الخريطة السياسية الليبية حبلى بالغموض والتعيقدات والتقلبات، وجذور الأزمة السياسية الراهنة تعود الى شكل المسار الدستوري وعملية السلام برعاية دولية، فقد اختير عبد الحميد الدبيبة رئيسا لحكومة الوحدة الوطنية في 25 من فبراير/شباط 2021، وصوت البرلمان الليبي لمنح الثقة للحكومة الانتقالية برئاسة الدبيبة.
وكان يفترض تمهيد الطريق لاجراء انتخابات برلمانية ورئاسية، غير أن الانتخابات تأجلت إلى أجل غير مسمى بسبب خلافات شديدة على الأساس القانوني لتنظيمها. وفي فبراير/شباط الماضي، اختار البرلمان الليبي فتحي باشاغا رئيسًا جديدا للحكومة خلفا لدبيبة، لكن الأخير شكك في دستورية الاجراء وأكد أنه لن يتنازل عن السلطة إلا بعد إجراء انتخابات وتشكيل حكومة منبثقة عنها.
انقسام سياسي
وشهد التنافس بين الدبيبة وباشاغا مراحل عديدة، آخرها اشتباكات مجموعات مسلحة موالية لكل منهما خلال الأيام الأخيرة في العاصمة طرابلس خلّفت عشرات القتلى والجرحى.
واعتبر مدير برامج شمال افريقيا والمكتب الاقليمي د. ايلي أبو عون في حديث لـ”جسور” أن “للنزاع في ليبيا جذورا أعمق بكثير من التنازع على السلطة بين الدبيبة وباشاغا، وبالتالي الحل في طرابلس يجب أن يتم على مراحل، أولا إيجاد تسوية سياسية مرحلية ساعية الى تأمين حد أدنى من الاستقرار والى تقديم خدمات شتى للمواطن الليبي، ثانيا العمل على آلية للحوار الوطني بغية الوصول الى عقد اجتماعي جديد بين الليبيين لوضع حد للخلافات الجوهرية، على سبيل المثال تحديد النظام المعتمد في البلاد.”
تدخل أممي
ودعا الأمين العام للأمم المتحدة أنطونيو غوتيريش إلى وقف فوري للعنف في طرابلس، كما دعا الأطراف الليبية للانخراط في حوار حقيقي لمعالجة المأزق السياسي الحالي وعدم اللجوء إلى القوة لحل خلافاتهم. وفي السياق، أشار أبو عون الى أن “بعثة الأمم المتحدة تعمل وفق الصلاحية الممنوحة من مجلس الأمن، وبالتالي بات واضحا أن صلاحيتها محدودة ولا يمكن تحميلها المسؤولية كاملة عما يحصل في ليبيا“. وأضاف “تنجح مهمة الأمم المتحدة في ليبيا بتوفير الأجواء المناسبة من المجتمع الدولي، أولا دول المنطقة تلعب دورا بارزا في هذا الخصوص ولا سيما الحوار المصري التركي الذي يتقدم ببطء لكن ثماره بدأت تظهر من خلال عدم موافقة تركيا على المشاركة في الاشتباكات الأخيرة في ليبيا.
ثانيا، يؤثر الخلاف بين دول الاتحاد الأوروبي، خصوصا بين إيطاليا وفرنسا ، على تطور مسار الخلافات في ليبيا.
ثالثا، تؤثر العلاقات الأميركية – الروسية على المشهدية الليبية، فموسكو حاضرة بقوة في ليبيا من خلال مجموعة فاغنر، منظمة روسية شبه عسكرية، الا أن واشنطن عبرت مرارا عن استيائها من التدخل الروسي الهادف الى تأمين استقرار في البلاد عبر هذه المنظمة ولمصلحة موسكو الشخصية.”
تجدد الاشتباكات
ولا يزال سكان طرابلس يعيشون يوميا قلقا ورعبا من عودة شبح الحرب، بعدما تجددت الاشتباكات فجر الاثنين في طرابلس بين قوات تابعة لرئيس حكومة الوحدة الوطنية الليبية عبد الحميد الدبيبة، و”الكتيبة 777″ بقيادة هيثم التاجوري، الداعمة لحكومة فتحي باشاغا المكلفة من البرلمان.
وأتى هذا التصعيد بعد هدوء حذر شهدته طرابلس الأحد، بعد أن حصدت المعارك التي تفجرت ليل الجمعة السبت بين الميليشيات 32 قتيلاً وعشرات الجرحى.
واعتبر أبو عون أن “المعطيات الأخيرة تشير الى أن القوى الموالية لدبيبة باتت تسيطر على طرابلس وأخرجت كل المجموعات التابعة لباشاغا.” وتابع “الدبيبة برهن أن ازالته أمرا صعبا للغاية، واي محاولة لازالته عسكريا ستؤدي الى النتيجة نفسها أي خسارة باشاغا والقوات الموالية له.”
تقاذف الاتهامات
وفي غضون ذلك، تبادل رئيس حكومة طرابلس عبد الحميد الدبيبة ورئيس الحكومة المكلف من البرلمان فتحي باشاغا الاتهامات بشأن الاشتباكات الأخيرة. ولفت الدبيبة “الى ان من شنوا العدوان على طرابلس، رضوا بأن يكونوا مطية لأجندات دولية لا تريد الاستقرار لليبيا”.
ومضى قائلا، “فشل مشروع الحكومة الموازية، لأن الشعب يرفض التمديد لأجسامهم الفاقدة للشرعية”، في إشارة لحكومة باشاغا والبرلمان. بينما حمّل فتحي باشاغا، الدبيبة بالمسؤولية عن الاشتباكات في طرابلس، معتبرا ان “حال الفوضى الأمنية في طرابلس، أحدثتها مجموعات إجرامية خارجة عن القانون، تأتمر من زعيمها الدبيبة الذي انتهت ولايته وشرعيته
When Sadr heard his rivals had plans to carve up the key organs of state, he sent his men back to the Green Zone. Now, there are no obvious routes for deescalation
In May 1994, Iraq witnessed a traumatic and bloody fratricidal war. Back then, tensions and competition between the Kurdistan region’s two major parties was at its zenith.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were essentially in control over the semi-autonomous region. Yet despite the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime, they failed to unite their 80,000 men and considerable arsenals, instead seeing each other as the principal threat.
‘What was leaked about this agreement is what provoked Sadr’s madness, and prompted him to storm the Green Zone and occupy the parliament building for the second time’
– Senior Iraqi official
That tension could be felt in almost all major Kurdish cities and towns, whose residents’ loyalty and affiliation were divided between the two parties, a Kurdish political leader told Middle East Eye.
In Qalat Deza, a town in northern Sulaminiyeh province on the Iraq-Iran border, a chicken lost its way and crossed from the house of a PUK fighter to one owned by his KDP neighbour.
A quarrel broke out between the two men. The PUK fighter, “without thinking”, pulled out his weapon and shot his neighbour dead, the Kurdish leader recalled.
The “chicken incident”, which the elders of the Kurdistan region recall bitterly, led to what they sarcastically call the “brother’s war”, a conflict that lasted for almost four years and led to the killing of hundreds and displacement of thousands.
Twenty-eight years later, the threat of intracommunal violence in Iraq looms large once again. But rather than Kurdish parties threatening violence, Iraqi Shias are teetering dangerously close to the edge.
On Friday, mass demonstrations brought parts of Baghdad and central and southern provinces to a standstill. Muqtada al-Sadr’s followers were demanding the dissolution of parliament and early elections.
Those protests were matched by even larger and more numerous counterdemonstrations by his Iranian-backed opponents, who framed their cause as a will to preserve the legitimacy of the political system and judiciary.
Supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr gather during a sit-in at the parliament building in Baghdad, 3 August 2022 (Reuters)
Though fraught, the day nonetheless passed peacefully. Sadr’s supporters maintained their sit-in protest at the parliament building in Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone. And outside the district’s blast walls, his rivals began an encampment too.
For most political leaders, officials and diplomats, Friday’s scenes were a show of force – and though there appeared no will for direct confrontation between the camps, everyone was holding their breath nonetheless.
Because one moment in Iraqi history could not be ignored: the chicken incident.
“Unfortunately, all the factors of civil war are available. The tension between the conflicting parties is at its height, and there is a complete absence of logic, the dominance of intransigence and arrogance, and the availability of weapons,” a senior Iraqi official told MEE.
“The Green Zone is currently surrounded by rings of weapons and militants. The amount of weapons that entered Baghdad over the past two weeks is staggering.”
What would happen, the official asked, if a chicken was to cross from Sadr City, the stronghold of the Sadrists, to Palestine Street, where Iranian-backed armed faction Kataeb Hezbollah holds sway?
A leak reaches Sadr
No one in Iraq is under any illusions – something needs to shift.
