Libyans carry national flags as they gather in the capital Tripoli's Martyrs Square, to celebrate a day ahead of the eighth anniversary of the Libyan revolution, on February 16, 2019. - Eight years after the revolt in Libya against Moamer Kadhafi's authoritarian regime, a modern and democratic state remains a distant dream in a country which has been sliding from crisis to crisis. (Photo by Mahmud TURKIA / AFP)

خيبة ليبيا من سانتا كلوس

Libyans carry national flags as they gather in the capital Tripoli’s Martyrs Square, to celebrate a day ahead of the eighth anniversary of the Libyan revolution, on February 16, 2019. – Eight years after the revolt in Libya against Moamer Kadhafi’s authoritarian regime, a modern and democratic state remains a distant dream in a country which has been sliding from crisis to crisis. (Photo by Mahmud TURKIA / AFP)

أخفق سانتا كلوس ولم يأت لليبيا عشية 24 ديسمبر 2021 برئيس منتخب كما كانت تأمل غالبية الشعب الليبي المعذب منذ ما يزيد عن 50 عاما.

This piece was originally published on the alhurra website https://www.alhurra.com/

أخفق سانتا كلوس ولم يأت لليبيا عشية 24 ديسمبر 2021 برئيس منتخب كما كانت تأمل غالبية الشعب الليبي المعذب منذ ما يزيد عن 50 عاما. 

ورغم التوق إلى تسوية سياسية تجيز التفرغ لمتطلبات الحياة الكريمة، لا يزال المجتمع الليبي منقسما، ليس بسبب قلة الموارد، أو عقيدة أو دين أو أحزاب قوية تجسد الاستقطاب السياسي. الحقيقة أن هناك حالة من الشرذمة تسود المشهد السياسي الليبي، حيث تتحكم به مجموعة من اللاعبين المحليين القبليين والجهويين والإقطاعيين (سياسيا) والميليشياوين وأصحاب النفوذ المالي. لذا يصعب تحديد القضية او المشروع السياسي الذي يتقاتل من أجله الليبيون. ففي الحد الأدنى، إن النزاع في ليبيا ليس واحدا بل هو طبقات متعددة من نزاعات محلية ومناطقية ووطنية بعضها له أبعاد أثنية ولغوية وثقافية وغيرها. باستثناء النزاع السياسي الظاهر للعيان بين معسكري الشرق والغرب، لم تحظ النزاعات الأخرى بعد بالاهتمام المطلوب لذا تبقى جمرا تحت رماد وسيفا مسلطا على أي تسوية سياسية مستقبلية.

في ظل هذا الواقع، إن مجرد حصول انتخابات في ليبيا مكسب بحد ذاته، أقله كوسيلة لاستكمال بلورة صيغة سياسية وعقد اجتماعي جديدين يجمعان أبناء وبنات ليبيا ويوفران الإطار العام لدولة ليبية ذات مشروعية.  

رغم أهمية إجرائها في أقرب وقت ممكن، تتجسد أخطار ما بعد العملية الانتخابية- في حال رفض فريق من الأفرقاء النتائج – بأن يتم استخدام العنف للتعامل مع تلك النتائج. فسيناريو الاقتتال عقب انتخابات عام 2014 لا يزال جاثما أمام الليبيين وكثيرون يخشون تكراره، ولو بشكل مختلف. 

وفي هذا السياق لا تزال مكونات أساسية من الشعب الليبي (كالأمازيغ والطوارق والتبويين وغيرهم) التي عانت تحت النظام السابق تشعر بالإقصاء السياسي والتهديد الوجودي فتعبر عن هواجسها تارة باللجوء إلى أعمال عنف وطورا بالتهديد بمقاطعة العملية الانتخابية أو حتى السياسية. لذا، يجب أولا أن تكون الانتخابات المقبلة شاملة إلى أقصى الحدود، وألا تعمق الشرخ بين المكونات الشعب الليبي بكل أطيافه السياسية والعرقية واللغوية وغيرها. ويمكن تحقيق هكذا شمولية من خلال الإطار القانوني للانتخابات بشكل يضمن أكبر مشاركة وأفضل تمثيل ممكن لجميع مكونات المجتمع الليبي بما فيهم تلك التي تشعر بالتهميش.

من جهة أخرى، اكتسبت مسألة حسنات وسيئات إجراء الانتخابات قبل حل موضوع المجموعات المسلحة أو بعده أهمية كبرى. لو أخذنا المعايير الموضوعية التقليدية، لكان الجواب على هذه المسألة سهلا إذ أنه لا يمكن التغاضي عن تأثير آلاف من المسلحين المنتشرين يمينا ويسارا على مجريات العملية الانتخابية، تماما كما رأينا في الأسابيع الماضية من نشاطات مريبة لبعض المجموعات المسلحة.

لكن، في الوقت الذي يستحيل فيه توقع نزع السلاح غير الشرعي وانسحاب المرتزقة والقوات الأجنبية في غضون أشهر قليلة، ينبغي على المجتمع الدولي والقوى الإقليمية- من خلال التواصل والضغط إذا لزم الأمر على حلفائهم الليبيين- تحريم استعمال السلاح وتحت أي عذر قبل وخلال وبعد التصويت.  لو لم يجد الليبي أن الجهد الدولي في هذا المجال جدي ورصين، لفقد الأمل تماما بأي حل سياسي حالي أو مستقبلي. 

إن التصور العام حاليا هو أن أي مجموعة سياسية أو عسكرية يمكنها تعطيل العملية السياسية واستعمال الشارع والسلاح لفرض إرادتها. وأغلب هذه المجموعات معروفة. فالمجتمع الدولي مطالب بأخذ إجراءات عقابية صارمة ضد كل من ساهم باضطرابات الأسابيع الماضية ضمانا لأجراء الانتخابات في مواعيدها. الإخفاق في مساءلة ومعاقبة المعطلين سيفتح باب الابتزاز السياسي مستقبلا ويفقد الأمل بنجاح أي تسوية سياسية مستقبلية. 

يتساءل البعض– حتى درجة التشكيك- عن حوافز الولايات المتحدة للاستثمار السياسي في حل النزاع الليبي، في ظل استراتيجية أميركية معدلة محورها التركيز على آسيا والتقليل من المجهود السياسي والعسكري المخصص لمنطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا. بينما يعتبر أصحاب هذا الرأي أن ليبيا هي “مشكلة أوروبا” بالدرجة الأولى، يخفى عليهم – أو يتناسون- أن موقع ليبيا على المتوسط – مع شاطئ يتجاوز طوله 1700 كم- يمكن أن يتم استخدامه من قبل القوى نفسها التي تعتبرها الولايات المتحدة خطرا عالميا عليها كروسيا والصين. 

