that falls due in March.

“The multilayered root causes of corruption in Lebanon are known to everyone,” Elie Abouaoun, director of the MENA programme at the US Institute for Peace, said via e-mail, “They are not confined to civil servants. As a matter of fact, corruption in the private sector is even more endemic. “

One means of salvation might be the $11 billion in pledges made at the CEDRE conference in April 2018. However, with pledges contingent on Lebanon undertaking serious reform, those funds seem distant.

“The French government seems so far convinced that the new Lebanese government might be an acceptable interlocutor if it commits to a specific reform plan,” Abouaoun said. “Personally, I think this is wishful thinking at best,” he added, pointing to the ties that bound many of the new ministers to Lebanon’s political class.

CEDRE failed to differ in substance from previous fundraising conferences. “None of them resulted in a sustainable change because the three main bleeding sources in Lebanon have been well established a while ago: deficit of the state-owned Electricite du Liban, salaries of the public sector and the service of the public debt. Short of addressing these three issues, all other plans are doomed to fail. If anything at all, CEDRE will only increase the amount of the public debt,” Abouaoun said.

The goodwill of the international community will be critical to tackling Lebanon’s longstanding problems, with even a potential loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) — typically seen as the lender of last resort — apparently up for discussion among Lebanese lawmakers.

“I think the consensus among the international community is really one of let’s wait and see,” said Mohanad Hage Ali, a fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Centre. “There’s a great deal of caution among potential donors about committing to a bailout without a serious commitment to reform.”

With the Eurobond due within weeks, lawmakers have little time for debate.

“At the moment there’s a lot of discussion about whether to default on the bond repayment after seeking the IMF advice on this matter. Another ongoing debate is about joining an IMF programme. This will require surrendering some degree of sovereignty and I’m not sure that the Lebanese sectarian leaders agree on how much control they’re willing to give up,” Hage Ali said.

Despite the deterioration of services and the stagnating salaries of the positions offered in return for political support, maintaining the parties’ clientelist base remains central to the outlook of Lebanon’s political class, Hage Ali explained.

“There’s a real effort to portray this government as independent of the political class,” Hage Ali said. “However, in terms of reform, this will really depend on the willingness of Lebanon’s political class. They need to be seen as taking actions against corruption. This could start with ensuring the independence of the judiciary, (regarded as being tied to the interests of their political sponsors). Will they do that? I haven’t seen any major steps that would suggest so,” Hage Ali concluded.

Until the scale of the impending catastrophe becomes unavoidable, however, there appears to be little indication of Lebanon’s new government changing course.

“Lebanon is unlikely to enact significant measures to solve endemic corruption in the near future but this has little to do with the ideological makeup of the government,” Thomas Abi-Hanna, an analyst with risk consultancy Strafor, said, referring to the composition of the government, which is dominated by Hezbollah, Amal and their allies.

“The issue of corruption is not isolated to one sect, ideology or political party in Lebanon, given that politicians across the board engage in corrupt activity. Even if there were political will, tackling these endemic issues could take years,” Abi-Hanna said.

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Untangling the roots of change in Lebanon

The popular uprising is a reminder that the flames of hope have not been extinguished; far from it, the sparks of a new generation’s hopes have just been lit.

This piece was originally published on the thearabweekly website https://thearabweekly.com/

The October 17 nation-wide protests, financial crisis and subsequent security incidents in Lebanon shook a 30-year-old status quo. Across Lebanon’s religious and political groups, new voices emerged, employing rights-based language and advocating for accountability.

The chorus of new voices included many who had long deified deep-seated feudal leaders, not just habitual protesters. Amid uncertainty and a new illegitimate government, the country can still avoid a wrong turn.

With public spaces open to community debates on a way forward, a vibrant youth movement surfaced, eager to reverse the narrative of an older and incapacitated generation. Among activists who often felt isolated, even from constituencies they fought for, coy whispers of change among angry howls turned into shouts of hope that drowned out the fury. There was even a much-adored rendition of “Baby Shark” that reminded us and the world of Lebanon’s spirit during times of adversity.

Inasmuch as the crisis did not discriminate along sectarian lines, those reacting to the crisis on the street found unity despite coming from diverse backgrounds. Each time the protests seemed to devolve into clashes — whether between citizens and security officers or involving armed groups bent on preserving the old system — Lebanon’s wise, including strong-willed mothers, reminded the new generation of the costs of war and called for reason.

Seeking justice and accountability is vital, not only to fight impunity but to revive transitional justice processes and reconciliation following years of conflicts and internal unrest. The crucial question remains the feasibility of the “All means all” slogan that the protesters are pushing for.

History shows that fragile and volatile societies, particularly those deeply divided by mistrust, have rarely been able to rely on conventional justice systems to try political leaders for their crimes and wrongdoings, especially when the leaders are the product of a power-sharing arrangement that mirrors the mosaic of the community.

It is inconceivable, both conceptually and logistically, to investigate all previous and current parliamentarians, prime ministers, ministers, senior bureaucrats and other potentially involved individuals, corporations and security apparatus within a realistic time frame. Lebanon’s court system is neither equipped nor perceived as independent or impartial and evidence is often inaccessible and unavailable.

On the other hand, show trials — mostly selective — that fail to uphold principles of due process (or no trials at all) risk replacing just accountability with a punitive and vindictive process. This would fall short of the goals of advancing justice, reconciliation and stability.

As there is no one-size-fits-all approach to implementing accountability, the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings in the region shows that throwing a handful of senior leaders in jail (or exiling or executing them) does not in itself help reform the institutional legacies they created. Furthermore, this approach does not help mend distorted social norms, nor does it prevent future atrocities or corruption. If anything, regime decapitation often further polarises societies.

While Lebanon’s citizenry has showed resilience and evolution, a flimsy diagnosis blamed sweepingly the political party system and sectarian identity politics, overlooking the root societal causes of the problem.

Political expedience reigned, paving the way for a dismissive approach by the government. The establishment’s patronising response pays lip service to the demands of the people but does not commit to real change. Its ineptitude, matched only by shrewdness, generated fig-leaf solutions that preserved an ailing oligarchy.

Real change is not as simple as installing a government of “independent experts,” commonly called in Lebanon “technocrats,” particularly if those are beholden to political masters or hostages of the latter’s’ power dynamics.

Outrage against political parties is legitimate. Nevertheless, advocates of change should, rather than demonising them, call for new and reformed political organisations embracing realistic and measurable programmes that address actual problems and concerns instead of clinging to ill-defined conceptual narratives.

Political participation is the cornerstone of democracy and activism, including finding a group that represents one’s values, is a sacred political right. Such groups remain an important vehicle for change and a key stakeholder in the country’s social compact with the people.

The same is true of the undefined “sectarianism,” which means different things to different people, vilified to the extent of becoming a ghost enemy. Without proper definition, decrying sectarianism is smearing the basic concept of diversity as the source of all troubles in the country. To be sure, manipulating the fear of some religious or political groups and echoing the rhetoric of the civil war reinforces segregation and further empowers religious warmongers.