The country has been in limbo ever since last October’s parliamentary elections, when Sadr’s Sairoon Alliance emerged as the biggest party. The cleric struck a deal with the KDP and Sunni bloc, and for a moment it looked as if the Iranian-backed parties that make up the Shia Coordination Framework alliance would be marginalised and Iraq’s traditional power-sharing system of government overturned.
Yet the Coordination Framework managed to block, frustrate and impede government-formation efforts at every turn, until an exasperated Sadr ordered his MPs to resign in June.
Those resignations shocked Iraq and left the Coordination Framework as the largest bloc in parliament. Now able to take the lead, on 25 July the alliance nominated Muhammad Shia al-Sudani, who has long been associated with Sadr’s chief rival Nouri Maliki, as prime minister.
Elections to protests: How Iraq descended into crisis
In response, the Sadrists flooded the Green Zone with protesters. Sadr personally called on his supporters to retreat, and they filed out of the district after a raucous few hours.
But 72 hours later they were back, after the cleric called on the Sadrists to occupy parliament – where they have been ever since.
Neither Sadr nor any of his leaders have revealed what happened in those three days to make the cleric send his men back in.
However three Shia leaders, one of whom is close to Sadr and the other two close to the leaders of the Coordination Framework, told MEE that the decision to storm the Green Zone for the second time was directly related to a leak.
According to the sources, Sadr discovered that several Coordination Framework leaders, including Sudani, had struck an agreement that guaranteed them control of several key ministries and governmental bodies after a new government was formed.
The interior ministry, the counter-terrorism service, the intelligence service, and the state-run oil marketing company SOMO, were among the most prominent positions agreed upon, the three leaders said.
The sources were not able to determine the exact date or location of the meeting where this agreement was struck, but it is certain that it took place in Baghdad during July, and that Hadi al-Amiri and Haider al-Abadi, two of the Framework’s key leaders, did not attend and were not part of the pact.
“What was leaked about this agreement is what provoked Sadr’s madness, and prompted him to storm the Green Zone and occupy the parliament building for the second time,” a senior Iraqi official familiar with the leak told MEE. Sadr currently controls many powerful state organs, and his authority and influence would be greatly damaged if the Framework leaders were successful.
“The agreement aims to dismantle and isolate the Sadrist machine within state institutions,” the official said.
“The Americans are the ones who leaked the details of this agreement. It is unreasonable for them to stand by while the armed factions seek to control the interior ministry and the intelligence and counter-terrorism apparatus.”
Middle East Eye has asked US officials in Iraq for comment.
No dialogue
Attempts at deescalation have been hindered by Sadr’s complete refusal to receive any calls or visits from anyone that isn’t a Sadrist leader since his MPs resigned.
Despite multiple attempts to communicate with him, and initiatives suggested by political powers that are not involved in the conflict, he will not open any channel for dialogue.
Jeneanine Hennis-Plasschaert, UN representative in Iraq, is the only person to have successfully spoken with Sadr after he agreed to receive her at his residence in Najaf last week.
Neither party has disclosed what happened in the meeting, which lasted for nearly two hours, but it was clear that Hennis-Plasschaert’s efforts to persuade Sadr to open a dialogue with his opponents were not successful, according to a western diplomat.
In fact, Sadr only escalated matters further 48 hours later by demanding the head of the Supreme Judicial Council, Faiq Zaydan, dissolve parliament within a week.
“Plasschaert’s meeting with Sadr was not bad, but it did not produce tangible results,” the western diplomat told MEE.
‘The international community is confused and sees not many available outlets to resolve the crisis’
– Elie Abouaoun, United States Institute of Peace
“Sadr requires the parliament to be dissolved before starting any dialogues or making any settlements, and this is not acceptable for his opponents and allies.”
Two major powers, the United States and Iran, are yet to wade in. Despite being the most influential players in Iraq since 2003, neither have used their power to help dismantle the crisis, international observers, Iraqi politicians and western diplomats told MEE.
And they do not seem to have the appetite to intervene anytime soon: torturous negotiations over resuming the 2015 nuclear deal are Washington and Tehran’s main priority in the region.
Since the countries of the European Union do not have a particularly large influence in Iraq, the attention turns to the UK, which has good relations with everyone and is able to influence people in both camps.
“The international community is confused and sees not many available outlets to resolve the crisis,” Elie Abouaoun, the director of the United States Institute of Peace, told MEE.
“The Americans will not interfere directly and will not invest any of their political weight in the interest of any party. They may support another mediator, but they will not interfere,” he added.
“Regional parties such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran may intervene… but no one will support an armed confrontation.”
It is not yet clear what the UK’s position is, Abouaoun said, “but there is great potential for an active British intervention.”
“The British have wide influence and arms in Iraq, and are now one of the most important parties that can play an active role in resolving this crisis.”
Early elections are not a solution
Sadr wants early elections but so do many other political forces, including his Iran-backed opponents.
Yet the Coordination Framework wants polls to be held according to mechanisms that would see them do better than in October, which need to be implemented in parliament.
Sadr rejects all such proposals. And though he has demanded the Supreme Judicial Council dissolve parliament, everyone knows the body has no authority to do so. Zaidan said it himself on Sunday.
At the same time, Sadr’s political office has launched a campaign to file as many lawsuits as possible against President Barham Salih, Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi and Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi.
The lawsuits accuse the three men of violating the constitution by exceeding the post-polling day deadlines for the election of a president, nomination of a prime minister and formation of a government.
What Sadr, or any of his legal or political advisers, does not mention publicly is that holding early elections according to the same election law and mechanisms will not solve the problem and will not much change the current reality, political leaders, officials, diplomats and legal experts told MEE.
Supporters of the Coordination Framework gather during a sit-in near the Green Zone, in Baghdad, 13 August 2022 (Reuters)
In October, the Iran-backed parties undermined their chances by failing to understand the new electoral law, poorly distributing candidates to districts and fighting among themselves. They performed very poorly as a result.
The Framework’s parties are not likely to make the same mistakes again, so don’t expect a repeat performance, politicians, legal experts and observers said. In fact, the biggest winner in any early elections will likely be the Coordination Framework parties.
“The forces of the Coordination Framework fully know their weaknesses that led them to this severe loss, and they will not repeat it again,” a prominent Shia politician told MEE.
“Conducting the elections according to the same law will not produce significantly different results. Sadr’s audience is almost fixed, and therefore he will get almost the same number of seats, while his opponents will get twice the number that the Sadrists will get.”
As for the independent MPs that emerged from the protest movement. “The biggest loser in any upcoming elections will be the forces emanating from Tishreen,” he said.
After entering parliament riding a wave of popular expectation and hope, the Tishreen movement has been ravaged by internal conflict. Its 25 MPs have been unable to score any notable achievements in their short term in office, with the paralysis imposed by the major blocs leaving them little chance of making an impact.
As a result, confidence in Tishreen’s politicians is at an all time low. “Their audience has started cursing them everywhere,” the Shia politician said.
Struggle over money
The main challenge Sadr could not overcome was a court ruling that said a president can only be elected by MPs when two-thirds of parliament is sitting. A government can only be formed after a president is elected, so when Coordination Framework parties began boycotting parliament the entire political process broke down.
But if elections are held without an adjustment to the constitution that would allow a president to be elected with a smaller quorum, Iraq could well face the same problem, legal and political experts told MEE.
Iraq is Opec’s second-largest oil producer, and the financial surplus it has achieved from booming oil sales during recent months has reached $20bn.
‘The current conflict, the real one at its core, is a struggle over money distribution outlets’
– Prominent Shia politician
Oil revenues are used illegally to finance the country’s political forces and paramilitaries, so ultimately control of this wealth underpins the current political crisis.
“All decision-makers in Iraq, including Sadr, know for sure that early elections will not solve the problem,” a prominent Shia politician told MEE.
The politician predicted that none of the quarrelling parties will gain many seats on their own, and their bombastic statements on elections and the legitimacy of the state and parliament are “used to cover their real goals”.
“The real problem lies elsewhere. The current conflict, the real one at its core, is a struggle over money distribution outlets,” he said.
“The existing forces, especially the Shia, have turned into mini-states parallel to the state, and they are all fighting to secure their financial resources,” he added.
“The conflict started from the areas where the oil companies, the border crossings and the banks are, and now it is moving towards the centre [Baghdad]. The current scramble aims to redraw the influence of each group in Baghdad, but within the state system, not outside it.”
A tattered Tunisian flag at the Marche Central, a market in downtown Tunis, Tunisia, Sept. 28, 2021. Tunisia, birthplace of the pro-democracy uprisings that swept the Arab world, now looks to many like a final confirmation of failed promise. (Ivor Prickett/The New York Times)
With turnout at roughly 30 percent, the country’s new political system is being built on shaky ground.
