Lebanon_AFP

Lebanon protests undermine Hezbollah’s sectarian narrative

By: Simon Speakman Cordall

This piece was originally published on the thearabweekly website https://thearabweekly.com/

TUNIS – As predominantly young demonstrators have taken to the streets across Lebanon calling for an end to the country’s confessional system of government in which posts and ministries are divided along sectarian lines, the sense of identity that has underpinned Hezbollah and its ally Amal’s rise has come under repeated attack.

The cross-sectarian nature of the protests took many among Lebanon’s ruling elite, more accustomed to attributing blame across confessional lines than defending the system of government, by surprise. Protesters from all sects — Sunni, Druze, Shia and Christian — have rebelled against a political elite they see as having enriched itself at the country’s cost.

For Hezbollah, which has relied on an ingrained sense of Shia identity, the problems are acute. Responding to the groundswell of popular discontent, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah appeared to open the door to corruption investigations while maintaining his defence of the political status quo and particularly the group’s allies within the Shia Amal Movement.

Speaking to the Daily Beast, a Hezbollah member who fought in Syria in support of Syrian President Bashar Assad said the challenges of defending the movement and denying the demands of protesters were manifest.

“Am I a member of Hezbollah against the Israelis? Yes, I am,” the fighter, identified as Abu Hussein, said. “Am I a member of Hezbollah when it’s against the people in the streets? No!”

“The protesters’ demands are 100% legitimate and they have no other choice to get their demands met,” he told the Daily Beast, suggesting that an increasing number of fighters held similar views.

“Hezbollah built itself up into a formidable power in large part by portraying itself as a defender of the Lebanese people against Israel,” said Thomas Abi-Hanna, a security analyst with the risk consultancy Stratfor. “The group’s sole focus was defending Lebanon. Hezbollah’s activities in Syria, in which it fought to defend the Syrian government of Bashar Assad, undermined that image in the eyes of some Lebanese.”

Since its foundation, Iran has played a pivotal role in Hezbollah’s development, providing arms to the group through Syria and overseeing its deployment in that conflict. As in other countries across the region, that influence is being challenged. “Iran is watching the events with great interest. However, Lebanese protests are likely the third-most important protest movement to Iran, which also faces problems closer to home including massive protests within its own borders as well as large scale protests in neighbouring Iraq,” Abi-Hanna said. 

However, predictions that the protests might inflict long-term damage to Hezbollah’s support in Lebanon appear flawed. 
“There has been a lot of speculation recently about the level of control Hezbollah and Amal maintain over Shias given the multiple demonstrations that happened in places considered as the stronghold of these two parties,” said Elie Abouaoun, director of the MENA programme at the US Institute of Peace.

“Undeniably, a number of both parties’ supporters went on the streets and complained about the lack of services and economic opportunities. However, this uprising in the parties’ fiefs is more about the economic and social conditions than it is about the political options of these parties.”

Abouaoun said that, after decades of political exclusion, many Lebanese Shias hold that Hezbollah remains the only route to political representation and protection.

“While this might shift to become less of a priority in the context of acute economic and social hardship,” he said, “it does not disappear completely and will re-emerge when relevant. So, in a nutshell, this erosion is easily reversible unless a miracle happens, i.e. building a political system and state institutions that would dismiss their concern.”

It has been suggested that the extent to which Hezbollah would be open to corruption investigations may be limited. While accusations against Hezbollah officials have been limited, those against their allies are widespread.

“Hezbollah’s main allies in Lebanon, starting with Amal, are heavily involved in corruption. Therefore, going after (corruption) will lead to a sharp divide between Shias, which is the last thing Hezbollah would want now,” Abouaoun said.

“Fighting corruption will involve as well targeting key figures in another heavyweight ally, the Free Patriotic Movement, some of which are also involved in malpractices and abuse of power.”

Hezbollah’s position cannot be assured. “Even within its own ranks and despite a strict discipline there have been more than one case of corruption reported. There is no doubt that this is only the emerging part of the iceberg and that a serious investigation will disclose more about the involvement of key figures in Hezbollah in corruption,” Abouaoun said.

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Can the UN mediate the Iraq and Lebanon crises?

This piece was originally published on the thearabweekly website https://www.thearabweekly.com/

UN representatives recently delved into the tumultuous politics of Iraq and Lebanon, searching for a peaceful solution to the showdowns between protesters and authorities.

In Iraq, mediation is spearheaded by Jeanine Antoinette Hennis-Plasschaert, special representative of the UN secretary-general of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), based on UN Security Council resolutions.

In Lebanon, the effort is led by Jan Kubis, a former Slovak Foreign Affairs minister and UN special coordinator for Lebanon.

Elie Abouaoun, director of the MENA programme at the US Institute of Peace, noted the difference between the Iraqi and Lebanese situations.

UN agencies in Lebanon, he said, “don’t have a special mandate decided by a [UN Security Council resolution] as is the case in Iraq. This means that their ‘political’ mandate is restricted and should only be confined to coordination,” he said.

The United Nations’ plan for Iraq included ending violence, anti-corruption measures and electoral reform by the end of November. It provided for constitutional amendments and legislative initiatives on infrastructure within three months.

Considering the impatience of protesters and their distrust of the ruling elite, Hennis-Plasschaert pressed Iraqi authorities to “step up to the plate and make things happen.”

“They are elected by the people. They are accountable to them,” she said.

She discussed the plan with Iraqi legislators November 13, saying: “Now is the time to act, otherwise any momentum will be lost — lost at a time when many, many Iraqis demand concrete results.”

“Something that very few people know is that actually the UN SRSG [special representative of the secretary-general] visited the sit-in because she wanted to convince them to give the [prime minister] a grace period of six months if he commits to a serious and feasible reform agenda,” Abouaoun said.

The UN mediation seemed welcomed by the Iraqi protesters. Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported demonstrators were “bolstered” by the meeting November 11 between her and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s top Shia cleric.

“We’re optimistic about the UN and I respect her visit to Sistani,” Ali Kadhem, 33, a demonstrator at the main Baghdad protest site of Tahrir Square, told AFP. “Let them intervene more in Iraq. We want them here. Our people were starved, killed. We’ve been through everything.”

Abouaoun explained that “from the Iraqi public opinion stance, the UNAMI still enjoys relatively wide support. Obviously, the current steep political polarisation affects how some segments of the population perceive the UN but I don’t see their approval rate among Iraqis as plummeting.”

There were questions about the apparent convergence of the United Nations’ effort with the Iran-backed official Iraqi position to work with Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi.

After considering removing Abdul-Mahdi, the political leadership of Iraq, including President Barham Salih, voiced support for the prime minister.

The official Iraqi stance was reportedly cemented during meetings in Baghdad that involved Iranian Major-General Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ al-Quds Force. Following that consensus, the US call for early elections seemed to fall by the wayside. A political compromise could be a full reshuffle of the cabinet with Abdul-Mahdi staying as prime minister.

“Both the US and the UN are on the same page when it comes to considering the current PM as the ‘best option for the moment’ and both are trying to avoid creating a power vacuum that Iran is likely to use,” Abouaoun said.

“It is noteworthy that, within the same week, the US issued a statement supporting the efforts of the UN [and] the SRSG was received by Sistani personally, a rare occurrence/honour with foreign officials who usually meet his representatives, and the Iranians brokered a deal between Shia political parties to give the PM a grace period of 6-12 months with some reform initiatives on track.”

For foreign parties involved, Abdul-Mahdi is considered “the best option” because “he is politically weak, which allows each of the parties to implement their own agenda without much resistance from the PM,” Abouaoun said.

The risk of interference from outsiders, such as Iran, remains on mediators’ minds, however. Hennis-Plasschaert told AFP that she did not seek to be a counterweight to Iranian influence but said she feared “spoilers” could prevent progress.

