ماذا يفعل السياسيون اليوم بينما يتحضر العماد عون للعودة الى قصر بعبدا

ماذا يفعل السياسيون اليوم بينما يتحضر العماد عون للعودة الى قصر بعبدا

من نسج الخيال و لا تعكس بالضرورة مواقف حقيقية

وليد جنبلاط: يبحث عن أرشبفه الخاص لأعوام 1982-1988 ليلقن تيمور بعض المفاهيم التاريخية الخاصة بنعت رئيس جمهورية لبنان بعبارات التشبيه بعيدي أمين دادا أو بوكاسا. فأمين الجميل كان محظوظا اذ انه تمت مقارنته ببشر و ليس بحيوانات كما جرت عادة جنبلاط تجاه بشار الأسد بعد 2005. فترى ما هي قائمة النعوت الجديدة التي سيصدرها جنبلاط بحق عون بعد 31-10؟

نبيه بري: رغم وجوده في مهمة رسمية طلب من الخليل و معاونيه الاخرين نفض الغبار عن خطط و وثائق 6 شباط 1984 لان التاريخ سوف يعيد نفسه ان لم يكن عسكريا على الأقل سياسيا و شعبيا و من خلال استعمال متراس مجلس النواب و حلف المتضررين (جنبلاط السنيورة ريفي و غيرهم)

حسن نصرالله: يرتاح بعد أن أنزل عن ظهره هم رد الجميل للعماد عون. فالأخير سلف حزب الله بالجملة عام 2006 و من ثم بالمفرق بين 2008 و تاريخ اليوم أما الحزب فجل ما فعل (لغاية الاسبوع الماضي) هو الرد بالمفرق و بقيمة أقل من قيمة السوق. أما اليوم فرد الجميل جاء بحجم الجميل (اذا مش أكتر) و المرحلة القادمة هي مرحلة الخروج من العهد الأدبي الى النعاطي مع الرئيس العتيد وفق قواعد جديدة

سعد الحريري: يأخذ دروسا خصوصية من مستشاري والده بين عامي 2000 و 2004 عن كيفية تعاطي رئيس حكومة مع رئيص جمهورية من غير “جبلة” (أحسن ما نقول غير شيء)

سمير جعجع: لا يزال يحلل كيف تحولت المناورة الى حقيقة و كيف خانه بري بكشف السر

سليمان فرنجية: يحضر خطابا مهما عن المظلومية و كيف نفذ ميشال عون و من دعمه جريمة “أهدن 2”

ميشال سليمان: لم يصدق بعد أنه أكثر رئيس جمهورية غير شرعي في لبنان و أن فاقد الشيء لا يعطيه لذا لا عجب أن كل مواعظه عن الأخلاق لا تلق أذانا صاغية لأنها تصدر عن شخص متهم بالتزوير.

فارس سعيد: منهمك بعد صواريخ حزب الله لتأمين عدد الشاحنات المطلوب لازالة السلاح المتوقع حسب سعيد في الأسابيع القادمة. فالعائق الأساسي لوجستي و يتعلق بعدد الشاحنات اللازمة فقط

Unlocking Refugees Economic Potential

foreignaffairs

Over the past four years, the Zaatari refugee camp [1] along Jordan’s border with Syria has undergone a jarring transformation. What was once a desolate desert settlement has become a bustling, oddly vibrant city of 80,000. Virtually every one of its residents has suffered unimaginable loss and needs help from the international community, but they aren’t just waiting for it. In the forest of tents and prefabricated homes, barbers and teachers, fruit vendors and bakers—all Syrian refugees—are playing a role in their local economy.

It is a phenomenon we have witnessed before in working with people who’ve fled violent conflict in places such as Darfur, Lebanon, and Iraq. After losing everything, many displaced people have the resilience and resourcefulness to try again. And that begs a question: Why are these individuals, with their varied backgrounds and talents, so seldom viewed as an economic opportunity? It is a question addressed at two major meetings held this month during the opening of the United Nations General Assembly in New York: The UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants on September 19, followed the next day by the Leaders’ Summit on Refugees, hosted by U.S. President Barack Obama. The UN summit called [2] for a crisis response that goes beyond humanitarian aid to embrace employment and education. Obama is seeking enhanced work rights for refugees amid other massive increases in refugee assistance.

Syrian refugees live in a factory bombed by the Israeli military in 1982 near Faida, Lebanon, Nov. 14, 2013. Citing the country's tortured history with Palestinian refugees, Lebanon has not established camps for Syrians, leaving many in ad-hoc "urban refugee" situations where they have proven particularly difficult to reach with aid.(Lynsey Addario/The New York Times) -- NO SALES.

Can Lebanon’s New President Defuse Major Crises?

This piece was originally published on the U.S. Institute of Peace website usip.org

The Lebanese Parliament’s selection this week of General Michel Aoun as president ends 2 ½ years of a leadership vacuum that mired decision-making on fundamental economic, social and political crises facing Lebanon. The Parliament had been unable to elect a new president since May 2014, even as it faced emergencies such as the influx of more than 1 million refugees from the war in neighboring Syria. USIP Middle East and North Africa Director Elie Abouaoun examines the potential effect of the appointment of Aoun, a former interim prime minister and Army chief of staff.

How did this decision to appoint Aoun as president come about?

The election occurred because of a convergence of interests among major Lebanese political leaders and parties, namely Aoun as head of the largely Christian Free Patriotic Movement; former Premier Saad Hariri, the son of assassinated Lebanese leader Rafik Hariri and head of the mainly Sunni Future Movement; the Iranian-backed Shia party and militia Hezbollah; and the Lebanese Forces, a formerly Christian militia that became a political party. For different reasons, each of these decided that having Aoun elected would be rewarding.

For General Aoun, this election is an honorable cap to his political career after years of exile and exclusion and a platform for his party to wield more authority within Lebanon’s power structures. The appointment was made possible via a deal in which Aoun, as president, nominates Hariri for a return to the premiership. For Hariri, it is a good opportunity to boost his fading political leadership among his Sunni constituents as prime minister. For Hezbollah, it is a gain both symbolically—Aoun has been Hezbollah’s official candidate since 2014, as well as politically, since Aoun and Hezbollah have been unlikely allies since 2006. For the Lebanese Forces, it was a bitter choice they had to embrace after Hariri shunned their preferences by supporting a foe, Sulaiman Frangieh, to become president in 2015.

What will change in Lebanon after this election?

The Lebanese decision-making process is complex and regulated by a check-and-balance system. Therefore, it is hard for any elected or appointed official to implement an agenda that does not enjoy a broad political consensus. The major challenge in Lebanon is that the political and personal interests of the major actors tend to get in the way of common-sense reforms. From this perspective, it will be hard to imagine how the newly elected president will be able to navigate through this complex landscape with an agenda promoting genuine reform.

This is especially true because people familiar with the agreement that enabled the appointment tell me that it only addresses the presidency and the premiership and doesn’t go into political, social or economic issues. The first test will be the formation of a new government—Hariri being named prime minister and then selecting a Cabinet. Once this is done, various ideas and projects for reform will be put on the table, but the final endorsement of any of those proposals will be subject to consensus among the major political players. Accordingly, there are very high expectations from the new president and prime minister and a high likelihood of public frustration again in the end. So nothing major is likely to change in Lebanon.

So why does this development matter?

There are multiple but incremental measures that could help improve conditions in Lebanon over the longer term. One of them is an honest discussion among the Lebanese political actors about the best form of governance based on today’s realities. The country is still administered through a largely centralized system inherited from French colonial rule from the 1920s through the mid-1940s. Today’s demographic, economic, social and political realities in Lebanon and the region make this system obsolete.

What’s the alternative to this centralized system?

Lebanon needs to move to a politically and administratively decentralized system that allows local constituencies to choose their governors and hold them accountable. Such a system also would address a lot of the concerns resulting from citizens’ historical and chronic “fear of the other” in a diverse but divided society: Sunnis are afraid of what they see as the excessive power of the Shias, especially in the form of Hezbollah; Shias always look at the broader environment in the region, where Sunnis are the majority, and fear that a weaker Iran will allow Sunnis to oppress them again; and both Christians and Druze behave politically as minority groups, always reverting to a defensive posture.

In a sense, every constituency in Lebanon considers itself a minority in some way or other and nurtures fears and concerns accordingly. A decentralized political and administrative system would help tremendously.

Is there any support for something like that?

There are some political parties that have backed such a direction publicly, and others are discussing the idea internally. But it’s hard to know whether this concept could gain momentum because some of the strongest players might understandably resist any dilution of their powers.

How Syria orchestrates Lebanon’s elections

https://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0008_l1.htm

Published in the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin Vol. 2 No 7

As Lebanon prepares for its third round of post-war parliamentary elections next month, politics has momentarily replaced soccer as the number one spectator sport–the country is rife with speculation about which candidates will emerge victorious at the polls. If the past is any guide, though, most Lebanese will not bother to actually vote. The perception that Syria, which occupies the country with 35,000-40,000 troops, controls the electoral process is nearly universal.