However, as fanciful and politically correct as it looks, overlooking that the Lebanese system reflects an entrenched individual religious identity projecting into the political realm is an abrupt assassination of diversity. More important, it will not address corruption, societal seclusion, discrimination — whether in laws or practice — or give equal right to non-religiously affiliated citizens to access power because it will lead to another form of populist authoritarian regime.

Even in the world’s so-called highly developed democracies, which either are or claim to be secular, discrimination and corruption can take root, societies can form fissures and social movements calling for changes to government do not always occur on the same timeline as elections.

For these initial tremors to lead to real and durable change, three critical outputs that require collaborative thinking and action among the different stakeholders should be considered.

First, come up with an electoral law that steers the various constituencies away from the overplayed sectarian politics but still recognises the diversity of identities and views them as the cornerstone of an inclusive citizenship. Such a law would assert the compatibility between multiple subnational and a single national identity. Such an effort has been initiated by the Adyan Foundation and is worth investing in.

Second, reform the judiciary. The newly established and promising Lebanon’s Judges’ Association put forward worthwhile ideas and the protest movement would benefit greatly by giving the lead on this matter to the association, while applying pressure as needed once the club starts pushing for policy change.

Third, and most pivotal, assess a workable solution related to the amount of losses resulting from the 30-plus years of corrupt and incompetent politics and force a fair burden-sharing scheme among the various actors — government, private sector, banking sector, Central Bank, taxpayers, et cetera. Obviously, the lesser burden should be borne by taxpayers while the heaviest by the banking sector and central bank.

This last initiative is the hardest and actors, such as banks, with a lot of leverage will resist. Therefore, the protest movement should focus almost exclusively on setting the agenda for this discussion, making sure it happens and weighing in on the outcome.

This popular uprising is a reminder that the flames of hope have not been extinguished; far from it, the sparks of a new generation’s hopes have just been lit.

However, sustainable change requires that the constellation of actors emerging from this organic movement work strategically and be driven by a focused agenda to address the pressing financial situation. Controversial social issues do need to be discussed but in a way that does not create exclusionary political and social practices under the label of a different political system.

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Tunisian labour union demands dialogue amid rising unemployment and unrest

The coronavirus crisis has exacerbated the country’s financial problems, prompting protests and political division

This piece was originally published on the thenationanewsl website https://thenationalnews.com/

Tunisia’s dramatic economic downturn since the coronavirus pandemic has exacerbated social and financial woes facing the country, prompting the influential Tunisian General Labour Union, (UGTT) to call on the country’s president, Kais Saied for a National Dialogue to address mounting concern.

In November, the international ratings agency, Fitch, downgraded Tunisia’s credit rating from ‘stable’ to ‘negative,’ reflecting the deteriorating outlook for a country saddled with millions in international debt.

Perhaps of more immediate concern to many within Tunisia is the joint study earlier this year by Tunisia’s central bank and the UNDP predicting that unemployment, a long-time driver of social unrest, is expected to increase from 15 to 21.6 per cent by the year’s end.

Though Tunisia’s winter months are often witness to predominantly peaceful demonstrations, the combination of deteriorating social, health and economic resources have made the current round of protests especially significant.

Recent weeks have seen simmering unrest over unemployment and living conditions transform into vocal protest at the phosphate mines in the southern towns of Gafsa, Kairouan and across the country’s neglected interior regions.

In the capital, the country’s professional unions are on the march, with journalists’ and lawyers’ unions calling for improvements in the conditions of their members. Dwarfing all is the uncertain future of the country’s national carrier, TunisAir, which, already struggling before the pandemic, now stands on the point of insolvency.

Tunisia has experienced three governments since inconclusive results in last year’s legislative elections provided the country with a divided and fractious assembly.

In September, the expectation had been that incoming Head of Government, Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, initially seen as a close ally of the President, would form a technocratic government. However, progress towards significant reform since parliament voted confidence in his proposed cabinet has been underwhelming.

Into this mix the Tunisian General Labour Union is now asserting itself. Boasting a membership equal to around half a million, (around five per cent of the country) and an ancestry reaching back to 1946, the union has proven itself more of a durable presence than many of the country’s sometimes fleeting political parties.

With branch offices in nearly every Tunisian town, the UGTT draws its membership from across Tunisian society. In 2013, its influence was such that it was able to initiate a similar national dialogue that steered the country through one of its most significant crises since the 2011 revolution, later earning all four bodies the Nobel Peace prize.

Under the UGTT’s proposals, a National Dialogue committee would be formed from figures outside the political sphere under the auspices of the President, establishing a model distinct from the legislature and closer to Kais Saied’s own vision for a more direct democracy.

“I trust the UGTT more because it’s closer to the people,” Hazel Ezzadine, a 59 – year-old civil servant from the southern town of Tataouine told The National, “We had had the government taking the lead before the Revolution. Now, it’s time to trust the sides that are closer to the people.

“The government may be serving foreign agendas,” he added, referring to the government’s obligations to the IMF and foreign lenders, “but the UGTT is ours.”

Nevertheless, for observers such as Dr Elie Abouaoun, the Tunis-based director of the United States Institute for Peace’s MENA programme, these latest proposals are principally driven by the need to underscore the union’s legitimacy and recover some of its grass roots connections.

Recent protests in Tunisia’s south, he said, indicated that “the UGTT does not enjoy the same influence in all the places at all times. So in some way, they need to maintain their posture as the main social actor.”

While uncertain how the President would respond, Dr Abouaoun was clear of the value such a proposal would bring. “Irrespective of the model and the actors, I see the value of a genuine inclusive dialogue that will address all the outstanding economic and social issues,” he said.

For the dialogue to succeed, it must reach beyond the capital Tunis and include figures from across the country, “Local community figures need to be engaged, develop understanding of the real issues and be part of the solution rather than just being recipients of help and advice,” he said.

However, facing this are the expectations of most of the populace which, he cautioned, may be at odds with the resources of an economically straightened government heavily reliant upon international support. “Therefore, what is crucial now for the executive power in Tunisia is to think how to set the expectations at the right level and to stay away from the prevailing tendency to just provide promises as a response to social grievances.

“The Tunisians deserve being told the truth about what is possible and what is not. The reforms needed to kick-off Tunisia’s economy are painful and require including a solid and reliable social safety net,” he said, stressing the need for all involved to be clear in communicating the challenges Tunisia faces within a changing post-Covid environment, within North Africa and globally.

Nevertheless, he said, “The UGTT stands out as the most active and influential labour union in the MENA region. The absence of such active unions in other countries led to disastrous drifts that consolidated monopoly and unilateralism.”

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Liban : la France veut réformer l’État mais quid du système ?