“This country, unfortunately, knows many actors, external, internal, that could act as spoilers (and) undermine the legitimate demands of the people,” she said.

In Lebanon, Kubis called for the urgent formation of a cabinet including people known “for their competence and integrity” and who would be “trusted by the people. He said such a government would be in “a better position to appeal for support from Lebanon’s international partners.”

International goodwill is crucial for Lebanon, where reform could help release $11 billion in aid pledged at a conference last year.

The economic crisis loomed large in the UN coordinator’s efforts. “The financial and economic situation is critical and the government and other authorities cannot wait any longer to start addressing it,” he said after a November 12 meeting with Lebanese President Michel Aoun.

The formation of the new government is one of the most contentious issues in Lebanon. No party has as much at stake in continuing the status quo as Hezbollah, the Shia militant party holding many of the political cards.

While protesters clamoured for a technocratic government, Aoun pleaded in a November 12 interview for the inclusion of politicians in any future cabinet. He did not deny there was pressure from foreign countries to exclude his Hezbollah allies from the new government.

However, he said: “They can’t force me to get rid of a party that represents at least one-third of Lebanese.”

While protests in both Iraq and Lebanon are calling for the removal of the entire ruling class, UN mediators seem to be focusing on preventing the two countries from descending further into violence and chaos.

“My own reading is that we entered a phase of chaos in both countries that needs to be shortened to the extent possible so a concerted effort by the international community — with and through — the UN is more than welcome,” Abouaoun said.

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Liban-Irak : en filigrane des troubles, une confrontation irano-américaine

Les manifestations qui secouent le Liban et l’Irak depuis plusieurs semaines constituent un véritable défi à l’influence iranienne

This piece was originally published on the middleeasteye website https://www.middleeasteye.net/

Journalistes et observateurs établissent un parallèle entre les mouvements de contestation qui secouent l’Irak et le Liban depuis maintenant plusieurs semaines. Dans les deux pays, la foule s’insurge contre l’absence des services publics les plus élémentaires (eau, électricité, soins de santé, etc.) et sa colère cible les élites dirigeantes, accusées de corruption, d’incurie et d’irresponsabilité.

En Irak comme au Liban, le mouvement de contestation est présenté comme « spontané » et soustrait à l’influence des partis politiques traditionnels. Il est dépeint comme une révolte authentique et sans chef. Les manifestants affichent, aussi bien à Beyrouth qu’à Bagdad, un rejet du système politique en place, mettent en avant une identité nationale dépassant les clivages confessionnels et brandissent des slogans parfois identiques.

Les contestataires sont parfaitement conscients de ces similitudes et ils ne manquent pas de s’adresser mutuellement des messages d’encouragement ou de mener des actions de solidarité prenant des formes diverses, sérieuses ou burlesques.

La comparaison entre les mouvements de contestation qui secouent le Liban et l’Irak va encore plus loin. Ces événements se déroulent dans deux pays où coexiste tant bien que mal depuis des années une forte influence de l’Iran et des États-Unis, qui se disputent la prééminence dans les affaires politiques, sécuritaires et économiques.

Une dimension géopolitique

Cette constatation introduit une dimension géopolitique dans des mouvements qui se veulent farouchement indépendants et authentiques, libérés de toute influence extérieure, et qui se défendent d’exécuter un autre agenda que celui qu’ils revendiquent ouvertement.

Il n’en reste pas moins que les révoltes libanaise et irakienne sont évaluées, à Washington et à Téhéran, à travers le prisme de la confrontation globale entre ces deux pays. Elles ne sont pas uniquement considérées comme des affaires internes, ayant leur propre dynamique et dont les résultats, quels qu’ils soient, n’auront aucune répercussion sur la politique étrangère des deux pays et, par conséquent, sur leur positionnement régional.

Des manifestants au Liban tentent de retirer les barbelés et barrières placés par la police anti-émeute sur la route menant au palais présidentiel de Baabda le 13 novembre (AFP)
Des manifestants au Liban tentent de retirer les barbelés et barrières placés par la police anti-émeute sur la route menant au palais présidentiel de Baabda le 13 novembre (AFP)

Dans un tweet publié le 6 novembre, le secrétaire d’État américain, Mike Pompeo, a établi un lien entre les révoltes dans les deux pays et en a même fixé la finalité. « Les peuples libanais et irakien ont découvert que le régime iranien exporte sa corruption déguisée en révolution […] L’Irak et le Liban méritent de fixer leur propre cap loin des ingérences de Khamenei », a-t-il dit.

La réponse de Téhéran n’a pas tardé. Le lendemain, le chef d’état-major de l’armée iranienne, le général Mohammad Baqeri, a déclaré que « les ennemis des peuples irakiens et libanais [avaient] ourdi des complots et essayé d’installer dans ces deux pays des gouvernements agents [des États-Unis] ».

Mêmes si les contestataires en Irak et au Liban tiennent à donner à leurs révolte un cachet purement local et exigent des réformes de nature politique, économique et sociale, force est de constater que leur mouvement constitue un défi de taille à l’influence de l’Iran.

L’Irak, source de préoccupation majeure pour l’Iran

Au Liban, les slogans scandés par les manifestants contre les dirigeants corrompus n’épargnent pas le secrétaire général du Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah. Certains contestataires, qui battent le pavé depuis le 17 octobre, n’hésitent pas à réclamer le désarmement du parti chiite, lequel conserve une puissante structure militaire qui lui a permis de libérer le Liban de l’occupation israélienne en 2000, de mettre l’armée israélienne en échec en 2006, et de combattre les groupes islamistes radicaux en Syrie aux côtés de l’armée syrienne, à partir de 2013.

« Les amis de Téhéran font partie de l’économie formelle, par conséquent, les dégâts subis par l’Iran en Irak sont plus importants qu’au Liban »

– Elie Abou Aoun, Institut des États-Unis pour la paix

En Irak, des manifestants en colère ont attaqué le consulat iranien dans la ville sainte de Kerbala. Les slogans dénonçant les « ingérences » de la République iranienne dans les affaires internes irakiennes sont fréquents. Les troubles qui secouent les régions à forte majorité chiite depuis le 1er octobre ont fragilisé le Premier ministre Adel Abdel-Mehdi, soutenu par Téhéran.

En dépit des nombreuses similitudes, les troubles dans les deux pays n’ont pas le même impact sur l’influence de l’Iran. « Les contextes libanais et irakien sont différents », explique à Middle East Eye Elie Abou Aoun, directeur du programme Afrique du Nord et Moyen-Orient à l’Institut des États-Unis pour la paix.

Ce qui se passe en Irak est selon lui plus préoccupant pour Téhéran que les développements au Liban.

« Les alliés de l’Iran en Irak ne contrôlent pas seulement la sphère politique, ils font aussi partie du paysage économique », explique-t-il. « Le Hachd al-Chaabi [Unités de mobilisation populaire, proches de l’Iran] a réussi à infiltrer le secteur privé, les banques, l’immobilier, etc. Les amis de Téhéran font partie de l’économie formelle, par conséquent, les dégâts subis par l’Iran en Irak sont plus importants qu’au Liban. »

La répression des manifestations en Irak a fait plus de 300 morts depuis début octobre (Reuters)
La répression des manifestations en Irak a fait plus de 300 morts depuis début octobre (Reuters)

De plus, en Irak, la confrontation se déroule au sein même de la communauté chiite, les sunnites et les Kurdes se tenant à l’écart de la contestation. « La division inter-chiite en Irak est plus grave qu’au Liban, où les chiites sont plus unis », détaille Elie Abou Aoun.

Le chercheur ajoute que « la République islamique a transformé l’Irak, où elle aurait installé des rampes de lancement de missiles, en menace stratégique pour le Golfe », et toute déstabilisation de ce pays pourrait compromettre cet acquis qui lui permet d’exercer des pressions sur ses adversaires régionaux.