The reality is somewhat more complex. To be sure, since Syria’s overthrow of Lebanon’s First Republic in 1990, no vocal political opponent of Damascus has ever been elected to parliament. In fact, no sitting member of these parliaments has ever publicly called for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. However, unlike in Syria, legislative elections in Lebanon are not a complete sham. Syrian security forces no longer deploy outside the polling booths, citizens are not routinely arrested if they vote for the “wrong” candidates, and no one wins 99.9% of the vote.

Whereas the Syrian government directly manufactures its own electoral results and makes little effort to project a credible pretense of democracy within Syria itself, the situation in Lebanon is different. American and European recognition of Syrian authority in Lebanon has always been conditioned, in part, on Damascus maintaining the illusions of a functioning democratic system and a freely elected government to endorse the Syrian presence. The end result, of course, is very much the same–a parliament thoroughly subservient to the Syrian regime, but it is achieved not through the wholesale falsification of electoral results, but through a variety of sophisticated techniques that take place at different stages of the electoral process. This report examines each of these techniques.

Manipulation of Electoral Districts.

The 1989 Taif Accord stipulated that future parliamentary elections would be held on the basis of the muhafazat, large administrative districts of which here were six in Lebanon: North Lebanon, Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Beqaa, Nabatiyya and South Lebanon. The purpose of these large electoral districts was simple: candidates in each district would have to appeal to a broader multisectarian constituency of voters in order to win. In short, holding elections on the basis of the muhafaza was seen as a vital safeguard to preserve national unity against sectarian extremism.

Prior to the 1992 parliamentary elections, however, Syrian officials grew concerned that some of their most important allies might lose the elections if they were obliged to court voters outside of their tribal and sectarian communities. In Mount Lebanon, for example, Druze militia chieftain Walid Jumblatt and his political allies faced opposition from the Christian majority, who favored rival Druze candidates aligned with the more moderate Arslan family. A new electoral law was passed which stipulated that separate elections in Mount Lebanon would be held for each local district (qada), rather than the muhafaza as a whole. This ensured the election of Jumblatt and his allies by narrowing their constituency to the predominantly Druze population of the Shouf and Aley districts. An “exception” was also made for the Beqaa, which was divided into three districts for similar, though more convoluted, political calculations. In 1996, elections in Mount Lebanon were again held at the qada level (for the same reasons mentioned above) in violation of the Taif Accord.

The electoral districts for the 2000 elections have been completely reorganized. In November and December 1999, the head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, Gen. Ghazi Kanaan, and Bashar Assad held a series of meetings with Lebanese Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and other pro-Syrian politicians to hammer out the details of the new electoral law, which divided the muhafazat into a total of 14 electoral districts. North Lebanon was split into two districts so as to ensure the election of Agriculture Minister Suleiman Franjieh and other Syrian allies. This involved combining the districts of Bsharri, Akkar, and Minyeh-Dinnieh even though the areas are not geographically contiguous. Mount Lebanon was divided into four districts. Once again, predominantly Druze areas were set apart in order to bolster Walid Jumblatt and his allies (though the Syrians later decided to switch their support to Arslan). The district of Metn was designed to consolidate support for Interior Minister Michel Murr. In order to reduce the number of seats won by former prime minister Rafiq Hariri, a fierce critic of the new Lebanese regime, and his allies, Beirut was sliced into three districts–one going to Hariri and the others corresponding with the power bases of his two main rivals for leadership of the Sunni community, MP Tammam Salam (District 2) and Prime Minister Hoss (District 3).

In addition to manipulating the size of electoral districts, Syria has also altered the distribution of delegates to favor areas of the country in which Syrian forces are most concentrated and have been stationed the longest. The 1992 electoral law, which added 20 seats to the parliament (another violation of the Taif Accord, which stipulated a 108-seat parliament), raised the number of seats in the Beqaa and North Lebanon by over 50%, while the number of seats for Beirut and Mount Lebanon increased by less than 20%. “In other words,” wrote one prominent scholar of Lebanese politics, “those regions gained most where the Syrian Army had been stationed for fifteen years, and even in the event of a partial withdrawal would still be stationed.”1

Manipulation of Electoral Lists

The electoral process in Lebanon is governed by a list system, in which each voter casts a ballot designating his/her choices for the entire bloc of representatives allotted to the district. For example, in the Baalbeck/Hermel district, there are 10 seats: 6 Shi’ite, 2 Sunni, 1 Maronite, and 1 Greek Catholic. Thus, each voter in this district chooses 6 Shi’ite candidates, 2 Sunni candidates, and so forth. This encourages individual candidates to form joint lists prior to the elections, so that voters can simply choose a predesignated slate of candidates. Although voters are permitted to cross off the names of candidates from a particular list and add others (a practice known as al-tashtib in election lingo), this rarely happens (see the section on intimidation of voters below).

One of the most critical means by which Syria manipulates the electoral process is its influence over the formation of candidate lists. Lebanon’s political elites are united by little else other than their subservience to Damascus. In order to bridge sectarian, political, and ideological differences among it’s allies, which could potentially be exploited by opposition candidates, Syrian officials pressure their Lebanese proteges to run joint electoral lists, the composition of which is subject to direct negotiations overseen by Damascus.

A good example of this pressure occurred just prior to the 1996 parliamentary elections in the south of Lebanon, when Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah addressed a mass rally of supporters and declared that the group had made an “irreversible” decision to run independent lists of candidates. A week later, Nasrallah and Nabih Berri, leader of the rival Shi’ite Amal movement, were summoned by Assad to Damascus . . . after their return, they promptly announced their commitment to run joint lists in the election (this spectacle led British journalist Graham Usher to conclude that Hezbollah “is not a fully autonomous political player in Lebanon.” 2). As Jumblatt recently confessed during a speech in Saida, the Syrians also forced him to include Zaher Khatib on his list for the 1996 elections.

As for the August 2000 elections, Syria’s hand in the formation of electoral lists has been quite evident. Most notably, Syrian officials have been actively involved in the establishment of the “Consensus and Renewal” list in Baabda-Aley which will oppose Jumblatt, whose loyalty to the “old guard” in Damascus has alienated the new regime of Bashar Assad. The list is headed by Jumblatt’s main rival for leadership of the Druze community, Aley MP Talal Arslan, and contains representatives of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Amal, and Hezbollah. Damascus originally insisted that former militia leader Elie Hobeiqa be included, but Hezbollah officials objected because of Hobeiqa’s sordid wartime past (particularly his responsibility for the 1982 massacre of Palestinian refugees at Sabra and Shatila). A compromise was eventually reached whereby a slot on this list was left open so that Hobeiqa’s supporters could write in his name.

Perhaps the best indication of how central Syria is to negotiation of electoral lists is the fact that this process, which normally intensifies during the months preceding the elections, was virtually suspended after Assad’s death in June. By mid-July, so few lists had been announced that Maronite Christian Patriarch Butrous Sfeir publicly condemned those who “are hesitant in announcing their lists, waiting for the final word that does not come from Lebanon but from outside” and former justice minister Edmond Rizk decried the fact that “the setting up of lists is not based on . . . national principles and convictions.” 3

Manipulation of Who Can Vote

The last two rounds of parliamentary elections were also influenced by efforts to disenfranchise certain segments of the population likely to vote against Syrian-aligned candidates and extend Lebanese citizenship to Syrian and other Arab residents in the country who could be easily pressured to vote as desired. Lebanese citizens living abroad were denied the right to vote by absentee ballot, even though many have valid passports, own property, and periodically return to visit relatives. This decision surprised no one: the hundreds of thousands of Lebanese who fled Beirut during the siege by Syrian forces in 1989-90 could not, of course, be relied upon to endorse candidates backed by Damascus.

Other methods of effectively disenfranchising voters were more subtle. For example, refugees who fled their homes during the war and live in other parts of Lebanon (mainly Beirut) were required to vote in their home districts. In 1992, the authorities set up special absentee polling booths in Beirut for refugees from the predominantly Druze districts of Shouf and Aley, but not for refugees from predominantly Christian districts.

Meanwhile, a 1994 naturalization decree extended Lebanese citizenship to approximately 300,000 foreign residents, most of them Syrians (increasing the country’s official population by 10 percent). These newly-naturalized citizens played a major role in the 1996 elections, particularly in the Beqaa and the Akkar district of North Lebanon, where thousands were herded to the polls by government busses to vote for pro-Syrian candidates (according to one report, some of these “Lebanese citizens” had to be bussed in from their homes in the Syrian village of Zein Abidin).4

Intimidation, Extortion and Bribery of Voters

As illustrated above, the range of possible electoral outcomes is already heavily skewed in favor of Syrian-backed candidates well before the voting actually takes place. On election day, several additional factors converge to influence the results. The most important, overriding factor influencing the Lebanese voter is the fact that his/her vote can be observed by others. Whereas in most democratic countries the secret ballot is mandatory, in Lebanon it is more or less optional (voters are not required to go behind a curtain to place their votes). This distinction is critical. The reason it is mandatory in Western democracies is quite simple–in order to protect the voter from intimidation and bribery, it is necessary to deny him any means of making his choice publicly observable (even if he strongly wishes to do so).

