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Les droits de l’Homme au Liban sous la loupe des Nations-Unies

Published in “Arc en Ciel” (Magazine of the international NGO “Nouveaux droits de l’Homme”; Paris- France)

“C’est un sentiment de déception qui m’envahit à la fin de cette réunion car la situation des droits de l’Homme au Liban n’est pas du tout saine”.

En disant ces mots, Madame Medina Kerruga, membre du Comité des droits de l’Homme des Nations Unies a reflété l’avis de tous ses collègues à la fin de leur réunion, consacrée au Liban, du 7 avril 1997 à New York.

Le Comité des droits de l’Homme, composé d’une vingtaine d’experts internationaux a pour rôle de veiller à l’application, par les états signataires, du pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques. Il étudie les rapports périodiques des gouvernements, les compare avec les rapports des ONG et les discute en présence d’une délégation officielle du pays en question.

Le Liban, qui a adhéré au pacte en 1976, a soumis le rapport initial en 1983. C’est en 1997 qu’il a présenté le deuxième rapport, avec un retard de neuf ans. Ce qui a poussé plusieurs membres du Comité à critiquer cette attitude nonchalante. Plusieurs organisations non-gouvernementales, dont “Nouveaux droits de l’Homme-International” (Mission au Liban), conjointement avec la “Fondation des droits de l’Homme et du droit humanitaire”(membre correspondant de la FIDH) ont soumis au Comité un rapport détaillé sur les droits de l’Homme au Liban. Les membres ont beaucoup apprécié l’objectivité et le sérieux de ces rapports . Ils ont violemment critiqué le fait que le rapport du gouvernement ne contient que des extraits de la constitution, ce qui est tout à fait inutile pour une telle réunion.

Les discussions ont surtout porté sur les violations suivantes:
  • La déclaration de l’état d’urgence en Février 1996 sans aucune raison valable. Selon le Comité, cette mesure doit être prise uniquement si “la Nation est en péril” et non pas en cas de manifestations syndicales comme ca a été le cas.
  • L’interdiction de manifester décrétée en 1994 et toujours en vigueur.
  • Les arrestations arbitraires, les méthodes d’interrogatoires (tortures, traitement inhumain…) ainsi que la dépendance du pouvoir judiciaire vis à vis de l’autorité politique.
  • Les atteintes à la liberté de presse (censure, autocensure… ) et la récente loi controversée sur l’audiovisuel.
  • Les actions et les violations commises par les forces armées syriennes au Liban (arrestations, transfert de prisonniers sans base juridique) et l’attitude passive des autorités libanaises vis à vis de ces exactions.
  • Les conditions dégradantes des prisons libanaises.
  • La situation des immigrés (discrimination, mauvais traitement…).

L’absence des réponses ainsi que leur incohérence ont laissé une impression chez la presque totalité des membres que les autorités libanaises attachent très peu d’importance à la situation des droits de l’Homme. Le Comité a notamment souligné plusieurs contradictions entre les déclarations officielles et les réponses de la délégation. Dans ses recommandations soumises au gouvernement libanais, le Comité a mentionné toutes les violations ainsi que quelques propositions pratiques. Il demande au Liban de présenter le prochain rapport en 1999. Osons espérer que d’ici la, un effort particulier sera déployé afin d’améliorer l’état de l’être humain au Liban et de ses droits.

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تعليقات على”ألقراءة ألمنهجية في ألإعلان ألعالمي لحقوق ألإنسان “

Comment on an article in a newspaper in Iraq

” تعليقات على”ألقراءة ألمنهجية في ألإعلان ألعالمي لحقوق ألإنسان ” ألواردة في ألعدد 50 بتاريخ 20 كانون الثاني 2004 .
· أستاذ محاضر في مادة حقوق ألإنسان – جامعة ألقديس يوسف – بيروت. · لبناني مقيم في مدينة ألعمارة – محافظة ميسان.

لقد سرَني أن أرى ، وللمرة ألأولى منذ قدومي إلى ألعراق في تموز 2003 ، مقالاً عميقاً يعالج موضوع حقوق ألإنسان ، في ألصحافة ألعراقية ألمتجددة بعد سقوط نظام ألبعث . ويعود مدى إهتمامي بصياغة هذه ألتعليقات إلى مدى سروري بالمقال .

ليس من ألجدير ألتعليق على الخطأين المطبعين ( 1984 بدل 1948 كتاريخ ألأعلان ألعالمي ) و ( 1935 بدل 1953 كبداية تحضير ألعهدين ألدوليين ). إلا إن ألتعليق ألأول يتناول بداية ألمقال حيث يقول ألكاتب إن إعلان حقوق ألأنسان وألمواطن ألفرنسي هو أول إعلان تتالت بعده ألإعلانات ، متناسياً وثيقة ألحقوق ألبريطانية عام 1689 وألوثيقة ألمماثلة ألأمريكية عام 1776 الذين ساهما مباشرة بالنهضة الفكرية الفرنسية في القرن السابع عشر.

أما ألتعليق ألثاني فموضوعه إضفاء صفة ألمكانة ألعالمية لما يسمى “ألوثيقة ألخضراء ألكبرى لحقوق ألإنسان في ألجماهيرية ألعربية ألليبية” . يبدو إنه غفل عن الكاتب إن هذه ألوثيقة صنيعة نظام ديكتاتوري تتقاطع تصرفاته مع نظيره حزب ألبعث في كل من سوريا وألعراق ومع نظرائه ألأنظمة ألعربية ألدكتاتورية . فليس كل من كتب وثيقة عن حقوق ألإنسان يعطى صفة ألمدافع عن حقوق ألإنسان حتى ولو كان جماهيرياً كما يدَعي .