A year after Tunisian President Kais Saied began a series of moves that expanded presidential powers, a new constitution further empowering the presidency has been approved by referendum. Amid a dire economic crisis, many Tunisians expressed support for Saied’s moves, as the promise of the 2011 uprising evaporated over the last decade. While the referendum passed with 94 percent of the vote, only 30 percent of Tunisians participated. Once heralded as the sole democratic success of the Arab uprisings, Tunisia’s democratic future trajectory is more uncertain than ever following the constitutional referendum.
USIP’s Elie Abouaoun, Thomas Hill and Leo Siebert explain how the new constitution changes Tunisia’s political system, why turnout was so low, the implications for the country’s economic crisis and how Tunisian democracy advocates and their supporters can slow democratic backsliding.
How would the proposed constitution change Tunisia’s political system?
Tunisia’s new constitution removes many of the checks and balances of the 2014 constitution and firmly centralizes power in the hands of the president. In the new system, the president unilaterally appoints the prime minister and the cabinet. The legislative branch is weakened and divided into two bodies. The judiciary is reduced to an administrative function of the executive branch under the control of the president. The president cannot be impeached.
Saied’s supporters believe a strong presidency is needed to simplify governance and enable decisive leadership to meet the demands of the public and steer Tunisia’s through its deep, protracted economic crisis. Opponents believe the new constitution may result in a return to an autocratic regime.
Finally, the new constitution obscures the secular nature of the state. Tunisia is now characterized as part of the Islamic Ummah (nation/community) and the constitution stipulates that the state shall work to achieve the objectives (maqāsid) of pure Islam.
Polls have shown that many Tunisians want a strong leader and effective government no matter the form it takes. So why did so many Tunisians boycott the vote?
Like in many other countries, the transition to a parliamentary democracy created an expectation that Tunisia’s economic performance would improve. However, post-2011 governments were unable to take the bold actions needed to address failing post-independence economic policies. Instead they continued to turn to the IMF to fund public spending as internal economic output shrunk, expanding dependence on an unsustainable debt trap. As living conditions deteriorated after 2011, a majority of Tunisians felt that the checks and balances in their democracy were contributing to protracted economic hardship justifying the need for a strong leader who would not be hindered by the parliament.
The same sweeping anti-establishment sentiment that allowed Saied to win the 2019 elections continues to shape the electoral behavior of the average citizen. The loss of credibility of the post-2011 political parties goes beyond names and personalities: it is mostly about a trust deficit in the political process itself. This trust deficit has led a majority of Tunisians to support the exceptional measures Saied took in July 2021, believing he cannot do any worse than the democratically elected governments of the last decade, while others fear that these measures reverse the democratic gains since 2011 and will only further decay Tunisia’s institutions and the few rights and freedoms that Tunisians now enjoy. The opposition to the president’s roadmap intensified when he began dismantling Tunisia’s constitutional institutions by decree and consolidating power within the presidency. This led to calls from major civil society groups and large political parties to boycott the referendum due to its lack of credibility and a lack of trust in the election commission now firmly under the control of the president. Those urging a boycott believe that low turnout undermines the referendum’s credibility and hinders the president’s mandate to implement the new constitution and political system.
While there was also a counterargument among some parties and activists urging the public to participate through a negative vote rather than boycotting, the majority of the president’s opponents preferred the boycott option. Initial results after the referendum suggest that only 30 percent or so of eligible voters participated.
Exit polls suggest that more than 94 percent of those who participated voted in favor of the new constitution. Those who boycotted now point to the low turnout as justification that their strategy was successful in delegitimizing the president. Those who voted no are exasperated, arguing that if those who actively boycotted had instead voted no, they may have beaten the yes vote or at least come close enough to demonstrate that the majority of the public do not support the new constitution. In either case, with turnout at roughly 30 percent, the new republic is being constructed on unstable ground.
How will the referendum’s passage impact Tunisia’s ability to address its economic crisis and seek relief from international financial institutions?
Tunisia’s economic crisis began before the 2011 revolution and was a major contributing factor to the uprising that ousted President Ben Ali. Since then, the economy has shrunk dramatically while subsequent governments were unable to address the underlying structural problems, cronyism and weak rule of law that created situation. Over the last decade, Tunisia’s economy has crumbled further and dependency on international financial institutions to prop up the economy has only grown.
By 2020, an already weak economy was pushed to the brink of collapse by the global pandemic. Tunisia is now struggling to recover amid rampant inflation, currency depreciation, rising poverty, increasing energy costs and a shrinking middle class. If Tunisia does not secure external loans, it is likely to default within the year. The IMF seems to be the most likely lender. However, the ongoing negotiations for a $4 billion loan require harsh conditionality like freezing public sector wages, laying off public sector employees and reducing subsidies on essentials like food and energy. As the purchasing power of Tunisians has been declining rapidly and poverty increases, there is broad opposition to the IMF’s austerity measures as they would wreak economic havoc on a fragile population and further weaken the state’s ability to stimulate growth.
However, an IMF package seems to be the only viable option in the short term to prevent default. So, it becomes a question of how well the government can negotiate terms and mitigate damage in the near term. In the long term, Tunisia must break out of its debt trap. And many are pinning their hopes on Saied to deliver where previous governments have failed.
Changing the constitution and political system will not fix Tunisia’s deep and complex economic problems. But the president has argued that strong centralized leadership is necessary to avoid the political gridlock of the post-revolution period and put the country back on track. Either way, it’s an uphill battle with stiff headwinds.
For economic reforms to create broader prosperity, Tunisia must rein in crony capitalism, develop marginalized interior regions, improve education, align skills with the job market, reform the administrative and legal hurdles for more equitable economic opportunity, increase food and energy sovereignty, and build the physical infrastructure needed for increased economic output. It is unlikely that this can be achieved quickly, and Tunisia is not immune to the macro conditions affecting global trade and finance. Globally, recession seems likely, and this will further compound economic challenges and exacerbate social and political tensions. Already, the impact of the war in Ukraine has brought Tunisia further to the brink of default with the government unable to pay the rapidly increasing prices for imported basic commodities. It remains to be seen if one-man rule can better address these challenges.
Can Tunisia’s political and civil society movements form a united front?
The absence of a viable alternative to the president’s project is unlikely to be filled in the short term. The parties opposing the president are unable to mobilize effectively in the current political environment due to a lack of credibility and ability to speak convincingly to the general public. Secondly, not all political parties are opposed to the president. Some hope to eventually become a part of his new system and benefit from it, similar to the Ben Ali system. Thirdly, those labeled as the “democratic opposition” are unwilling to join forces with the largest centers of resistance (who themselves are diametrically opposed to one another), the Muslim Democrat Ennahda party and the Free Destourian Party of Ben Ali regime figure Abir Moussi. Until these deep divides are overcome, the currently factionalized centers of opposition are unlikely to succeed.
Historically, as pressure on opposition parties increases, their ability to compromise and collaborate deteriorates. This is yet another reason that a unified front is unlikely. Thus far in Tunisia, it is only after elections, when multi-party governance becomes necessary, that parties have been able to form coalitions. And these coalitions have lacked the support of their electoral bases. Under the president’s new system, many anticipate that traditional parties will find it increasingly difficult to organize and campaign as freely as they did in the post-2011 period.
In civil society, the picture is not much rosier. Activists have been unable to unify against the president’s consolidation of power due to internal divisions, a lack of alternative solutions and a fear that ousting the president could plunge the country into unpredictable political and security turmoil amid an escalating economic crisis. However, in the absence of an inclusive political process, it is only a matter of time before opposition to the president escalates and unity among organizations increases.
There is also broad speculation that Saied will seek to muzzle the influence and space of civil society by restricting funding and, potentially, ramping up prosecutions and intimidation of activists. So, the extent to which the president uses repressive tactics will be a major factor in how civil society organizes and acts.
Where do Tunisian democracy advocates go from here? Can the United States help safeguard Tunisia’s democracy from further backsliding?
It’s premature at this point to proclaim an end to Tunisia’s democratic project. To be sure, there has been tremendous backsliding over the past year but it’s not irreversible. As the economy continues to struggle and grave socio-economic issues persist, the president’s popularity is expected to decrease overtime. As this occurs, political activists will have to organize themselves into a coherent opposition bloc capable of articulating an alternative vision for the country — a vision that addresses the issues that matter most to the Tunisian street. Specifically, this alternate vision should offer real solutions to the country’s dire economic predicament, something Saied has not done thus far. Groups that have traditionally not been allied will need to find common ground. The extent to which they are able to coalesce and achieve success at the ballot box will be shaped heavily by forthcoming presidential decrees outlining the nature and shape of the newly bicameral legislature and the electoral laws governing parliamentary and presidential elections.