يشكل تفاقم نفوذ روسيا في جنوب المتوسط (مصر، الجزائر والآن ليبيا) والذي يصور كمحاولة لتطويق أوروبا من الجنوب مصدر قلق متزايد للديبلوماسيين الأوروبيين. بغض النظر عن الإحباط من الانقسام الأوروبي حول ملفات إقليمية عديدة أهمها الملف الليبي، يبقى أن أضعاف أوروبا والقبول بنفوذ روسي جنوب المتوسط يؤثر سلبا على مقومات نجاح عملية احتواء التمدد الروسي والصيني على حد سواء وعلى قدرة الولايات المتحدة في الحد من هذا التمدد من دون حلفاء أقوياء. من جهة أخرى، يظهر سلوك روسيا بشكل عام أن عين بوتين – وخلفه منظومة التصنيع العسكري- على جيوش المنطقة إذ تستمر محاولة إبعادها عن الغرب وخلق أطر تعاون وتسليح مع روسيا. لذا افساح المجال أمام الدب الروسي في حوض المتوسط له انعكاسات تتعدى أوروبا ومصالحها لتطال عنصرا أساسيا من استراتيجية الولايات المتحدة والمتمثلة بعلاقة وثيقة وشبه حصرية مع أغلب جيوش المنطقة. أخيرا وليس أخرا، رغم التقدم الكبير الذي أنجزته الولايات المتحدة في حماية الداخل الأميركي من عمليات إرهابية كبيرة، منظمة ومصدرة من الشرق الأوسط أو من أوروبا، لا تزال المنظومة الأمنية الأميركية تتوجس من قدرة المنظمات الإرهابية على عبور الحدود والقيام بعمليات يمكن أن تستهدف المصالح ألأميركية. لذا يهتم البنتاغون ووكالة المخابرات وغيرها من الجهات بليبيا كأحد بلدان العبور أو حتى التجمع لتلك المجموعات. 

رغم أن جل ما يكتب عن ليبيا منذ أشهر هو عن الانتخابات والتحضير لها والمرشحين وغيرها من الأمور التي قد تبدو بديهية في أي بلد أخر لكنها قد تكون مصيرية في بلدان منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا، يبدو واضحا أن حدا أدنى من الاستقرار في ليبيا فيه مصلحة لأكثر اللاعبين الإقليميين والدوليين ليبقى التساؤل الرئيسي عن قدرة القوى الليبية الأساسية ملاقاة هذا الواقع الإقليمي والدولي والتقدم بالعملية السياسية من أجل استقرار وازدهار ليبيا ورفاهية من يدعون تمثيلهم

2021-11-11T154150Z_1450101279_MT1HNSLCS000FOUBHM_RTRMADP_3_HANS-LUCAS-scaled

Tunisia has a new government: How will challenges be addressed?

By Alissa Pavia, Karim Mezran, and Yaseen Rashed

Tunisian President Kais Saied has been ruling by decree since July 25, when he froze parliament and sacked Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi. Much has been said about the president’s moves. Opponents call it a coup d’état and have asked the international community to sanction Saied, while those close to the president claim his moves are long overdue and a necessary measure to rid the country of a corrupt parliament. Since then, President Saied has nominated a new Prime Minister, Najla Bouden Romdhane, who formed a new government in October. A former geology professor with little to no policy expertise and no political affiliation, Bouden’s appointment has raised eyebrows among experts who suspect that Saied is simply attempting to distract the international community by nominating Tunisia’s first female prime minister.

The country is facing a plethora of challenges that need immediate attention. An economic crisis is looming as the coronavirus pandemic has strained public finances. Meanwhile, unemployment is skyrocketing to 18 percent. Additionally, on November 9, protestors took to the streets to oppose the reopening of a hazardous waste dump near the southeastern city of Sfax, which resulted in a man dying by asphyxiation from teargas fired by the police. A future increase of irregular migration is also cause for concern for many European countries, given the current high number of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa trying to cross the Mediterranean. In 2021 alone, almost twenty thousand migrants were intercepted off the Tunisian coast.

The Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative asked several experts a series of questions on Tunisia’s situation. Here is how they answered:

QUESTION: Do you think the appointment of a new prime minister will restore negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)?

The appointment of Tunisia’s new prime minister was overdue and is good news. Restoring negotiations with the IMF will need firm commitments to reforms to restore the confidence of international investors and financial institutions. Such reforms, however, can’t be implemented without popular support, which depends on cushioning potential negative effects on poverty, marginalization, and political trust. Confidence in the political system and its players, therefore, needs to be urgently restored.

In the current setting where an “us” versus “them” rhetoric—referring to pro- and anti- Islamist party Ennahda—dominates internal Tunisian discourse and often commentary by foreign observers and international institutions, Tunisia urgently needs a joint vision and new social contract. The re-installation of the elected parliament as a basis for developing such a social contract would be a fundamentally important first step in restoring confidence in the political system and, thereby, in Tunisia’s economy, including its negotiations with the IMF.

Annabelle Houdret, senior researcher at the German Development Institute.

QUESTION: How can President Kais Saied and new Prime Minister Najla Bouden Romdhane improve social conditions in Tunisia, a country where unemployment is almost at 18 percent, according to the World Bank? Moreover, does Saied’s latest moves hinder or help Tunisians?

Improving the economic and social conditions in Tunisia takes much more than a new government or legislature. If it’s true that the post-2011 political system did more harm than good to the economy and, therefore, led to a further deterioration of the social conditions, it remains that Tunisia’s problems stem from the failed economic model set up sixty years ago compounded by public distrust of state institutions.

Prime Minister Bouden’s priority must be to set up a national socio-economic dialogue involving all segments of society, such as women, youth, persons with disabilities, professional sectors, and civil society. Such a dialogue should also be geographically inclusive so as not to further the rift between the more developed coastal areas and the marginalized interior regions of the country. A dialogue would allow the new government to first rebuild public trust, as well as secure buy-in for the painful reforms that are indispensable to any recovery plan.

Dr. Elie Abouaoun, director of Middle East and North Africa Programs at the United States Institute of Peace.

QUESTION: Do you think democracy in Tunisia is at risk?

Yes. In recent years, ordinary Tunisians have chafed under a freely elected but feckless ruling elite that failed to use democracy to improve their lives. Unfortunately, “outsider” President Kais Saied’s response to this crisis has been to shut down parliament, grant himself unchecked powers, and demonize his critics. After trampling on the 2014 constitution, Saied wants to impose his own system, likely with a supercharged presidency, subservient legislature, and curtailed pluralism. That, so far, Saied enjoys popular support and has refrained from widespread repression, must not obscure this clear assault on democracy.

With his esoteric ideas, disdain for other actors, and possibly unrealistic economic and anti-corruption promises—and without a political structure behind him—Saied’s attempt at emperorship might fall apart. But democracy would still be in deep trouble. Many Tunisians have soured on politics, parties are discredited, civil society is fragmented, and the abusive Interior Ministry is unreformed. As Saied has brought back one-man rule and otherwise severely eroded democratic norms, the international community has largely been silent. All this could open the door for a more experienced and ruthless autocrat to replace Saied and successfully resurrect the police state.

Amy Hawthorne, deputy director for research at Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED).

QUESTION: As Tunisia’s debt burden increases due to the COVID-19 shock, what role can President Saied play in stabilizing the economy and promoting private sector growth in the backdrop of an unprecedented power grab?

Although President Saied recognizes the need to stabilize the economy and address the high unemployment rate exacerbated by the pandemic, he is not well-positioned to address Tunisia’s economic challenges. While he committed to fighting the endemic corruption that continues to plague the country a decade after the revolution, so far, Saied’s approach to addressing corruption has largely been to accuse his political opponents of corruption and to arrest those who disagree with him. He doesn’t appear to have a clear plan on how to deal with the economy and his authoritarian tendencies are doing little to bring the stability Tunisia needs to encourage private sector growth. Furthermore, his appointment of Bouden as prime minister—a geologist without an economics background and little government experience—doesn’t suggest that Saied is surrounding himself with the sort of expertise that would help him craft a way out of the current economic crisis.

Sarah Yerkes, senior fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

This piece was edited by Alissa Pavia, assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative; Karim Mezran, director of the North Africa Initiative; and Yaseen Rashed, Young Global Professional with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. 

People walk along Avenue Habib Bourguiba in downtown Tunis, Tunisia, Feb. 11, 2013. The avenue, named for Tunisia's first post-independence leader, has absorbed more than a century of Tunisia's struggles; and in its best moments, the avenue forges a community even when the country seems at odds. (Tara Todras-Whitehill/The New York Times)

What’s Next for Tunisia’s Transition?