لا يجوز مني إلا أن أستغرب ايضا عدم ذكر ألديبلوماسي وألمفكر أللبناني ألدكتور شارل مالك ضمن لجنة صياغة ألإعلان ، علماً أن مصر ألمذكورة في ألمقال لعبت دوراً أقل أهمية من لبنان ممثلاً آنذاك بالدكتور شارل مالك . هذا ألأخير كان له ألفضل في وضع ألمبادىء ألفلسفية ألأساسية للإعلان لاسيما ألديباجة ( أو مقدمة ألإعلان ) ويشهد أرشيف ألأمم ألمتحده ألمفرج عنه عام 1998 على أهمية ومحورية دور ألدكتور شارل مالك خلال ألأعوام 1946 – 1948 لجهة صياغة ألإعلان ألعالمي .

كما و ذكر في ألمقال إن ألإعلان حاز على 48 صوتاً مقابل صوت واحد ضده وألحقيقة إنه لم يسجل أي صوت ضد ألإعلان وقت ألتصويت . فقد نال ألإعلان أغلبية ألأصوات وسجلت 8 إمتناعات عن ألتصويت ( كما ذكر في ألمقال ) ولكن لم تصوِت أي دولة ضد ألإعلان وهذا ما يعطي الإعلان قيمة ومكانة معنويتيين لم تتمتع بهما أي وثيقة دولية لاحقة .

أخيراً وفي معرض ألحديث عن ألواجبات وألمادة 29 من الإعلان تم بتر كلمة ” ألديمقراطي ” بعد كلمة ” ألمجتمع ” ألواردة في آخر ألفقرة 2 من ألمادة 29 . وهذا ألبتر يغيَر كامل معنى ألمادة 29 ألتي ربطت ، ولأول مرة ، مفهوم ألواجبات وألخير ألعام بوجود ” مجتمع ديمقراطي ” منعاً لتحديد تعسفي لمفهوم ألخير ألعام .

وإلا فماذا يمنع صدام حسين من أن يبرر كل حروبه وجرائمه وذلاَته بالحفاظ على ألخير ألعام ألعراقي ؟؟

إن ربط مفهوم ألخير ألعام بوجود مجتمع ديمقراطي كان نتيجة جهود حثيثة ضمن لجنة حقوق ألإنسان وبتر كلمة ديمقراطي من ألمادة يفتح ألمجال واسعاً أمام تأويل وتحديد مفهوم واجبات ألمواطن ومفهوم ألخير ألعام

Geekondoor

Comments on the start-up of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

This week, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) will hold its first trial sessions. This is surely a historical moment for Lebanon for one main reason: this is the first time a case of political violence in Lebanon is taken as far as being probed by an International Independent Investigation Committee (IIIC) and brought before a “Special International Tribunal:

Despite the excitement by rights activists about this attempt to end impunity in Lebanon, the main challenge remains for the STL to reverse the perception of many Lebanese that arouse due to the controversial performance of the IIIC. Neither the scope of the crimes probed by the IIIC nor the complexity of the situation in Lebanon are sufficient justification for many of the shortcomings seen between 2005 and 2009. It is crucial for the credibility of international justice to have a flawless judicial process that would shift the perception, in Lebanon and the region, that international justice is nothing but a political tool manipulated by the “big 5”.

Stunning is the poor and disrespectful performance of the STL spokesman Mr. Martin Youssef on New TV on Sunday. When confronted with a question about the many standpoints in Lebanon about STL, all what he had to say that “Part of the Lebanese population don’t want to see the crimes judged by independent judges…” and carried on with a couple of other critiques against “part of the Lebanese population”. Not only Mr. Youssef represents STL, he should himself be an expert in communication. Dealing with negative perceptions of some people in Lebanon does not – and should not – lead to such generalizations and disrespectful comments about the Lebanese. As the spokesman of the STL and communication expert, he should know this quite well.

Mr. Youssef endorsed the well-known black or white approach; an approach that is used mainly by ideological regimes (if you are not with me then you are against me). He categorized people into blind believers in or opponents to STL. He could not – or does not want to – imagine that there are people in Lebanon who would are dying to see the concept of international justice succeed but at the same time are skeptical about the STL success exactly because of the poor performance of some IIIC and STL personnel including Mr. Youssef himself.

تعقد هذا الأسبوع أولى جلسات المحكمة الخاصة بلبنان. لا شك بأن هذه اللحظة تاريخية اقله لأنها المرة الأولى في تاريخ لبنان التي يتم إحالة جريمة سياسية الى لجنة تحقيق دولية ومن ثم الى محكمة خاصة دولية:

1- رغم الحماسة الشديدة عند كثير من الناشطين الحقوقيين حول هذه المحاولة للحد من الإفلات من العقاب في لبنان، لا بد لهذه المحكمة أن تنجح في تغيير الانطباع السائد عند عدد من اللبنانيين نتيجة الأداء الجدلي للجنة التحقيق الدولية. ولا يعقل أن تتم تبرير بعض هفوات هذه اللجنة بين عامي 2005 و2009 باي شكل رغم حجم الجرائم المحالة الى اللجنة ورغم تعقيدات الوضع اللبناني. من الضروري جدا، لأجل مصداقية نظام العدالة الدولية، أن تجرى المحاكمات بشكل يؤدي الى تغيير الانطباع السائد في لبنان والمنطقة بأن نظام العدالة الدولية ليس الا أداة سياسية يستخدم غب الطلب من الدول الكبرى.