Emmanuel Macron s’est rendu au chevet du Liban, le jour de la célébration de son centenaire. Il a presque imposé à la classe politique un plan de sauvetage du pays. Mais son ambition de réformer le système politique libanais sera plus difficile à concrétiser

This piece was originally published on the middleeasteye website https://www.middleeasteye.net/

« En 1920, la France était à l’origine de la création du Grand Liban. Un siècle plus tard, elle est là pour l’empêcher de disparaître. Qui a dit que l’histoire ne se répétait pas ? » Il y a quelques jours encore, Amine Saadé, menuisier de profession, ne rêvait que d’obtenir un visa pour quitter le Liban. Aujourd’hui, après la visite du président français, l’avenir lui semble moins sombre.

Emmanuel Macron a réussi à insuffler un peu d’espoir chez une partie des Libanais. Pour la deuxième fois en moins d’un mois, le chef de l’État français a effectué une visite de 24 heures au Liban, riche en symbole et en messages politiques.

Il a débarqué dans un pays à la dérive, le 1er septembre, jour de la célébration du centenaire du Grand Liban, porteur d’un plan de sauvetage qu’il a presque imposé à la classe politique, accusée par une partie de la population d’être responsable des crises en série qui frappent le pays depuis l’automne dernier : désastre économique et financier, blocages politiques et crise sanitaire avec la propagation du coronavirus, le tout couronné par la double explosion cataclysmique du 4 août, qui a fait 190 morts, 6 500 blessés et détruit le port de Beyrouth et une partie de la ville.

Lors de sa première visite, le 6 août, le président français avait presque sommé les dirigeants politiques d’agir au plus vite pour freiner l’effondrement du pays et d’entamer un processus de redressement. Ses conseils fermes, prodigués publiquement, et les fortes pressions, exercées plus discrètement, ont donné des résultats, semble-t-il.

Après avoir perdu du temps dans de stériles conciliabules, les principales forces politiques se sont en effet entendues sur le nom d’un nouveau Premier ministre pour succéder à Hassan Diab, démissionnaire depuis le 10 août sous la pression de la rue, de l’opposition et après avoir été lâché par ses alliés.

Les bonnes relations de Moustapha Adib avec la France

Moustapha Adib a été nommé le 31 août, à la veille de l’arrivée de Macron, lors de consultations parlementaires convoquées par le président Michel Aoun. Cet homme de 49 ans, inconnu du grand public, a été convoqué en urgence de Berlin, où il occupait depuis 2013 le poste d’ambassadeur du Liban en Allemagne.

Avant sa carrière de diplomate, il était professeur de sciences politiques à l’Université libanaise (publique) et conférencier à l’Académie militaire de l’armée. Entre 2011 et 2013, il a occupé le poste de directeur du cabinet du Premier ministre de l’époque, le milliardaire Najib Mikati, originaire comme lui de Tripoli.

« Les Français connaissent bien [le nouveau Premier ministre Moustapha Adib] et le considèrent comme un ‘’membre de la famille’’. Son beau-père est proche de l’Élysée et tous les étés, il passe ses vacances en France avec son épouse et ses cinq enfants »

– Salim al-Asmar, journaliste

Moustapha Adib a été choisi par le « rassemblement des anciens Premiers ministres » (regroupant Saad Hariri, Fouad Siniora, Najib Mikati et Tammam Salam) et son nom a été accepté par le président de la République Michel Aoun et les partis chiites (Hezbollah et Amal). La nature consensuelle du choix correspond à cet homme grand et élégant, qualifié de « personnalité modérée » et « ouverte au dialogue » par un de ses proches à Beyrouth.

Mais ce ne sont pas les seuls atouts dont il disposerait. Le Premier ministre détient le passeport tricolore de par son épouse française et entretient de bons rapports avec Paris.

« Les Français le connaissent bien et le considèrent comme un ‘’membre de la famille’’ », écrit Salim al-Asmar dans le site 180post. « Son beau-père est proche de l’Élysée et tous les étés, il passe ses vacances en France avec son épouse et ses cinq enfants. »

Emmanuel Macron a dit, à Beyrouth, ne pas connaître le nouveau Premier ministre mais une source politique libanaise croit savoir qu’« il a été proposé par Bernard Emié, le chef de la Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure (DGSE) [française] ».

Les deux visites du président français et le choix de Moustapha Adib illustrent un fort engagement de la France au pays du Cèdre.

« Il est clair que le Liban ne peut pas se relever seul à cause d’une variété de facteurs : manque de maturité politique, manque de ressources, blocages politiques, intérêts régionaux », explique à Middle East Eye Elie Abouaoun, directeur du Moyen-Orient et de l’Afrique du Nord à l’Institut des États-Unis pour la paix. 

« C’est justement à ce niveau que le président Macron a essayé de briser l’étau. »

Macron menace les dirigeants libanais de sanctions

Lors de ses rencontres avec les principaux dirigeants et les chefs des grands partis mardi, Emmanuel Macron leur a arraché l’engagement de faciliter la formation du prochain gouvernement « dans un délai de quinze jours ». Ce processus traînait depuis des mois en raison des appétits insatiables et des intérêts divergents des partis politiques.

D’ici à trois mois, le « gouvernement de mission », comme l’a appelé le président français, devra mettre en œuvre « la réforme des marchés publics, de la justice, de la lutte contre la corruption, la réforme de l’énergie et de l’électricité, la réforme du port, une meilleure gestion de la Banque centrale et du système bancaire ».

Il a par ailleurs proposé d’organiser à Paris une conférence d’aide au Liban dans la première quinzaine d’octobre, estimant que les trois mois à venir seraient « cruciaux » pour qu’un véritable changement s’opère au Liban.

Si les dirigeants libanais ne respectaient pas leurs engagements, Emmanuel Macron s’est montré presque menaçant, se disant prêt à changer d’approche et à soutenir des mesures punitives allant d’un gel du plan international d’assistance financière au Liban à des sanctions contre la classe dirigeante.

Des positions conciliantes à l’égard du Hezbollah

Les efforts engagés par la France pour éviter l’effondrement du Liban vont à contre-courant de la politique déployée par les États-Unis depuis 2017. Celle-ci consiste à étouffer le pays en empêchant l’aide internationale et en imposant des sanctions contre le Hezbollah, lesquelles ont contribué à faire fuir les capitaux et mis à genoux le secteur bancaire. 

« La France dispose d’un nombre d’atouts comme la relation séculaire avec les groupes constituants du Liban, un feu vert conditionnel américain, une panoplie de relations au niveau régional, une influence sur certains organismes européens et onusiens », énumère Elie Abouaoun.

« Cependant, l’action française doit surmonter un certain nombre d’obstacles. Contrairement à ce qui peut être perçu, l’influence de la France sur les acteurs régionaux actifs au Liban n’est pas assez forte pour les amener à composer avec les impératifs d’une solution aux problèmes du Liban », nuance-t-il.