The only solution to Tunisia’s political crisis is a roadmap for getting back to inclusive politics and a renewed social contract.

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.usip.org/

Long heralded as the sole success story of the Arab uprisings, Tunisia was thrown into political tumult on July 25 when President Kais Saied dismissed the prime minister, suspended parliament and removed politicians’ immunity from criminal prosecution. The decision followed days of protest and long-term malaise, with Tunisians angered over the government’s COVID response, endemic corruption, a lagging economy and, more broadly, the inability of the post-Ben Ali political system — particularly political parties — to deliver for citizens. While many Tunisians supported Saied’s move, they and the international community await what comes next and how it will impact the North African country’s long-term political and economic trajectory.

USIP’s Elie Abouaoun and Leo Siebert look at what led Saied to take this dramatic move, why many Tunisians support it, what comes next and how the international community can help. 

Why did President Saied decide to take such an extraordinary move? 

Siebert: There are multiple reasons, with both immediate and longer-term objectives behind Saied’s invocation of article 80 of the constitution, which gives the president exceptional powers “in the event of imminent danger.” The spark for the decision was a political conflict and crisis of governance that was spiraling out of control amid the country’s most catastrophic COVID-19 wave. In July, the public hospital system was failing, with preventable deaths on the rise as hospitals ran out of oxygen, and in some cases, even lost electricity. This comes against a backdrop of already steadily declining public services and a stagnant and fragmented government perceived by the public as unable or unwilling to manage the myriad crises at its door. Public demonstrations demanding accountable and responsive governance have been met by numerous instances of excessive police violence against demonstrators, harassment of civil society and journalists, as well as prosecutions of government criticism on social media.    

With the state and society increasingly at odds, the state itself was also experiencing an alarming level of dysfunction at a critical period. A primary cause of the dysfunction was a political conflict between Saied and Speaker of Parliament Rachid Ghannouchi in which neither was willing or able to negotiate a path forward, resulting in a stalemate with both sides spending their energy on political maneuvering. Meanwhile economic, social and health conditions continued to deteriorate.

Dismissing the government and freezing parliament, while deeply controversial, effectively ended the stalemate, at least for the time being. It also strengthens Saied’s bargaining position ahead of what will be contentious debates around how to correct the country’s trajectory. The president has been clear that by invoking article 80, he also intends to reform the political system, citing the endemic corruption, continued impunity and the inability of the current system to deliver the reforms, accountability and justice Tunisians need and deserve. Critics of the president’s decision argue that change via one-man rule, even temporarily, is not the solution and only exacerbates the problem’s the president has cited as justification for his decision.

It’s also important to remember that Saied was elected without a political party and has made his distaste for Tunisia’s political parties clear. Given this fact and the popular belief that leading parties have to-date failed to act in the interest of the public good, we should not be surprised to see forthcoming proposals from the president that diminish the primacy of parties in addressing the many challenges facing the country. On numerous occasions the president has advocated for a presidential system with stronger, democratically elected local and regional councils. Many believe he will pursue this model. But even this remains unclear.  Another possibility in the short term that may be easier to negotiate is amendments to the electoral law that could limit the chances of deeply fragmented parliaments incapable of forming stable ruling coalitions.  

Many Tunisians have expressed support for Saied’s decision. What does this reveal about citizens’ views on the country’s political system?

Siebert: It is important to understand that public support for the suspension of the current political system is not a referendum on democracy. It is a referendum on the performance of those elected since 2011, the system created by the 2014 constitution and the resulting transactional consensus between the main political parties. Citizens who fought hard and sacrificed greatly to dislodge the oppressive one-party system of the old regime expected their democratically elected leaders to improve living conditions and enable transitional justice, responsive governance and accountability. However, the current system has not led to prosperity nor consolidated democracy, which Tunisians so badly desire.  

The ills of the old regime remain and the underlying conditions that led to the 2011 uprising have not been addressed. While access to the spoils of power can now be won through credible electoral processes, citizens continue to suffer skyrocketing inflation, declining public services and systemic marginalization as politicians, business elites and security forces continue to act with impunity.  

Some in civil society point to the current predicament as evidence that their attempts to hold leaders to account via the ballot box have not worked, citing this as further evidence of the need for reforms. 

While those who helped build the current system are rightly sounding the alarm that Tunisia risks authoritarian drift, it appears that a majority are willing to give the president some leeway and continue to watch carefully and cautiously, ready to stand in unity against him should he prove to be a threat to the country’s hard-won freedoms. 

What comes next? How can this crisis be resolved?

Abouaoun: The president has yet to appoint a new prime minister as he promised when invoking article 80. And there are no updates on his plan for a roadmap toward restoring inclusive politics. The longer he waits, the more impatient the public, civil society and political parties will become, further testing the legitimacy of his actions and threatening the country’s tenuous stability.

The outcome of the recent shake-up will only yield positive results if it is complemented by a political roadmap that can bring the country back to the realm of inclusive politics. The grievances against mainstream political parties are irrefutable, but their role is still essential to a sound democracy. Therefore, the key question is what systemic reforms are needed to enable and incentivize responsive governance and prevent the recurrence of previous failures.  

Despite the significant gains made by Tunisians since 2011, political and social exclusion continued to fuel public grievances. Polling regularly confirms a majority of Tunisians believe their living conditions have deteriorated since 2011 and that political parties have not managed well the economic and social aspects of the transition. While this is not inaccurate, it is worth highlighting that the structural economic and social reforms needed in Tunisia require more than just a functioning government. Tunisia’s crisis is primarily driven by a lack of popular legitimacy of the current governing structures. Without a renewed social contract and a large constituency for these painful reforms, no government will be able to make the right decisions.

Is there a role for the United States and the international community?

Abouaoun: There is certainly a role for the international community, including the United States. As the security landscape in the Middle East and North Africa is changing with a multitude of regional actors playing a larger role than before, and not necessarily to the benefit of local citizens, Tunisia needs to be shielded from regional conflicts and power struggles. The United States, the Europe Union and other countries should caution regional players against using Tunisia to settle their own differences. 

Beyond providing bilateral financial and technical assistance — which are important and necessary —Tunisia’s political transition continues to require constant international support and encouragement to all political forces to remain vigilant about the importance of inclusive politics and the disastrous consequences of resorting to violence. Tunisian political forces should realize that, after all, establishing legitimate governance structures is the cornerstone of stability and prosperity. Such a process requires a constructive role for politicians, corporations, unions, civil society and other stakeholders and will certainly benefit from international support, be it technical, financial or political.

597269Image1-1180x677_d

إيران ستستخدم “الحشد الشعبي” لفرض تسوية على القوى الشيعية في العراق

This piece was originally published on the annaharar website https://www.annaharar.com/


ألقى تقرير لـ”معهد الولايات المتحدة للسلام” عن نتائج الانتخابات البرلمانية الأخيرة في العراق، شكوكاً حيال إمكان زعيم “التيار الصدري” مقتدى الصدر ترجمة انتصاره الانتخابي بشكل مباشر في معركة تسمية رئيس الوزراء المقبل.

وتوصل معدّ التقرير، مدير برامج الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا في المعهد إيلي أبو عون، إلى أن نتائج الانتخابات العراقية تطرح تساؤلات أكثر مما تقدّم أجوبة. لكنه توقع أن تستخدم إيران “الحشد الشعبي” لتفرض على القوى الشيعية التوصل إلى أرضية مشتركة.