اقل ما يقال بالمقابلة المتلفزة مع الناطق الرسمي باسم المحكمة السيد مارتن يوسف على شاشة التلفزيون الجديد يوم البارحة. عندما سؤل السيد يوسف عن الاختلاف في وجهات النظر في لبنان حول عمل المحكمة لم يكن لديه سوى اتهام “جزئ من الشعب اللبناني بأنه لا يريد رؤية قضاة مستقلين النظر في جرائم” وأكمل باتهامات أخرى “لجزء من الشعب اللبناني…”. اليس السيد يوسف الناطق الرسمي باسم المحكمة فحسب بل يفترض به أن يكون أيضا خبيرا في مجال التواصل وبهتين الصفتين لا بد له أن يعرف جيدا ان معالجة الانطباعات السلبية لا يعالج بالتعميم وسيل الاتهامات ولا باعتماد المقاربة المفضلة للأنظمة الأيديولوجية بأن من ليس معي هو بالضرورة ضدي. لقد صنف السيد يوسف الشعب اما بخانة الولاء الأعمى للمحكمة اما العداء لهاو لم يستطع التفكير بأن هناك أناس في لبنان مهتمون جدا بنجاح تجربة العدالة الدولية ولكنهم متخوفون من انعكاس سوء أداء بعض موظفي لجنة التحقيق والمحكمة الدولية – بمن فيهم السيد يوسف نفسه – على حظوظ نجاح المحكمة الدولية بالحد من الإفلات من العقاب

Geekondoor-6

هل نعرف عما نتكلم

Reflection On Lebanon political system published in An-Nahar

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كثرت في الآونة الاخيرة – في اطار المشاحنات الرئاسية اللبنانية – الطروحات والطروحات المضادة عن موضوعات مهمة للغاية يبتذلها بعض الافواه والاقلام بأبشع ما يمكن ان يتصوره اي شخص يتمتع بالحد الادنى من الحس النقدي.
اول هذه الموضوعات المتداولة هو ما يعرف لبنانياً بـ”المثالثة” اي تقسيم السلطة في لبنان بين السنة والشيعة والمسيحيين خلافا للنموذج السابق والمعروف بـ”المناصفة” بين المسيحيين والمسلمين (سنة وشيعة ودروز وعلويين).
وهنا يتعمد المزايدون اغفال ابسط القواعد المنطقية في مقاربة طبيعة النظام السياسي اللبناني. اذ ان الهدف من انشاء نظام سياسي قائم على الانتماء المذهبي – بحسناته وسيئاته – هو الاخذ بالمعطى التاريخي بأن يتقاطع الانتماء السياسي مع المذهبي لدى شريحة كبرى من اللبنانيين مما يتطلب نظاما سياسيا يبنى على هذا المعطى. لذا، وبصرف النظر اذا كان التقاسم مناصفة اومثالثة، لا يرتقي نظام من هذا النوع الى الهدف الذي انشئ من اجله، الا اذا تمتع من يمثل اي مكون من المجتمع اللبناني في تركيبة السلطة بمشروعية نابعة من المكون نفسه وليس من اي مكون آخر. اذا نظرنا بتمعن في مدى توافر هذا الشرط منذ عام 1990 نجد ان النظم الانتخابية المعتمدة منذ انتهاء الحرب كرست مبدأ التمثيل المجتزأ خاصة عند المسيحيين (ولكن ليس عندهم فقط). ففي كل الدورات الانتخابية لم تتعدَ نسبة النواب المسيحيين المنتخبين من المكونات المسيحية الثلث بأفضل الاحوال، علماً انها كانت اقل من الربع في اكثر المرات. ووجدت المشكلة نفسها في اغلب الحكومات، اذ ان عدد الحكومات التي تعكس التمثيل السياسي الصحيح كانت غائبة تماماً بين 1990 و2005. اذاً المناصفة الذي يتغنى بها البعض في ايامنا هذه ليست إلّا وهماً وخيالاً. في هذا الاطار يطل البعض بحجة واقعية، ولكن غير دقيقة بأن اتفاق الطائف كرس المناصفة اقله بالنص، ولكن الممارسة خالفت النص. ينسى هذا البعض ان دستور الطائف ينص على امور عدة منها الغاء “الطائفية السياسية” وانتخابات على اساس دوائر معدلة، مما يطيح بمبدأ التمثيل الفعلي وينقض بشكل كبير متطلبات المناصفة.
لذا ان الامر الاساس والسابق لنقاش المناصفة او المثالثة هو اما اعتماد نظام سياسي غير مبني على الانتماء المذهبي (والذي لا يصلح للواقع اللبناني الحالي برأيي) او ان تقبل كل المكونات بمبدأ التمثيل الصحيح بما فيه ان يتخلى كل من تيار المستقبل “وحزب الله” وحركة “امل” والحزب التقدمي الاشتراكي عن الاتيان بوزراء ونواب مسيحيين تابعين لهم (منتخبين من قبل قواعدهم الشعبية). كل كلام عن مناصفة او مثالثة قبل الاقرار بمبدأ حصرية التمثيل يبقى ذراً للرماد في عيون اللبنانيين.
من جهة اخرى، شهد السجال الانتخابي الرئاسي ايضاً طرح “مواصفات” الرئيس المنتظر. فنشط خيال السياسيين وبعض الاعلام في “حلب” مفردات اللغة العربية ليتحفونا بمصطلحات مثل “الرئيس القوي” او “التوافقي” او “الوفاقي” او “الوسطي” وغيرها من المفردات الرنانة. ولم يفكر هؤلاء في ان هذه المواصفات تبقى فارغة المضمون ما لم يتحدد الدور السياسي الذي “يجب” و”يمكن” ان يمارسه الرئيس في ضوء الواقع اللبناني والصلاحيات المتاحة له دستوريا. وبناء عليه، ان الاطار الافضل للنقاش هو اذا كانت وظيفة رئيس الجمهورية ان “يحكم”، “يدير” او ان يكون “حكما”. الادوار الثلاثة مختلفة تماما والاتفاق على الدور يملي الآلية التي يجب اعتمادها، كما و”بروفايل” الرئيس.
فاذا كان المطلوب من الرئيس ان يحكم يجب انتخابه بالاكثرية المطلقة، ويمكن ان يأتي الرئيس في هذه الحالة من كنف الاكثرية النيابية وان يتمتع بصفات قيادية بامتياز. ولكن هذا الخيار يتطلب تعديلا دستوريا يعيد النظر في الصلاحيات الرئاسية بما يتيح للرئيس ان يحكم. اما دور “المدير” – اسوأ الخيارات على الاطلاق – فهو اقرب ما يكون عليه هو شخص غير قيادي تكنوقراطي على الارجح ولا يتمتع بالضرورة بحيثية سياسية. اما الدور التحكيمي فيتطلب رئيساً مقبولاً من الجميع دون ان يعني هذا ان يكون مجردا من الحيثية السياسية. فالحكم يجب ان لا يكون “موظفا” عند احد (والا انتفت صفته التحكيمية) بل على العكس يجب ان يكون لديه القدرة على التأثير الايجابي في مختلف الاطراف دون ان يفقده هذا استقلاليته وهامش المناورة. لا بد من الاعتراف بأن حاضر لبنان ومستقبله القريب يتطلبان دورا تحكيميا للرئيس اكثر من اي شيء آخر. هذا الدور مختلف جذريا عن الوسطية بالمفهوم اللبناني، والتي اضحت مجرد “ضربة على الحافر وضربة على المسمار”… هل يصوب النقاش في اتجاه عقلاني يسمح بتحديد دور الرئيس المقبل ومواصفاته؟