Lebanese voters have no such protection. As a result, intimidation, extortion and vote-buying are rampant. In fact, they have become virtually institutionalized–political candidates are legally entitled to have a representative present at each polling station in their district and routinely instruct their “supporters” to cast their votes openly. For someone who has been paid or pressured to vote for a particular list, election day goes something like this: outside the polling station, the voter is handed a ballot with the list candidates already printed on it. He then waits in line and, under the careful gaze of security forces and representatives of this list, bypasses the curtain and drops his ballot into the box.

Since it is relatively easy to monitor people’s voting behavior, powerful political figures can pressure their constituents in a variety of ways. In Lebanon, where government jobs are often obtained through contacts with political bosses rather than by merit (particularly at the municipal level), the bloated state bureaucracy obviously constitutes a massive pool of bought and sold voters. Newly naturalized Lebanese citizens constitute another large reserve of voters easily intimidated into voting for candidates backed by Damascus. Capitalizing on their memories of life in Syria, Interior Minister Michel Murr’s cronies sent them scrambling to the polls in 1996 by suggesting that some of them may have obtained their citizenship “by mistake.”

Many Lebanese, especially the poor, are readily willing to sell their votes to the highest bidder. During the 1996 parliamentary elections in Beirut, a Reuters reporter witnessed supporters of then prime minister Rafiq Hariri paying voters $64 apiece to vote for Hariri’s list of candidates.6 In light of the country’s dismal economic crisis and soaring unemployment rate, the number of Lebanese willing to sell their votes will skyrocket in this month’s elections.

Not everyone with the financial means to buy votes can do so, however–this is where Syrian backing becomes a critical element in the equation. In both the 1992 and 1996 elections, representatives of opposition candidates were routinely kicked out of polling centers or arrested by security forces–independent candidates cannot reliably buy votes if they have no observers present at the polls. In addition to the routine extortion and bribery of individual voters, political candidates who have risen to positions of power in the Lebanese government (all of whom did so with the explicit backing of Syria) have proven adept at using their control over the distribution of state funds and services to intimidate entire villages and municipalities into voting en masse for a given candidate by threatening or bribing local municipal leaders (mukhtars). “Certain officials are summoning mukhtars of towns and villages and asking them to coerce voters to cast a specific number of ballots in specific boxes,” Maronite Patriarch Boutros Sfeir complained during a Sunday sermon from his summer residence in Diman last month.7 This method of intimidation is particularly effective in rural areas, where the cutoff of government services and utilities by powerful regime figures spurned at the polls can potentially be devastating to the well-being of the population.

More generally, all voters in Lebanon are subject to an atmosphere of tension and anxiety on election day stemming from the Syrian occupation itself. In addition to the 35-40,000 Syrian soldiers stationed in Lebanon, thousands of ununiformed Syrian intelligence agents roam the country at will. Whether or not they are actually present inside the polls is unclear, but many Lebanese certainly believe that they are and act accordingly. The heavy (and technically illegal) presence of Lebanese security forces inside polling stations reinforces this sense of trepidation.8

The Media

The role of the media in molding public perceptions of political figures is, of course, very relevant to the outcome of elections. The fact that Lebanon’s post-war political elites own all major television stations and have a considerable stake in the print media tends to limit the political fortunes of opposition candidates. Television coverage of electoral campaigns in the past has tended to focus primarily on pro-government lists. Although the print media is much more willing to give voice to “opposition” candidates, the effect of print journalism on voter perceptions is more limited. As a result, many “opposition” candidates are forced to rely on advertising to get their message across. Here, too, they face an uphill battle against Syrian-backed candidates. Advertising agencies frequently come under pressure to deny media exposure to “opposition” candidates. A recent illustration of this occurred late last month when Metn MP Nassib Lahoud (one of a handful of parliament members who can be said to have taken positions that are independent of, though certainly not opposed to, Syrian policy) paid a private company $10,000 to lease 200 billboards displaying the candidate and his slogan, “Voice of the Metn, the echo of Lebanon.” Shortly after the first 50 billboards went up, however, representatives of the company told Lahoud’s office that they had come “under pressure” to remove the displays and could not risk “destroying the business.” Meanwhile, municipal workers began tearing down the displays and replacing them with those of candidates from the rival Syrian-backed list, headed by Interior Minister Michel Murr.9

Falsification of Electoral Votes

By the time election day arrives, blatant vote-rigging is not usually necessary to ensure that Syrian-backed candidates sweep the elections. In hotly contested districts, though, such measures have not been uncommon. Few were surprised when two electrical outages mysteriously interrupted the 1996 elections in South Metn–the head of the victorious list in this district was none other than Electricity Minister Elie Hobeiqa, a former militia leader and staunch ally of Syria. Most Lebanese presumed that the power in Jounieh had been cut in order to “allow ballot-stuffing to occur under cover of darkness.”10

Official figures regarding the percentage of registered voters taking part in the elections are widely believed to be grossly inflated by the government in order to bolster the perceived legitimacy of the results. During the 1996 elections in the Beqaa, when late afternoon press reports estimated the participation rate at around 13%, Murr arbitrarily extended the voting hours from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. and afterwards announced that voter turnout had surged to 52%.

Electoral Boycotts

In light of the above factors compromising the integrity of the elections, most nationalist opposition figures have generally refused to participate. While in principle this has helped detract from the legitimacy of the elections, in practice it has bolstered the electoral prospects of Syrian allies–no opponents of the Syrian occupation are competing against them and the silent majority who would most likely vote against pro-Syrian electoral lists do not bother going to the ballot box.

In 1992, nearly all major Christian political figures refused to run in the elections. In Kisrawan, where there were five seats, the elections had to be postponed because the Syrian-installed government could persuade only one candidate to run for election. Most Muslim politicians also expressed doubts about the elections, but cautiously declined to support the boycott–the most notable exception being former prime minister Saeb Salam, who announced this position from the safety of his residence in Geneva. Salim al-Hoss reluctantly agreed to run only after being summoned to Damascus for a lengthy meeting with Syrian Vice-president Abdul Halim Khaddam just days before the election. Well over 70% of registered voters declined to vote in the 1992 elections. In the predominantly Maronite Christian districts of Mount Lebanon, turnout was so low that one candidate, Maha Assad, won a seat in parliament with only 41 votes. The Christian boycott weakened in 1996, as the Kata’ib party and prominent figures such as former MP Albert Moukheiber threw their hats into the ring only to lose handily to Syrian-backed candidates (ironically, the Syrians allowed pro-boycott protesters to demonstrate openly in Moukheiber’s district so as to reduce the turnout of his supporters).11 Far fewer voters boycotted the election as the population became resigned to the futility of countering the orchestrated process and more attentive to the economic incentives of selling their votes. Nevertheless, voter turnout in this election (even according to the inflated official figures) was fairly low by Western standards, particularly in areas where the complete domination of a single list was widely anticipated. Only 31% showed up to vote in Beirut, where Hariri’s formidable electoral machine steam-rolled opposition candidates.

Most of the political figures who boycotted in 1996 have also refused to take part in this year’s elections as well. In a joint statement released early this month, the multiconfessional Free Nationalist Current (FNC), the National Liberal Party, and the outlawed Lebanese Forces movement announced their decision to boycott the polls because “electoral districts were tailored to fit certain candidates, while Syria is flagrantly imposing its alliances and forming the lists . . . to guarantee the election of a subjugated parliament.”12 The most notable exception was former president Amine Gemayel, who chose to promote the candidacy of his son Pierre and return to Lebanon. American & European Reaction to the Elections Syria’s orchestration of Lebanese electoral politics has generally received tacit approval from Western governments. After the first round of parliamentary elections in 1992, U.S. State Department officials issued a relatively mild rebuke, expressing disappointment that “the elections were not prepared and not carried out in a manner to ensure the broadest national consensus,” but said nothing of Syrian involvement in the charade.13 In 1996, American reaction was even milder. In fact, rather than seeking to limit Syrian control of the electoral process in Lebanon, the Clinton administration has sought to capitalize on it. Prior to the 1996 elections, U.S. officials asked Syria to limit the success of Hezbollah and other Islamist candidates in order to help pave the way for a peace settlement with Israel. Far from facing Western pressure to relinquish its grip on the Lebanese political system, the Syrian government sees its continued control of the political process and ability to “fine tune” the outcomes as an important means of currying favor with the West. In recent years, French and American diplomats have joined Syrian and Lebanese officials in persistently urging opposition figures and the Lebanese population as a whole to participate in the elections.

Conclusion

The first round of Lebanon’s parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place in Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon on August 27, while those in Beirut, South Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley will occur on September 3. This parliament will in turn elect the next president of Lebanese in 2004. “The next parliament will be a carbon copy of the 1992 and 1996 legislatures, spurred by the same regional factors,” writes Al-Nahar journalist Nicolas Nassif, using a common euphemism for Syrian control over Lebanon.14 Nassif and other Lebanese political analysts estimate that only 25-30 of the 128 seats at stake in the upcoming election will witness serious electoral battles (in the Baabda-Aley, North Metn, Beirut 2 and Beirut 3 districts). A handful of so-called “opposition” candidates will no doubt be elected and perhaps even distinguish themselves as critics of the government’s socio-economic policies, but they will join their colleagues in openly embracing the Syrian occupation of Lebanon.