وبعدما أظهرت النتائج أن “الكتلة الصدرية” تحظى بالعدد الأكبر من المقاعد في البرلمان الجديد، يتساءل الباحث عن البرنامج السياسي للصدر والمعاني التي يحملها توسع نفوذه في العراق.

لا ضمانات للصدر
يعتمد البرنامج السياسي للصدر على مجموعة فضفاضة من الشخصيات القبلية والسياسية. والواقع أن فوز تياره بالعدد الأكبر من المقاعد لا يضمن تشكيله الائتلاف البرلماني الأكبر الذي سيفرض اسم رئيس الوزراء في ما بعد.

ومع الخسارة الفادحة لتحالف “قوى الدولة الوطنية” الذي شكّله رئيس الوزراء السابق حيدر العبادي وزعيم “تيار الحكمة” عمار الحكيم، بحيث حصلا على 5 مقاعد فقط، قد تتمكن الكتل المقربة من إيران من جمع حوالى 80 مقعداً، وإذا فعلت ذلك فسيكون من الصعب على الصدر القول إنه يحظى بالكتلة الأكبر.

ويشير الباحث إلى صعوبة ترجمة شعبوية الصدر إلى نفوذ سياسي فعلي، في وقت يتطلب ذلك رؤية واضحة، وجدول أعمال واضح المعالم، وتحالفات ثابتة ومؤسسة قوية لدعم العمل الشاق الذي يجب القيام به. وفي هذه المرحلة، لا يزال “التيار” يفتقد إلى الكثير من هذه العناصر.

معركة تحالفات تكتيكية
ينسب أبو عون إلى سياسي شيعي بارز أن اختيار رئيس الوزراء لا يعتمد على الانتخابات بقدر ما يعتمد على إجماع الشيعة، مع مشاركة إيرانية. وبالتالي، لا يجد سبباً لأن تكون تجربة هذه السنة مختلفة.

ويشير إلى أن معادلة القوة لم تتغير كثيراً بشكل عام، فخسائر تحالف “الفتح”، القريب إلى إيران، تعوّضها مكاسب رئيس الوزراء الأسبق نوري المالكي، وخسائر العبادي والحكيم تعوّضها نجاحات الصدر ورئيس البرلمان المنتهية ولايته محمد الحلبوسي.

وفي الوقت الحالي، يركز السياسيون على ضمان دخولهم في تحالفات تكتيكية تسمح لهم بالادعاء أن لديهم الكتلة الأكبر.

وقد يكون الصدر على خلاف تكتيكي مع النظام الإيراني، إلا أنه لن يعتمد نهجاً عدائياً حيال إيران. وبالتالي، لا تزال طهران تحافظ على وجودها البارز في العراق.

والواقع أن تماسك التيار الصدري يبقى هشاً أمام نفوذ إيران، التي لا تزال تتمتع بسلطة زائدة من خلال ميليشيات “الحشد الشعبي” الموالية لها، وستستخدمها لإيجاد أرضية مشتركة بين الأحزاب الشيعية، في معادلة تخرج الجميع “منتصرين”.

وحتى الساعة، لا يمكن تحديد تأثير نتائج الانتخابات على علاقة العراق مع الولايات المتحدة. لكن يبدو أن الإيرانيين سيستمرون في استغلال البلاد للضغط على إدارة الرئيس الأميركي جو بايدن، ولا سيما في المحادثات حول العودة إلى الاتفاق النووي لعام 2015، من دون أن يؤثر ذلك على امكان رفع العقوبات.

FILE Ñ A poster of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr in the Sadr City neighborhood of Baghdad, Sept. 30, 2021. Iraqis voted Sunday, Oct. 10, in parliamentary elections meant to herald sweeping change to a dysfunctional political system that has dragged the country through almost two decades of deprivation. (Andrea DiCenzo/The New York Times)

Iraq’s Election Raises More Questions Than Answers

FILE Ñ A poster of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr in the Sadr City neighborhood of Baghdad, Sept. 30, 2021. Iraqis voted Sunday, Oct. 10, in parliamentary elections meant to herald sweeping change to a dysfunctional political system that has dragged the country through almost two decades of deprivation. (Andrea DiCenzo/The New York Times)

One-time U.S. foe emerges as top vote-getter but could still struggle to form the next government.

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.USIP.ORG/

Muqtada al-Sadr, a Shia cleric whose Mahdi Army followers battled U.S. forces during the years of the occupation, made big gains in Iraq’s parliamentary election on October 10. His victory could pose problems for the United States and Iran. But despite the Sadrist List’s electoral success, it is not a given that al-Sadr’s list will form the government, or even be the only kingmaker. USIP’s Elie Abouaoun examines the outcome of the election, the electoral process and the implications for Iraq’s future.

According to the latest results, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Sadrist List has the largest number of seats in the new parliament. What is al-Sadr’s platform, and what does his increased influence mean for Iraq?

Al-Sadr’s political platform is a loose constellation of tribal and political figures. It is true that al-Sadr’s list won the largest number of seats, but this is not a guarantee that he will be able to form the largest coalition in the parliament in order to impose the name of a prime minister. His natural allies — Ammar al-Hakeem of the Alliance of National State Forces and former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi — suffered devastating losses with five seats down from around 40 in the outgoing parliament. The lists considered close to Iran may be able to gather around 80 seats. If they manage to build such a large coalition, al-Sadr will find it difficult to claim he has the largest bloc.

As for the implications of al-Sadr’s increased influence, I think that it will not be easy for him to translate this populism into actual political leverage; such leverage requires a clear vision, well-articulated agenda, steady alliances and a solid institution to support the tedious work that needs to be done. At this stage, it looks like many of these assets and attributes are missing in al-Sadr’s movement.

Prior to the vote, there were numerous concerns regarding turnout and the administration of this election. How did the electoral process unfold?

The concerns about turnout proved to be true. In general, turnout was quite low. The Independent High Electoral Commission changed the criteria used to determine turnout, from the total number of eligible voters to the number of people who hold voter ID cards. With this change, the turnout is now officially at 43%.

Voting on election day went more or less smoothly. With the exception of one serious incident in Steih-Kirkuk, there were no reports of other major incidents. This does not mean that the electoral process went smoothly. The process includes what happens both before and after an election. The pre-election period was marred by assassinations, intimidation, threats, bribery and unequal access to media. The post-election period has seen confusion around the vote count and manual vote counts being conducted with few safeguards. This has resulted in several groups contesting the results of the elections.

The new election law was meant to open space for more independent candidates to win seats. How did independent candidates fare?

Estimations — ranging from 20 to 40 — about how many seats were won by independent candidates are contradictory and not accurate. Given the lack of clarity about whom to consider an independent and how many of the victorious candidates will resist the temptation of joining a well-established parliamentary bloc, defining the success or the failure of the independents in Iraq’s 2021 elections remains in the realm of speculation. Such a determination can be made only after the appointment of a prime minister, which is when the consistency and cohesion of the independent candidates will be tested.  

The elections were held early in part to address the ongoing protest movement that dates back to October 2019. How have protest leaders reacted to the results, and are there indications that the new parliament might deliver the change Iraqis are demanding?

The makeup of the new parliament is much closer to the old establishment against which Iraqis protested in the streets. Of all the demands put forth by the key figures in the October 2019 protest groups, only the promise of early elections has been fulfilled. Many other demands, notably investigating the shooting of protesters and the need to bring the perpetrators of those incidents to justice, the demand for reforms, more inclusive governance, and curbing corruption, still need to be addressed. There has been limited progress on these demands.

Beyond the Sadrist List, which groups have seen the largest shifts in seats?