Geekondoor

Comments on Ersal Lebanon Incidents

Comment on Ersal – Lebanon incidents

I got some questions about the difference in the approaches I am writing about to deal with both the Iraqi and Lebanese situation. In the aftermath of the Mosul invasion, I called, in an article, for a political solution whereas in Lebanon I am calling for a military one.

For me, the difference is clear: The core issue in Iraq is political i.e. the political marginalization of essential constituents which led to a temporary arrangement between ISIS, Sunni tribes and those who consider themselves victims of Maliki political behavior.

Without this temporary arrangement, ISIS would not have been able to gain any territory in Iraq. The evidence to this is that when the Awakening Councils in Iraq decided to fight the radical terrorist groups in 2007 and 2008, they succeeded to a large extent while the most powerful army was unable to claim the same gain. In Lebanon the situation is different in the sense that despite the current imbalance in the power sharing system, the Christian constituent is the one mostly affected by this imbalance and not the Sunni one.

Moreover, the recent events showed that there was no real support to the IS campaign from any political party. The complains from Arsal inhabitants themselves is a clear indicator that they don’t endorse what is happening. Therefore, the nature of the fights in Lebanon is pretty much military/security oriented and any attempt to find a political accommodation with these groups is the biggest danger at this stage.

سألني البعض لماذا كتبت مقالا بعد اجتياح الموصل عن أهمية البعد السياسي للحل في العراق بينما عبرت عن أن الحل العسكري هو الأساس لما يحدث في شرق لبنان. بالنسبة لي الفرق واضح: أساس المشكلة في العراق هي مشكلة سياسية تتمثل بأقصاء مكونات أساسية عن اليات المشاركة في القرار أدت الى تفاهم ظرفي بين العشائرالسنية و المتضررين من سياسات المالكي و تنظيمات كداعش و اخواتها. و لولا هذا التفاهم الظرفي لما تمكنت داعش من التقدم ميدانيا. البرهان على ذلك أنه عندما قررت الصحوات العراقية محاربة الحركات التكفيرية في عامي 2007 و 2008 نجحت بنسبة كبيرة فيما اخفق اكبر جيش في العالم في تحقيق نفس النتيجة. أما في لبنان فرغم اختلال التوازن نوعا ما في نسبة المشاركة في القرار السياسي الا أن المتضرر الأكبر على هذا المستوى هو المكون المسيحي و ليس السني. كما أن الأحداث الأخيرة برهنت أن التحرك التكفيري في عرسال لم يلق أي دعم فعلي من أي طرف سياسي أو شعبي لا بل أن الشكاوى من أهل عرسال نفسهم مؤشر على أنه لا يوجد بيئة حاضنة فعلية لهذا التحرك. لذا طبيعة المعركة الحالية في لبنان هي الى حد كبير طبيعة عسكرية – أمنية و ليس سياسية. و بالتالي أي محاولة لإيجاد تسوية سياسية لهذه الحالة هو من أخطر ما يمكن أن يحصل

Geekondoor-3

Human Rights Organisations in Transition Countries (PDF)

davidpublisher.org

Human Rights Organizations in Transition Countries
Elie Abouaoun
St. Joseph University

The paper examines the challenges faced by the human rights organizations in the Arab region. It will focus on those challenges resulting from the radical changes that happened since 2011. It will also look into the prospective role of the human rights organizations in the future phases of the political transition. Keywords: civil society, Arab Region, human rights organizations, countries in transition

1. Introduction

The prevailing public perception in the Arab region is that the government is responsible for the protection and promotion of respecting human rights. The role of other segments of the society is often questioned.