Notes

Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1993), p. 625.
See Graham Usher, “Hizballah, Syria and the Lebanese Elections,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXVI, No. 2 (Winter 1997), pp. 59-67.
Daily Star (Beirut), 14 July 2000 and 15 July 2000.
Al-Nahar (Beirut), 19 August 1996.
Christian Science Monitor, 9 September 1996.
Reuters, 2 September 1996.
Al-Nahar (Beirut), 24 July 2000.
The Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE) reported that security forces were illegally present in hundreds of polling stations during the 1996 elections in Beqaa. Mideast Mirror, 17 September 1996.
Daily Star (Beirut) 2 August 2000.
Al-Hayat (London), 20 August 1996.
The Lebanon Report, Fall 1996.
Al-Hayat (London), 2 August 2000.
Associated Press, 8 September 1992.
Al-Nahar (Beirut), 18 July 2000.

أزمة اللاجئين بين التزامات لبنان وهاجس التوطين

http://www.alakhbar.com/node/258585

لم يشهد العالم بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية أزمة بحجم أزمة اللجوء السوري التي وصفها المفوض السامي لشؤون اللاجئين أنطونيو غوتيريس عام 2015 بأنّها “أكبر كارثة إنسانية منذ الحرب العالمية الثانية”.

وبالفعل، تخطت هذه الأزمة، من حيث عدد اللاجئين الناتج من صراع واحد، أزمة اللجوء الفلسطيني وأزمات اللجوء التي شهدها العالم في أواخر القرن الماضي ومطلع القرن الحاضر الناتجة من حرب العراق الأولى والثانية وحروب أفغانستان والبلقان ورواندا. وبحسب آخر تقرير لمفوضية الأمم المتّحدة لشؤون اللاجئين، فإّن عدد اللاجئين السوريين بات يقارب 5 ملايين، موزعين بنحو أساسي على تركيا، لبنان، الأردن وإقليم كردستان.

وفي مثل أزمات كهذه، فإّن الحلول الدائمة التي تسعى عادة الدول والمنظمات وراء تطبيقها هي ثلاث: العودة الطوعية إلى مكان الأصل، أو إعادة التوطين في بلد ثالث، أو الاندماج المحلي، أي دمج اللاجئين في المجتمع المضيف. لكّن الوضع الراهن في لبنان وفي بعض بلدان المنطقة يجعل من تطبيق بعض هذه الحلول بالطريقة التقليدية سبباً لنزاعات جديدة بدل أن تكون خاتمة لمعاناة اللاجئين. فمن جهة أولى، إّن استمرار المعارك والآفاق المسدودة لإعادة الاستقرار في سوريا تحّد بشكل كبير من إمكانية العودة الطوعية للاجئين. أّما عملية دمج اللاجئين في المجتمعات المضيفة، فهي تواجه صعوبات عّدة نتيجة لواقع التوازنات الدينية والمذهبية والعرقية في بعض الأحيان، بالإضافة إلى النسب المرتفعة لعدد اللاجئين بالنسبة إلى عدد سكان المجتمعات المضيفة كلبنان والأردن وإقليم كردستان، ولما لتلك النسب من تأثير في التماسك الاجتماعي والوضع الاقتصادي في تلك المجتمعات. لا يبقى إذاً سوى حّل إعادة التوطين في بلدان أخرى، إّلا أنّه حّل بطيء وصعب أيضاً نظراً إلى الازمة الاقتصادية التي تمرّ بها معظم دول العالم وأولوية مكافحة الإرهاب وما نتج منها من ترسيخ للعقلية الأمنية التي باتت تتحكم بالقرارات دولياً ومحلياً. فحتّى يومنا هذا لم يتجاوز عدد السوريين الذين أُعيد توطينهم سوى الذين أُعيد توطينهم سوى 4 %من العدد الإجمالي للاجئين السوريين في العالم

وأمام أزمة بهذا الحجم، قررت الحكومة اللبنانية منذ بداية الحرب في سوريا، عام 2011 ،أن تتبع سياسة إنكار المشكلة، متلطية خلف عباءة “النأي بالنفس”. فبدل أن تضع خطة متعددة الجوانب والأطراف لمواجهتها، وفّرت ـ عن دراية أو جهل ـ غطاًء لإعطاء صفة لاجئ لكل سوري موجود في لبنان دون التدقيق في وضعه، متجاهلة بذلك كل النداءات لإنشاء مراكز مؤقتة على الحدود تسمح لأجهزة الدولة بالاشتراك في منح صفة لاجئ فقط لمن يستحق من السوريين.

ثّم ما لبثت أن استفاقت بعد ثلاث سنوات على وجود أكثر من مليون ونصف مليون لاجئ على الأراضي اللبنانية موزعين عشوائياً على أكثر من 1400 مخيم غير رسمي ويشكّلون ما يزيد على ربع عدد السكّان في لبنان. في تشرين الأوّل 2014 اعتمدت الحكومة أوّل خطة أو ما عرف حينها بورقة “سياسة النزوح السوري إلى لبنان” التي تهدف أوّلاً إلى “تقليص أعداد النازحين” من خلال وقف “النزوح” على الحدود باستثناء الحالات الاستثنائية، وثانياً إلى تكليف قوى الأمن الداخلي والبلديات ضبط أمن “النزوح”، وثالثاً إلى “تخفيف الأعباء من خلال التشّدد في تطبيق القوانين على النازحين لحماية اللبنانيين في مجالات العمل والعمالة كافة”.

إّن الإصرار على تسمية اللاجئ بالنازح والتذكير مراراً وتكراراً بأّن لبنان لم يوقّع اتفاقية 1951 المتعلقة بوضع اللاجئين لتبرير عدم التزام لبنان حمايتهم، ليس سوى ابتكار لمصطلحات وفتاوى لا قيمة قانونية لها، ولا تعدو سوى كونها تحايلاً كلامياً على التزامات لبنان. لذلك ينبغي تصحيح بعض المغالطات التي تّمت ويتّم تداولها عند التطرق إلى موضوع اللجوء السوري. أولاً، إّن التوقيع أو عدمه على اتفاقية 1951 لا يغيّر أّي أمر جوهري في التزامات الحكومة اللبنانية لجهة توفير الحماية للاجئين ومبادئ عدم الرد أو الإعادة القسرية، نظراً إلى أّن تلك المبادئ تعرف في القانون الدولي “بالقواعد العرفية الآمرة” التي تلزم جميع الدول. بالإضافة إلى أّن لبنان ملزم أساساً بمبادئ مواثيق الأمم المتّحدة الواردة في مقدمة دستوره، والتي تنّص على حماية كرامة الإنسان. أّما في ما يتعلق بمعايير تحديد صفة اللاجئ أو النازح، فليس هناك سوى معيار وحيد يحدد الفرق، هو أن يكون الهارب قد عبر حدوداً دولية أو لا، فإذا عبرها يصبح لاجئاً، وإذا لم يعبرها يسّمى نازحاً. لذا، إّن تسمية الهاربين من الحرب في سوريا إلى لبنان “نازحين”، فضلاً عن أنّها غير صحيحة فإنّها لا تؤثر بشيء في التزامات الحكومة اللبنانية تجاه هؤلاء. وعندما نتكلم عن الحماية الواجب على لبنان توفيرها، إنّما المقصود هو حماية من ثبت أنّه هارب من خطر ملموس، ولا بّد من أن نوضح هنا أن ليس كل السوريين في لبنان تنطبق عليهم صفة اللاجئ، وذلك لأّن البعض منهم يصنف كمهاجر اقتصادي ينطبق عليه قانون إقامة الأجانب. وتجدر الإشارة إلى أّن عدم تنظيم العمالة الأجنبية في لبنان بما فيها العمالة السورية منذ عام 1990 وخاصة بعد عام 2005 ،هو أحد أسباب المشكلة، لما إثارته من جدل حول تأثير الأزمة ببطالة اليد العاملة اللبنانية.