Neutraliser le Hezbollah en déstabilisant le Liban ?

Avec la présence du Hezbollah, le Liban constitue lui aussi une « menace stratégique » pour Israël. Mais au pays du Cèdre, le parti chiite est resté confiné à l’économie informelle, même si son influence politique et sécuritaire lui permet d’avoir un pouvoir de véto qui empêche ses rivaux d’enregistrer des acquis politiques importants.

Elie Abou Aoun affirme qu’après le départ de John Bolton, conseiller à la sécurité nationale du président américain, la stratégie anti-iranienne des États-Unis au Liban s’est effondrée. Des divergences sont apparues entre le département de la Défense et d’autres cercles du pouvoir concernant l’attitude à adopter.

« Le [Hezbollah] a choisi la retenue et la patience, pour faire échec aux tentatives visant à l’entraîner dans une confrontation interne »

– Source proche du Hezbollah

Le cafouillage concernant l’aide américaine fournie à l’armée libanaise en est la parfaite illustration. Après l’annonce, il y a quelques jours, de la suspension d’une aide de 105 millions de dollars, d’autres informations en provenance de Washington ont précisé que la décision définitive concernant le sort de cette enveloppe n’avait pas encore été prise.

Pour le Hezbollah, en tout cas, les troubles qui secouent le Liban depuis près d’un mois sont analysés à travers le prisme de la confrontation avec les États-Unis.

Dans un discours prononcé le 11 novembre, Hassan Nasrallah s’est livré à un long réquisitoire contre la politique américaine au Liban, faisant assumer aux États-Unis la responsabilité de la crise actuelle et de tous les maux dont souffre le pays depuis des années, y compris les difficultés économiques et financières auxquelles il est actuellement confronté.

L’objectif final de Washington est d’obtenir le désarmement du Hezbollah. « Les Américains souhaitent couper la seule main qui défend le Liban, qui protège sa sécurité, son intégrité territoriale, ses gisements en hydrocarbures», a dit Nasrallah dans son discours.

Pour atteindre cet objectif, tous les moyens sont bons, y compris la déstabilisation totale du Liban, estime le leader chiite.

Liban : même à Nabatieh, le mouvement de colère n’épargne pas le Hezbollah

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Dans une série d’articles intitulés « Contestation au Liban et en Irak, les États-Unis, Israël et l’Arabie saoudite en ont assez du Liban », Ellijah Magnier, expert du Moyen-Orient, soutient que la meilleure façon de neutraliser le Hezbollah est de l’entraîner dans un conflit interne au Liban, exactement comme cela s’est produit avec l’Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP) en 1975. 

C’est parce qu’il craint un tel scénario que le Hezbollah a demandé à ses partisans de rester à l’écart du mouvement de contestation et de ne pas réagir à la fermeture des routes qui mènent à ses fiefs du Liban-Sud et de la plaine orientale de la Bekaa.

« La banlieue sud de Beyrouth [à majorité chiite] est pratiquement encerclée, coupée du reste du pays », affirme à MEE une source proche du Hezbollah. « Malgré cela, le parti a choisi la retenue et la patience, pour faire échec aux tentatives visant à l’entraîner dans une confrontation interne. »

Les violences qui ont secoué le Liban ces deux derniers jours montrent toutefois que les craintes d’un dérapage existent. Et le pire des scénarios, pour les Libanais, est que la contestation, qui reste en grande partie pacifique, ne vire à la violence, comme cela est le cas en Irak, ce qui pourrait entraîner le pays dans la spirale de la guerre civile.

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A massive protest movement emerges in Lebanon. What does it mean?

Lebanon has seen its biggest protest in years. But it remains to be seen if anyone is ready for real reform.

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.usip.org/

Over the last week, mass protests broke out across Lebanon, signaling citizens’ mounting discontent with their government and economy. Millions of Lebanese of all backgrounds, including Sunnis, Shiites, Christians and Druze from across the socio-economic spectrum hit the streets to express their exasperation with the country’s endemic corruption. Although not a cohered uniform movement, protesters have several commons core demands, including the resignation of the current cabinet; a new government composed of technocrats who would usher in political, economic, and administrative reforms; and the lifting of taxes on poor communities. The government announced on Monday emergency economic reforms in an effort to assuage protesters. Will it be enough? USIP’s Elie Abouaoun takes a closer look at what sparked the protests, the impact on Lebanon’s highly polarized politics, and possible scenarios for the next few weeks.

What is behind the spate of large-scale protests in Lebanon?

Well, the direct trigger was a recent decision by the government to impose taxes on all voice over internet protocol applications, like WhatsApp. However, this is just the straw that broke the camel’s back. Over the last two years, many of Lebanon’s economic and social equities were fading away. After a boom in the real estate sector between 2008 and 2015, a 2017 recession has weighed heavily on the economy, including a recent rise in interest rates and a suspension of the subsidized housing loans provided through the state-run Public Corporation for Housing. This has affected the wider economy and caused a spike in inflation.

This has been compounded in the last few months by a steady decrease in the foreign reserves of the Central Bank, hindering its ability to counter increasing speculation on the national currency. For the first time since 1992, the fixed exchange rate of the Lebanese pound (LBP) against the U.S. dollar (USD) rose from 1507 LBP to 1 USD to 1,600-1,700 per dollar, reviving a dormant black market of forex dealers. Despite the Lebanese banking sector’s solid reputation, the banks started to restrict access to U.S. greenbacks. Many experts attribute the decrease in the availability of foreign reserves to reasons ranging from the U.S. sanctions on Hezbollah and the Syrian regime—resulting in many essential commodities for Syria being bought through Lebanese banks—as well as the declining remittances of the Lebanese expatriates.

Other issues driving the protests include rampant corruption and ineffective governance, including by parties who overpromised the population that they would engage in an ambitious reform program in the lead up to the 2018 legislative elections and have failed to do so. Further, the explosive mix of economic hardship and underperforming political parties, combined to create an untenable situation. It can only be resolved by political leaders willing to take painful decisions, and we haven’t seen the political will for that so far. Instead, successive governments have periodically resorted to adding new consumption taxes that disproportionately hit the middle and lowest classes.

How is this affecting the already highly polarized political landscape?

The main actors in the current protests are political parties and some civil society organizations, with the notable absence of the already illegitimate labor unions, who are seen as corrupt and coopted. Large parties such as the Shiite dominated Amal movement (led by Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri), the Druze-dominated socialist party (led by Walid Joumblatt) and the Christian Lebanese Forces (led by Samir Geagea) were the most visible in calling for street protests last week. They have long-standing political accounts to settle with the President Michel Aoun and his Free Patriotic Movement led by Gebran Bassil. Both Joumblatt and Berri count among the most corrupt politicians in Lebanon. Therefore, there is no question that their parties, and other smaller parties with grievances against Aoun, are fueling the protest movement and trying to hijack it for their own gain.

On another hand, the already weakened Prime Minister Saad Hariri is also being targeted by his Sunni competitors and some of his former allies—such as Joumblatt and Geagea—who accuse him of being too accommodating with Hezbollah. What happened to me last Friday shows the extent to which the protest movement has been coopted by some political parties. I was in Beirut and was stuck on my way to the airport. I had to go through eight roadblocks, all of them controlled by the Amal movement. My cab driver was from Amal and had to show his membership card to get through the blocks. All protesters were chanting against Aoun while praising Berri with rare mentions of poverty or dignity.

Even though there are spontaneous and genuine protest groups with legitimate demands, the fact is that these groups—for many reasons—cannot be game changers by themselves. Not only they are not organized, but none of them has a vision or a realistic framework for practical solutions. Protesting alone is never enough. Even when ideas emerge from the protests, they often prove to be unrealistic or irrelevant to the Lebanese context. Another flaw is that most of the civil society activists in Lebanon—where sub-national identity is widely seen as protective and most important—put forward an absurd conditionality between secularism and reform.