In the last two decades, there has been a growing interest in the Arab region in human rights. This interest is materialized, amongst other things, with the emergence of voluntary initiatives aiming at the promotion and respect of human rights. Many of these initiatives are now well-established Civil Society Organizations (CSO) which are able to attract large funding.

In this regard, the question that has yet to be addressed is whether all CSO in the region operate in the arena of voluntary collective actions around shared interests, purposes, and values. Can human rights actors within the Civil Society Ecosystem genuinely claim representing a well-defined constituency?

2. The Changes

Although it was difficult to generalize, the pre-2011 political landscape in the Arab region consisted mainly of authoritarian regimes with a set of diverse civil actors such as political opponents, intellectuals, rights groups/activists, unions, women, students, and disaffected former members of the regime. These groups were largely against the dictator in one way or another, but for various and often diverging reasons. Among these opposition groups were highly organized Islamist movements, led or inspired by the teachings of radical political Islam, excluded through brutal oppression. The extent to which all of these actors with diverse agendas evolved to become a heterogeneous, but harmonized, civil society sector (CSS) was still up for debate.

This reality severely affected the credibility and legitimacy of the CSS in the region. Prior to 2011, the CSS acted in a hostile political and legislative environment, under governments that acted persistently to challenge both their credibility and legitimacy. In countries undergoing political transition, we have seen a chaotic growth of CSS actors after 2011 that are flooded with guided funding resulting in a negative image and a business-minded mentality, which has had detrimental effects on their ability to be accepted by their potential constituencies.

Moreover, the legitimacy of the CSS suffers from the sector’s spontaneous hostility towards religious values and establishment. Working under the assumption that the only solution is western style secularism, most of the CSS actors fail to recognize that more than two thirds of the current world’s population identifies with a religion and that this factor is more ostensible in a region where a belief system emerges as a core source of identity. While clerics use religious language to mobilize followers and widen their base of support, political leaders use religious discourse to garner popular support for specific policy aims or make space for their group that may feel discriminated and/or marginalized. CSS actors do not give enough thought about the linkages that have to be established with and between these two trends and how to relate it to human rights work; therefore, deepening the gap between the CSS and its potential constituency.

Similarly, building a constituency for human rights in the region requires a public endorsement of the human rights values. The element that has yet to become clear is whether the popular paradigms in the Arab region favor human rights in general. There is no question that the success and sustainability of right based interventions are intimately linked to a buy-in from society itself. As such, it is not enough for CSS actors to implement projects or randomly support their communities. They must also engage initiatives aimed at popularizing the universal values of human rights, so that they become the foundation of the social order.

However, most Arab CSS actors have continuously relied on foreign funding because of the absence of local and unconditional funding to human rights initiatives. This has impeded their capacity to drift away from their funders’ restrictive agendas. Unfortunately, most of the main funding agencies are yet to be convinced of the importance of investing in long-term endeavors by local actors to trigger a social change in favor of a better endorsement of human rights values by communities. As such, a large portion of foreign funding is still directed to support specific thematic and mostly short-term interventions. The few actors who try to challenge this trend found themselves in financial hardship as soon as they try to resist their funders’ agendas.

Alternatively, the post 2011 environment favors established and large civil society groups at the expense of grassroots groups because of a prevailing assumption by large donors that technical capacity refers only to the ability to design and implement a project on time and as per the approved project proposal. In practice, those who are granted most of the resources are the ones able to fill out the forms and have fancy accounting systems, such as urban-based NGOs, often disassociated from the communities around them. However, these actors may not necessarily be the ones who are aware of the needs to be addressed or how to accomplish it in the local context.

While accountability to donors is essential, the value of being accountable to the constituency is almost absent. This widens the gap further with the community and negatively affects the legitimacy and acceptability of CS actors. The weak culture of accountability in the region, even among the CSOs who refrain from imposing accountability towards their constituencies, contributes to the weak legitimacy and acceptability of the sector as a whole.

Beyond the issue of legitimacy lies another obstacle: It is the distorted perception about human rights work. This latter is pictured in general as being anti-governmental by nature. If it is true that the relationship between CSOs and the governments during the last decades is mostly characterized by a deep mistrust and hostility, maintaining an ongoing hostile attitude towards the governments is surely counterproductive. Engaging in cooperative problem solving some human rights issues at least is key to the proper positioning of the CSS and will dismiss the concern that human rights work is anti-governmental. What are still missing is that by taking all human rights work as a package, confrontation with the government is required only on a limited basis.

Otherwise, many interventions can still be done through cooperation with stakeholders including national and local authorities.

Finally yet importantly, the fact is that national legislations in the region have embraced more human rights principles. Despite that the governments’ practices are far from complying with international standards, it remains that the numbers of international treaties and conventions signed and ratified over the last years by Arab governments have increased with all the requirements to the relevant UN relevant bodies.

3. Way forward

Only three decades ago, governmental stakeholders strongly questioned the role of CS actors in many fields including human rights. Actually, the role of the latter was perceived as an “invasion” of the “public” sphere by unknown non-governmental actors. Nowadays, this role is more acknowledged than ever before and the public sector cannot claim exclusivity in serving the public good anymore. There are even more actors involved in the struggle for better respect of human rights, such as the corporate sector, academia, and others. This is why it becomes urgent for the CSO in the Arab region to shift their mode of operation to one based on inclusiveness (e.g., envisage working with governments, religious institutions…) and collaborative approaches. Building alliances, even when their scope is thematically or geographically limited, is not optional anymore.