ولكن كان لجدل آخر الحيّز الأكبر من الاستغلال السياسي لأزمة اللجوء السوري، ألا وهو هاجس التوطين كجزء من مشروع دولي يراد فرضه على لبنان. وقد أُعيد هذا الجدل أخيراً إلى الواجهة عقب صدور وثيقة عن الأمين العام للأمم المتّحدة اعتبر مضمونها غير بريء ومشبوهاً ووضعها البعض الآخر في إطار الضغط على الحكومة لتحقيق هدف التوطين. وتلك السجالات إنّما تشير إلى أّن المسؤولين والرأي العام في لبنان لا يتعبون نفسهم بقراءة ما يودون انتقاده، فالتقرير موضوع السجال ليس إّلا مجموعة توصيات من الأمين العام للأمم المتّحدة، تحضيراً لاجتماع سوف يعقد في شهر أيلول 2016 .والتوصيات ليست موّجهة إلى لبنان أو الدول المضيفة للاجئين السوريين، بل يتطرق إلى موضوع اللجوء عموماً، وطبيعة التوصيات غير ملزمة، وتبقي حيّز القرار كاملاً للدولة اللبنانية

لا يوجد أّي نّص أو مبدأ في القانون الدولي يلزم أّي دولة بإعطاء الجنسية للاجئ، بما في ذلك اتفاقية 1951 .وكان لهواجس بعض الفرقاء السياسين من موضوع التوطين تبعات عملية أدّت إلى اتخاذ قرار انفعالي وغير صائب، هو وقف تسجيل الولادات لدى السوريين الذي، فضلاً عن إحداث فوضى في إدارة الملف، سيؤدي إلى خلق ضبابية أخرى ستفتح المجال أمام التزوير لاحقاً وستؤدي بطبيعة الحال إلى حالات عديمي الجنسية الذين سوف يصبحون عبئاً لا يستطيع لبنان تحمله في حال عدم قدرتهم على إثبات جنسيتهم السورية… وتعوق بذلك عودتهم إلى الوطن الأّم، وهنا ستكون سخرية القدر أن يصبح لبنان ملزماً بتوطينهم من خلال قرار مبتغاه محاربة التوطين.

لذلك، بناًء على كل ما تقدم، ونظراً إلى عدم إمكانية عودة اللاجئين السوريين إلى وطنهم في المدى المنظور، ونظراً إلى إلزامية توفير الحماية للسوريين الذين يتمتعون بصفة لاجئ فقط، يجب على الحكومة اللبنانية أّن تحدد أوّلاً من يستحق صفة لاجئ ومن هو عامل أجنبي أو مهاجر اقتصادي.

بناًء عليه، يجب تنظيم وجود من صنّفوا باللاجئين فقط بشكل يوفّر لهم الحماية والعيش الكريم طوال تمتعهم بالصفة فقط التي يفقدونها عند انتهاء النزاع في سوريا ويخضعون حينها لقانون الإقامة. كذلك يجب التفاوض مع المجتمع الدولي لتقاسم العبء قررت الحكومة اللبنانية منذ عام 2011 أن تتّبع سياسة إنكار المشكلة أالديموغرافي عبر إعادة توطين أعلى نسبة ممكنة منهم. أّما بقية السوريين، فيخضعون لقوانين العمل والإقامة المطبّقة على العمال الأجانب. كذلك يجب على الحكومة، بالتعاون مع مفوضية الأمم المتّحدة لشؤون اللاجئين، أن تعيد تسجيل ولادات السوريين وأن تسّهل للسوريين على الأراضي اللبنانية آلية تسجيل ولادات أطفالهم. أخيراً وليس آخراً هناك ضرورة للعمل أيضاً على دعم البرامج التي تخفف من التوتّر بين السوريين والمجتمع المضيف للوقاية من نزاعات سوف تؤدي إلى لجوء إضافي. * الأمين العاّم لمنظمة «ألف تحرك من أجل حقوق الإنسان» ** عضو في منظمة «ألف تحرك من أجل حقوق الإنسان»

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Comments on the naturalization of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

Comments on the naturalization of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

Commenting the issue of refugee naturalization in Lebanon

The officials and most of the public opinion in Lebanon don’t bother reading a document they want to criticize or comment. The report attributed to the UNSG, subject of today’s controversy, is nothing but a set of recommendations in preparation for a meeting that will take place in New York in Sep 2016. These recommendations are not submitted to Lebanon or the host countries of Syrian refugees. They are generic, not obligatory and leave the leeway for any government to decide freely. The naturalization is not part of essential refugee protection and is not imposed by any international convention. In all cases, providing protection to refugees ceases to be an obligation as soon as the reason of asylum has been reversed.

Then they will be considered as visitors. Stop instigating hatred between Lebanese and Syrian because this is the real danger; when you instigate resentment against hundreds of thousands of refugees and you prevent them from registering newborn kids which later one becomes a reason why these unregistered kids cannot return to their place of origin. It is then that you either have to naturalize them or leave them to live in exclusion. The problem is not Ban Ki Moon, the US, Turkey or Israel. The problem lies in the level of mediocrity among our appointed or elected officials whose unique ambition is to incite the public opinion to cover their failures

تعليق عن موضوع توطين اللاجئين

تعليق عن موضوع توطين اللاجئين – د. ايلي أبو عون – في 20 ايار 2016 أن المسؤولين و الرأي العام في لبنان لا يتعبون نفسهم بقراءة ما يودون انتقاده فالتقرير موضوع السجال اليوم ليس الا مجموعة توصيات من الأمين العام للامم المتحدة تحضيرا لاجتماع سوف يعقد في شهر أيلول 2016. و التوصيات ليست موجهة الى لبنان أو الدول المضيفة للاجئيين السوريين بل يتطرق الى موضوع اللجوء بشكل عام و طبيعة التوصيات غير ملزمة و تبقي حيز القلرار كاملا للدولة اللبيانية.فيا أغبياء تأمين الحماية للاجئ لا يشمل بأي حالة و لا ضمن أي فقرة من فقرات القانون الدولي التجنيس و أصلا واجب تأمين الحماية ينتفي مبرره حالما يزول سبب اللجوء فيصبح اللاجئ كأي زائر أجنبي. كفوا عن خلق روح الكراهية بين اللبنبانيين و السوريين فهذا هو الخطر الحقيقي عندما تخلق عداء مع مئات الالاف من اللاجئين و تمنع تسجيل ولاداتهم فيتعذر اعادتهم الى البلد الأصل و يتوجب عندئذ اما تجنيسهم او تركهم يعيشون على هامش المجتمع. فالمشكلة ليست من بان كي مون و لا أميركا و لا تركيا و لا اسرائيل انما تكمن في بعض الأغبياء الذين يتولون المسؤولية و لا يطمحون الا الى تهييج الرلأي العام للتغطية على اخفاقاتهم الأخرى

بيروت مدينتي ما لها و ما عليها

بيروت مدينتي ما لها و ما عليها

تكثر التعليقات حول مبادرة “بيروت مدينتي”. و في حمى الانتخابات تكاد لا تجد الا من يؤيد المبادرة حتى الموت أو من ينعتها بأبشع الصفات. على عادتي افضل النظرة الموضوعية في الامور السياسية خاصة في زمن الاستقطابات العمياء. ان مسار المبادرة منذ اطلاقها أسس لحالة لا يمكن التنكر لها حتى و ان هزم جميع مرشحي “بيروت مدينتي” في الانتخابات.

أولا لا بد من الثني على الخيار الاستراتيجي الذي تبناه القيمون على المبادرة و المتمثل بحصر أهداف المبادرة في مواضيع بيروتية و انمائية بحتة دون الانحراف الى ما فعله سابقا مجاميع أخرى من الناشطين حينما مزجوا بين مواضيع انمائية-خدماتية (كموضوع النفايات مثلا) مع مواضيع سياسية (كشكل النظام السياسي). و الايجابية الثانية تكمن في خيار تحديد الأولويات دون الوقوع في خطأ التوسع في وضع الأهداف و الولوج الى مواضيع مشتتة و غير قابلة للتحديد.

و يبدو, على الأقل حسب أدبيات المبادرة المكتوبة و الظاهرة اعلاميا أن القيمين لم يتبنوا مقاربة “شيطنة” الأحزاب و السياسيين كما فعل أسلافهم في الأشهر و السنوات الماضية. و هذا موضوع أساسي لان الحياة السياسية لا تقوم و لا تستقيم دونما أحزاب. ضرورة اصلاح اطار ممارسة الأحزاب للعمل السياسي في لبنان لا يجوزأن يؤدي الى شيطنة الأحزاب و المحازبين كما رأينا سابقا.

أهداف المبادرة جيدة جدا و مهمة للعاصمة و أهلها و لكنها تفتقر الى توضيح أمرين مهمين:

اليات التنفيذ في ظل ثغرات قانونية جمة و نقص في الموارد البشرية و المادية. من السهل وضع أهداف و لكن اليات التنفيذ هي التي اما تقنع الناخب المتردد او لا تقنعه. فلا أحد يمكن أن يعترض على أهداف المبادرة (أو على الأقل 90% منها) اما العقدة تبقى في التنفيذ. حتى هواة السياسة يعلمون أن طرح أفكار جيدة لا يكفي الا اذا اقترن بخطة تنفيذ واقعية تأخذ في عين الاعتبار المحددات السياسية و المادية و غياب الموارد البشرية كما و سبل التصدي لمحاولات التعطيل من المتضررين من أي عملية تغيير. و هذا ما لا يبدو واضحا في مبادرة “بيروت مدينتي”.