« La France a compris que si elle veut jouer un rôle au Liban, l’interlocuteur politique le plus fort, c’est le Hezbollah »

– Walid Charara, éditorialiste et auteur

Toutefois, la France semble avoir surmonté ces obstacles, du moins à ce stade. Lors d’une conférence de presse clôturant sa visite mardi soir, Emmanuel Macron a parlé aux cinq membres du Groupe international de soutien au Liban, qui comprend notamment les États-Unis, et aux acteurs régionaux, citant le président iranien Hassan Rohani et le prince héritier saoudien Mohammed ben Salmane.

« La politique américaine prônée par l’aile dure de l’administration américaine visait à couler le pays pour couler le Hezbollah, en étendant au Liban la politique de pression maximale en vigueur contre la Syrie », déclare à MEE Walid Charara, éditorialiste au quotidien Al-Akhbar et co-auteur du Hezbollah, un mouvement islamo-nationaliste.

« Après la double explosion au port, Emmanuel Macron s’est saisi de l’opportunité pour dire à Donald Trump que cette politique allait étouffer le Liban sans tuer le Hezbollah car il est le seul parti à avoir une résilience forte. Les Américains ont donné un feu vert aux Français pour tenter une nouvelle approche. »

Les positions conciliantes affichées par le président français à l’égard du Hezbollah confirment cette analyse. « Le Hezbollah est un parti libanais qui possède des députés élus par le peuple. Il a une clientèle », a-t-il fait remarquer.

Mohammad Raad, le chef du bloc parlementaire du parti chiite, ennemi juré d’Israël et des États-Unis, était invité mardi à une rencontre avec le président français, au même titre que les dirigeants de huit autres grands partis politiques. Déjà, lors de son premier voyage le 6 août, Emmanuel Macron avait eu un tête-à-tête avec ce député à la résidence de l’ambassadeur de France.

Cette approche pragmatique serait due au fait que « la France a compris que si elle veut jouer un rôle au Liban, l’interlocuteur politique le plus fort, c’est le Hezbollah », ajoute Walid Charara.

« Si Paris veut lui imposer des concessions s’agissant des armes [le Hezbollah est le seul à les avoir conservées après la guerre civile] ou d’Israël, c’est perdu d’avance ; ce que les Israéliens et les États-Unis n’ont pas obtenu par la force et les pressions, ils ne l’obtiendront pas avec la diplomatie française », relativise-t-il.

Cette posture dépourvue d’hostilité de Macron à l’égard du Hezbollah a fait des mécontents parmi ceux qui avaient durci leur discours contre le parti chiite au lendemain de l’explosion du 4 août, espérant instrumentaliser cette catastrophe pour affaiblir le « Parti de Dieu ».

Le député démissionnaire des Kataëb (droite chrétienne) Nadim Gemayel s’est notamment adressé au président français sur Twitter, lui demandant en « toute franchise » s’il considérait « les armes de ce parti comme légales et légitimes ».

Un démantèlement du système confessionnel en vue ?

Le chef de l’État français a annoncé un troisième voyage au Liban, en décembre, pour s’assurer que les réformes ont bien été mises sur les rails. Passé ce cap, il envisage de s’attaquer à des questions plus délicates, comme les armes du Hezbollah, voire un « nouveau pacte politique », comme il l’avait dit lors de sa première visite.

Sur ce plan, le président libanais Michel Aoun avait exprimé son souhait, dimanche 30 août, de transformer le Liban en « État civil », ce qui implique le démantèlement du système du « confessionnalisme politique », basé sur un partage entre chrétiens et musulmans des postes politiques et administratifs.

Le secrétaire général du Hezbollah avait appelé de ses vœux, quelques heures plus tôt, à un « nouveau contrat politique ». Le président du Parlement Nabih Berry, principale personnalité chiite de l’État, lui avait emboîté le pas le lendemain.

« Le chef du Hezbollah avait déjà défendu l’idée d’une constituante, une sorte d’assise nationale pour discuter du renouveau du système politique avec la participation de l’ensemble des composantes libanaises », rappelle d’ailleurs Walid Charara.

Elie Abouaoun souligne pour sa part la difficulté d’un changement de système. « Encourager la reconstitution des pouvoirs législatif et exécutif sur des bases saines et équitables signifie une confrontation avec la plupart des forces politiques », fait-il observer.

Selon lui, « la France pourra trouver une formule qui engendrera un changement de la pratique politique au Liban ainsi que du niveau de transparence dans la gestion de la chose publique sans toutefois saper les fondements de la stabilité ».

À défaut d’encourager l’émergence d’un nouveau système politique, la France œuvrerait, à court terme, à replâtrer l’ancien, en améliorant les standards de gouvernance, qui sont tombés très bas ces dernières années.

« Il faut espérer que les efforts de Macron ne seront pas court-circuités par David Schencker », le secrétaire d’État adjoint américain, attendu cette semaine à Beyrouth, fait remarquer à MEE une source politique.

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Lebanon’s confessional system keeps change just out of reach

This piece was originally published on the electoral-reform website https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/

Josh Dell is a writer based in London, who has led on democracy projects for organisations including Bite The Ballot and The Politics Project. His work has been published in CityMetric, Left Foot Forward, and The Sunday Times. 

The views, opinions and positions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Electoral Reform Society.

Following the tragic Beirut Port disaster on 4 August 2020, there was a call for elections from caretaker Prime Minister Hassan Diab. While in many countries such a call would be seen as heralding change, in Lebanon early elections (the next was not due until 2022) are seen by some as a “trap”, laid a by a long-entrenched political elite that does not want to lose power.

Lebanon (estimated population 5.5m in 2020) has a political and electoral system in which political representation is directly equated with religious representation. In the only country in the world that guarantees representation for six different branches of Christianity (as well as all major and some minor branches of Islam), the question of how elections should be fairly run is an ever-present. In fact, the inability to agree on a new election law delayed elections in the country by five years between 2013-18.

Below we will explore the Lebanese electoral system, how it functions within the nation’s complex demographics, and the question of whether it can bring change to a country whose current politicians are widely derided and only recently described as its “greatest tragedy”

Lebanon’s confessional system: a brief overview

Elections in Lebanon happen in a higgedly-piggedly way. Its most recent general election in May 2018 was scheduled for 2013 but delayed three times by Parliament, meaning that Lebanon’s citizens had been unable to elect new representatives for nearly 10 years.

Lebanon’s political system is based around confessionalism, wherein its various religious groups are guaranteed representation relative to their presence across the country’s electoral districts, with Parliament’s 128 seats split equally between Christians and Muslims and the branches within each of the religions. This differs significantly to other democracies in which seats are specifically reserved for minorities to ensure representation is the face of the majority ethnic group, such as the Iranian Consultative Assembly’s reserved Jewish seat or New Zealand’s Maori electorates. 