In addition to inclusiveness and collaboration addressing issues such as building a constituency for human rights, strengthening accountability framework of the CSS, effectiveness of CSO, professional public communication, and cultivating local philanthropy for human rights seem to be a priority on the agenda.

Previous experiences show that transitions to democracies are not reversible and no matter how costly they can be, they will lead to a renewed social contract in each of the affected countries. Moreover, despite of the horrors seen in Libya and Syria, this dynamic will spill over to other countries in the midterm. In this context, CS actors will have a vital role to play. Will they qualify for this role?

People leaving areas controlled by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria wait to clear the Khazer checkpoint between Mosul and Erbil in Iraq, June 14, 2014. A rebel juggernaut that captured Iraq's second-largest city and raced south in three days, raising fears of the imminent fall of Baghdad, stalled for a second day on Saturday about 60 miles north of the capital, leaving residents bracing for a siege that so far has not happened. (Bryan Denton/The New York Times)

Iraq crisis: Will Politics Deliver More After Military Response This Time?

http://www.usip.org/

Just six months ago, I was having a traditional Iraqi dinner with a friend in a building overlooking the Tigris River. But this was no ordinary Iraqi, and our surroundings were hardly luxurious. My friend is a senior Iraqi intelligence officer and a close aide to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the setting was his bunker-like office in a heavily guarded military compound in Baghdad. Security threats left us no choice.

People leaving areas controlled by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria wait to clear the Khazer checkpoint between Mosul and Erbil in Iraq, June 14, 2014. Photo Credit: The New York Times/ Bryan Denton
People leaving areas controlled by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria wait to clear the Khazer checkpoint between Mosul and Erbil in Iraq, June 14, 2014. Photo Credit: The New York Times/ Bryan Denton

Our conversation quickly turned to the escalating security and political turmoil in Iraq. “The conflict in Syria is our major concern,” he told me. “The groups are moving freely between Syria and Iraq and are building up forces in some areas in Iraq where we expect more troubles. We think of this as an existential threat, and all our energy is focused now on curbing the expansion of these movements.”

Unfortunately, “all” the energy turned out to be mainly focused on military efforts rather than the desperately needed political accommodation that might have headed off the downward spiral we see in Iraq today. But it’s not too late – in fact, it’s even more urgent — to think about the political approach needed now to ensure that any potential military counter-offensive will be sustainable this time.

Despite those huge military and security efforts, the question is why the militant group Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS) still was able to conquer a geographical space as large as North Carolina? It is an achievement that no non-state player in the region had been able to claim before.

Although there certainly are various factors at play, including regional dynamics such as the competition between primarily Shia Iran and Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia, groups like ISIL cannot operate so freely in an environment of public hostility toward them. So, does the fact that they’ve swept easily across northern Iraq mean that the Sunnis of Al-Anbar, Nineveh, Salah El-Dine, Diyala and other provinces are all supporters of ISIL? Are they all terrorists? Certainly not.

The most reasonable analysis of why ISIL was able to move without significant resistance by local citizens in the Sunni provinces is that the political process in Iraq failed. The Sunnis who helped suppress a previous extremist-led insurgency in 2007 felt disenfranchised from the government that Maliki controlled. He invested heavily in military and other security measures in response to political grievances that turned into months of public demonstrations. He put far less energy into building trust with Sunnis, Kurds and other components of today’s Iraq.

Call it shortsighted strategy or the curse of the powerful or the trend of new-wave dictatorship or whatever — the result is the same: a huge percentage of Iraqis felt targeted, marginalized, ostracized and dismissed. The Iraqis waited for elections, and all they got was a renewal of the same political order that they saw as responsible for disaster for the last seven years. In their frustration and desperation, would they resist any attempt to force change, regardless of what form it took? Not likely.

The International community is mobilizing now to address the ISIL surge in Iraq. While some military actions might be considered, the most pressing need is for a political strategy.

There is no way a military response will pacify Iraq and the region. It might halt the progress of ISIL for a while. But a sustainable peace in Iraq cannot be achieved without a credible political settlement.

If there is a niche where the U.S., the EU and other Western countries could be particularly effective, it is in pressing for and supporting the design and implementation of a full-fledged, inclusive national dialogue in Iraq, as should have been done in April 2003.  Such a dialogue would aim to address the legitimate concerns of various constituencies in Iraq, including revisiting the current political arrangements to ensure all are represented fairly.

To further strengthen the outcomes of such a dialogue would eventually require a de-escalation at the regional level as well, namely between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which is a process the U.S. already started pushing for and is worth continuing.

My friend in Baghdad is busy today with the military response launched by the government of Iraq. Will he and others in Iraq’s ruling elite acknowledge that a political settlement will be imperative to sustain any military gain that he and his fellow generals achieve in the coming days? Will the U.S. and the West deliver enough resources and pressure to make sure the 2014 counter-insurgency does not fade away as did the one in 2007?

Let no one try to fool Iraqis and public opinion in the West by promoting an exclusively military response. There’s also an urgent need to talk politics.

20140529-Refugee-Camp-Lebanon-Syrian-border-Wiki-QA

Q&A: Lebanese Presidential Elections

This piece was originally published on the U.S. Institute of Peace website usip.org

Lebanon’s parliament failed to elect a successor within the constitutional timeframe before President Michel Suleiman’s term expired on May 25. Elie Abouaoun, the director of Middle East programs for the U.S. Institute of Peace, explains the dynamics feeding the divisions, the ramifications of the vacancy and possible solutions.

Lebanon’s internal political and sectarian divisions have deepened precipitously since the outbreak of civil war in neighboring Syria, as refugees from that fighting fled across the border and Lebanese factions took sides in the neighboring conflict. The Lebanese Shia militant group Hezbollah intervened to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, while Sunni groups sided with the rebels in Syria.