رغم أن الصفة الطاغية للمرشحين هي عدم الانتماء السياسي (العلني على الأقل) الا أن أغلب مقترحات المبادرة تتطلب تعاونا مع قوى حزبية و سياسية و دينية, و كما ذكرت سابقا يسجل للمبادرة عدم شيطنة هذه القوى الا أن ما هو غامض هو المقاربة التي سيعتمدها الفائزون من اللائحة مع القوى السياسية. هل السكوت عن هذه القوى هو مؤقت لعدم استعداء الناخبين أم ينم عن قرار استراتيجي بانشاء اليات تعاون ايجابية مع بعض الأحزاب و القوى من أجل تفعيل العمل البلدي؟

اتمنى أن يقوم القيمون على المبادرة بتوضيح الأمور المذكورة. في كل الأحوال لا بد من التأكيد على ايجابية المبادرة و المؤشرات بانه تم تصميمها بناء على دروس مستقاة من تجارب سابقة و هو أمر نادر في لبنان. لا بد من النظر الى هكذا مبادلرات من منظار ايجابي و تفاؤلي. في الحد الأدنى تحاول المبادرة ارساء اسس جديدة للعمل البلدي في بيروت و هذا بحد ذاته ليس بقليل. تمتلك هذه المبادرة عدة نقاط قوة لا تمتلكها اللائحة المنافسة الأساسية (البيارتة) كما تفتقدها اللوائح و المرشحين الأخرين.

بيروت في 2 ايار 2016

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الفصل التثقيف في مجال حقوق الإنسان في الجامعات العربية

الفصل التثقيف في مجال حقوق الإنسان في الجامعات العربية

Chapter on Human Rights Education in Arab Universities (2015)

Comments on the agreement between Michel Aoun and Samir Geagea

Comments on the agreement between Michel Aoun and Samir Geagea

English follows Arabic (On the Geagea-Aoun agreement)

A friend asked me why I did not comment on the recent “reconciliation” between Aoun and Geagea. My answer was that there is no “reconciliation”.

1- What happened is very important because it changes the Christian political landscape in Lebanon from one of perpetual hostility between two major Christian parties (who nonetheless cannot claim an exclusive representation of Christians) to one of normal political practice whereby both parties collaborate sometimes and resort to competition in other circumstances. It also reflects that every party acknowledges the existence and constituency of the other party. It also takes us away from the usual “I am the only representative of the Christians in Lebanon”. The move also protects the Christians from the ongoing calls to “unify the Christians”, a poisonous slogan inherited from the era of Syrian tutorship and some fiction leftists.

2- Describing the Aoun-Geagea initiative as a “reconciliation” is misleading. First, the interaction – both political and personal- between both Aoun and Geagea has always existed and culminated last year by the “Statement of Intents” adopted by both parties. On the personal level, General Aoun paid a visit to Dr. Geagea in his detention center as soon as the former returned from Paris in 2005. Both described the discussion as highly “humanistic”. Geagea paid condolences visits to Aoun couple of times as well in the last few years. So what happened is not new

3- What happened is just a temporary political alignment on a specific issue and comes as a reaction to another imitative (Hariri-Frangieh). And this is actually the main weakness of this rapprochement in the sense that it came – in its form and timing- as a reaction rather than a strategic shift with regards to the vacuum in the Presidency of the Republic. This actually might be the major reason of its collapse later one

4- I came across a lot of criticism of the recent move. Two of them caught my attention: the political criticism and the one that criticized the absence of attention to the victims of the violent conlict that involved both Aoun and Geagea in 1990.

5- Most of the “political” criticism reflects a unfortunate and steady rejection for the rights of the Christians to align behind a specific political agenda.

6- The 2nd criticism is very important but there are important questions around the timing. So going through a “truth and reconciliation” process should be an uninterrupted demand for the Christians and non-Christians since 2005. It should not be a “convenience” demand depending on political alignments. Most of the ones criticizing this aspect today did not raise their voice for the last 11 years when the PLO-Kataeb announced their reconciliation or when other parties that fought each other in Lebanon (Kataeb, Lebanese Forces, National Liberal Party, Amal. Socialist party…) did actually come to agreements without addressing the issue of war crimes and violations to human rights. Why this double standards approach? The Lebanese politics will never be up and running properly before such a process is initiated nationwide and then any reconciliation or amnesty is granted only after the victims and their families are informed about who did what, where and when. Only then, the rest can follow.

سألني أحد الأصدقاء لماذا لم أعلق بعد على “مصالحة عون-جعجع”. جوابي أنه فعليا لا تيوجد مصالحة:

1- ما حصل هو مهم جدا لانه ينقل المشهد السياسي المسيحي في لبنان من حالة عداء شاملة بين تياريين سياسيين أكثريين من ناحية التمثيل المسيحي (و لكنه ليس تمثيل حصري لكل المسيحيين) الى حالة من الممارسة السياسية الطبيعية التي تقوم على التحالف عند الضرورة و الاختلاف الى حد المنافسة احيانا أخرى. كما أنها تكرس أعتراف كل طرف من الطرفيين بوجود و حيثية الطرف الأخر مما يخلصنا من نغمة “انا وحدي أمثل المسيحيين”. لقد ساهم هذا “التفاهم” في انقاذ المسيحيين من الدعوات السخيفة “الى توحيدهم” في حزب أو مشروع سياسي واحد و فق منطق الانصهار البغيض الموروث عن حقبة الوصاية السورية و بعض اليسار الحالم و الخيالي.

2- اما توصيف ما حصل بأنه “مصالحة” ففيه وهم و تضليل. أولا التواصل السياسي بين الطرفين موجود منذ مدة و تتوج بأعلان النوايا السنة الماضية. ثانيا على الصعيد الشخصي بادر العماد عون بزيارة الدكتور جعجع في معتقله فور عودة الأول من باريس عام 2005 و يروي الطرفان أنها كانت جلسة انسانية بامتيازز و بادله جعجع بزيارات تعزية و غيرها.فاذا ما حصل الاسبوع الماضي هو ليس بجديد من ناحية التواصل الشخصي أو السياسي.

3- انه مجرد تفاهم مرحلي على موضوع معين و يأتي كردة فعل على مبادرة أخرى (الحريري فرنجية). و هذه احدى عيوبه أنه لم يأتي نتيجة تحول استراتيجي لدى الطرفين لمقاربة الموضوع الرئاسي بحكمة بل يأتي “شكلا و توقيتا” كنكاية بأطراف أخرى و هذا مؤسف و يمكن أن يكون عامل انهيار لهذا التفاهم.

4- لقد سمعت و قرأت كثير من الانتقادات لفتني منها اثنان: من انتقد التقارب من زاوية سياسية و من انتقده لجهة عدم شموله عنصر تنقية الذاكرة و خاصة فيما يتعلق بالعدد الكبير لضحايا الحرب بين الرجلين

5- في السياسة تنم بعض النتقادات على تصور أنه لا يجب أن يتحد المسيحيين خلف أي تفاهم سياسي و هو مؤسف فعلا اذ انه لا يزال يعكس رفض وجود أجندة سياسية متناغمة بين أطراف مسيحية- على الأقل في بعض المواضيع

6- اما الانتقاد الثاني فهو مهم و لكن توقيته غير مفهوم. فطلب تنقية الذاكرة كان يجب أن يكون مطلب شعبي ضاغط على الطرفين و على أطراف مسيحية و غير مسيحية أخرى منذ عام 2005. و لا يجب أن يكون “مطلب متحرك” حسب الاصطفافات السياسية. لماذا أغلب من يعلو صوتهم اليوم صمتوا منذ 11 سنة؟ و لماذا بعضهم لم يرفع نفس الصوت عند مصالحة فتح- الكتائب اللبنانية؟ أو التقارب بين الكتائب و الأحرار أو بين الكتائب و القوات او بين حركة أمل و الحزب الاشتراكي أو غيرها؟ لماذا هذه الازدواجية في قبول أو رفض بعض الامور ؟ لن تستقيم الحياة السياسية في لبنان الا بعد عملية شاملة تكشف حقائق ما حصل من معارك و قتل و دمار و ان تحدد المسؤوليات و من ثم يبادر أصحاب الحقوق و أهل الضحايا الى تنقية الضمير و العفو

Peace Building in the Middle East

Conversation:

Peacebuilding in the Middle East, with Dr. Elie Abouaoun

charonqc.co.uk
This piece was originally published on the U.S. Institute of Peace website usip.org

2015 was the year of the further disastrous turn in the Syrian civil war, and the year of the rise of the terror state ISIS. As 2016 begins, what are the prospects, amidst the air strikes, terror and counter-terror attempts, and city-by-city militia battles, for peacemaking in the terror-afflicted states of the Middle East and North Africa?

Dr. Elie Abouaoun

is the Lebanon-based Director of Middle East Programs for the United States Institute of Peace. In this Conversation, exclusive to Charon QC, he offers us his insights into the strife and the solutions.

Michael Cavendish

MC: Dr. Abouaoun, you are a professional human rights and peacebuilding practitioner serving with the United States Institute of Peace as the Director of Middle East Programs, and you are based in Beirut, Lebanon. How did you get started in human rights advocacy and peacebuilding in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa Region)?

EA: My interest in public issues started in my teen age as I was involved with the Lebanese Boy Scouts Movement. During my university training, I got involved as a volunteer with a French-based human rights group. I discovered a personal interest in this field, and started acquiring more knowledge, given that my original academic background was in Dental Surgery. Things evolved quickly; I was called to be part of small projects and training workshops in Lebanon and the Euromed region. In 2003, I was offered a job in southern Iraq in the aftermath of the US military operation that toppled Saddam Hussein. After several years working between Iraq, Jordan and Beirut, I was employed by the USIP, first on the Iraq program, and then in a regional capacity.