Last but not least is the fact that the collective public will to engage in serious reforms remains rhetorical. The level of resistance to real changes is too high among the population. Anecdotally, some protesters were offering to transport passengers to the airport for money and these offers were made in front of the protest leaders at roadblocks. A good description of the situation is that despite the certainty that the system is corrupt, not everyone who is against the system is clean or ready to start by themselves.

What are the possible scenarios for the next few weeks?

Given the diversity of actors involved in these protests and their often-contradicting agendas, it is hard to predict the direction that events will take. Three major political formations (President Aoun and his party, Prime Minister Hariri and his party, and Hezbollah) know that a collapse is not in their best interest and that any new-power sharing agreement will not give them as much as they have now. I believe they will try to accommodate some of the demands by resorting to cosmetic or unrealistic measures—as the ones voted on Monday—without agreeing to a radical change in the political system. Joumblatt, Geagea and Berri are, on the contrary, keen on going far with their movement but will have to limit their ambitions by regional considerations and alliances (e.g., Iran’s alliance with Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia’s support for Hariri, and Syria’s fear of a new government that is less friendly to the regime, among other factors).

A general collapse in Lebanon does not seem to be accepted or desired neither domestically nor internationally. But, the Lebanese state is ripe for collapse, though internal checks and balances and regional interests will likely prevent its fall. However, the level of popular anger is so high and some of the protest groups are not well organized and unpredictable. For all these reasons and because in such cases a minor incident can change the course of things, no one affords the luxury of providing a confident forecast. We must just wait and see.

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Beyond Barriers: Contours and Complexities of IDP Return

MERI Forum 2019: Ending Wars – Winning Peace in the Middle East

This piece was originally published on the meri-k website https://http://www.meri-k.org/

Click here to download the report in PDF.

MERI Forum 2019: Ending Wars – Winning Peace in the Middle East

Panel Three: Beyond Barriers: Contours and Complexities of IDP Return

• Nathanael Nizar Semaan, Archbishop of Hadiab Syriac Catholic Diocese
• Karem Sleman, Spokesperson of Yazidi Spiritual Council
• Elie Abouaoun, Director of MENA Programs, United States Institute of Peace
• Henriette Johansen, Research Fellow, MERI (Moderator)

Panel chairman Henriette Johansen explained that internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Nineveh Province experience multiple layers of barriers to their return, some of which are unarticulated or invisible in the milieu of societal concerns stemming from Nineveh’s history of violence and its ongoing challenges with security and public administration. Within Nineveh’s minority communities, historic legacies of socio-economic and political disenfranchisement, war, genocide, and foreign invasion have enervated the will to return.

While 4.3 million IDPs have returned, 1.5 million still remain in displacement. Recent government measures, such as rapidly consolidating and closing IDP camps across Nineveh, have sent a new wave of IDPs into critical shelter and extreme living conditions. Expectation and hope for sustainable, voluntary return are diminishing, along with IDPs’ expectation that authorities will deliver on their promises. After protracted displacement, IDPs are feeling the push to integrate into their host communities or emigrate abroad. Johansen explained that, in the ensuing discussion, panelists would be solicited for any actions within their respective remits that could rectify this situation for their constituents.

In his remarks, Nathanael Nizar Semaan praised the “great hope” that has sustained the Christian minority through a long history of injustice, difficulty, and persecution. Despite disappointing rates of return among the Christian community, he argued that his constituents feel rooted to their ancestral lands, and were among the first to attempt a return to their areas of origin in the Nineveh Plains following liberation. He highlighted the example of Qaraqosh, which has seen approximately 22,000 Christian returnees out of an original population of 50,000. Unfortunately, however, continued deficits in services, limited career opportunities, and a poor standard of living have rendered most returns unsustainable. Additionally, after years of persecution and inequality, governmental inaction in the face of political disputes and demographic change has enervated the confidence of Christian constituents in the federal government’s ability to provide safety and prosperity for their children. As a result, many have chosen to remain in the KRI or to migrate abroad.

“Our country is bleeding. Many are leaving… it is very painful for us.” – Semaan

He acknowledged that religious leaders have a responsibility to incentivize return and remind their constituents that they belong to Iraq, but noted that stymieing the flow of migration is impossible without sufficient political will, attention, and provision from the government. He urged the government to rectify its neglect of the disputed territories and provide practical solutions. “Our areas need to be given more,” he said.

“Christians are like an olive tree that is cut and burned, but the root will appear and grow again. We are rooted to this ground, though we face different difficulties and […] persecution.” – Semaan

Semaan stated that religious leaders have renewed their vows to serve their constituents. To support the implementation of Iraq’s National Action Plan (INAP) on UNSCR 1325, he emphasized the need for assistance and training from the international community, as the Church has very little experience rendering psychological treatment to women and children. He also urged the international community to expend significant effort in securing the inclusion of youth and providing opportunities for them to make positive contributions to Iraq’s reconstruction. He explained that, while the Church offers social activities, cultural events, and entertainment to engage with young people, it does not have the power to dissuade them from migration or offer them a prosperous life. “If we lose them,” he admitted, “we will vanish.” Finally, he highlighted the church’s involvement in housing reconstruction projects, and invited the partnership of engineers and economists to assist in the planning and strategizing process.

Semaan concluded his remarks by encouraging a spirit of optimism. He emphasized that Christians consider all Iraqis their brothers, and noted that securing the lawful rights of the Christian minority need not come at the expense of other components. He promoted a vision of the future predicated on dignity and respect, and reassured listeners that “our common language will be the language of love.”

Karem Sleman argued that Yazidis are the “number one” victims of the IS invasion in Iraq and the broader region. For Yazidis, he emphasized, the calamity is not over, but is simply entering its 5th year. At this stage, 80-90% of displaced Yazidis have been living in camps since 2014; thousands of women and girls remain missing; and mass graves continue to be unearthed in Shingal. These recent atrocities are layered atop a long history of violence, inordinate taxation, and marginalization, in which Yazidis have been relegated to adverse living conditions without adequate schools and medication. Frustration over insufficient assistance and services since the invasion has weakened hope and belief throughout this community. As a result, over 100,000 Yazidis have migrated in the past 5 years, abandoning their homeland.

Sleman observed that many Yazidi victims returned to Bashiqa and other areas of origin after liberation. However, unique barriers are impeding return in Shingal. Among these, he cited geopolitical competition between Baghdad and Erbil, the lack of adequate security services, the proliferation of militias and armed groups, and the absence of a legitimate administrative apparatus. On this last point, he observed that the legitimate administration, installed prior to 2014, is now practicing in an area close to Duhok Province; meanwhile, other entities, neither legal nor legitimate, have been imposed on Shingal. The resultant duality, as well as the absence of a trusted local administration, makes it difficult for civil society organizations to provide necessary services, opportunities, and security in the region. Sleman therefore asked the international community, the Iraqi government, and the KRG to demonstrate greater seriousness in their efforts to promote return to this area. He emphasized that no prince, tribe, or spiritual council has any power to motivate IDP return without the provision of safety and services.

When pressed to address social cohesion needs in the Yazidi community, Sleman emphasized that reconciliation is a complex topic, and that the victims of the 2014 invasion need more time.