A group of international officials on May 26 called for an end to the power vacuum by electing a new President and for Lebanon’s leaders to ensure the government of Prime Minister Tammam Salam has the authority to deal with economic, security and humanitarian issues in the meantime.Has this happened before?

This constitutional milestone is known to polarize political leaders in and around Lebanon and often even international players. So this is not the first time the Lebanese presidential election has created a deadlock. In 12 similar presidential-succession crises since Lebanon became an independent country in 1943, electing a new president proved to be difficult and led to half-baked imposed solutions.How does a vacancy in the presidency affect the fragile stability in Lebanon?

Because this has happened before and because most regional and international leaders wouldn’t benefit from major upheaval in Lebanon, this latest occurrence isn’t likely to cause a deterioration that would lead to civil war. Even for the most militarized party in Lebanon, Hezbollah, an internal conflict in Lebanon would only divert the group’s resources from the main battle it is leading in support of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in neighboring Syria and from its overall mandate of fighting Israel. The only game changer for Hezbollah would be if it identifies an internal threat to its existence or operations. Other parties in Lebanon are far from posing such a threat at this stage.

Because this has happened before and because most regional and international leaders wouldn’t benefit from major upheaval in Lebanon, this latest occurrence isn’t likely to cause a deterioration that would lead to civil war. Even for the most militarized party in Lebanon, Hezbollah, an internal conflict in Lebanon would only divert the group’s resources from the main battle it is leading in support of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in neighboring Syria and from its overall mandate of fighting Israel. The only game changer for Hezbollah would be if it identifies an internal threat to its existence or operations. Other parties in Lebanon are far from posing such a threat at this stage.

However, the partial paralysis at the legislative and executive levels now could trigger other crises as the existing economic, social and humanitarian (Syrian refugees) challenges worsen. 

Why is electing a President so complicated in a nation known to have adopted rather democratic practices compared to the largely authoritarian neighboring countries?

The Presidential election crisis is a symptom of a larger and deep-rooted problem: the formal Lebanese political system is not properly structured for a country of 18 different religious groups and intense identity-based politics. Despite constitutional changes introduced in 1926, 1943 and 1989, the system is largely based on majority rule. But in practice, different parties with different interpretations of legislation can block measures in efforts to strengthen their grip on the power structures. That results in political deadlocks that usually are resolved only through settlements brokered by regional or international powers.  

So, the most urgent need for Lebanon now is structural reforms to the political system. Political and civil society leaders should admit that a majority cannot govern Lebanon today with its demographic, social and political diversity.  Instead, the constitution should reflect the customary practice used since 1943 and formalize a system based on consensus that would also spell out interim arrangements. Crises might still occur, but their length and intensity might be eased.  While the easiest solution would be another quick fix, that would only have a palliative effect until the next crisis erupts.How do you envisage a new President will be elected?

It is hard to predict. The fate of the Presidency depends on the outcome of the potential talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia. If these discussions do not result in political arrangements (assuming Lebanon is even on the agenda, which is still uncertain), it is likely that another regional mediation will be initiated for Lebanon. Regional intervention in the Lebanese parliament’s selection of a president has always been and will still be a determining factor if the whole Lebanese political system is not revisited.Are there any top candidates for President and what kind of influence do they have?

None of the top four Christian political figures who have significant constituencies seem likely to win, at least in part because none of them is accepted by both sides on Lebanon’s pro-Iran and pro-Saudi divide. The most likely scenario is that prospective mediators will look for a “compromise” (second-tier) candidate agreed by both Saudis and Iranians. Unfortunately, this means that the next president will have little margin to exercise real authority.

20140529-Refugee-Camp-Lebanon-Syrian-border-Wiki-QA

Q&A: Lebanese Presidential Elections

This piece was originally published on the U.S. Institute of Peace website usip.org

Lebanon’s parliament failed to elect a successor within the constitutional timeframe before President Michel Suleiman’s term expired on May 25. Elie Abouaoun, the director of Middle East programs for the U.S. Institute of Peace, explains the dynamics feeding the divisions, the ramifications of the vacancy and possible solutions.

Lebanon’s internal political and sectarian divisions have deepened precipitously since the outbreak of civil war in neighboring Syria, as refugees from that fighting fled across the border and Lebanese factions took sides in the neighboring conflict. The Lebanese Shia militant group Hezbollah intervened to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, while Sunni groups sided with the rebels in Syria.

A group of international officials on May 26 called for an end to the power vacuum by electing a new President and for Lebanon’s leaders to ensure the government of Prime Minister Tammam Salam has the authority to deal with economic, security and humanitarian issues in the meantime.Has this happened before?

This constitutional milestone is known to polarize political leaders in and around Lebanon and often even international players. So this is not the first time the Lebanese presidential election has created a deadlock. In 12 similar presidential-succession crises since Lebanon became an independent country in 1943, electing a new president proved to be difficult and led to half-baked imposed solutions.How does a vacancy in the presidency affect the fragile stability in Lebanon?

Because this has happened before and because most regional and international leaders wouldn’t benefit from major upheaval in Lebanon, this latest occurrence isn’t likely to cause a deterioration that would lead to civil war. Even for the most militarized party in Lebanon, Hezbollah, an internal conflict in Lebanon would only divert the group’s resources from the main battle it is leading in support of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in neighboring Syria and from its overall mandate of fighting Israel. The only game changer for Hezbollah would be if it identifies an internal threat to its existence or operations. Other parties in Lebanon are far from posing such a threat at this stage.