As for the United States and other governments, any opposition to power consolidation and potential democratic backsliding must be organic and Tunisian-led. Western capitals can’t want democracy more than the Tunisian people. That being said, the United States can lend rhetorical and financial support to Tunisia’s democracy activists and use its leverage within international financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank to encourage the president to respect rights and freedoms and strengthen rule of law. Lastly, now that the Independent High Authority for Elections is under the control of the executive authority, the United States and others should insist that international observers be allowed unfettered access to all election preparations and the administration thereof.
To help maintain stability, the United States can continue to prioritize assistance that improves participatory governance, economic opportunity, bridges deepening societal cleavages, strengthens rule of law and protects the rights of all citizens.
(FILES) A picture taken on August 23, 2011 shows Seif al-Islam Kadhafi, son of slain Libyan dictator Moamer Kadhafi, appearing at his father’s residential complex in the Libyan capital Tripoli. Seif al-Islam was due to appear at a pre-trial hearing with more than 30 others in Tripoli on Setpember 19, 2013 although doubts remained whether his ex-rebel captors would allow him to attend. AFP PHOTO/IMED LAMLOUM
بعد إعلانه “مبادرة الانتخابات”.. ماذا يريد سيف الإسلام القذافي؟
في غمرة الانقسام المزمن الذي تعيشه ليبيا، والتأجيل المستمر لعملية الانتقال السياسي، خرج سيف الإسلام، نجل العقيد الليبي، معمر القذافي، بمبادرة جديدة “هدفها مصلحة ليبيا”، وفق تقديره.
وتضمن اقتراح القذافي الابن، في بيان تناقلته وسائل إعلام محلية، خيارين: أما أن تنسحب الشخصيات المعروفة “بشكل جماعي من العملية الانتخابية، من دون استثناء وإجراء انتخابات من دونهم، أو أن تتولى جهة مستقلة ترتيب الانتخابات بشكل محايد “ودون إقصاء لأي أحد مهما كانت الاعتبارات والمبررات
وتأتي مبادرة القذافي بعد يوم واحد من إعلان المجلس الرئاسي الليبي عن مشروع خطة جديدة، لحل أزمة الانسداد السياسي في البلاد تنهي المراحل الانتقالية عبر الانتخابات.
وتم تكليف عبد الله اللافي، النائب بالمجلس الرئاسي، بإجراء مشاورات مع الأطراف السياسية، لتحقيق التوافق على تفاصيلها، وإطلاقها في شكل “خارطة طريق”، تُنهي المراحل الانتقالية، عبر انتخابات رئاسية وبرلمانية في إطار زمني محدد.
يذكر أن المجلس الرئاسي يمثل أعلى سلطة تنفيذية في ليبيا، ويتألف من رئيس ونائبين، وتم اختياره من قبل ملتقى الحوار الليبي في جنيف، في فبراير 2021.
مبادرة سيف الإسلام القذافي جاءت أيضا وسط انقسام حاد على الساحة السياسية الليبية، مع وجود حكومتين متنافستين، الأولى في طرابلس، جاءت إثر ملتقى جنيف، برئاسة عبد الحميد الدبيبة الرافض تسليم السلطة إلا إلى حكومة منتخبة، والثانية برئاسة فتحي باشاغا عينها البرلمان في فبراير الماضي، وتتخذ من سرت وسط البلاد مقراً مؤقتاً لها، بعد منعها من دخول طرابلس رغم محاولتها ذلك.
الهدف؟
انقسم المحللون بشأن هدف مبادرة سيف الإسلام القذافي، إذ يرى البعض أنها تهدف “لإنقاذ العملية الانتخابية”، بينما يراها آخرون “مجرد إعلان للاستهلاك المحلي لا غير”.
وبينما يرى المحلل السياسي الليبي، إبراهيم بلقاسم، أن القذافي ربما أراد من وراء مقترحه، إنقاذ العملية الانتخابية التي تم تأجيلها مرات عدة، يبرز إيلي أبو عون، مدير برامج شمال أفريقيا والمكتب الإقليمي في معهد الولايات المتحدة للسلام، فكرة أن سيف الإسلام يريد ملء الفراغ بإطلاق مبادرة، يعلم مسبقا أنها غير واقعية.
ويسود تململ كبير في ليبيا بشأن موعد الانتخابات الرئاسية والبرلمانية، التي أجلت سابقا، بعدما كانت مقررة في 24 ديسمبر الماضي.
وقبل أيام قليلة على ذلك التاريخ، لم تعلن اللائحة الرسمية النهائية للمرشحين، حيث حامت شكوك كبيرة حول مسار قبول ملفات المترشحين، ولا سيما ملف سيف الإسلام نفسه، والمشير خليفة حفتر، الرجل القوي في شرق ليبيا.
وقال محللون وقتها أن أي نصر انتخابي لسيف الإسلام أو لحفتر سيجر البلاد إلى حرب يطلقها من عارضوا القذافي في 2011، أو من قاوموا هجوم حفتر على طرابلس في 2019.
المحلل الليبي، إبراهيم بلقاسم، أشاد في حديث لموقع الحرة، بمبادرة القذافي، واعتبر أنه أطلقها لإدراكه بأن “هناك أطرافا دولية لن تسمح له بالمشاركة في الانتخابات على الأقل في هذه المرحلة”، كما كشف أن الرجل لديه دعم روسي للترشح.
بلقاسم قال كذلك إن انسحاب الشخصيات المعروفة من السباق الرئاسي “ربما يعيد الزخم للانتخابات، وهي فكرة يقبلها الجميع” وفق تصوره.
في المقابل، أوضح أن ما تضمنته المبادرة من دعوة لعدم إقصاء أي مترشح “غير واقعية”.
وقال: “علينا أن نكون مدركين بأن الظروف لا تسمح بقبول ترشح الجميع دون قيد” ثم عاد ليصف مبادرة القذافي بـ”العقلانية” و”الاستجابة الذكية منه” للأصوات الخارجية المناوئة لترشحه.
“ذر الرماد”
لكن إيلي أبو عون، يرى أن “سيف الإسلام يسعى لذر الرماد في العيون فقط”.
وفي اتصال مع موقع الحرة، وصف الرجل مبادرة القذافي بـ”الشعبوية” التي لا تستند على أي معطيات واقعية.
وتساءل كيف يقترح القذافي أن تترشح وجوه جديدة، وهو يعلم جيدا أن أي شخصية لا تتمتع بعوامل قوة في الساحة السياسية في أي بلد لا يمكنها أن تستقطب الناخبين.
وعبّر على موقفه بالقول إن التجارب في المنطقة وفي ليبيا على وجه الخصوص، أثبتت أن أي شخص، ليس له عوامل قوة، لا ينجح في أي استحقاق انتخابي وقال: “يجب على أي مترشح أن ينخرط في موازين القوى، لكي يحقق شيئا في الاستحقاق الرئاسي”.
وفي رده على الطرح الذي يرى بأن القذافي يهدف بمبادرته إنجاح الانتخابات المقبلة، لفت أبو عون، إلى عدم إعلان القذافي انسحابه من الانتخابات، وهو دليل، وفق رأيه، على أن مبادرة القذافي “مجرد فقاعة إعلامية لا غير”.
وقال: لوكان جديا في طرحه لكان أول المنسحبين”.
وقبل تقديم أوراق ترشّحه في سبها في أكتوبر 2021، ظلّ ظهور ومكان سيف الإسلام القذافي غامضاً طيله سنوات، كما أنه أحاط تحركاته بالسرية إلى حد كبير، وذلك خوفاً على الأرجح من التعرّض له، لا سيّما وأنّه كان من أبرز أركان نظام والده الذي انقلب عليه الليبيون.
ويجمع متابعون على فكرة أن ظروف إجراء انتخابات حرة وعادلة غير متوافرة، فانقسام الليبيين، يحول دون قبولهم أو توافقهم على نتائج الانتخابات، التي تأتي عقدا من الزمن بعد الإطاحة بنظام معمر القذافي.
وقتل القذافي في أكتوبر 2011 بعد أشهر من انتفاضة واسعة ضد حكمه بدعم من حلف شمال الأطلسي، وبعد أن حكم “قائد الجماهيرية” البلد منذ 1969.
وشهدت ليبيا بعد ذلك انقسامات وخصومات مناطقية، ونزاعات على السلطة، وتصاعد نفوذ الميليشيات وتزايد التدخلات الخارجية. وهي على ذات الانقسام حتى اليوم
The 2023 Children Affected by the Foreign Fighter Phenomenon (CAFF) Series aims to provide insight and advice for states, professionals, practitioners, and other relevant stakeholders. The CAFF expounds the trajectory of child involvement with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in relation to the foreign fighter phenomenon and the life cycle of the present scenario, offering solutions across sectors and disciplines and tackling the full range of issues it exerts. It encompasses key themes such as online safety, the crisis in refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in northeast Syria, repatriation, reintegration, and rehabilitation, and offers four sets of guidelines.