In the most recent general election of 2018, the allocation of seats looked like this:

Religious branchNumber of seats in Chamber of Deputies
Sunni27
Shia27
Druze8
Alawite2
Muslim Total:64
Maronite34
Greek Orthodox14
Greek Catholic8
Armenian Orthodox5
Armenian Catholic1
Evangelical1
Minorities1
Christian Total:64
Grand Total:128

This system has been in place since before Lebanon’s independence and is unlikely to change any time soon despite the demands of protestors and civil society activists. It is one whose rules are as arcane as to require citizens to vote not where they live but in their family’s ancestral home, and where there is no pathway to citizenship whatsoever for longterm residents of the country, meaning that in the case of Lebanon’s 500,000 plus Palestinian refugees there is no way to have a say in the nation’s politics.

Intense sectarian divides in Lebanon continue to exist in a nation in which some religious groups do not want to hear about demographic changes that would alter their political position – hence Lebanon has not conducted a nationwide census since 1932.

This occurs alongside the allocation of various leadership roles to religious groups – the president must be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, the speaker a Shia Muslim. Reflecting on Lebanon’s capacity to retain the politicians of old (many of those helming its political parties, such as President Michel Aoun, were leaders during the Civil War), Lebanese lawyer and elections expert Rabih El Chaer described how “Each time before an election they [the political class] are able to split the population… based on confession. They don’t allow them to think widely and out of the box about the real questions”.

Lebanon’s electoral system 

Up until the 2018 general election, Lebanon utilized the same First Past The Post electoral system as the UK. This meant that for those seeking to go beyond sectarian politics the challenges were manifold, as evidenced in the last elections to use FPTP in 2016, the Beirut municipal elections. 

Despite securing 40% of the vote, a movement called Beirut Madinati (Beirut Is My City) sought to take on a coalition of old-guard politicians led by former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, yet was unable to win any seats in the city’s council.

Lebanon’s new electoral law, finally agreed in October 2017, was seen as a major milestone in allowing independents, new parties, and non-sectarian groups to secure representation. 

In it, the country is divided up into 15 electoral districts, some which have several sub-districts within them. Voters are given two votes, one for a party list and one for a candidate within the list.

And yet the requirement within each district for confessional quotas to be met resulted in frustrating divides for those seeking a post-confessional world. El Chaer described a situation in one district wherein one candidate received thousands of votes and was still unable to win, whilst another with only 70 votes was elected due to the requirement that their sect receive representation.

Conversely, Paula Yacoubian MP – one of the few civil society independent candidates elected in 2018 – benefitted in the district of Beirut I both from the electorate’s desire for political change, and the additional benefit of receiving significant support from the Armenian Orthodox confession. Due to Yacoubian’s religious background, she was thus assisted by a significant block of voters to draw on.

What are the alternatives?

Lebanon’s constitution, first adopted in 1926, clearly states that the confessional system’s elimination is a “basic national goal”. Furthermore, one of the key commitments made at Taif in 1989 was to create a Lebanese Senate that would maintain the confessional system, while elections to the Chamber of Deputies would be conducted in an entirely non-sectarian manner.

It is 2020, and these types of changes seem far away. Indeed, commenting on the impact of the adoption of proportional representation in 2018, Dr, Elie Abouaoun, Director of Middle East and North Africa Programmes at the United States Institute of Peace, said (speaking in a personal capacity) that the alterations were “a big disappointment as it actually allowed the same political tycoons to consolidate their power in the legislative – and later in the executive powers.”

In a move that has further dented hopes, the replacement for the recently resigned Prime Minister was based in large part around their being hand-picked by four former Lebanese PMs – a role that Parliament is meant to lead on and be at the heart of.

Lebanon faces a huge range of political, economic, health and societal issues that go far beyond its political set-up and voting system. Yet in a country that has been shaken to its core by August’s port explosion, the need for change is greater than ever. 

Dr Abouaoun argued that this change must be one that takes time and be “a gradual change that considers Lebanon’s sensitive reality…[its] diversity and historic fears of marginalization”. Change to the voting system in 2018 was one of these changes. More will have to follow to fulfil the promise of its constitution and bring an end to the confessional system.

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Iraq and U.S.-Iran Tensions

Dr. Elie Abouaoun on Iraq and U.S.-Iran Tensions

Following the attempted siege of the American Embassy in Iraq, USIP’s Elie Abouaoun says the U.S. must

On Peace is a weekly podcast sponsored by USIP and Sirius XM POTUS Ch. 124. Each week, USIP experts tackle the latest foreign policy issues from around the world.

Transcript

Tim Farley: We’ve been watching closely the situation as it has been developing in Baghdad. We know now that the assault on the compound there has stopped, for now at the very least, but Arwa Damon is located in Baghdad and says that as the militia men withdrew from the U.S. Embassy compound, security analysts were interested in how so many protestors were able to march so easily through so many checkpoints to get to the perimeter of the compound.

Arwa Damon: Among the top leaders that we saw in the first images that came out when this was first unfolding were some key figures, notably one key figure who was once detained by the Americans back during the years of the U.S.-led occupation here. He was directly responsible for a number of attacks against U.S. forces.

Tim Farley: Let’s get some more understanding of this issue, a deeper understanding with Dr. Elie Abouaoun, who is the United States Institute of Peace, Middle East [and] North Africa director, joining us from the Middle East [and] North Africa Tunisia hub of USIP, tweeting [@elie022.] Dr. Abouaoun, thank you for joining us on POTUS today.

Dr. Elie Abouaoun: Thank you and good morning. Happy new year.

Tim Farley: Happy new year to you, sir. Help us understand better what happened at the embassy and why the attack took place.

Dr. Elie Abouaoun: Actually, what happened was a reaction against the strike that hit a military base of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which is their para-governmental military force that is basically composed of several groups, many of them loyal to the Iran. And the U.S. strike itself came as a reaction, actually, after an attack against the U.S. military force near Kirkuk in northern Iraq, the result of which was one casualty, a civilian Department of Defense contractor.

So it was a chain of events starting with the strike against the U.S. base in Kirkuk leading to another strike by the U.S. Air Force against the PMF base, and then the demonstration or the attack against the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

Tim Farley: So now we understand more about exactly what happened. Did the U.S. make the right decision to respond to that original attack?

Dr. Elie Abouaoun: Well, the U.S. comes basically, as I said, as a response to the attack. And basically, this response is in line with the red lines that were announced initially by the U.S. government by saying that any casualty within the U.S. contractors or military will be responded to. So this is in line with the red lines that were set by the U.S. government initially. And I don’t see how the U.S. would have ignored this given that, as I said, there was at least one casualty among the contractors, and if I’m not mistaken, four people were injured as well. Four U.S. military were injured.

Tim Farley: One other factor in this, Dr. Elie Abouaoun, is the United States engagement with Iraq and Iran, or as some have characterized, the disengagement with Iraq. Speak to that as part of the growing tensions between the U.S. and Iraq right now.

Dr. Elie Abouaoun: Yeah. Well, I mean, this engagement of the United States does not apply only to Iraq. It applies to the entire region. We’ve seen this in Libya, we’re seeing this in Syria and Lebanon, other places including Iraq, of course. So it’s not specific to Iraq, it’s an overall foreign policy that the U.S. has basically chose to take. However, what’s happening in Iraq right now is that I think the U.S. government doesn’t have the choice but to increase its investment, especially the nonmilitary investment, so that the expansion of the Iranian influence is basically contained in a way or another.