MC: Are there specific projects you are working on at the present that you can share with us?

EA: We are working on several projects in the Middle East. In line with its mandate, USIP implements projects aiming at building local capacities on conflict related issues, doing research to inform the US public policy on peacebuilding, as well as playing the role of a convener and facilitator between parties to conflicts. Most of USIP’s projects are done in partnership with local actors, whether governmental or non-governmental.

MC: You witnessed the political geography of the Middle East in the period before the 1990-91 Gulf War, and then you had the opportunity to study the same thing during what we might call the early post-U.S. period following the tail-end of the 2003-2011 Iraq War, and now you are witness to I think what could be labeled the Civil Wars years in both Iraq and Syria. How in your view have the prospects changed for the individual man, the individual woman, the isolated locality—your exemplar Syrian or Iraqi town—to find their way back to local life without local armed conflict?

EA: It is hard for the average citizen in the MENA region to think outside the framework of conflicts. The level of violence in the last fifteen years, combined with decades of autocracy and/or theocracy, shaped the mindset of people in the region to an extent that they are not able to envisage their future in isolation from the current events.
What has changed though, is that the expectations of people are now “diluted” somehow. In the 1970’s and the 1980’s, the focus was on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and on issues related to what the leftists in the region called “social justice.” The rise of the Islamic Jihadism in the 1990’s altered the political landscape and posed new challenges, or to be more accurate, highlighted the scope of the “Islamist” problem. In all these struggles, no significant win was achieved. The Palestinians are still stateless, Palestinian refugees are all over the region, dictators were heavily supported by the West under the justification of “preserving stability and preventing Islamists from gaining power,” the economic disparities are larger than ever, the human rights records in the region is still very poor, et cetera. The 2011 uprisings were interpreted by some as the jumping board to freedom, democracy and prosperity. But the failed transition in Iraq, Yemen, Egypt & Libya, added to the unprecedented level of brutality by both the Syrian regime and its opponents in Syria, have added to the dismay of people about the chances of success. The only exception to this grim picture is the extremely fragile – though relatively successful- Tunisian model.

MC: In a white paper the USIP released of January of 2015 you gave two observations. One was that we are in the midst of the age of militarization—the age at which a male turns about 15 and can be thought of to take up arms—of those children of the Iraqis who fought in the Iraq War, starting in 2003. The second was that you have observed a higher tolerance of, perhaps emotionally a higher willingness to resort to violence, among roughly this same demographic of young men in Iraq, than you would have seen in that same cohort of age in 2003, or prior. Are you concerned that the repeated war events in the Gulf since 1990 are creating within Iraq and other areas influenced by Iraq a cultural imprint depicting war and low level armed conflict, shootings, bombings, as a part of a value system that is passed from father to son?

EA: Needless to say that violence did exist in the region pre-2003. As a matter of fact, many countries in the region have witnessed atrocious conflicts such as the Lebanese civil war, the Algerian civil war, the Inter-Kurdish war in Northern Iraq in the mid-1990s, as well as dozens of smaller scale but very violent conflicts (crushing the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama-Syria in the early 1980s, crushing the Shia uprising in the early 1990s…). This is not new. However, many contextual elements have changed and these developments might need to be considered as red flags. One of these changes is the growing role and legitimacy of militarized non-state actors. Not only they are trained and equipped by regional and international actors, but these small to medium size armed groups have acquired a legitimacy that their predecessors did not necessarily enjoy.
For example, it is perfectly “normal” nowadays to endorse and facilitate the movement of Kurdish fighters from Iraq’s Kurdistan to go through Turkey and fight in Kobane. The same applies to Shia militants from Iraq and Lebanon fighting in Syria. More recently, UAE has enrolled mercenaries from Latin America to support their units in Yemen. YPG units are seen as partners of the international community in Syria, Jabhat Al-Nusra is being marketed by some GCC countries as “legitimate” actor or “freedom fighters” in Syria, and there are many other examples highlighting the increased capacity and legitimacy of these non-state actors. The presence of hundreds of distinct armed groups in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Libya, et cetera, poses a serious challenge to the prospective stabilization efforts of these countries.
How can any Iraqi government deal with 60.000 to 100.000fighters who have been fighting for several years on their own, outside any legal or governmental framework?
Are we trying to imagine the scope of this problem once the conflicts tends to an end? This same question applies to Syria, Yemen, Libya and some extent Lebanon. There are thousands of fighters who have been involved in military and criminal activities for several years, in addition to thousands of youngsters who are outside the education system because of displacement. The impact of this reality on the future of the region is of particular relevance given the long prevailing social paradigms in the region that consider “violence” as a strength and virtue, rather than a vice.
All societies in the world went through this madness at some point in their history, but many of them have learned. It is unfortunate to realize that people in the region are still in the denial phase. For them, the problem is always imputed to “Foreign intervention”, “Colonialism”, Israel, Iran, Turkey, GCC, et cetera. In a nutshell, it is always someone else’s’ responsibility but no one is admitting that the root of the problem lies in the people of the region themselves. They were unable to generate a good model for diversity management and have resorted instead to a blame game. This means that stabilization efforts should include a component of “social transformation” for the people in the region to start demonizing violence. Otherwise, we will be just jumping from one war to another.

MC: Can we or should we draw a contrast between the status of the young man surrounded by conflict in Iraq or Syria versus a peer of his surrounded by conflict in Lebanon? Is there a distinction to be made between working on post-conflict identities for the young man in a state where conflict is being summoned versus a young man in a state like Lebanon where the conflict is spilling in as an import?

EA: I don’t see major differences between countries where the conflict is ongoing compared to those bearing the spillover of a given conflict. There are certainly minor context-related specifics, but with very little impact on the overall dynamics. The prevailing reality in the region is one of weak national identities compared to the ethno-sectarian ones. This is a legacy of years of inappropriate political governance models imposed by the secular Colonial powers who just decided that “a national identity” can be imposed. The result is the chaos and violence we are seeing today. On another level, the justification of violence— the fear of being eliminated—is almost the same in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and other places. A Sunni in Lebanon has the same fear as does a Sunni in Syria. The same applies to a Shia in Iraq and Shia in Lebanon. All of them accept a resort to violence under the pretext of “self-defense”.

MC: In another USIP white paper just released last month, the British politician David Miliband was credited with adopting the quote that as of today: “the Muslim world is living through its own Reformation, Declaration of Independence, American civil war, and collapse of communism all at the same time.” Within Syria I tend to think that view is hard to counter, but from your vantage point, is the majority of the MENA region experiencing such a disruptive level of conflict? What is the most apt analogy to history we can apply to the Middle Eastern Muslim populaces in terms of the conflicts of the past several years and what we can see around the bend?

EA: The level of violence is different from one country to another but the conflict depth and dynamics are the same. I am not sure there is one relevant historical analogy, but I would say that the peoples in the region are going through their own political transition after centuries of occupation, colonialism, monarchies and dictatorships. What is different is that the actors leading this change appear to be as bloody and repressive as the previous regimes. Here comes the fact that the social paradigms—praising violence— are not helping the transition processes to generate an inclusive model of governance. In Iraq for example, those who came to power after Saddam used exactly the same approaches in government. But instead of having one dictator, we have seen many of them trying to split the cheese among themselves. Failing to work on the social level, the transition in the region will remain bloody and uncertain.

MC: The militia operating as the self-styled caliphate IS, some now call them DAESH, has carved out a fluid, temporary state comprised of one-third of western Iraq and one-third of eastern Syria. And then, through terror killings and threats of further terror attacks, IS has seemed to intentionally provoke all three of the planet’s military super-powers—the U.S., Russia, and China—into agreeing on taking military action against them. Have observers discerned a deeper belief held by a wide spectrum of the IS hierarchy that could explain what seems to be such an irrational, non-professional strategy from the very top of the IS hierarchy?

EA: That ISIS lacks a rational strategy does not need to be proven or justified. The “Islamic State” is not based on the Western State model and therefore comparing both models does not seem to me very relevant. ISIS is not working to capture one specific country and transform it into an “Islamic State”. They are rather after a model that is a trans-national, inspired from the “Islamic Umma” model, where all Muslims in the world live under Islamic Charia, irrespective of borders and national identities.

MC: You had also indicated in a previous discussion that formal or traceable financial support to IS from neighboring states, particularly those states in the Gulf Cooperation Council organization, is not evident, yet there are suggestions that wealthy individual sympathizers living in those other Arab nations are intentionally directing financial support to IS through low-key channels such as religious charities. In terms of popular politics in the region, profile for us the makeup of private interests that would be interested in seeing IS transform into a permanent state in its current physical footprint.

EA: The motivation of ISIS supporters are different. Some of them see this organization as a Sunni defense line against Shias and Iran’s expansionism in the MENA without necessarily endorsing its precepts. Others believe firmly in the “Islamic Umma” model and see ISIS as a continuation of previous similar initiatives (Wahhabism, Al-Tahreer party, et cetera) who called for one Islamic Umma. When you look at the grass root constituency of ISIS, you can easily detect a majority of people who see ISIS as bad, but less harmful than a Shia hegemony over their countries. However, the longer ISIS controls an area, the higher risk we incur in seeing people accepting their political vision.