This line of effort by the CRTG Working Group proposes comprehensive, integrated, and multi-faceted approaches to progress towards sustainable and meaningful solutions to the prolonged child protection and security crisis stemming from the issue of foreign fighters. Central to CAFF is ensuring that human rights, the rule of law, and children’s rights remain at the forefront throughout the development and implementation of interventions and programs.
These syntheses of accumulated experience and expertise on selected themes provide comprehensive, detailed, and nuanced overviews of their subject matter. The first technical session addressing the online ecosystem of terrorism and violent extremism, culminated in the Guidelines on the Prevention of Radicalization on Social Media and the Internet in this Digital Era.1 The present Guidelines reflect the progression of this line of thematic work undertaken by the CRTG Working Group focusing on the detained, refugee, and displaced child population currently residing in two internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee camps in northeastern Syria: al-Hol and Roj. It is the result of CRTG Working Group specialized knowledge and draws from a CRTG Working Group-led technical session with Dr. Elie Abouaoun, Country Director Libya at the International Rescue Committee, and Mr. Zuhrab Saadi, Director of DAN for Relief and Development, a nongovernmental organization delivering humanitarian assistance across multiple sectors in northeast Syria. The CRTG Working Group ́s technical session sought to expose the complexities of the humanitarian and security dimensions in the internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees al-Hol and Roj camps in northeast Syria. It addressed the potential impact of ISIS child recruitment and radicalization efforts, children ́s vulnerabilities and protection needs, and highlighted critical challenges hampering the return of children to their home communities and countries of origin.
This report should be of interest to governments, United Nations partners, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), along with the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who are focused on providing support to children in al-Hol and Roj. The recommendations that follow include both potential avenues to improve humanitarian and security conditions for children, address legal and judicial challenges, mitigate child exploitation and radicalization risks, as well as steps to support successful repatriation of displaced populations and long-term security in the region.
“Defeating the Russians will require a completely different level of support that not all Western countries seem to envisage at this stage unless Russia moves on to directly provoke a NATO member state.”
ERBIL (Kurdistan 24) – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could develop into the largest conflict seen in Europe since the Second World War. But the war’s effects will not be limited to Europe. Middle East countries have deep ties in trade, tourism, and defense with both sides. Turkey lies at the geographic center of the conflict. Kyiv has called on Ankara to close off the Turkish Straits to the Black Sea to the Russian Navy. The war also turned the spotlight on Arab Gulf states as oil surged past $100 on Thursday for the first time since 2014.
Dr. Elie Abouaoun, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programs at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), discussed some of the implications of this war in Europe on the Middle East with Kurdistan 24.
“Defeating the Russians will require a completely different level of support that not all Western countries seem to envisage at this stage unless Russia moves on to directly provoke a NATO member state.”
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has now been ongoing for almost a week, with Ukrainians showing heroic resistance. Answering Kurdistan 24’s questions about how much longer Ukraine can resist this Russian aggression and the significance of the military aid Ukraine is receiving from friendly countries, Abouaoun said that there are multiple variables that could affect how fast the Russian armed forces can advance into that country.
“Resistance to the invasion depends first and foremost on the speed and level of support provided by the West to the Ukrainian armed forces and the emerging popular resistance units,” he said. “It also depends on the impact of the sanctions on Russia itself, including on the morale of its soldiers if and when domestic pressure reaches a critical level.”
He added that it will also “be affected by how far other countries can go in supporting or countering the invasion (i.e., Belorussia’s readiness to go into a full-fledged war, Turkey’s expected enactment of the Montreux Convention…etc.) and how far NATO countries will accept Russia’s massive deployment of its military on the borders with some member states (i.e. deploying Russian troops on the borders between Ukraine and Poland to cut off supplies to Ukraine).”
“A war of attrition in Ukraine could ‘sink Russia in a quagmire.”
Abouaoun pointed out that what is clear so far is that the Ukrainians proved to be more resilient than expected and that Russia’s calculations were not all necessarily accurate.
“So far, the Western countries’ military aid to Ukraine seems to be swift enough to delay the Russian invasion,” he said. “However, defeating the Russians will require a completely different level of support that not all Western countries seem to envisage at this stage unless Russia moves on to directly provoke a NATO member state.”
“However, the likely scenario of an attrition war – through guerilla-like popular resistance – will sink Russia in a quagmire once its conventional warfare becomes obsolete,” he added.
“The sanctions need to be constantly evaluated for impact and be as focused as possible targeting the pillars of Putin’s temple.”
Regarding the economic and financial sanctions, the U.S., UK, Canada, and E.U. states are imposing on Russia, Abouaoun underlined that Russia’s political regime is not one where public opinion actually shapes military or political decisions.
“However, if the sanctions target specific centers of power within the establishment supporting Putin domestically, then the pressure on him might reach a critical level, pushing him to revisit some of his assumptions,” he said. “So far, there are no indications that the domestic pressure is strong enough to dissuade Putin from carrying on with his war, which is why some of the sanctions are – and should remain- focused on specific institutions or figures in Russia.”
Unfortunately, he added, the previous experience with sanctions is that with time, targeted “entities – governmental or non-governmental – adapt to the sanctions and find ways to circumvent them, and with the help of China, this scenario is not to be completely excluded in the case of Russia.”
“Therefore, the sanctions regime needs to be constantly evaluated for impact and be as focused as possible targeting the pillars of Putin’s temple,” he said.
“Shortages and higher prices of oil will increase the risks of social unrest, add pressure on governments, and put the security actors and communities in direct confrontation.”
The Middle East countries will feel the effects of the war in Europe. It is expected that the war will impact food and grain supplies to some Middle East countries such as Syria and Egypt.
“As both Ukraine and Russia are major suppliers of wheat to many countries in the region, it is not hard to foresee how this war will cause shortages and spikes in prices,” said Abouaoun. “On the other hand, the surge in oil prices is obviously not good news for many oil importers in the region, where oil and its derivatives continue to be subsidized by states, most of which have already fragile economies.”
“Shortages and higher prices will increase the risks of social unrest, add pressure on governments lacking legitimacy in general, and put the security actors and communities in direct confrontation when the relations between both are already strained,” he added.
“Assad is carefully watching the outcome of this war and will be emboldened by a Russian victory.”
Political observers believe the war in Europe might further empower Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and will more likely have implications for Israel-Russia security coordination in Syria.
Abouaoun argued that while it is indisputable that Russia has immense military capacities and that fighting in Ukraine does not mean withdrawing from Syria, Russia will nonetheless have to revisit the level of its political and military investments in Syria.
“Assad is carefully watching the outcome of this war and will be emboldened by a Russian victory; however, if the scenario of an attrition war materializes, then he will be in a weaker position as the Russian focus will pivot from Syria to Ukraine,” he said. “This would not be a game-changer in Syria for two main reasons: the Iranians continue to be strong enough to defend Assad; and the anti-Assad forces have lost support, momentum, and resources and cannot threaten the regime anymore; so a Ukrainian ‘forever war’ means a weaker Assad who will have to bear the brunt of a low-intensity conflict without being in an existential danger.”
“Russia wants Israel to refrain from supporting Ukraine while Israel tends to sympathize with Ukraine and its young President who even has some family ties with Israel.”
On the Israel-Russia side, Abouaoun pointed out that the recent days highlighted, if anything, the delicate and dilemmatic position of Israel vis-à-vis the U.S., Ukraine, and Russia.
“Israel initially tried to strike the balance between Russia and Ukraine in order to preserve its freedom to act in Syria against the Iranians and their proxies, as well as the other terrorist groups planning to target Israel out of Syria,” he said. “The current rules of engagement in Syria between Russia and Israel remain of great relevance to the Israelis; however, the level of mutual frustration between Russia and Israel is increasing as Russia wants Israel to refrain from supporting Ukraine while Israel tends to sympathize with Ukraine and its young President who even has some family ties with Israel.”
Abouaoun believes there is no immediate impact of this specific conflict on Iran’s posture in the Middle East.
“Russia’s influence in Iraq is insignificant so even a weaker Russia will not have a major impact on the core issues Iraq is currently grappling with.”
“Iran already feels slightly more comfortable with the progress of the Vienna talks and given that the U.S. agreed to partial relief, through waivers or other actions, of some sanctions,” he said. “Iran’s most hawkish foes in the Gulf have reconsidered their positions in the last few months, choosing a path of détente with the Iranians rather than confrontation.”
“Overall, the pressure on Iran from other regional powers has decreased,” he added. “To the joy of the Iranians, the possibilities of escalation in the Middle East remain highly unlikely as the U.S. and other European countries are busy with the Ukraine crisis.”