I know that this is not ideal for the Iraqis, but at the same time, leaving the space will only embolden the Iranians and will lead to more expansion possibly beyond Iraq itself. And as I always say, is that Iraq is a workable case. So there is a likeliness of success in Iraq to contain the Iranian influence if the right investment is done.

Tim Farley: Dr. Elie Abouaoun is with us, the United States Institute [of Peace’s] Middle East [and] North Africa director. He’s joining us from Tunisia.

You mentioned the nonmilitary investment. People will ask the question, “Why does the U.S. still have somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 troops still in Iraq?

Dr. Elie Abouaoun: There are two missions for the force as far as I know. One of them is to support the fight against ISIS, which is still an unfinished task as everyone knows, and we’ve seen recently a surge in the activity of some dormant cells around Nineveh, Kirkuk and other places in Northern Iraq. So this is one more indicator that there is a need for a sustained effort in fighting ISIS in both Iraq and Syria, and U.S. is an instrumental part of this fight.

And the second mission or the second fold of the mission is basically the training and the capacity building of the Iraqi armed forces that the U.S. army has committed to do. So this requires obviously the physical presence of some trainers, advisors and other military officers.

Tim Farley: One last question, Dr. Abouaoun, this has to do with protests that were already taking place, unrelated protests in Iraq against the government there. Is it your sense that the government still has a handle on things? In other words, that there is still a strong chance of survival of the institutions or is that in jeopardy?

Dr. Elie Abouaoun: Well, the present government is a caretaker government, and even before the prime minister resigned, I think they lost control of the street. The two main actors at that time were the protestors, which was a constellation of different groups with a wide range of demands and ideological backgrounds, and the second key actor was the, I would say the loyalist, but they were not loyalist to the prime minister. They were mostly loyalist to Iran, so the PMF or the Popular Mobilization Forces and their affiliated groups, what could happen… I mean, sorry, the question was about the survival of the institutions.

I think institutions will survive as institutions, but the question is who will be leading these institutions and what will be their actions, basically. So this is the key question. It’s not about whether the institution will survive or not as much as it is who’s going to influence or lead these institutions. And I don’t think there is a known answer for this question at this stage. It all depends, as I said, on how much there will be a nonmilitary investment in Iraq to counter the Iranian expansion, because clearly one of the two parties is affiliated with Iran, and I don’t think that, as I said before, leaving the space is a good option at this stage.

Tim Farley: Last question: Is Iraq in a better place, and the U.S. with reference to Iraq, are we in a better place than we were 10 years ago when the decade opened?

Dr. Elie Abouaoun: Compared to 10 years ago? I don’t think Iraq is in a better place, but up until two or three months ago, Iraq was basically taking the road to become a better place. The victory against ISIS in 2017, then the elections in 2018 and other political developments were positive, including economic development, were indications that Iraq was recovering slowly but steadily. The recent events in the last two to three months basically are a setback, and this is why I’m constantly calling for a concerted international effort, including the U.S., to support the Iraqis in basically taking back the recovery path.

Tim Farley: Dr. Abouaoun, I certainly appreciate you joining us here on POTUS today. Thank you very much. Happy New Year.

Dr. Elie Abouaoun: Thank you very much. Same to you. Bye.

Tim Farley: Dr. Elie Abouaoun, who is the United States Institute of Peace’s Middle East [and] North Africa director, joining us from their Middle East [and] North Africa Tunisia hub this morning to comment on the latest developments in Baghdad, the storming of the embassy, which is over, but the problem remains. The Twitter handle, by the way, is @elie022.

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Hezbollah’s support for Iran exposes its vulnerabilities at home and abroad

This piece was originally published on the thearabweekly website https://thearabweekly.com/

TUNIS – With violence escalating on the streets of Lebanon, Hezbollah’s commitment to supporting any potential Iranian response to the assassination of Iranian Major-General Qassem Soleimani risks exposing the group’s vulnerabilities at home and abroad.

All through its existence, Iran’s Lebanese ally has maintained a dual identity: that of a powerful armed Shia group at home and an active agent of Iranian foreign policy and member of the so-called axis of resistance abroad.

This apparently schizophrenic approach to its identity has not been without risks. However, as Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah voices support for Iran’s targeting of US military sites, he risks stoking resistance to his group’s political power at home and alienating potential international help for the failing Lebanese state.

Addressing supporters in Beirut on January 12, Nasrallah described Iran’s limited strike against two US bases in Iraq as a “slap” and as a “first step down a long path” that would eventually see US troops withdraw from the region.

However, as Nasrallah threatened bloody revenge abroad, Hezbollah’s position was under increasing challenge at home. Across Lebanon, protesters vented their anger at the Lebanese political class, in which Hezbollah and its allies in the Amal Movement play pivotal roles.

Nasrallah maintained that “the Americans must remove their bases, soldiers and officers and ships from our region. The alternative… to leaving vertically is leaving horizontally. This is a decisive and firm decision.”

He used part of his 90-minute address to highlight the message that Iran’s retaliation against US bases intends for Israel, a country with which Lebanon remains in a state of war.

“The attack on the American bases is also a strong message to the Zionist entity, that is always planning to ‘play’ with Iran. [Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin] Netanyahu always dreams of sending his air force to attack the infrastructure or nuclear facilities in Iran,” Nasrallah said.

Elie Abouaoun, director of the MENA programme at the US Institute of Peace, said Nasrallah reiterated that the US military in the region is the target but vowed to end the US military presence in “days or weeks.”

While Abouaoun said he doubted that was achievable, he added: “Even if the US decides to withdraw, it will take more than “days/weeks” to do it.

“So the speech has to be looked at from the two-pronged angle: clear rules of engagement that preserve the Iranian regime and its allies from an all-out war that will be detrimental to Iran while maintaining the thrust of their own constituency, especially at a time when Iranians, thousands of Iraqi Shias — and part of Hezbollah base — are protesting in the streets in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon,” he said.

Along with the unrest in the region’s Shia community are more prosaic domestic concerns. Lebanon is one of the world’s most indebted countries, one ill-prepared to weather the push back it might face should one of its most prominent political and military groups escalate its regional adventurism in support of Tehran.

After years of financial decline, Lebanon is regarded as teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, with a public debt burden equivalent to 150% and a budget deficit equal to 11% of GDP. The cost of servicing its debt is reportedly almost $4 billion a year.

Potentially offsetting Lebanon’s dire financial circumstances is the $11 billion in international pledges made at the 2018 CEDRE conference that were conditional on internal reforms and anti-corruption measures. While even these have yet to materialise, Hezbollah’s participation in a wider campaign of retaliation against the United States and its allies in response to the killing of Soleimani is unlikely to engender much goodwill in the international community.