Besides al-Sadr’s victory, the most significant changes include a substantial increase in the number of seats won by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list, a sizable win for the outgoing speaker of parliament Muhammad al-Halbousi’s Taqaddum party, and devastating losses for the Iran-backed Fateh list as well as the al-Hakeem-al-Abadi alliance. Despite these major shifts in numbers, the overall power equation has not changed much. Fateh’s losses are compensated by al-Maliki’s gains and the losses of the al-Hakeem-al-Abadi alliance are compensated by al-Sadr and al-Halbousi’s successes.

As expected, Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) asserted not only its pole position among Kurdish parties by getting the largest number of seats compared to others, but most importantly it proved that the small splinter parties — Goran (Change), New Generation etc. — are not viable options for the Kurds, whose interests will continue to be mostly upheld by the dual coalition between KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

What do these results mean for the government formation process, and who might we see as candidates for prime minister and other major positions?

As a prominent Shia politician once told me, the selection of a prime minister does not depend on the elections as much as it depends on an intra-Shia consensus, usually facilitated by the Iranians. I do not see why the 2021 experience will be any different. It is too soon to know who has the best chance of becoming prime minister. For now, all politicians are focused on making sure they enter into tactical, time-bound alliances so they can claim to have the largest bloc in parliament.

How do these results affect Iraq’s relationship with both Iran and the United States, as well as other regional actors?

The results announced so far are interpreted by many as a big loss for the Iranians. While this could be true at the tactical level, I do not see it as a major loss for them. Fateh, al-Maliki and Khamis al-Khanjar, the leader of the Parliamentary Azm Alliance — all considered to be close to Iran — still have a sizable bloc (25% to 30% of the total seats in parliament) which makes them a de facto partner in decision-making. In Iraq, simple majority rule does not really work. Most of the decisions are taken by consensus.

Al-Sadr might be in tactical disagreement with the Iranian regime, but he will not engage in a hostile way against the Iranians. Neither will the KDP nor al-Halbousi. So, at the end of the day, Iran still has a strong foothold in Iraq.

Moreover, al-Sadr’s platform is not as coherent as some think. It can be easily fractured by the Iranians, who continue to enjoy an excess of power through the pro-Iranian units of the Popular Mobilization Forces. They will use it to facilitate finding a common ground among Shia parties, all of whom will emerge as “victors.”

It is too soon to judge how Iraq’s relationship with the United States will be affected as a result of this election. What is clear though is that the Iranians will continue using Iraq to pressure the Biden administration, at least as long as the Vienna discussions do not lead to a lifting of sanctions on Iran. I believe that the Iranians will make sure that challenging the United States in Iraq remains within a certain ceiling, in a way that the prospects of an agreement with the Americans on lifting sanctions are not undermined.

223_0hh-800x480

Biden’s Summit for Democracy sparks questions in Middle East

Elie Abouaoun told The Arab Weekly: “When elections are rushed in a sharply divided society going through a conflict, the outcome is usually further deterioration and civil wars”.

This piece was originally thearabweekly on the atfl website https://thearabweekly.com/

WASHINGTON-

President Joe Biden on Thursday opened the first White House Summit for Democracy by sounding an alarm about what he sees as a global slide for democratic institutions and called for world leaders to “lock arms” and demonstrate democracies can deliver.

In the Middle East, the summit sparked questions about whether it matters for a region that has not managed to embark on successful democratic transitions and just how the US intends to adjust its democracy promotion to MENA’s realities.

Biden called the virtual meeting a critical moment for fellow leaders to redouble efforts on bolstering democracies. In making the case for action, he noted his own battle to win the passage of voting rights legislation at home and alluded to the United States’ own challenges to its democratic institutions and traditions.

“This is an urgent matter,” Biden said in remarks to open the two-day virtual summit. “The data we’re seeing is largely pointing in the wrong direction.”

“Make no mistake, we’re at a moment of democratic reckoning,” said Uzra Zeya, the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights. “Countries in virtually every region of the world have experienced degrees of democratic backsliding.”

The summit featured opening remarks from Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, with representatives from some 100 governments, as well as NGOs, private businesses, philanthropical organisations and legislatures attending.

The gathering already has drawn a backlash from the United States’ chief adversaries and other nations that were not invited to participate.

There are concerns in Washington that democratic practices are fraying while the tide of authoritarianism is rising.

A Pew Research Centre report released this week said that while “people like democracy, their commitment to it is often not very strong.” Even wealthy countries, including the US, have some people who favour military rule, the report said.

Another group, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, said in its annual report that the number of countries experiencing democratic backsliding “has never been as high” as the past decade, with the US added to the list alongside India and Brazil.

US officials promise a year of action will follow the two-day conference but preparations have been overshadowed by questions over some invitees’ democratic credentials and complaints from uninvited countries.

White House spokeswoman Karine Jean-Pierre said Biden will call on participants to dedicate themselves to “reversing the democratic recession and ensuring that democracies deliver for their people.”

Biden has made promoting democratic values a focal point of his foreign policy and has repeatedly stressed the need for the US and other like-minded allies to demonstrate that democracies are a better vehicle for societies than autocracies.

— Guest list —

The White House declined to say how it went about deciding who was invited and who was left off the list.

White House press secretary Jen Psaki said the invitation list was not meant to be a “stamp of approval or disapproval.”

“It’s just meant to have a diverse range of voices and faces and representatives at the discussion,” she said.

In the Middle East, Turkey, a fellow NATO member and Egypt and Jordan, key US allies in the region, were left out. Israel and Iraq were the only MENA countries to be invited.

Tunisia, long perceived by the US and other Western nations as embodying hopes for successful democratic transitions in the Arab world, has not been invited either, with no explanations offered by Washington or Tunis. US concerns about the future of the Tunisian transition were reflected by a US House of representatives hearing held last October.

President Kais Saied has said, however, that the “state of exception” he installed in Tunisia since July 25 aims to save the Tunisian political system from corrupt practices.

An invitation list published last month included countries whose leaders are accused by human rights groups of harbouring authoritarian tendencies, such as the Philippines, Poland and Brazil.

It also included Taiwan, stoking anger from China, which considers the democratically-governed island part of its territory.

The guest list raises the question of the often unconvincing categorisation of countries of the world as democratic or not. There have been questions about governments and non-government organisations making that determination.

“There are multiple frameworks, indicators and attributes used to assess the extent to which a government is democratic or not. There are also multiple institutions doing these classifications. Some of these institutions are less independent than others, in some cases pushing for a partisan or partial political agenda. Therefore, the real value of these classifications lies more in what kind of patterns they reveal rather than taking them to the word, ” Elie Abouaoun, director of the MENA programme at the US Institute Peace, told The Arab Weekly.

Some in the Arab world reject Western categorisations as artificial or trying to impose democracy models with no connection to the region. “I would not put all the West in one basket. In my work, I have seen very rigid conceptual frameworks adopted by some Western organisations and pushed into some countries. But I have also seen several organisations and initiatives showing a great deal of understanding of the local dynamics, contexts, and nuances,”  says Abouaoun.

— Risks and pitfalls —

With the examples of Libya and Iraq in mind, regional analysts caution against the exclusive focus on electoral norms in MENA countries plagued by serious crises or internal divisions, as a yardstick to measure the success of democratic transitions.

“Taking several examples from the region, I see a clear tendency by the international community (or most of its members) to focus on the technical aspects of democratic transition such as holding elections and expediting the process of adopting a constitution, ” admits Abou Aoun. “When elections are rushed in a sharply divided society going through a conflict, the outcome is usually further deterioration and civil wars,” he adds.

Former Tunisian minister of foreign affairs Khemaies Jhinaoui believes “local populations should take ownership of the democratic process” and not see it as influenced by the outside.