“Those who paid the high price should be the ones deciding on reconciliation.” – Sleman

Intracommunal fragmentation is also an issue, as many Yazidi constituents have splintered over disparate political affiliations and personal interests. The prospect of reconciliation among these components remains difficult, as Yazidis continue to receive support from different political parties. Finally, Sleman addressed the particular social integration needs represented by former IS sex slaves and their children. While the Yazidi Spiritual Council made the decision to reintegrate formerly enslaved Yazidi women, religious and legal obstacles remain, challenging the ability of these women to lead “a normal life.” For this reason, Sleman would like to see the international community assist Yazidi women who wish to relocate to another country. Children born to Yazidi women in IS captivity, similarly, face communal and legal barriers to reintegration, as Iraqi legislation dictates that children of anonymous parental lineage must be listed as Muslim. According to religious precedent, these children cannot be accepted as Yazidis. In order to protect these children from further victimization and allow them the freedom to choose their own religion, the Yazidi Spiritual Council would like the international community to grant them refugee status and facilitate their relocation to non-tribal, secular societies. Sleman expressed his willingness to engage in a high-level conference for religious leaders to discuss alternative solutions to this issue.

When asked to distill relevant learnings from the work of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Iraq, Elie Abouaoun encouraged panelists to view problems holistically. Many root causes of current conflict, he argued, existed prior to the regime change in 2003 and must be addressed in order to encourage the return of IDPs to their communities.

“Take a holistic view of the problem. Look at the root causes of the conflict.” – Abouaoun

Abouaoun identified several challenges to stabilization and IDP return in Nineveh Province. One of these is a pervasive, widespread distrust that registers at multiple societal strata: between communities; within communities; and between citizens and the local, provincial, regional, and central governments. Overlooking this factor and its impacts on displacement will lead to the implementation of half-baked solutions, he cautioned. Additionally, he warned against generic descriptions of problems, such as “demographic change.” Demographic change, he reminded listeners, can be intentional or natural. While naming and shaming the regional powers behind politically-motivated demographic change projects may be fair and necessary, the crux of the work on this issue must occur at the civilian, communal level rather than geopolitical one. He recommended outcome-oriented dialogues to explore solutions and increase the resilience of affected communities. Finally, Abouaoun expressed concern over the heavy, widespread militarization of communities; if left unchecked, this can spawn further violence and conflict. It is now imperative to find solutions that will effectively engage the thousands of young people who have been fighting in non-state armed groups for years.

When asked about reconciliation projects, Abouaoun clarified that reconciliation should never require victims to waive their right to justice. The first step toward restoring social cohesion, he argued, is convincing affected communities to pursue rights and reparations without resorting to violence. Current obstacles to reconciliation in Nineveh Province include a lack of adequate governmental attention to improving the security environment, and political fragmentation within communities. Addressing the latter involves helping communities develop a common vision on specific issues.

Abouaoun celebrated recent progress on the implementation of UNSCR 1325, and noted that Iraq is one of the most advanced countries in the region on this front. To facilitate continued progress, USIP is providing technical assistance to some of Iraq’s multiple coordination platforms to increase their capacity.

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ليبيا تعود لـ”المطبخ الأميركي”.. وواشنطن تدرس “شكل التحرك”

This piece was originally published on the 218tv website www.218tv.net

قال مدير برنامج معهد الولايات المتحدة للسلام في الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا، الدكتور إيلي أبو عون، إن تفجّر الأوضاع الأخيرة في ليبيا كان نتيجة خلاف دولي وإقليمي حول كيفية التعامل مع الوضع الليبي، مشيرا إلى أن الواقع الإقليمي هو المسؤول عما يحدث في البلاد، وأن توقيت الهجوم على طرابلس كان بمثابة “الضربة” لمصداقية الأمم المتحدة، لكن إلقاء اللوم في تعثر العملية السياسة على مبعوث الأمم المتحدة فيه الكثير من عدم الموضوعية.

وأوضح “أبو عون” لبرنامج “US-L” على قناة “218NEWS” أن ليبيا الآن مجهولة المصير وتقف على مفترق طرق كونها من الممكن أن تدخل إلى دائرة عنف أكبر من التي تمر بها حاليا، وهو ما يعني المزيد من الدمار، مبينا أن ما يحدث الآن في البلاد يعتبر مسارا تدميريا لجميع الأطراف ولن يخرج منه منتصر.

وحول مساعي التهدئة القائمة لوقف إطلاق النار في ضواحي طرابلس، أكد “أبو عون” أن قدرة المجتمع الدولي على تصميم أي مبادرات مرهونة بتقبل المجتمع المحلي لها، مضيفا أنه من المفيد للطرفين أن يقبلا بآلية تفاوض يمكن خلق ظروف مناسبة لها، مشيرا إلى أن المؤتمرات هي إحدى الآليات للتعاطي مع الوضع الحاصل في ليبيا.

وفي السياق ذاته، اعتبر “أبو عون” ليبيا من أفضل الأمثلة على اختلاف إرادة الأطراف المحلية مع رغبة المجتمع الدولي، مؤكدا أن الرهان الأساسي في ليبيا الآن هو على قدرة الإرادة المحلية على الدفع نحو الخروج من المأزق الحالي، كون أطراف النزاع لن تحصل على أكثر مما لديها الآن سواء استراتيجيا أو سياسيا، بغض النظر عن التغيرات التكتيكية اليومية.

وأضاف: “توجد إمكانية ضئيلة أن يقضي أحد الطرفين وقتيا على الطرف الآخر، لكن لن يتمكن من السيطرة على البلاد. واقع الحال يقول إن هناك استنزافا للطرفين المتصارعين، والأحداث الأخيرة في طرابلس أثبتت أن الطرفين وصلا إلى حد معين من القدرة الفعلية”.وحول تعطل عجلة العملية السياسية بفشل عقد ملتقى غدامس، رأى “أبو عون” أن المؤتمر سيكون تتويجا لجهود كبيرة بذلتها الأمم المتحدة في ليبيا، وكانت هناك آمال كبيرة معقودة عليه لوقف دورة العنف والانتقال إلى مسار الانتخابات لأن أغلب النزاعات المسلحة في التاريخ المعاصر انتهت بحلها عن طريق التفاوض، حسب قوله.

وأشار “أبو عون” إلى أن المجتمع الدولي لديه عمل قد يستغرق 50 عاما للنهوض بليبيا في ظل حد أدنى من الاستقرار السياسي والأمني، نظرا لأن أغلب القطاعات الأساسية في ليبيا مدمرة تماما من أيام النظام السابق، وعلى الرغم من أنها تمتلك مقومات كثيرة، لكن تحسن الوضع الأمني شرط أساس للنهوض باقتصادها.

وحول دور الجيش الوطني في سير العملية السياسية في ليبيا، كشف مدير برنامج معهد الولايات المتحدة للسلام في الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا، أن المعهد كان يرى وجوب عدم استثناء الجيش الوطني من العملية السياسية، لافتا إلى أن الدعم الدولي للقائد العام للجيش الوطني المشير خليفة حفتر ليس بجديد وكان متوفرا منذ البداية، كما أكد الدكتور إيلي أن ليبيا عادت إلى خارطة واشنطن والأخيرة بصدد بلورة سياسة محددة تجاهها.وقال “أبو عون” إن الأحداث الأخيرة في طرابلس أثرت على بعض مشاريع معهد الولايات المتحدة للسلام في الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا في ليبيا، بينها التعاون مع وزارة العدل ضمن مشروع يخص العدالة الجنائية، منوها أن المعهد يختص بالسلام ولا يتدخل بالدفع نحو أي سياسة للحفاظ على استقلاليته.

وحول طبيعة بقية المشاريع، أوضح أن بينها مشاريع في الجنوب تتضمن حوارات بين جماعات عرقية وسياسية مختلفة، إضافة إلى مشاريع مع جماعات شبابية للتخفيف من حدة العنف عبر الحوارات.