MC: The exodus of Syrian people out of Syria is the hottest news imaginable right now in America and much of Europe. But it is old and ongoing and ever-present news in Lebanon, and Turkey, and in some other nations that are near to Syria. Lebanon’s population has swelled with Syrian refugees such that one-fourth or one-fifth of those people currently residing in Lebanon are newly-arrived Syrians. Just from a standpoint of culture and political culture what initiatives are needed from a peacebuilding standpoint to address the sheer cultural disruption of adding such a huge population of refugees fleeing a civil war climate?

EA: It is hard if not impossible to convince people in Lebanon, Jordan or the Kurdistan region in Iraq that this huge and disruptive (to their social cohesion) number of refugees compared to their population is going to stay and that they have to accept the fact. There have been many calls by politicians, activists and relief organizations about the need to envisage a consistent “demographic burden sharing” policy. Unfortunately, very little has been done by the International community at this level. It is not about humanitarian solidarity. On the contrary, the above-mentioned societies have shown a great sense of solidarity. It is just that this huge demographic burden is looked at from the “fear of elimination” lens, i.e. the possibility of seeing permanent or long term demographic changes occurring in these countries.

MC: Quite a bit of today’s strife in Iraq and some of the surrounding states is placed at the feet of the Sunni vs. Shia sectarian divide within contemporary Islam. I don’t think anyone discounts that in some localities this divide has devolved into active hate and violence, with reprisals back and forth. But if you are asked in terms of a state-level political future for Iraq, for Syria, or for Muslim Arab neighborhoods in other places, is the Sunni-Shia divide a scapegoat that is catching blame for other causes and motivations for conflict?
And is it safe to assume that—again apart from certain localities that the wars have ravaged the hardest—the average Iraqi and the average Syrian do not see Sunni-Shia differences as any kind of implacable obstacle to a lasting nationhood or a functioning state that can provide services and also protect the individual?

EA: The political affinities in the region have been built around ethno-sectarian identities since ever because of the chronic absence of diligent state structures and inclusive national identities. Today’s conflict is indeed a Sunni-Shia one, but it is not primarily a religious conflict as much as a struggle of power between groups that identify themselves as “Shias” (without necessarily being themselves pious Shias from a religious standpoint) and “Sunnis”, the majority of whom are not necessarily following the “Sunna” in every single aspect of their life.
It is not a war between two religious institutions (the Najaf Shia religious pole and the Sunni Azhar in Egypt for example). The conflict is between two socio-political groups, called Sunnis and Shias. I know Shias in both Iraq and Lebanon who know very little about Imam Ali and his teachings; yet they are proud to be fighting Sunnis. It is just that they were borne in a Shia family or tribe that they consider themselves as Shias. And they consider the “Wahhabism” a threat to their existence as a collectivity not as a religion. The Sunni-Shia divide existed since the seventh century and took different forms, but it was always a political one more than a religious. The whole issue started as a war of succession to Prophet Mohammad after his death.
In the aftermath of the French withdrawal from Lebanon in 1943, Lebanese political actors discussed a “national pact” that regulated Lebanon political life until the war in 1975. During these discussions in 1943, the Sunni-Shia divide was an issue and one of the arrangements was to give the position of the Speaker of the Parliament to the Shias and the Prime Minister position to the Sunnis. But those who were discussing these arrangements were not religious actors. They were political leaders who had very little to do with the Islamic mode of living.

MC: The writer Kurt Vonnegut once remarked that life on this planet can be so hard at times, for anyone, that adults should issue all children with a standard book explaining where the ‘hard knocks’ that are waiting for them will come from and what are the strategies or the coping skills the adults that have survived those employed.
If we think about the youngest of the young demographic in the MENA region, children of age five and younger, equipping them with a workable plan to find a way out of a tribal conflict, a religious sectarian conflict, and then a citizen-vs-regime conflict that might be waiting for them and their demographic cohort, seems like a naïve idea but at the same time seems like an interesting idea. Because no other young population in recent history has been asked to—if we go back to David Miliband’s quote—extract themselves, all at once, from a sectarian reformation, a civil war, and a post-colonial or post-dictatorship revolution type of war. Is there any sense from where you sit that the MENA state populations need an intervention of beneficial anti-conflict advice the likes of which the world has never authored, perhaps because it has never had to?

EA: What is absolutely necessary is to show people in the region, kids and adults, that there are alternatives to violence in dealing with conflicts, and that the cost of war is always higher than the cost of political compromises. However, this approach does not really work in cases where the conflict is driven by the fear of being eliminated. This is why the international political and diplomatic efforts should be first focused on addressing this specific issue. In the meanwhile, other interventions work on conceptualizing and disseminating the benefits of the alternatives to violence. Both tracks need to be carried over in parallel.

MC: As we speak, the U.S., France, and Russia are running bomb raids across IS-held Syria. The U.K. has recently formally joined in the bombing runs. What effect on the IS territories in Syria do you think a sustained conventional bombing campaign—let’s say it continues for 12 months— will have?

EA: Sustained and multilateral military campaigns will certainly allow military gains on the ground. But with the present political disengagement of the West and increased militarization of non-state actors, I can hardly see how such gains can feed into the process of stabilizing Syria and Iraq. I just don’t see the direct correlation between the two.

MC: There is further talk that a number of nations may commit ground troops into Syria. Russia has started this, and France could follow, and the U.K. again through the Cameron government is floating out the idea of a U.K. ground troop presence in Syria after a defeat of IS. Is a post-IS Syria that is occupied by foreign ground troops a place that, in your estimation, an appreciable number of Syrian refugees will willingly return to?

EA: I am always resistant of the temptation to advance figures for such complicated matters. What is the difference if 40 or 60% return? You would still have thousands of families not willing or not able to return. The idea that ISIS is the reason for displacement is by itself misleading. The main motivation for any Syrian to return is to see a credible stabilization process being put in place. This element seems to be missing from both the US and the Russian strategies. Hence, I don’t see a lot of families packing to return home in the short to medium term.

MC: As a professional peacebuilder, what are some non-military initiatives for Syria and Iraq you would like to see the world powers and also the regional powers— Saudi Arabia and Iran—pursue?

EA: As stated above, a credible stabilization process within a clear political framework is needed to allow a sustainable peace. This should include inclusive governance models that would address the prevailing fear of elimination, as well as a compromise between the Sunni countries (mostly Saudi Arabia and Turkey) and Iran on a modus operandi in the region; a sort of a mutually agreed delineation of the zones of influence of the regional powers. Short of these two requirements, military gains will remain short-lived.

MC: It is not popular to talk about Balkanization—the permanent or long-term redrawing of national borders into smaller units to yield to ethnic or sectarian or tribal homogeneities. But in your view, are there states in the MENA that would benefit, both within themselves and from the standpoint of their neighboring states, from being divided into smaller units of, say, Sunni Iraqis, Sunni Syrians, Turkmen, Kurds.

EA: My view is that the social and cultural links as well as economic interests between the various ethno sectarian communities in the MENA are historic and sufficient enough to avert any attempt of re-mapping the region into small ethnic based entities. Having said that, maintaining countries such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon takes more than acknowledging these ties. It has go to the crucial aspect of finding inclusive governance models that give each constituent enough guarantees that the others will not eliminate them, that they will have enough autonomy to govern themselves while allowing for cross ethnic collaboration. Such a model would be closer to decentralized federal system whereby regions are administered by their own people without pushing necessarily for complete secession. It is a fine balance that needs to be found between addressing governance issues and political inclusion without inciting people to ask for a separation. It is worth noting in this regard that redrawing the map of the region in the direction of small and demographically homogenous entities will lead to more conflicts in the present context of fear and caution. So the cornerstone of any viable solution is addressing the valid concerns of the various constituents and then moving to negotiated political settlements.

MC: You co-authored a 2011 piece observing that Iraq’s then-government was worried, and perhaps was alerting other nations, of the chaos that could ensue within Syria if Bashar al-Assad were removed, and how that chaos could spread directly next-door to Iraq. Exactly this has come to pass in the form of IS, although it did not require Assad’s complete removal, only the incomplete rebellion against him. This is a bitter “I told you so” for Iraqi officials, but to your view how does it, as an unheeded warning, affect Iraq’s willingness to burden-share or make further sacrifice for a solution to the open crisis that will be post-Assad Syria?

EA: Unfortunately, Iraqi political forces are captive of their own regional patrons. They are not in a position to craft any role for Iraq in regional politics outside of their patrons’ will. I don’t see them in a position to craft a place for an Iraqi agenda in the regional turmoil.

MC: What is one solid-footed step of peacebuilding work you would like to see happen in 2016 in a state in the MENA in turmoil?

EA: The key to stabilization and peacebuilding lies in two tracks: inclusive governance models and consistent engagement by international and local actors, to induce a social transformation that would demonize violence.