Western democratic advocacy faces the additional challenge of being perceived by the Arab public as a form of foreign interference.  “It is clear by now that mainstreaming democratic practices in any given country must start with local buy-in. Short of this, the whole endeavour becomes an imposed agenda by foreign powers, ” noted Abouaoun.

Despite US professions of faith in the democratic ideal, experts say. Washington’s ambitions in the region seem to have taken a back seat in view of more urgent tasks, such as thwarting Iran’s nuclear threat and worrying about the resurgence of the Islamic State (ISIS).

White House coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa, Brett McGurk, bemoaned “hard lessons learnt” from previous policies including pursuits of democracy in the region. He pointed out that the current administration is now focused on “the basics of building, maintaining and strengthening our partnerships and alliances here.”

–US credibility–

The US also faces the challenge of enhancing its own credibility as a democratic leader. The nation, which has long postured as a shining example of democratic rule, is itself seen as a backslider.

Local elected officials in America are resigning at an alarming rate amid confrontations with angry voices at school board meetings, elections offices and town halls. States are passing laws to limit access to the ballot, making it more difficult for Americans to vote. And the January 6 attack at the Capitol has left many in one US political party clinging to Donald Trump’s false claims of a stolen election, eroding trust in the accuracy of the vote.

“The United States has a thriving democracy, but it’s been hurting in recent years,” said Michael Abramowitz, the president of Freedom House, whose annual report marked a 15th consecutive year of a global democratic slide. “Right now, we’re going through a phase in America where it’s very difficult to get things done and to really prove that democracy can deliver.”

image1454687814-38676-Place01-0_s660x390

It is not too late to renounce violence and think creatively of a win-win solution

http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/opinion/everyone-tried-confrontation-heres-a-better-road-for-the-middle-east_38676

It is not too late to renounce violence and think creatively of a win-win solution

yourmiddleeast.com

The region today faces riddles that go even beyond the fate of Assad, ISIS and other terrorist groups. It’s time for a new approach, Dr. Elie Abouaoun writes.

As the Iranian nuclear deal with the U.S. and the five other global powers goes into effect, this is an opportune time to consider the next steps the international community could take to stabilize the tumultuous Middle East. Rather than continued confrontation between regional powers Iran and Saudi Arabia, couldn’t international negotiators make the case that all sides could achieve greater gains with a political dialogue?

Certainly the Iran nuclear deal is a diplomatic achievement. During the negotiations, many did not believe that a positive outcome would be possible. Opposition was intense, especially in the United States. Several regional powers—mainly Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, to name the biggest—accuse the U.S. and its five partners in the negotiations of capitulating to a rogue state. But the fact remains that the critics offered no valid alternatives to negotiations and instead suggested only a military confrontation with a regional power that already had cultivated numerous powerful points of leverage in the region, making any confrontation clearly too costly. From this perspective, the nuclear agreement was the only option for an international community that is still recovering from the 2008 financial crisis and traumatized by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The criticism of the nuclear deal from Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia is less about the technical capabilities that Iran could develop than the idea that leaders in Tehran are now legitimate counterparts for the international community. For these countries, Iran remains an aggressor state, invasive through its proxies and maintaining as a core strategy the export of the “Islamic Revolution.”

It is not too late to renounce violence and think creatively of a win-win solution

Shia Iran’s image as a threat, real or perceived, to the Sunni countries in the region actually dates to long before the Islamic revolution. The geo-strategic standoff between the Iranian Empire and regional powers including Arabs took different forms for centuries but was more a struggle for power than ideological or religious. That changed in 1979, when Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini led the overthrow of the Shah and clearly stated the objective of exporting the “Islamic Revolution.” This added a sectarian layer to a very old competition between Iranians and Arabs. The subsequent expansion of Iranian influence into Lebanon in the 1990s, into Iraq after 2003 and in Syria and Yemen since 2011 came to corroborate the fears of several Arab monarchies.

Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and other smaller countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have always sought to deny Iran regional influence with cross-border games of their own. Even if some of the above mentioned countries might accept a bigger role for Iran in the region, they will never accept that Iran used and continues to use the Shia Arab communities as a tool to undermine the legitimacy of their own regimes. To date, there are no signs that Iran is yet ready to give up on this strategy. From the Iranian perspective, the determination of “artificial” and pro-West countries to weaken Iran and ensure it is confined to its own borders constitutes a hostile stand.

In this context of mutual distrust, caution and hatred, many GCC countries –supported by the West – preemptively bolstered Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran in the 1980s. The strategy of directly confronting Iran went into some sort of hibernation in the 1990s, only to be revived since 2003. The strategy included turning a blind eye to the Sunni insurgency in Iraq (against what was considered as a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad) and, as of 2004, supporting various attempts to undermine the Syrian regime, given the vital role Syria played to the fulfillment of an old dream of Iran of carving a strategic passage all the way to the Mediterranean (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon). To hamper Iran’s project, all means were considered legitimate, including nurturing a radical opposition in Syria, holding the Iraqi Sunnis off from participating constructively in an ailing but necessary political process, reviving Sunni-Shia strife in Lebanon, and playing Iran’s own game by supporting Sunni military groups in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

Iran’s “all time” strategy in any country it wants to control is to preserve a hollow regime while building up para-state civilian and military entities under their full control. Iran’s leaders have never supported Lebanese, Yemeni, Syrian or Iraqi armies or state institutions but rather invested in non-state Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, the Syrian National Defense Forces and to a lesser extent to the Houthi militia in Yemen. Moreover, the Iranian strategy in the region looks also at weakening the heavyweight Arab countries so that a modern Persian Empire becomes a reality.

w460

Lessons learned from Lebanon elections: Reforming Human Rights’ Policies

Elections in Lebanon carried several controversial elements

This piece was originally published on the ALEF Act For Human Rights website https://alefliban.org

The recently held elections in Lebanon carried several controversial elements – in both how they were organized and their results – but validated one assumption: the absence of a public will to reform human rights policies.

Lebanon has been into successive and often concurrent political, security, economic and social crisis since it became independent in 1943. Even the short periods of political and security stability (1952-1956, 1960-1966, 1992-2004) witnessed by the country did not lead to significant improvements in human rights policies. Since 1943, Lebanon was ruled, unilaterally or collaboratively, by a broad range of political actors affiliated to all ideological, partisan, political, sectarian and ethnic mainstreams. None of these actors could establish a sound public policy making process nor to induce significant improvements in the existing policies, including those related to human rights. Moreover, all these actors were either involved in gross violations of rights, corruption and/or showed legendary incompetence. Even when competent and well-intentioned individuals coincidentally occupied government positions, they were unable to trigger a sustainable change in public policies and political behavior. Their achievements proved to be short-lived and mostly reversible. To understand the reasons underlying this dismaying reality, it is important to look carefully at several factors, many of which can be validated by the recent elections.

Despite some exceptions, one can observe the deviation of social paradigms reflecting in a widespread human rights violations and corruption that undermine almost all sectors: public sector, private sector, judiciary, media, services (health sector, education…), civil society organizations. Moreover, many Lebanese praise the perpetrators as “true leaders”, “brave”, “or even “heroic” in some cases. Entire generations have been raised according to non-human rights precepts, making today’s society one of the most discriminatory, cynical and opportunistic, focused only on perceived short-term interests. The importance of “values”, “social good” and “public interest” have regressed to the lowest levels over the years.

Despite the prevailing perception that Lebanese are open minded, highly educated and competent, multilingual, entrepreneurs…etc., the reality is that this overstated self-confidence is denied by the realities on the ground. This is mostly true when it comes to the extent to which Lebanon’s public policies are rights oriented, relevant, impactful and viable. The paradox of a highly self-aware, skilled, educated and competent society accepting this level of low respect of human rights, public services and public-sector performance indicates that the “superiority” self-attributed by some Lebanese is nothing but a myth. A lot of the inappropriate public policies are caused primarily by a lack of competence rather than other factors.