“Russia’s influence in Iraq is insignificant so even a weaker Russia will not have a major impact on the core issues Iraq is currently grappling with.”
Abouaoun doesn’t expect this war in Europe to have any impact on the government formation in Baghdad or on the relations between Baghdad and Erbil.
“The dynamics underlying the process of government formation in Baghdad are distinct with no direct influence of the Russian-Ukrainian war,” he said. “Same applies to the Baghdad-Erbil relations.”
“Russia’s influence in Iraq is insignificant so even a weaker Russia will not have a major impact on the core issues Iraq is currently grappling with,” he added.
“If the conflict continues and becomes a protracted one, it will be hard for the Middle Eastern countries to remain on the fence.”
Abouaoun went on to state that if the conflict continues and becomes a protracted one, it will be hard for the Middle Eastern countries to remain on the fence.
“While public statements of Middle Eastern countries, in general, tried to be balanced – with the notable exception of Lebanon’s support of Ukraine and a predictable support to Russia from Syria – many of the decisions taken by other countries reflect a preference towards one of the protagonists,” he said. “The UAE’s refusal to condemn the invasion casts a doubt about the solidity of the strategic relations between UAE and the U.S. Qatar’s polite ‘decline’ to reroute gas supplies to Europe plays to the advantage of Russia.”
“As stated before, both Turkey and Israel’s hearts are leaning towards Ukraine, so the neutrality seen so far is not intractable,” he added.
“The E.U. decision to close its airspace to Russian airplanes – will affect tourists coming from these two countries; however, not all countries in the Middle East relied on Russian tourists.”
Recent reports say escalating war may see tourism revenue dry up and direct flights canceled for some of the most popular Russian tourist spots in the Middle East. While Abouaoun agrees, he believes that the impact will be significantly different from one country to another.
“Obviously, the Russia-Ukraine war, including the E.U. decision to close its airspace to Russian airplanes – will affect tourists coming from these two countries; however, not all countries in the Middle East relied on Russian tourists,” he said. “So, the impact will be significantly different from one country to another.”
“As the war in Europe continues, it has yet to be seen whether Turkey will deny Russian warships passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.”
The war might have implications for the Black Sea, too. Most immediately, it may impact what ships will be allowed to transit between that sea and the Mediterranean. As the war in Europe continues, it has yet to be seen whether Turkey will deny Russian warships passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.
Abouaoun believes that it is unlikely for Turkey to opt for a direct confrontation with Russia.
“Thus, Turkey will continue to hedge, while deciding to implement the Montreux convention which grants Turkey control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, allows Turkey to ban ships not based in the Black Sea during times of war,” he said.
“So, now, Turkey has the discretionary power to limit the transit of Russian (and Ukrainian) warships and civilian vessels between the Mediterranean to the Black Sea except those returning to their registered base.”
A member of South Africa’s Ukrainian Association holds a poster depicting Russian President Vladimir Putin as Adolf Hitler during a protest in support of Ukraine in front of the Russian Embassy in Pretoria, on February 25, 2022. (Photo by Phill Magakoe / AFP)
يقول محللون إن الأوربيين يكررون نفس الخطأ الذي وقعوا فيه مع هتلر خلال تعاملهم مع بوتين
من الشيشان إلى أوكرانيا مرورا بجورجيا وسوريا وغيرها من المحطات، خاضت روسيا تحت حكم رئيسها الحالي فلاديمير بوتين عدة حروب، تخللتها انتهاكات لحقوق الإنسان، مدفوعة بـ”تخاذل” غربي تجاه “بلطجة” موسكو في المنطقة والعالم، وفقا لمحللين.
أولى حروب بوتين انطلقت من الشيشان في أكتوبر 1999، عندما كان في حينها رئيسا للوزراء وانتخب بعدها رئيسا للبلاد.
دخلت القوات الروسية للشيشان بحجة تنفيذ عملية “لمكافحة الإرهاب”، بعد هجوم شنه الانفصاليون الشيشان على جمهورية داغستان في منطقة القوقاز الروسية وعدة اعتداءات دامية في روسيا، نسبتها موسكو إلى الشيشانيين.
في فبراير 2000، سيطرت روسيا على العاصمة غروزني بعد أن سوّتها المدفعية وسلاح الجو الروسي بالأرض. لكن حرب العصابات تواصلت، ليعلن الكرملين في 2009 إنهاء عمليته، بعدما أدى النزاع إلى مقتل عشرات الآلاف.
في صيف 2008، شنت جورجيا عملية عسكرية دامية ضد منطقة أوسيتيا الجنوبية الانفصالية الموالية لروسيا التي خرجت من سيطرة تبليسي منذ انهيار الاتحاد السوفياتي وحرب في مطلع التسعينيات. ردت روسيا بإرسال قواتها إلى الأراضي الجورجية وألحقت بها هزيمة خلال خمسة أيام في معارك أدت لمقتل المئات.
بعد الثورة الأوكرانية المؤيدة للاتحاد الأوروبي وفرار الرئيس فيكتور يانوكوفيتش إلى روسيا في 2014، ضمت موسكو شبه جزيرة القرم الأوكرانية، وهو إجراء لم يحظ باعتراف المجتمع الدولي.
ومنذ عام 2015، تنشر روسيا قوات عسكرية في سوريا دعما لقوات الرئيس بشار الأسد، حيث أدى التدخل، الذي ترافق مع عمليات قصف رهيبة في حلب على وجه الخصوص، إلى تغيير مسار الحرب ما سمح للنظام السوري بتحقيق انتصارات حاسمة واستعادة المناطق التي سيطرت عليها الفصائل المقاتلة المعارضة والجهاديين.
فما هي الأسباب التي سمحت لبوتين بالتمادي وانتهاك القوانين الدولية من دون الخوف من العواقب؟
يرى مدير برامج الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا في معهد الولايات المتحدة للسلام إيلي أبو عون أن “روسيا بقيادة بوتين تصرفت بشكل بلطجي في القرم وجورجيا وأوكرانيا وغيرها من المناطق”.
يقول أبو عون لموقع “الحرة” إن “الطريقة التي تعامل بها الغرب مع كل الأنظمة التي تناهض مبادئ النظام العالمي في احترام الحرية والكرامة وحقوق الإنسان، هي ما قادت بوتين لهذه التحركات”.
ويضيف أبو عون أن “المجتمع الدولي تخاذل في التعامل مع النظام السوري، وسكت عن تصرفات روسيا في جورجيا وأوكرانيا، وهذا شجع بوتين في التمادي أكثر وغزو أوكرانيا”.
احتلال شبه جزيرة القرم شكل “نقطة تحول” في تحركات موسكو التوسعية ضد أوكرانيا، التي تمتلك علاقات وطيدة من الغرب.
يقول الكاتب والمحلل السياسي مصطفى فحص أن “الأوربيين أهملوا هذه النقطة، والتي كانت بمثابة إعادة للتاريخ في ثلاثينيات القرن الماضي”.
ويضيف فحص لموقع “الحرة” أن “الأوربيين سمحوا في ذلك الوقت للزعيم النازي أدولف هتلر بالسيطرة على مناطق حدودية تابعة لتشيكوسلوفاكيا بحجة أنها أراض تاريخية تابعة لألمانيا، لكن هتلر تمادى بعدها أكثر واحتل البلاد بأكملها بعدها بعام”.
ويتابع أن “بوتين أقدم على نفس الخطوة من خلال اجتياح أوكرانيا، ليصحو الأوربيين على التوحش الروسي، وكيف أن كل القارة باتت مهددة”، مشيرا إلى أن “الأوربيين يدفعون الآن ثمن الإهمال في سوريا والقرم”.
بدأت روسيا غزوها لأوكرانيا فجر الخميس بهجوم بري وجوي وبحري، بعد إعلان بوتين الحرب في خطاب متلفز، في أكبر هجوم على دولة أوروبية منذ الحرب العالمية الثانية.
غداة الهجوم الواسع ضد أوكرانيا والذي أوقع عشرات القتلى وتسبب بنزوح عشرات آلاف المدنيين الأوكرانيين، أعلن الأوروبيون عن عقوبات جديدة استهدفت أعلى هرم الدولة الروسية، وكذلك فعلت الولايات المتحدة.
اعتبر الرئيس الأوكراني فولوديمير زيلينسكي، الجمعة، الرد الأوروبي على الغزو الروسي “بطيئا جدا” وطالب بوضع كل تدابير الرد “على الطاولة”، داعيا الأوروبيين المتمرسين بالقتال للمشاركة في المعركة إلى جانب الأوكرانيين.
وسأل زيلينسكي في تصريح جديد، “كيف ستدافعون عن أنفسكم إذا كنت بطيئين إلى هذه الحد في مساعدة أوكرانيا؟”.