Further exacerbating Hezbollah’s domestic challenges are protests that have dominated public life across Lebanon since October. These took an ominous turn with attacks on banks in the Beirut commercial hub of Hamra, highlighting public anger at Lebanon’s political and financial elite.

Anti-government protesters said Lebanon’s commercial banks have retained the public’s deposits while allowing politicians, senior civil servants and bank owners to move money abroad despite restrictions on such transfers.

Domestic concerns have yet to act as much of a brake on Hezbollah’s international ambitions. There is no doubt that Hezbollah will be part of the anti-US campaign in the region, Abouaoun said.

However, how close that may be to home remained uncertain.

“The space to carry out military actions in Lebanon will be limited given the fact that the US military presence in Lebanon is very light and almost invisible,” he said.

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Tunisia prepares for vote of confidence in government tasked with halting decline

Prime Minister-designate Hichem Mechichi is the third person to hold the post since elections last year

This piece was originally published on the thenational website https://thenational.ae/

Saad Boughdiri, a 68-year-old retiree, sits on the wall outside Parc Habib Thameur near central Tunis. For fourteen years, he says, he worked as a plumber and handyman at the Presidential Palace under Tunisia’s former autocrat, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Now, from underneath his broad straw hat, he watches people hurry past. Less than half are wearing the now mandatory face masks. Nearby, within the crowded Medina district, they’re ubiquitous.

“In the past the markets used to be filled with products from abroad, now there’s nothing,” he says.

Tunisia’s economic slide is unlikely to come as news to anyone. On Tuesday, the parliament is scheduled to vote confidence in the latest government to be tasked with halting that decline, a body of experts proposed by Prime Minister Designate, 46-year-old Hichem Mechichi.

From his perch outside the park, Mr Boughdiri isn’t aware of the vote.

Mr Mechichi is the third post holder since the country’s legislative elections last year. The first, Habib Jemli, nominated by the self-styled Muslim Democrats, Ennahda who won a plurality in October’s vote, was unable to secure the backing of the country’s fractious and splintered parliament. The second, Elyes Fakhfakh, nominated by President Kais Saied, resigned in July following corruption allegations. Now, despite the President’s reportedly uncertain support, Mr Mechichi proposes a technocratic government of experts to tackle Tunisia’s ingrained challenges.

Tunisia has made remarkable political gains since the revolution, the free speech once stifled by the apparatchiks of the Ben Ali regime is now commonplace. The pluralist democracy, which many fought for, is now entrenched within the bedrock of the country’s culture. However, as successive governments come and go, the unemployment figures, and the economy that fosters them, remains woeful.

Joblessness, which sat at a little over 13 per cent before the country’s landmark 2011 revolution, reached as high as 18 per cent in June of this year, with the young especially badly affected. The national currency, the dinar, which sat at 1.17 to the dollar before the revolution, now languishes at 2.73, less than half its former value. All the while, against a background of social unrest over joblessness, the trickle of illegal migrants that left the country following the initial deluge has again exploded.

“Mechichi’s an administrator, he’s just carrying out orders,” 40 year old teacher, Jamil Ali, explains on Rue de Paris in central Tunis, “I support the technocratic government, though it’s dangerous for democracy,” he tells a translator. “Many of the politicians since the revolution have served themselves rather than the country, but there are some who put the country first.”

Much of what Mr Ali says in the street finds an echo within parliament. Ennahda, the largest party with 54 seats within the 217-seat legislature, initially condemned the technocratic government, citing its undemocratic nature, though its governing Shura Council later voted to support its passage early on Tuesday morning. Among others, the Democratic Current, which controls 38 seats has already voiced its opposition to the proposed government, making the 109 votes the government needs to pass a distant prospect.

The alternative is early elections and with the Free Destourian Part (PDL), a group founded by former members of the Ben Ali regime, registering a fourteen-point lead over their Muslim democrat rivals in an August poll, it’s unclear if that’s a choice Ennahda are ready to make.

“There is no doubt that early elections will further delay the (formation) of a credible economic recovery plan,” Dr Elie Abouaoun, the Tuni-based Director of the MENA programme for the United States Institute for Peace wrote in an email.

Furthermore, delays in establishing that plan would inevitably lead to still further delays in negotiating the sorely needed international assistance package Tunisia relies upon.

“So, the cost in this case will be quite heavy on an ailing economy that was further affected by Covid-19,” Dr Abouaoun continued. Adding that, not only would fresh elections bring delays in themselves, “but also the fact that it is very likely that any new legislature will come as quite fragmented which will make forming a government and legislating an arduous exercise,” he wrote.

However, for Dr Abouaoun, a purely technocratic government’s chances of success looked equally dim, he said, citing the difficulty of forcing legislation through a potentially hostile parliament,

“The problems Tunisia suffers from are essentially political, and their solution requires adjusting the expectations of the population to what can be achieved in the span of a few years, given Tunisia’s limited resources and the global recession,” Dr Abouaoun wrote.

“One can argue that some ministers need to be picked from a pool of technocrats or experts. But beyond specific subject matter expertise, any government needs to have political clout without which Tunisia’s decline will not be slowed down,” he told The National.

It’s a difficult dilemma. However, for a country that has overcome so much, not an impossible one.

On Rue de Paris, Mr Ali remains sanguine. “There’s hope,“ he laughs, “ we can’t live without hope.”

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After the Soleimani Strike, What’s Next for Iraq and the Region?

Escalating U.S.-Iran tensions will reverberate throughout the Middle East—especially in Iraq.

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.usip.org/

With tensions between Iran and the U.S. already simmering, the January 3 U.S. airstrike that killed powerful Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani is sure to have ripple effects across the region. Maj. Gen. Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s Quds Force, coordinated Iran’s military operations and proxies across the Middle East.

A series of developments in recent weeks led to the U.S. decision to kill Soleimani. On December 27, Kataib Hezbollah, which is part of the Iranian-supported Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), carried out an attack in Kirkuk that killed a U.S. contractor. The U.S. responded with airstrikes on Kataib Hezbollah bases in Iraq and Syria, killing over 20. Days later, the PMF organized a siege on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. Two days after the siege ended on January 1, a U.S. drone strike at the Baghdad airport killed Soleimani and a leader of the PMF.

What does this mean for Iraq and the region? And what comes next? USIP’s Sarhang Hamasaeed and Dr. Elie Abouaoun explain.

Why is Soleimani’s death so consequential? What impact could it have in the region?

Hamasaeed: The killing of Qassem Soleimani and Abu-Mahdi al-Muhandis, the leader of Kataib Hezbollah and deputy chief of the PMF, is a game-changing development for the trajectory of U.S.-Iran tensions. Killing senior officials is fundamentally different than what the U.S. policy has been toward Iran by applying pressure through economic sanctions and targeting Iranian interests. The change was triggered after killing and injuring U.S. personnel, a stated U.S. redline. These events could unleash further retaliatory attacks in Iraq, the Middle East, and beyond, causing hard-to-stop chain reactions.