Because this has happened before and because most regional and international leaders wouldn’t benefit from major upheaval in Lebanon, this latest occurrence isn’t likely to cause a deterioration that would lead to civil war. Even for the most militarized party in Lebanon, Hezbollah, an internal conflict in Lebanon would only divert the group’s resources from the main battle it is leading in support of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in neighboring Syria and from its overall mandate of fighting Israel. The only game changer for Hezbollah would be if it identifies an internal threat to its existence or operations. Other parties in Lebanon are far from posing such a threat at this stage.

However, the partial paralysis at the legislative and executive levels now could trigger other crises as the existing economic, social and humanitarian (Syrian refugees) challenges worsen. 

Why is electing a President so complicated in a nation known to have adopted rather democratic practices compared to the largely authoritarian neighboring countries?

The Presidential election crisis is a symptom of a larger and deep-rooted problem: the formal Lebanese political system is not properly structured for a country of 18 different religious groups and intense identity-based politics. Despite constitutional changes introduced in 1926, 1943 and 1989, the system is largely based on majority rule. But in practice, different parties with different interpretations of legislation can block measures in efforts to strengthen their grip on the power structures. That results in political deadlocks that usually are resolved only through settlements brokered by regional or international powers.  

So, the most urgent need for Lebanon now is structural reforms to the political system. Political and civil society leaders should admit that a majority cannot govern Lebanon today with its demographic, social and political diversity.  Instead, the constitution should reflect the customary practice used since 1943 and formalize a system based on consensus that would also spell out interim arrangements. Crises might still occur, but their length and intensity might be eased.  While the easiest solution would be another quick fix, that would only have a palliative effect until the next crisis erupts.How do you envisage a new President will be elected?

It is hard to predict. The fate of the Presidency depends on the outcome of the potential talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia. If these discussions do not result in political arrangements (assuming Lebanon is even on the agenda, which is still uncertain), it is likely that another regional mediation will be initiated for Lebanon. Regional intervention in the Lebanese parliament’s selection of a president has always been and will still be a determining factor if the whole Lebanese political system is not revisited.Are there any top candidates for President and what kind of influence do they have?

None of the top four Christian political figures who have significant constituencies seem likely to win, at least in part because none of them is accepted by both sides on Lebanon’s pro-Iran and pro-Saudi divide. The most likely scenario is that prospective mediators will look for a “compromise” (second-tier) candidate agreed by both Saudis and Iranians. Unfortunately, this means that the next president will have little margin to exercise real authority.

Geekondoor-5-1200x478

Tunisia & Libya’s political transition: Impressions from the field

This piece was originally published on the U.S. Institute of Peace websiteusip.org

Tunisia and Libya recently took diverging tracks in their political transitions. A USIP field mission to both countries to meet with political and civil society leaders reveals potential lessons from Tunisia’s advances and possible opportunities that still exist for Libya to salvage its transition.man casts vote

Elie Abouaoun is USIP’s director of Middle East Programs, based in Beirut.

Tunisia is, for now, the most successful example of a peaceful and decisive political transition. The deal struck by the country’s main political parties on a roadmap eased an acute political crisis and undeniably constitutes a major breakthrough.

Reaching agreement was not easy, but the discussions that led to it were supported by the weighty and direct involvement of the Tunisian Bar Association, the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH) and the Tunisian Union for Commerce, Industry and Handicrafts. This so-called “National Dialogue Quartet” put enormous pressure on political parties to end a months-long stalemate. By positioning itself as a mediator, the quartet used varying techniques of persuasion and coercion to make sure all political parties came back to the table.

This unprecedented example in the Middle East and North Africa materialized mainly because of the strong credibility these four organizations built over time since the era of Habib Bourguiba, who led Tunisia to independence in 1956 and served as its president for 30 years until 1987. Each of the four groups is seen as a mobilizing force within its respective constituency; that allowed them to alternately position themselves as mediators or as enforcers who could threaten to name-and-shame the spoilers in case of a failure to reach a political settlement.

Certainly, the 2013 military ouster of President Mohamed Morsi in Egypt and the subsequent violence in the largest Arab country contributed to the urgency of reaching a political agreement in Tunisia. Beyond the promising prospects for Tunisia, this experience should be documented to inspire other countries in political transition. The main aspects to study would be how the quartet formed, the internal mechanisms used by the four members to navigate the troubled waters of Tunisia’s transition, and the role of the various levels of dialogue and consensus-building within the Constituent Assembly.

Libya is on a very different track, one marred by increased violence and political stagnation. But several indicators suggest the country is at a crossroad and still has realistic chances to see a political settlement emerge. Direct and behind-the-scenes negotiations are still taking place despite flares of violence. 

Not only was the National Dialogue Preparatory Commission, established by ousted Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, not dissolved, but it recently stepped up its activities. There are other smaller-scale dialogue initiatives underway as well, and the international community is vigorously trying to mediate to bring the scattered efforts under one umbrella. The major political players are serious about finding an acceptable deal because, as they have acknowledged, they know none of them could win outright.

The absence of credible civic groups who could play the role of “conflict inhibitors” such as in Tunisia is glaring in Libya. But alternative mediation mechanisms might still be found because at least the public seems to be interested in seeing their political leaders reach a settlement. While most Libyans rank security first on their list of priorities, most acknowledge that restoring security is not achievable without the right political framework.

The priority now should be to encourage the country’s embryonic, frustrated and disillusioned civil society to re-engage with the political process. Libya is in a critical phase of its political transition, yet a collapse into the torments of civil war is not yet a certainty. A lot can still be done to push for progress towards a less violent transition.