واستبعد أبو عون أن يتحرك بوتين لأماكن أخرى في أوروبا “لأن البلدان القريبة الأخرى هي أصلا من ضمن حلف الناتو والهجوم على دولة ضمن الحلف سيقود لرد مختلف على عكس ما يجري حاليا في أوكرانيا”.
يبين أبو عون أن “دخول بوتين مثلا لدول البلطيق أو وبولندا يعني أن قواعد الاشتباك ستتغير تماما، لأنها من ضمن حلف الناتو”.
ويشير إلى أن “روسيا تحاول ملء الفراغ الذي يخلفه الغرب في العديد من دول العالم، ومنها سوريا وليبيا وغيرها من البلدان”.
ويتابع أن “الغرب لم يواجه بوتين في تلك البلدان، وإنما هو استفاد من الفراغ وملأه وتمدد وأصبح لديه نفوذ”.
لكن أبو عون يعتقد أن “التعامل الغربي مع بوتين قد يشجع قوى إقليمية لاتخاذ نفس المنهجية والأفكار المجنونة التي يتبعها الرئيس الروسي”.
وهذا ما يتفق عليه أيضا فحص الذي يرى أن “بوتين قد يقدم على خلق قلاقل في كل دول البلطيق المنضوية بالناتو وتضم جالية روسيا، ما يعني تعريض أوروبا للخطر”.
ويضيف فحص أن “الصمت الأوروبي على أفعال بوتين سيشجع دولا أخرى مثل الصين وإيران وتركيا للمطالبة بأراض تعتقد تاريخيا أنها كانت تابعة لها”.
ويختتم فحص بالقول إن “المجتمع الدولي حاليا أمام مواجهة حقيقية تمثلها التصرفات المارقة لروسيا”.
The May 15 parliamentary elections in Lebanon are in danger of being delayed. This possibility led US Ambassador Dorothy Shea to clearly state to Lebanese lawmakers that “there is no wiggle room” on holding elections on time. ATFL’s position is that anyone who stands in the way of elections taking place transparently and on time should be sanctioned or face other penalties. So it is important to remind Lebanon’s leaders that the world is watching.
However, at the recent ATFL-MEI policy briefrollout, Middle East Institute Vice President of Policy Brian Katulis made the point that this demarche is really the bare minimum. While having elections is an accomplishment in and of itself (especially in Lebanon when they have been delayed before), Katulis argued that the real challenge is not merely having elections, but “enabling the environment for elections.” He was absolutely right because the current environment is not friendly to voters nor is it conducive to giving newcomers an equal opportunity to campaign.
As Wael Taeb has written, a well-documented challenge that political parties have is coalition building. Many of the prominent opposition groups born out of the October 2019 demonstrations have yet to come to an agreement on how they can build coalitions large enough to make a splash in parliament or how they can even fundraise and campaign. One challenge Taeb highlights is the challenges these groups have in reaching a consensus on who the “opposition” is. For example, how do resigned parliamentarians, political independents, and a range of new (and familiar) political parties from across the political spectrum learn to work together? Some groups, he notes, do not subscribe to the idea that the opposition should unite into a single coalition at all. Others, he and Ayman Raad note, refuse to consider their ideological opponents as part of the true “opposition.”
The opposition is not the only group struggling to come together. The departure of Saad Hariri from Lebanese politics will provide a crucial test for the Sunni community who were once united under the banner of his Future Movement (FM). While there is concern about the ramifications of this departure for Lebanese politics, Ibrahim Johari argues that these orphaned Sunni FM supporters are a clear and obvious bloc of voters that opposition parties can target.
For many of those who are challenging the status quo in the upcoming elections, they face many bureaucratic hurdles in order to organize and fundraise on a level to compete with the established players. Dana Hourany notes that Minteshreen, a leading opposition group born from the October 19 demonstrations, has yet to even receive its registration for the elections in May. They applied last June.
Many of these newer political parties currently lack the necessary registration to both fundraise and campaign. Mark Daou of Taqaddom told Hourany that “[t]here are no employees in the Ministry of Interior to receive our papers, and they would tell you to not bother as there were already a ton of applications they had to go through first.” Hourany notes that Beirut Madinati waited for over three years to receive notification they were officially registered.
Hourany notes that such obstacles can be attributed to the fact that Lebanon has no law for political parties, instead relying on an Ottoman-era “Law of Associations from 1909,” and is circumscribed by an inefficient bureaucracy that is beholden to the existing political framework..
Sarah Ludwick, writing for the Tahrir Institute for Middle East policy, notes that candidates seeking a run for public office must pay a fee of $5,000, which is certainly an obstacle for potential independent candidates who are not wealthy. She notes that in the 2018 election, the current election law favored the establishment parties when it came to campaign finance and spending provisions (which she notes exceed $1.7 million in some constituencies). The Supervisory Commission on Elections (SCE), which is supposed to punish those who make campaign finance violations, itself must report to a government body composed of members of the very same political parties that would have made these violations. Johari notes that resigned members of the SCE have not been replaced nor has a budget been set for the commission.
Taking into account the analysis from Daou and Ludwick, it is clear that new candidates and political parties have the deck stacked against them. Importantly, the banks will not open new accounts for the aspirants, further blocking their initiative.
Dr. Elie Abouaoun of the US Institute of Peace makes the case that these difficulties are not technical, but engineered by politicians seeking to protect their own careers and self-interest.
As an alternative, he makes the case for an independent Electoral Management Body (EMB) that can “create a conducive environment for reform-minded candidates to be able to compete and win.” EMB’s are actually considered the most common model of election management globally. Such a body should be “politically independent, financially autonomous, competent, inclusive, transparent, accountable and have full authority over the electoral process.” The key element of this body, as opposed to the current SCE or other national commission, is that it would be internationally supervised. Otherwise, it could fall prey to the same forces of corruption that have polluted Lebanon’s current government.
A notable example to look at is the EMB which was established in South Africa in 1994, the first elections after apartheid. They were able to successfully organize and implement internationally-recognized elections in less than four months with global support (including from USAID).
Something mentioned in both the ATFL-MEI policy paper and in Abouaboun’s writing is the significance of Mega-Centers. Under normal circumstances, it is difficult to travel across the country to one’s ancestral village to vote. Given the current economic crisis and fuel crisis, it will be expensive and logistically complicated for Lebanese to be able to go to their respective polling places.
Voting should not be expensive or an endeavor that occupies one or more days away from one’s workplace or home. The current election monitoring body, the SCE, is currently lacking both personnel and funding just months away from a crucial election. That being said, it is also clearly not a politically independent or neutral body. The levels of corruption seen in Lebanese politics make an EMB or serious international supervision essential for the upcoming elections
Campaign finance reform is desperately needed since the current system disincentivizes average Lebanese from presenting themselves as candidates. Relying on Ottoman-era laws and an inefficient bureaucracy is a massive obstacle to leveling the playing field for new political parties. Lastly, new political parties composing the opposition have crucial questions to wrestle with. The scales are already tilted in the favor of the establishment, even if they were to unite into a larger coalition. Are opposition parties and groups willing to unite together to stand as a feasible alternative to the status quo? In the meantime, the US and its allies must continue to leverage the Lebanese government to ensure these elections happen on time, fairly, freely, and transparently.
As Lebanon prepares for the upcoming legislative elections in May, the international community continues to consider Lebanon’s “deliberate depression” as inconsequential.
Since 2019, Lebanon has been a topic of interest to many experts and institutions. Amongst diverse, often redundant, analyses of the situation, the most astute description of the country’s predicament came in the World Bank’s Economic Monitors published respectively in the autumn of 2020 and 2021. The first, “The Deliberate Depression” argued that Lebanon’s economic recession was imposed on the general public by the elite that has long ruled the country and captured the state and its associated economic rents”. The second, “The Great Denial” states that “the elite’s preference has been to hold onto power and its rents and this entails preventing a recovery by eluding fundamental reforms to the unsustainable and now failed post-civil war development model”.
The most prominent conclusion is that the usual technical solutions offered by international financial institutions will not work by themselves and that only a change in both executive and legislative powers will extricate the country from the elite’s criminal capture.
Amongst the common vehicles of political change are elections. So far, the ruling elite’s constant assurances that the legislative elections due in May 2022 will take place on time are not corroborated by sustained and transparent preparations from the government. For example, less than one hundred days from D-Day, many candidates are still unable to officially submit their application because of multiple administrative and banking hurdles. This alone poses a significant threat to an already narrow space for electoral competition.
As with any other conundrum which design theorist Horst Rittel described as a “wicked problem”, Lebanon cannot be fixed by one party; nor can it be fixed through one round of elections. However, having a number of reform-minded new members of parliament can help putting the country on the overdue recovery path. Obviously, addressing all the issues of the electoral process needs time, resources and a political will that is hard to find. Insisting that all reforms are prerequisites to holding elections is not an option because this will give a golden pretext for the ruling elite to postpone them quasi-indefinitely.