Most Lebanese perceive the “State” as a “jackpot machine” rather than a proponent and regulator of public policies. Several factors have contributed to a significant disengagement of the public from monitoring respect for human rights, public policies and performance as well as contributing to setting the agendas of public policies. This has been aggravated by the inefficiency of most civil society organizations in shaping and pushing for better public policies. At every attempt to reform a sector or improve the policy framework pertaining to an issue, the politicians managed to picture such an attempt as an “existential war” waged by the “others” for the purpose of “political elimination”. In most of the cases, civil society organizations were not successful to build a constituency for change.

Even when very few actors had the intention to induce a positive change, they were not able to build alliances due to political polarization, trivial competition, strive for visibility or other factors. The importance of coalitions was never taken to its right value in the public sphere in Lebanon.

Last but not least, most of the human rights and reform initiatives are funded by international donors. Such funding comes with time and political constraints. Only unrestricted indigenous funding can unlock the potential actors willing to work on reform initiatives since these require long term approaches that international funders cannot commit to, given their funding cycles. Other factors such as the perception of international funding in some communities also played against the success of the very few funded initiatives.

In conclusion, the recent elections validated the assumption that reforming public policies to become more human rights friendly requires working systematically on the deviant social paradigms, building the deficient capacities of the local actors, mobilizing the public opinion by building a broader constituency for human rights reform, a better understanding and engagement with the Lebanese policy making cycle, building purposeful and result oriented alliances and encouraging indigenous funding for human rights initiatives.

000_9MR3JV.jpg

Lebanon: New government, different faces, same old problems

The reconstitution of political power and an independent electoral body are prerequisites for any substantive recovery in Lebanon. Until then, the country will lurch from crisis to crisis

This piece was originally published on the middleeasteye website https://www.middleeasteye.net/

In an exasperated population cheers the formation of a new government after almost a year of tribulations and an unprecedented economic and social crisis.

By now, though, seasoned Lebanese politicians are experts in generating an exciting “shock factor” and the illusion of impending change by introducing a few ministers from outside the usual pool of names. These people generally have impressive professional qualifications, but lack the political clout to spark meaningful reforms or take the necessary bold actions. The 2021 Najib Mikati government is no exception.

Translation: President Aoun and Prime Minister Mikati signed the decree to form the new government in the presence of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri.

Since the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005, various forms of governments – under three very different presidents and five very dissimilar prime ministers – have failed to address any of the many structural political, security, financial or social predicaments facing the country. There must be very good reasons for this.

Fierce resistance

Lebanon’s population – in general – has persistently complained about poor governance and the deterioration of public services, but such dissent is usually only expressed through rhetoric and on social media. Most Lebanese ignore the fact that the reforms being demanded of politicians would first require very strong public will – that is, citizens would need to demonstrate stringent discipline, given that the reforms would require their full support and significantly alter lifestyles.

On the other hand, the first few half-hearted attempts at reform were ferociously blocked by a ring of business leaders and politicians. Despite profound ideological and political differences between them, these politico-business leaders were united in seeing most of these reforms as threats to their power.

During the past two years, this “solidarity” manifested itself in fierce resistance against a financial recovery plan proposed by the outgoing government, as the plan would have required the private banks to absorb part of the financial deficit accumulated over the last 30 years. Instead, they arrogantly pushed for selling Lebanon’s public assets, thus exempting themselves from any liability.

And then there are the regional dynamics that have weighed heavily on Lebanon’s economic – and by extension financial – crisis. The lack of a concrete, consistent and perseverant plan by the international community to forestall Iran’s strategic and continuous investment in Hezbollah means that this “life insurance” for the Islamic republic is here to stay.

Domestically, this will extend the need for Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, one of the main symbols of corruption, to remain in good standing. It will also require maintaining the incestuous relationship between the Party of God and state institutions.

The protracted presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, as well as the use of Lebanon by the Assad regime to circumvent sanctions, will also continue to impede a healthy economic recovery. Finally, the reluctance of some Gulf Cooperation Council countries to come to Lebanon’s aid cannot be addressed by a government where Hezbollah and its allies continue to have the last word.

Political fragmentation

The same political fragmentation that crippled the outgoing Diab government is stronger than ever. The dynamics – both interpersonal and political – leading up to the announcement on 10 September that a new government had been formed are indicative of the depth of the political divide, mostly because the major political actors believe that this government will be in place well beyond the legal term end of the current legislature in 2022.

In the absence of tenacious public and political will, and in the current charged regional context, it is hard to imagine how this government can attend to the most immediate crises, such as the shortage of basic commodities or the lack of access to depositors’ money in banks.

Considerable cash injections are needed to replenish the banks and the government’s coffers, and this remains a major obstacle that cannot be easily overcome – even with the flashiest names in a hijacked executive branch. The only solution is through gradual structural reforms.

The frequently invoked ‘reconstitution of political power’ is a prerequisite for any recovery in Lebanon. At best, the current apparatus can be part of a transition

Moreover, the Lebanese public should remain vigilant about being manipulated by a bitter President Michel Aoun (who appears to be seriously considering an unconstitutional extension of his mandate), a very ambitious prime minister, and a number of equally ambitious ministers.

The attributes of inefficacy, lack of vision, corruption and fragmentation are not exclusive to those political groups that are part of the current power scheme. The vast majority of the opposition parties and organisations – including the self-proclaimed revolutionaries – suffer from the same plight but to a lesser degree.

The frequently invoked “reconstitution of political power” is a prerequisite for any recovery in Lebanon. At best, the current apparatus can be part of a transition. The “Macron doctrine”, stipulating that the same groups who led the country as it was going to the wall are the ones who will save it, is a pipe dream.

Nonetheless, such a reconstitution of political power is not – and should not be – only about the personnel involved. It must also involve a reconstitution of the values which underpin political practice in Lebanon, as well as reformed social paradigms that would complement the legal and political changes with social ones.

It will be a long-term process. The first step must be credible and inclusive elections as soon as possible. As Lebanon’s elections are currently managed by the subjugated Ministry of Interior, a cornerstone of the country’s recovery must be to establish an independent electoral management body, which could benefit from substantial international assistance and support.

If Prime Minister Najib Mikati is genuine about his intention to save Lebanon, an independent electoral body and a convincing road map leading to timely elections must be his opening gambits.  

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

This article is available in French on Middle East Eye French edition.

geekondoor787

حفتر… عين على طمأنة أميركا وعين على الفوز بالرئاسة الليبية

This piece was originally published on the aawsat website https://www.aawsat.com/

فيما تتأهب الأوساط السياسية الليبية إلى انطلاق الانتخابات الرئاسية والبرلمانية، المقررة في 24 من ديسمبر (كانون الأول) المقبل، يسعى الجنرال خليفة حفتر، قائد الجيش الوطني الليبي، إلى كسب الدعم والتأييد الغربي، وخصوصاً الولايات المتحدة، وسط منافسة شديدة من بعض الشخصيات السياسية الأخرى في الحصول على ذات الدعم.

الترتيب والاستعداد الذي يعمل عليه حفتر لكسب دعم الإدارة الأميركية والمشرعين في الكونغرس، دفعه إلى تخصيص نحو مليون دولار هي قيمة ترتيب لقاءات وزيارات مع مسؤولين أميركيين، هدفها تعزيز علاقة الولايات المتحدة مع ليبيا، وفقاً لسجلات وكالة العملاء الأجانب بوزارة العدل الأميركية.