وحول مدى تجاوب المواطنين في ليبيا مع هذه المشاريع، قال: “هناك عدد كبير من الشباب في ليبيا مقتنعون أن العنف لن يؤدي إلى أي نتيجة. رأينا بعض من انخرطوا في الأعمال العسكرية يعيدون النظر ويتخلون عن السلاح

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The Syria crisis persistent challenges to an effective humanitarian response in Lebanon

PHAP.org

The number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon continues to grow amid continuing speculations that the violence is likely to continue in Syria. The humanitarian agencies, while very active, are not able to respond in the most effective way to the crisis. Although there are many challenges impeding such an effective response, this brief commentary will shed light on the following selected ones:

Funding: Despite pledges by many donor countries, the amounts that the Government of Lebanon (GoL), UN agencies, and INGOs have received are far below what has been requested. In addition to donors’ fatigue three years after the start of the conflict, the main obstacle remains the lack of trust in the GoL institutions and the inability of the authorities to move forward with alternative solutions such as a jointly managed trust fund.

Growing resentment: The Lebanese infrastructure and economy were already suffering before the crisis. The number of Syrians in Lebanon today is estimated at 1.2 to 1.4 million, which is slightly more than 25% of Lebanon’s population. The conflict in Syria has already affected the economic activity in Lebanon, and the influx of thousands of families with depleted resources has led, as expected, to resentment among the host communities.

Scattered assistance: In addition to the “classical” lack of coordination among UN agencies and INGOs, an added challenge has appeared through the assistance that Gulf-based relief foundations decided to provide directly to refugees without prior coordination or collaboration with other actors. This has contributed to a diverse landscape where capturing “who is doing what and where” proves to be a difficult exercise.

Lebanese police put out a fire set by men who attacked anti-government protesters' tents, during ongoing anti-government protest, Lebanon October 29, 2019. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir

تداعيات انتفاضة لبنان

This piece was originally published on the alhurra website www.alhurra.com

د. إيلي أبو عون/

ليس غريبا أن يبدأ ربيع لبنان ـ بلد التناقضات ـ في فصل الخريف. كثرت المواقف والتحاليل ولكن وهج ما حصل أبرز استقطابا حادا يمجد الشعبوية على حساب التفكير المنهجي والموضوعي.

لا شك أن ما يحدث حاليا مفصلي وتاريخي وما بعده لن يكون ما قبله. ومما لا شك فيه أيضا أن غالبية المعترضين يعبرون عن وجع مزمن، حقيقي وقاتل لم يكن ليستمر رغم حقن المورفين “البلدية الصنع” (هندسات مالية وخطط مجتزأة وغيرها) والإفرنجية (مؤتمر سيدر، ودائع متفرقة…).

يشكل حراك أكتوبر البيروتي حالة استثنائية على عدة أوجه. بالإضافة إلى أنه عابر للطبقات والمذاهب والمناطق ـ عكس انتفاضة آذار (مارس) 2005 مثلا المركزة في بيروت حينها أو حراك 2015 ـ إنه حراك عفوي بالإجمال وبدون قيادة تنظيمية (ولو أن هناك قادة رأي يؤثرون في مسار الحراك).

كذلك برهن عن قابلية للاستمرار لم تتمتع بها التجارب السابقة وصحح صورة خاطئة عن المرأة اللبنانية فرأيناها تلعب دورا محوريا وفي الخط الأول حتى في المواجهة الجسدية مع مناهضي التظاهرات. كما بينت ما يعرف الآن “بأيقونة الثورة” (المرأة التي ترفس رجلا من جهاز حماية الشخصيات في وسط بيروت).

من المطالب تعزيز سيادة القانون والمؤسسات

من ناحية المفاعيل، أرسى هذا الحراك معايير وسقوفا جديدة للعلاقة بين المواطنين والساسة المنتخبين، المعينين أو حتى الحزبيين عندما بلور ـ عند غالبية الشعب ـ حسا مواطنيا يتلاقى مع الهويات الأخرى (حزبية، دينية، ثقافية، اجتماعية…إلخ) ولا ينقضها بالضرورة.

ورغم هذه الخصائص الإيجابية والتاريخية، يواجه الحراك تحديات عملاقة، أولها علاقته مع التشكيلات السياسية الموجودة (حزبية رسمية أو غير رسمية كالتجمعات السياسية). رغم المسؤولية المباشرة لكل تشكيل سياسي شارك في منظومة الحكم منذ 1990 (ولو بنسب مختلفة) إلا أن شيطنة الأحزاب وتعميم صورة أن كل حزبي هو شخص سيء وأن دور الأحزاب في الحياة السياسية غير ضروري وغير مرحب به هو مسار تدميري يعيق قيام نظام سياسي ديمقراطي ويؤسس لمرحلة من الفوضى أو بالحد الأدنى لتسلط فئات معينة واستبعاد أخرى لأن أي عملية استنهاض سياسية لا تستكمل من دون وجود تشكيلات سياسية ذات شرعية شعبية.

لذا الأجدى بقادة الرأي في الحراك الحالي أن يفكروا بنموذج يشدد على التفاعل مع أحزاب متجددة وعصرية عوض شيطنتها ـ نموذج يعطي دور بناء للأحزاب والحزبيين إذا التزموا ببرنامج الحراك ومنظومة قيم محددة.

من ناحية أخرى كان واضحا في أول أيام الحراك استخدامه من قبل بعض الأحزاب المناهضة لرئيس الجمهورية لتصفية حسابها مع العهد ولاحقا ركوب مجمل الأحزاب موجة الحراك عندما تيقنوا من غضب الشعب وتصميمه على التغيير.

فتبنى الأفرقاء السياسيين من دون استثناء الحراك مما يطرح السؤال عمن يدخل السجن من الفاسدين إذا كان الحراك مدعوما من جنبلاط وبري وجعجع والجميل، ووهاب وحزب الله وباسيل وعون والحريري وميقاتي والمجتمع المدني والحركات اليسارية.

لذا حماية الحراك من الانتهازيين ـ أحزابا وأفرادا ـ يجب أن تكون أولوية في المرحلة الحاضرة. ولا يخفى أن عامل الوقت يكون عادة لصالح الحركات المنظمة. فمن دون خطة استباقية سوف تنقلب خصائص الحراك (عفوي ومن دون قيادة تنظيمية) من نعمة إلى نقمة.

بلورة هكذا خطة استباقية يفرض وجود رؤيا عملانية للحراك. حتى هذ اللحظة يتكون الحراك من مجموعات متفرقة تجمعها النقمة على طبقة سياسية فاسدة وفاشلة ولكنها لا تجمع بالضرورة على مطالب عملية محددة.

يمكن القول “إنهم يعرفون ما لا يريدون لكنهم لا يتفقون على ما يريدون”. لذا تنطوي عملية تطوير أهداف محددة وآليات واضحة لتحقيق هذه الأهداف على أهمية قصوى. ولقد انتقد البعض هذا الطرح واعتبروه غير عادل إذ أن واجب الحركات الاعتراضية محصور بالاحتجاج بينما واجب الفريق الحاكم إيجاد الحلول.

يمكن أن ينطبق هذا المبدأ على حركة مطلبية عادية أما عندما تدعي هذه الحركة أنها “ثورة” وهدفها “تغيير النظام” فمن واجبها امتلاك خطة عمل واضحة وقابلة للتطبيق.

ومن أهم المعوقات أمام هذا الجهد هو أن معظم قادة الرأي في الحراك إما يتمتعون بالكفاءة ولكن يفتقدون للخبرة أو أنهم يفتقدون الاثنين معا فيعولون على شعارات أو أفكار فضفاضة، شعبوية أو غير قابلة للتطبيق أو قائمة على ديماغوجية اقتصادية واجتماعية وسياسية.

كذلك يسوق البعض مثلا أن الحراك لا يتفاوض حتى “رحيل الجميع” في استعادة لصورة نمطية من المنطقة العربية (الديكتاتور وعائلته يرحلون، يقتلون أو يسجنون) لا تنطبق أبدا على لبنان حيث النظام مركب وتعددي.