Nonetheless, there are a few reforms that are technically feasible in the short timeframe, with the potential for a significant impact on the outcome of the 2022 election.
Establishing an independent Electoral Management Body (EMB) to replace the ministry of interior in overseeing the vote is one of them.
Under the current law, the electoral process is managed by the ministry of interior, with a supervisory role through a Supervisory Electoral Commission” (SEC). Its function is limited to monitoring campaign spending and media coverage of the candidates. The SEC’s president warned recently that the committee will not be able to fulfil its mandate, not only because of financial and human resources but also because of legal constraints limiting its mandate to monitoring. Moreover, given the general distrust in government and the ruling parties, the continued control by the ministry of interior over elections will likely lead to a low voter turnout, a widespread boycott among non-affiliated voters and hence the re-election of the same political class.
As long as a government-appointed authority is in charge of overseeing elections, the credibility of the whole process will be undermined and it will remain subject to corruption, thus keeping many voters away from the ballot boxes. Entirely independent from the executive, the new EMB would enhance the integrity of elections in Lebanon, traditionally marred by massive corruption. In addition, an EMB will increase public trust in the vote and so lead to a higher turnout.
Counterarguments claiming there is not enough time to establish an independent EMB fall short, as past examples prove that in the presence of political will and international consensus, EMBs in South Africa and Tunisia were established in a few months.
The second proposed reform is to adopt Mega Voting Centres. Lebanese do not vote where they live. Instead, they must return to their birthplace, a requirement which has previously disenfranchised many citizens. The ongoing economic and fuel crises will discourage many Lebanese from voting. It is simply too expensive for citizens to exercise their right to vote by returning to where they were born. Mega centres would allow them to vote in their place of residence for MPs representing their place of origin. This will increase participation. It will also be a vital reform to enable citizens who face intimidation to vote freely, particularly in areas dominated by armed groups. Further, it reduces the ability of the ruling parties to influence voters, buy votes or coerce and intimidate candidates.
These two simple reforms do not require a major legislative overhaul as they can be carried through with expedited one-article laws. Yet they can significantly influence the outcome of the election by encouraging higher turnout and allowing voters’ free and fair exercise of their rights. They would mitigate, albeit partially, partisan pressure on voters and meddling in the management of the election process.
While many Lebanese political and civic groups, experts and specialised agencies have already highlighted the importance of these reforms, it is obvious that the ruling elite will never willingly adopt changes that will allow independent non-affiliated candidates to make their way into parliament. Only sustained international pressure, including conditionality on external funding, will persuade the Lebanese decision-makers to proceed with these reforms.
When approached by Lebanese opposition groups, some western diplomats based in Lebanon were reluctant to accept this. For them, such reforms remain a domestic issue. This position would have made sense in a country where the public space allows for change through citizen mobilisation. In Lebanon, this avenue is not available and as in 2005, mass mobilisation produces results only when it is boosted by international pressure. What is more, the donor countries are ignoring, or being misled by how much the SEC, which can only monitor media and electoral spending, can actually do to ensure free and fair elections.
As the government of Lebanon is looking desperately for external funding for both the elections and an overdue bailout package, there is no better timing to introduce this conditionality.
Another counterargument usually invoked is that the IMF is not entitled to impose political reforms while negotiating an assistance package. As much as this is accurate, this specific case is different because it is about fighting corruption not imposing political conditions. Moreover, the IMF limitation does not apply to donor countries, some of which have often had unconventional demands, way more controversial than a couple of electoral reforms. Therefore, the UN coordinated “Friends of Lebanon” group can and should make sure that the Lebanese government does not receive any assistance if the above-mentioned two electoral reforms are not adopted.
By simply supporting, politically or financially, the SEC and by reassuring local public opinion that its own monitoring will deter Lebanon’s ruling elite from manipulating the 2022 elections, the international community will be failing the Lebanese. Electoral Observation Missions (EOM), whether from EU or elsewhere will not have been formed before the electoral corruption begins. Knowingly or not, the outside world and its EOMs will be complicit in failing to provide assistance to a population in danger.
Two of Iran’s vassal countries, Lebanon and Iraq, are witnessing acute political crises that could undermine Iran’s political gains of the last two decades. The hardship confronting Tehran in these two countries could be an opportunity to contain its expansion.
David Hume distinguishes in his 1740 essay “A Treatise of Human Nature” between impressions and ideas. Impressions embrace, according to Hume, “all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will.” Thus, both the colour red and the feeling of anger are considered impressions. Ideas are what arise when we reflect upon our impressions, so the memory of seeing the colour red or a thought about anger are considered ideas.
So far, Iran has excelled at playing around with impressions to generate ideas that suit its political project in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. However, recent months have shown that Iran and its assets, in both Lebanon and Iraq, are having to deal with a different reality. In a way, they have become victims of their own success.
In 2016, Hezbollah consolidated its grip on Lebanon’s executive power by imposing its ally Michel Aoun as the president of the republic and Saad Hariri as a prime minister. In 2017, the improvised arrest of Hariri in Riyadh was used by Hezbollah to present itself as the premier’s saviour. Abandoned by his regional and local allies, Hariri was ultimately released from custody thanks to a French initiative with the blessing of Aoun and Hezbollah. With an overt ally as president of the republic, a covert sympathiser as a prime minister, along with considerable military might and a parliamentary majority, it was hard for Hezbollah to shield itself from responsibility for the financial calamity that was in the making after 2016. That calamity arrived in 2019 with the collapse of the banking system and the general deterioration of the already poor basic services. The Beirut port explosion in August 2020 solidified the public perception that Hezbollah was in large measure responsible for what Lebanon was going through, including the endemic corruption that was partly behind one of the most powerful artificial non-nuclear explosions in history. It was and still is very hard to convince any Lebanese, including those within the party’s own constituency, that Hezbollah’s robust intelligence network did not know of the presence and associated threats of such a large quantity of explosives in a strategic site such as the main port of Lebanon.
So despite all Hezbollah’s efforts to create a false perception that it did not control the executive power, for instance by simply appointing a couple of party-affiliated ministers in governments of 30 ministers, its rise to become the main power broker in Lebanon made it a major part of the problem in the eyes of the majority of the Lebanese. Obviously, its persistent attempts to obstruct the investigation into the port blast, which have included threatening the investigating judge and paralysing the government at a time when Lebanon needs every minute to negotiate a bailout plan with the IMF, has further damaged its public image.
One can argue that Iraq has witnessed a similar path overall, with significantly different nuances. First and foremost, Iran had to deal with a multitude of proxies in Iraq, unlike in Lebanon where they were able to silence, by fair means or foul, all Shia rivals for Hezbollah’s leadership.
As Iran’s proxies emerged victorious from the battle against ISIS in 2017, they were given enough room to infiltrate most of the government’s institutions including the Iraqi armed forces and to establish themselves as one of the main economic actors at the provincial level.
Most of these groups resorted to assassinations, extortion and criminal activities to boost their power and income. As in Lebanon, Iran’s assets in Iraq were also able to block and change any governmental decision with which they disagreed, even to the point of besieging the residence of the prime minister when some of their members were arrested by the security forces. In just a few years, these groups became the go-to brokers for getting a public works contract, being hired as a civil servant, challenging a judicial decision, getting a promotion or just evading accountability when accused of incompetence or corruption.
The 2021 elections showed growing resentment, especially among Shias in Iraq, at the behaviour of these groups, which led to a decrease in their popular support compared to their 2018 electoral performance. This translated into a significant drop in the number of parliamentary seats they won.
In both countries, Iran is far from being strategically threatened. It still withholds too many cards. However, the resentment against Iran’s proxies in Lebanon and Iraq is now unprecedented. Tehran’s level of support within the Lebanese and Iraqi Shia constituencies is at its lowest during the last two decades. By taking Iraq and Lebanon through a path of para-state military groups, of hollow and ineffective institutions as well as indirect but firm control through its allies, the “ideas” (referred in Hume’s theory) generated by the perception they wanted to create are placing them in a predicament, which they have created themselves.
As is commonly understood, Iran’s support in both Iraq and Lebanon is organic, not external, especially among Shias. Therefore, most of the theories about containing Iran in both countries were, quite rightly, built around the idea of reversing those factors and the processes by which Iran was able to suborn Shias in each country. There is no better timing to start this endeavour than now, given the growing negative public perception of Iran in Iraq and Lebanon. Such an endeavour would start by rebuilding a pool of local political groups that has the legitimacy to challenge, without violence, Iran’s regional behaviour and that of its proxies. Coupled with a heavy investment in soft power tools by the West along with maintaining deterrence and sanctions, the time is now ripe to start pushing back on what Iran has been doing in both countries for decades.