وبحسب الاتفاقية بين حفتر وجماعة الضغط والدعم السياسي الأميركية (اطلعت «الشرق الأوسط» على هذه السجلات)، فإنه من المفترض أن يعمل الفريق على مدى ستة أشهر للمساعدة في ترتيب زيارة لحفتر إلى واشنطن، مدتها ثلاثة أيام، تكون كجزء من المرحلة الأولى من الاتفاقية، ويتوقع أن يتم في إطار ذلك تنظيم اجتماعات مع بعض مسؤولي البيت الأبيض، ووزارتي الخارجية والدفاع، وبعض قادة الكونغرس، وأعضاء لجان الخارجية والدفاع والمخصصات، إضافة إلى المؤسسات البحثية الأخرى، بما في ذلك «مركز التقدم الأميركي»، و«المعهد الأميركي للسلام».

وأشارت السجلات إلى أن الهدف المعلن من هذه التحركات هو نيل دعم الولايات المتحدة للانتخابات الليبية العامة المرتقبة، تحت إشراف الأمم المتحدة، بالإضافة إلى نيل «دعم أميركي سياسي ودبلوماسي واقتصادي إضافي إلى أقصى حد ممكن، وذلك بهدف تعزيز مستقبل ليبيا الموحدة، في ظل نظام حكم ديمقراطي تحكمه سيادة القانون».

وتأتي تحركات المشير حفتر في وقت يكثف فيه سياسيون ليبيون آخرون يتنافسون على الفوز بالانتخابات المقبلة، من تواصلهم مع الكونغرس والإدارة الأميركية قبل الانتخابات، التي تأجلت مرارًا وتكرارًا منذ ديسمبر 2018، غير أن حفتر يواجه معركة شاقة لتأمين دعم إدارة بايدن، وذلك بسبب تداعيات حملته العسكرية التي قادها ضد حكومة الوفاق الوطني، المدعومة من الأمم المتحدة بين أبريل (نيسان) 2019 ويونيو (حزيران) 2020.

وعلمت «الشرق الأوسط» أن الولايات المتحدة قدمت مقترحاً بتمديد فترة الانتخابات البرلمانية مع الانتخابات الرئاسية، والتي تبدأ معاً في ديسمبر المقبل، على أن تبقى صناديق الاقتراع مفتوحة على فترات حتى سبتمبر (أيلول) من العام المقبل، وذلك ليتسنى لكافة الأطراف المشاركة في الانتخابات، لكن هذا المقترح قوبل برفض الليبيين أنفسهم.

وفي حوار مع جوي هود، مساعد وزير الخارجية لشؤون الشرق الأدنى بالإنابة، مع «الشرق الأوسط» الأسبوع الماضي، كشف هود أن الولايات المتحدة تعمل على زيادة تركيزها الدبلوماسي في ليبيا، مبرزاً أن هدف واشنطن هو «إقامة ليبيا ذات سيادة مستقرة، وموحدة وآمنة، بدون تدخل أجنبي، تقودها حكومة منتخبة ديمقراطياً، حكومة تدعم حقوق الإنسان والتنمية، وقادرة على محاربة الإرهاب داخل حدودها». وبخصوص ترشح خليفة حفتر للانتخابات القادمة، واحتمال دعم واشنطن له، قال هود: «إذا اختار خليفة حفتر الانخراط الحقيقي في العملية السياسية، فإن الليبيين أنفسهم سيحددون ما إذا كان هناك دور يلعبه حفتر في مستقبل البلاد».

ومن بين المتنافسين الآخرين الذين يسعون للدعم الأميركي نجل رئيس ليبيا السابق، سيف الإسلام القذافي، الذي تعترض الدعوات الأميركية إلى حد كبير فرص نجاحه، وذلك بسبب استمرار العقوبات الأميركية والدولية المفروضة عليه. إضافة إلى السفير الليبي السابق لدى الإمارات العربية المتحدة، عارف علي النايض، وإبراهيم باشاغا.

وفي يوليو (تموز) الماضي قال حفتر بحسب عدد من وسائل الإعلام: «لقد اتبعنا رغبات أصدقائنا وحلفائنا، وسنلجأ إلى حل سياسي… وهو الانتخابات، وإذا لم نتوصل إلى حل، فإن قواتنا المسلحة مستعدة مرة أخرى لتحرير العاصمة من الميليشيات والمجرمين».

ويرى الدكتور إيلي أبو عون، مدير برامج الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا في «معهد الولايات المتحدة للسلام» أن «عيون العالم تنصب على إنجاح الانتخابات الليبية. فعلى المستوى الفني هناك جهود متواصلة من قبل أصحاب المصلحة الليبيين والدوليين، بما فيهم المفوضية الوطنية للانتخابات، وزارة الداخلية، وبعثة الأمم المتحدة للدعم في ليبيا، للتأكد من أن الظروف مواتية لعملية انتخابية موثوقة».

واعتبر أبو عون خلال حديثه إلى «الشرق الأوسط»، أن ما ينقص الآن في الشأن الليبي هو «شبكة الأمان السياسي»، التي تضمن قبول نتائج الانتخابات من قبل جميع الأطراف المعنية، موضحاً أن شبكة الأمان «هي عملية الحوار السياسي، الذي من شأنه أن يعالج المخاوف المشروعة لمعظم الليبيين، رغم أن أعضاء لجنة «5 + 5» يواصلون العمل معاً بشأن تدابير ملموسة»، إلا أن نوع وعدد الحوادث الأمنية في جميع أنحاء ليبيا يشير إلى أن احتمال وقوع أعمال عنف انتخابية (قبل وبعد الانتخابات) لا تزال مرتفعة، ولذلك «من الضروري في هذه المرحلة وجود شبكة أمان سياسية، من شأنها أن تشمل قواعد سلوك من نوع ما».

وبسؤاله عن أكثر المرشحين للفوز برضا الغرب، قال أبو عون إنه «لا توجد معايير موحدة للدول الغربية حتى يحظى هؤلاء المتنافسون على رضا الدول الغربية، خصوصاً أن بعض هذه الدول منخرطة بشكل مباشر على الأرض، ولديها أجندة سياسية واضحة في ليبيا. ومع ذلك، يبدو أن معظم الدول الغربية، وخصوصاً الولايات المتحدة، حريصة على منع مزيد من التدهور في الوضع في ليبيا، أي التدهور الأمني». مشيراً إلى أن معظم الدول «تركز بشكل أكبر على التأكد من إجراء الانتخابات في موعدها وبأمان، ومن الواضح أن هذا يعني أيضاً أن المرشحين المفضلين لمعظم الدول الغربية هم أولئك الذين لا يثيرون الشقاق أو الاستفزاز».

ورأى الدكتور أبو عون أن هناك «الكثير من الأساطير» في ليبيا حول «كيفية عمل جماعات الضغط في الغرب، وتوقع النتائج التي يمكن أن تسفر عنها، وهناك أيضاً أحداث في تاريخ ليبيا الحديث تؤجج السرديات المعادية للغرب، فيما ينظر الكثير من الليبيين بشكل سلبي إلى المرشحين، الذين يحشدون الدعم الغربي من خلال الضغط، وقد ينظر إليه الآخرون على أنه شر لا بد منه». مضيفاً أن هناك الكثير من التركيز المفرط على جهود الضغط من قبل مرشحين محددين، وفي عالم اليوم، حيث يكون الوصول إلى المعلومات في الوقت الفعلي أسهل بكثير، وحيث يتم تحويل جوهر العمل الدبلوماسي، انخفض مفهوم وقيمة الضغط المباشر والشخصي في العواصم الكبرى