فما يحصل اليوم في لبنان يجب أن يؤدي إلى إطلاق مرحلة انتقالية تأخذ بعين الاعتبار تركيبة المجتمع اللبناني والهواجس السياسية للمواطنين (بالإضافة إلى الهواجس الاقتصادية والاجتماعية).

فمثلا كيف نتصور إجراء محاكمات عادلة للفاسدين في غياب سلطة قضائية مستقلة وفي ظل فراغ قانوني في مجال المساءلة العامة (في لبنان لا يوجد قانون عن تضارب المصالح في القطاع العام مثلا) وفي غياب قاعدة بيانات ضريبية متكاملة. وكيف نتصور تفاعل أعداد كبيرة من المتظاهرين عندما يستوعبون مثلا أن إجراء انتخابات وفق قانون “غير طائفي” وعلى أساس لبنان دائرة انتخابية واحدة سوف يؤدي على الأرجح إلى أن يكون الرؤساء الثلاثة من طائفة واحدة.

معظم قادة الرأي في الحراك اليوم وغالبية السياسيين يلجأ إلى الشعبوية

ومن الأفكار الوهمية المتداولة أيضا هي صياغة دستور جديد من قبل “لجنة خبراء مستقلين” ومن ثم إجراء استفتاء حوله، في بلد لا يملك سجلات دقيقة بسبب أن أي مسح ديمغرافي علمي سوف يكون له تداعيات خطيرة.

من المطالب أيضا تعزيز سيادة القانون والمؤسسات وهو أمر أساسي طبعا لاستبدال المزرعة الموجودة بدولة ذات صدقية. وهنا يطرح السؤال عن تصور قادة الرأي في الحراك لمقاربة إشكالية “حزب الله” ومؤسساته الأمنية والاقتصادية والمالية ودوره في النزاعات الإقليمية وعلاقته الملتبسة بالقوى العسكرية والأجهزة الأمنية اللبنانية. فهل سنطبق القانون ومحاربة الفساد انتقائيا لاستحالة اخضاع الحزب لمقتضيات قيام دولة قادرة أم أن هناك خارطة طريق تعالج الإشكالية دون التسبب بحرب أهلية جديدة؟ فهل المضي بتغيير النظام مع تجاهل مشكلة إقليمية ودولية بهذا الحجم يخدم مصلحة الحراك أم يكون لصالح حزب في غاية التنظيم وبموارد جمة؟

ومن الأسئلة المحورية ما هو سلم قيم الموجود والمقبول من السواد الأعظم من اللبنانيين (من ضمنهم المتظاهرين). فلا نرى مثلا أي احتجاج يستهدف مؤسسات خاصة أو حتى قطاعات عرفت بفسادها كالمستشفيات الخاصة ومختبرات التحاليل وشركات الأدوية ومكاتب تعليم السياقة وكبرى مكاتب المحامين ومقاولي الأشغال العامة والجامعات الخاصة، والمؤسسات الدينية وغيرها من أعلام الفساد “الخاص”.

كما ولم نر رد فعل شعبي أو مدني- في حينها -يتناسب مع فظاعة الوقائع التي كشفها مدير عام وزارة المال منذ ستة أشهر عن الحسابات العامة ومتاهات تدقيقها. من المعروف أن انتقائية المساءلة واستنابتيها عدو للعدالة لذا التركيز على بعض السياسيين والمصارف دون سواهم من رموز الفساد يضر ولا ينفع.

ومن أحد أسباب الانتقائية في هذا الحراك وما سبقه أن الجمهور المعترض يحكم على الأمور بمعايير مزدوجة. فالطبيب مثلا يعتبر دفع مبلغ إضافي لتسجيل شقة أو سيارة فسادا فيما يعتبر تقاضي عمولة على وصف أدوية أو تحاليل معينة “شطارة”.

كذلك المحاسب الذي يوقع على تقرير تدقيق مالي مقابل بدل دون الاطلاع عليه من باب “الربح المشروع” أو سائق التاكسي الذي يستعمل لوحة مزورة أو المواطن الذي يبني غرفا إضافية خلافا للقانون في بيته ويلجأ للتسوية المالية أو الواسطة وغير ذلك من نماذج الاستنسابية في تقييم ما هو فساد وما هو مشروع.

من أهم عوامل نجاح هذا الحراك هو قبول الرأي العام بمتطلبات الإصلاح. وهنا تبرز معوقات كبيرة بسبب عدم دراية غالبية المواطنين بالتضحيات المطلوبة لإجراء تغيير جذري نحو الأفضل.

ومن هذه التضحيات مثلا تحجيم القطاع العام، وما يعنيه ذلك من إنهاء لخدمات عدد كبير ـ لا يقل عن الثلث ـ من موظفي هذا القطاع لتحسين فعاليته وترشيده. كما يتطلب العمل على التخفيف من التهرب الضريبي وإعادة النظر بتسعيرة بعض الخدمات العامة وبتنظيم الاقتصاد الموازي (غير الرسمي) وبتغيير النظام الاقتصادي الحمائي ومكافحة الاحتكار وغيرها من الإجراءات الموجعة التي لا تتم من دون مقبولية المجتمع، كونه كعلاج مرض مزمن لا يتم بالمسكنات بل ببروتوكول علاجي متكامل، موجع وطويل.

أرسى هذا الحراك معايير وسقوفا جديدة للعلاقة بين المواطنين والساسة المنتخبين

فنرى معظم قادة الرأي في الحراك اليوم وغالبية السياسيين يلجأ إلى الشعبوية (البلد منهوب وغير مفلس…) بدل الحوار مع مكوناتهم عن كيفية المضي بهذه الإجراءات الموجعة مع تخفيف آثارها الاجتماعية السلبية.

وهنا يبرز خطر “اليسار التقليدي” الذي يعتبر أن ” الدولة الراعية هي الحل”، متجاهلا أن موارد الدولة تأتي أساسا من ضرائب المواطن وأن الدولةلا تجني المال من العدم.

لبنان اليوم يشبه مريضا يحتضر بسبب أخطاء جسيمة ارتكبها أطباؤه المعالجون على فترة سنوات فجاء أهله إلى المستشفى وكسروها وعطلوا آلة التنفس الاصطناعي وقتلوا كل الأطباء وبدأوا بارتجال العلاجات دون اللجوء إلى اهل الاختصاص وعندما طلب منهم التبرع بالدم للمريض لإنقاذه تهربوا تحت حجج واهية.

هل يعي شعب لبنان أن التغيير المرتجى يبدأ عند كل مواطن ومواطنة قبل السياسي والمصرفي ورئيس الحزب، وأن ما تقبلناه وساهمنا به على مدى عقود يستوجب أن ندفع ثمنه بأنفسنا اليوم؟ وهل يستفيق الرأي العام على المصائد المنصوبة من قبل كبار السياسيين وصغارهم وعلى تبعات قرارات يتخذها معظم قادة رأي الحراك من باب الانتهازية أو الشعبوية أو عدم الكفاءة والخبرة؟

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البطريرك وحقوق الانسان

This piece was originally published on the elnashra website www.elnashra.com

خرج لبنان من مرحلة النزاع المسلح عام 1990 منقسما على نفسه بين مؤيد ل​اتفاق الطائف​ ومعارضا له. وكانت شريحة كبرى من الرأي المسيحي تنظر سلبيا الى الاتفاق والى كل من لعب دورا في صياغته أو تسويقه أو توفير غطاء له.

ورغم بركته لتسوية الطائف لم يتأخر البطريرك في الوقوف ضد النظام السياسي والأمني السوري اللبناني عندما لجأ أركان هذا النظام الى الممارسات القمعية والتهميشية سياسيا واجتماعيا. وقد تفاجأ الكثيرون – وانا منهم – بصلابة البطريرك مقارنة بالانطباع الذي سرى عنه ابان طبخة اتفاق الطائف.