This is a major setback for Iran—but, given how the Iranians have invested in personnel and structures that provide continuity, they will likely recover. Iran’s supreme leader has already appointed a replacement to lead the Quds Force, and Hadi al-Ameri, another senior PMF commander, has been selected to replace Muhandis.

Soleimani played an instrumental role in advancing Iran’s interest in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. In Syria, Soleimani spearheaded Iran’s efforts to save the Assad regime, including mobilizing armed groups comprised of Iraqis, Afghans, Syrians, and Hezbollah.

In Iraq, Soleimani mobilized armed groups that gave Iran leverage against U.S. and coalition troops, ISIS, and Iraqis who got in Tehran’s way. His influence grew so much that he shaped the appointment of Iraqi prime ministers, played a major role in pushing Kurdish forces out of disputed Iraqi territories after the 2017 independence referendum, directed the response to Iraq’s recent protests, and much more. He rallied Iraqi Shia parties during major political decisions, and he had increasingly made inroads influencing Sunni and Kurdish politics.

During the fight against ISIS, he made appearances in different battlefields in Iraq and impressed PMF fighters with his charisma and presence. Iraqi leaders give him credit for his role in the fight against ISIS, while others owe him for their political survival. It may seem exaggerated, but in recent years he wielded so much power, some Iraqis were saying he was acting as a shadow prime minister.

Iraqis have wondered for years why the U.S. let Soleimani act freely in Iraq. But, they also have worried that any sort of action against Soleimani or Iran more broadly could result in an open confrontation between Washington and Tehran on Iraqi soil.

Abouaoun: This is going to have serious security and political implications for the region, strongly influence the government formation discussions in Lebanon and Iraq, and will shift attention from the popular protests in those countries. However, the scale of the impact will be determined by the nature of Iran’s response and the outcome of the intense diplomatic activity carried out by various international and regional powers.

In Syria, an Iran weakened by open conflict with the U.S. will not significantly affect the posture of the Russian-backed Assad regime. The Gulf Cooperation Council countries are mostly calling for restraint, worried about the safety of maritime traffic and their own vulnerability, as some of them are hosting U.S. bases.

Given Saudi Arabia’s exposure in Yemen, the Saudis have one more reason to be worried about an all-out war. When it comes to Hezbollah, the deterrence equation that has existed since 2006 still prevails. Neither Israel nor Hezbollah seem interested in a devastating military confrontation at this stage, despite the inflammatory rhetoric in recent days from Nasrallah and the Israelis.

What does this mean for Iraq?

Hamasaeed: From the perspectives of Iraqis, the country’s political class, and some outside observers, the U.S. taking a stand against Soleimani and the PMF is a change, but they wonder if it’s a one-off action or a fundamental change in strategy. The closing of the U.S. consulate in Basra in 2018 and the ordered departure of embassy personnel in 2019 were seen in Iraq as the U.S. retreating in the face of Iranian pressure. On the flip side, Iran and the PMF doubled down in the Ninewa Plains and other domains in the face of U.S. pressure, defying decrees from Iraq’s prime minister for the PMF to withdraw.

Recent U.S. actions show that Washington is taking a stand against Iran—something many Iraqis always expected and wanted to see. But, it is unclear at this stage how the U.S.-Iran conflict will evolve. What is clear is that the U.S.-Iran conflict has deepened and threatens to lead to further retaliation. It remains to been seen how much of a change in U.S. strategy the targeting of Soleimani and Muhandis represents.

Amid the most significant political upheaval in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the strike will take attention away from the demands of the Iraqi protesters. It will certainly further complicate the government formation process to replace the caretaker government of Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi. Iran is more likely to exert significant influence in selecting the next Iraqi prime minister.

Iraqi parliamentarians voted on Sunday to expel U.S. troops from the country—but this resolution is nonbinding and it remains to be seen if it will be implemented. Although, it’s important to note that the Sunnis and Kurds did not participate in the vote on the resolution requesting the departure of U.S. forces. This highlights the degree of differences on the issue of the U.S. troop presence in the country.

Iraq’s caretaker government, its next government, and the country’s political class already face serious challenges to meet protesters’ demands. A direct U.S.-Iran confrontation on Iraqi soil will only exacerbate this complicated and rapidly evolving dynamic.

And yet it remains true—just as it was before the rise in tensions—that it will take Iraqi, regional, and international efforts to prevent Iraq from sliding into further chaos and violence.

What comes next?

Abouaoun: Aside from a possible symbolic response, I don’t expect a quick retaliatory move from Iran, given how they typically plan and execute major operations. Iran has the ability to either engage directly in retaliatory action or use one of its proxies. Their usual modus operandi, however, is to do it themselves when they want to convey a strong message.

Where would such retaliation take place and in what form? There are three locations where the U.S. has a strong military and civilian presence and where the Iranians have a strong operational capacity: Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. To a lesser extent, some African countries and northeast Syria might be options as well.

I think Iran will avoid a move that would push the European Union or countries like the UK, Russia or China to take a stand against Tehran. Given the pragmatic nature of the Iranian regime, it’s highly unlikely they would stir up a confrontation with the entire international community. Unless Iran is unable to find opportunities in the aforementioned countries, I do not think they will consider targeting Americans in Europe or elsewhere.

Hamasaeed: The U.S. framed its action against Soleimani and Muhandis as “decisive defensive action.” It sent more troops to the region to prepare for the blowback from Iran and its proxies. It also increased messaging to the Iraqi leadership and people that the move was necessary and supports Iraq’s sovereignty. The U.S. and its allies have taken precautionary measures, asking citizens to leave Iraq and suspending the operations of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

There are those who think that the U.S. raising the bar will deter further actions by Iran or at least signal that Iranian attacks will not be cost-free. It is too early to assess if such an outcome will be achieved.

Many Iraqis were critical of the U.S. for not doing more to curb the influence of Iran, and are now concerned that the U.S. may, yet again, not do enough to contain a wounded Iran and the PMF. Because of the prevailing narrative that “America is martyring Shia heroes who defended the Shia against ISIS,” the pressure coming from the Shia constituency for a response is significant. This may inhibit Iraqi Shia’s growing anti-Iran sentiment, which has been fueled by Tehran’s support for armed groups and corrupt officials, and violent response to peaceful protesters.

What steps could be taken to de-escalate tensions?

Hamasaeed: De-escalation will not be easy, but it will require steps in Iraq, the Middle East, and beyond. The Iraqi government, parliament, political parties, and community leaders more than ever need to avoid being drawn into one camp against another. Iraqi state institutions need to do their part by preventing attacks against facilities where U.S. military, diplomatic, or civilian personnel are based. The diplomatic efforts of international actors such as Germany, Oman, Qatar, Switzerland, and others that have relations with both the U.S. and Iran could be instrumental in helping to prevent escalation. While emotions and the prospects of reprisal are high, both the U.S. and Iran have indicated they do not seek war, which may give diplomatic channels some space to contain retaliatory measures that would likely be taken. There is a need for cooler heads to prevail.