بدأت بالتواصل مع غبطته وفريق عمله في منتصف التسعينات ضمن مجموعة من الناشطين الحقوقيين وان كان أسلوبه هادئا الا انه كان يتابع كل ملف حقوقي حملناه له خلال زياراتنا المتكررة. لم يوفق غبطته في تغيير سلوكيات ​النظام السوري​ اللبناني بشكل عام الا ان مداخلاته و عظات أيام الأحاد أصبحت من مقومات صمود القوى السياسية المناهضة للدور السوري في لبنان أنداك. لدرجة أن محتوى عظات البطريرك أصبح هاجسا لبعض السياسيين والأمنيين الموالين ل​سوريا​ حتى باتوا يتساءلون ويسألون كيف ستكون “ضربة الأحد” كما وصفها أحدهم امامي في 1998.

في نهاية عام 1996 قامت الأجهزة ألأمنية في لبنان بحملة اعتقالات واسعة طالت عشرات من النشطاء السياسيين والحقوقيين. وبدأ يتوافد الى ​بكركي​ العديد من السياسيين والأمنيين وغيرهم اما لتبرير هذه الحملة أو حث البطريرك على التصعيد. لم يغرق غبطته في بحر المعطيات المتناقضة التي وفرها له زوار الصرح كما تخوف البعض بل لجأ الى تظهير موقف صلب ومقاوم واضح عندما أعلن عدم استقبال المهنئين بمناسبة عيد الميلاد تنديدا بالاعتقالات.

في هذه الفترة كنت أزوره أو اتواصل مع فريق عمله يوميا لاطلاعه على نتيجة الضغط الدولي الذي قاده آنذاك الاتحاد الأوروبي و​فرنسا​ والولايات المتحدة.

فليرحم الله الكاردينال صفير و ينعم علينا بقادة زمنيين و روحيين يجيدون انجاز مهامهم دون انحراف

Protesters fill the streets around Tahrir Square in Baghdad on Monday, Oct. 28, 2019. (Ivor Prickett/The New York Times)

Iraq’s protesters just ousted a prime minister. Now what?

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.usip.org/

Iraq faces a new political crisis and the risk of more violence after its prime minister, Adel Abdul Mahdi, resigned under pressure from two months of mass demonstrations by youthful protesters. More than 400 people have been reported killed amid authorities’ forceful attempts to disperse the youthful protesters, who say a corrupt elite is failing to provide basic government services and share the country’s wealth with citizens. But Abdul Mahdi is stepping down only after Iraq’s most prominent Shia cleric withdrew his support. USIP’s Sarhang Hamasaeed and Elie Abouaoun discussed where the crisis could lead.

These are Iraq’s biggest protest demonstrations in the post-Saddam Hussein era. What are the stakes?

Abouaoun: Iraq’s domestic upheaval has moved to a more serious, dangerous stage. The protesters in Baghdad and other cities are proving resilient, and they are demanding far more than the removal of a prime minister. Iraq is now facing a multilayered conflict that involves economic and social elements in addition to a strong political one. The protesters’ demands are not only for a new prime minister, but for economic reforms, greater job opportunities for youth, and better government services. Responding to their demands would require a solution to the growth of Iranian proxy forces in Iraq, revisiting the roles of clerics and tribes in the political system, amending the constitution, setting up a truly inclusive and independent electoral process. In a nutshell, it means writing a new social contract among Iraqis. This moment has the potential to be a historic turning point for Iraq. Given those stakes, and the complexity of the situation, the international community, including the United States, should be looking for every opportunity to support a nonviolent shift toward real democracy. But right now, international engagement is not proportionate to the scope of this crisis. 

Given the sweeping changes sought by the protesters, can Abdul Mahdi’s resignation reduce tensions?

Hamasaeed: No, not by itself. And if you look carefully at his resignation letter, it includes a telling signal. His letter acknowledges only the call by Iraq’s powerful cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, for a change in leadership. Abdul Mahdi makes no mention of the demands of the protesters—and this signals that the political class continues to regard the protests’ message as an unrealistic, maximalist demand to which they will make only minimalist responses. That heightens the risk of a greater scale of violence.

Neither side in this conflict—those who seek change and those who seek to preserve as much of the status quo as possible—are willing to budge. And it has become a pattern that Iraq’s political class acts usually only after Sistani applies public pressure. Finally, there is no guarantee that a new government—transitional or permanent—will be able to provide what the protests are demanding: better services, jobs, an end to corruption and a reduction in the influence of external forces in Iraq. On the demonstrators’ side, they share a broad consensus on all of those demands, but they diverge when it comes to how much to insist on constitutional amendments and changing the political system of Iraq.

Forming governments in Iraq has become a months-long ordeal of negotiations among the parties. So what happens now, and can a new government can be formed soon?

Hamasaeed: Abdul Mahdi’s resignation has started the clock to appoint a transitional prime minister and cabinet who will be tasked with holding new elections. As you say, even under normal circumstances the negotiations would be extremely complex and difficult. The political class would wish to appoint someone from within, and names are already floating around. Because this is only a short-term, transitional government, not all parties may be interested in seeking a position in it—and that could permit a faster decision-making process. The complicating factor, again, is that the demonstrators are demanding deeper change. For one, they demand that the next government exclude current and prior prime ministers and ministers. Some go as far as rejecting any leaders from the current parties in the government and political class.

How will this impact the role of international actors in Iraq—namely, Iran and the United States?

Hamasaeed: Iran did not desire this outcome and made every effort to keep Abdul Mahdi as prime minister. They have already mobilized to ensure that they will have a primary role in appointing the new prime minister and government. They will spare no effort in protecting their interests and preserving as much as possible of their influence. The forming of a new government and early elections will give the United States and international community an opportunity to support reforms, including a more inclusive elections law, independent electoral commission, and election monitoring. It could also help reduce the tensions that built up as result of U.S. policymakers feeling frustrated that Abdul Mahdi of failed to push back against the strong influence of Iran. Their complaints include what they said was his failure to implement his own decree to reign in the Iranian-backed groups within and outside the Popular Mobilization Forces, as well as inadequate support to religious minorities, and insufficient steps to sustain the military victory over ISIS. This included stabilizing areas liberated from ISIS, and repatriating Iraqi families accused of affiliation with ISIS.

Abouaoun: The Iranian proxy forces in Iraq are certainly in a tough spot. Anti-Iranian sentiment is growing among Iraq’s Shia Muslims, and this is a major source of concern for Iran, a Shia state. It has spent years trying to coopt Iraq’s Shias, partly by claiming that the ISIS threat justified Iran’s protection of Shias in Iraq. That argument for an Iranian role in Iraq is now being dissipated. This is why we’re seeing such direct attacks on Iranian interests such as the burning of Iran’s consulate in Najaf last week. And it’s extremely important that now, Iraq’s most respected Shia cleric, Ayatollah Sistani, has pushed overtly for a change in government and parliament. He has so far avoided a public anti-Iranian discourse. Iran cannot but be cautious in how they deal with the crisis. They want not only to preserve their privileged place in political and economic realms, but also to sustain their control over the Iraqi Shias. This fine balance is not going to be easy to find, especially considering the differences that are appearing among the Iranian policy makers in Iraq. Some are pushing for an aggressive, “iron fist” approach, while others want a subtler, longer-term approach. So far, the latter seem to still have the upper hand. But this could change at some point when Iran realizes it has little to lose in Iraq. This dynamic between Iraqi and Iranian Shias is very interesting and may lead to either a “right-sizing” of Iran’s role in Iraq or a robust Iranian retaliation against its opponents.