What’s Behind the Lebanon-Gulf Diplomatic Row?

Demonstrators look on at an unfurled banner in Beirut, Lebanon on Wednesday, Aug. 4, 2021, during a march to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the catastrophic port explosion in Beirut that killed more than 200 people. Amid a financial collapse that could rank among the worldÕs worst since the mid-1800s is closing like a vise on LebanonÕs middle class, whose money has plummeted in value as the cost of nearly everything has skyrocketed. (Diego Ibarra Sanchez/The New York Times)

A profound disagreement over how to handle Iran’s influence in the region drives tension between Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.USIP.ORG/

Already in the throes of existential political and economic crises, Lebanon is now facing a diplomatic row with Saudi Arabia and several of its allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Following critical comments made by Lebanese Minister of Information George Kordahi about the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, Riyadh expelled Lebanon’s ambassador, banned all Lebanese imports, and recalled its ambassador to Lebanon. In solidarity, the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait summoned their ambassadors in Lebanon. This current crisis reflects the Gulf’s broader concerns over Iran’s influence in the region and the powerful role of its ally Hezbollah in Lebanon.

USIP’s Elie Abouaoun explains how this rift impacts Lebanon’s ability to address its economic and political crises and how it can be resolved.

What kicked off this diplomatic row with Saudi Arabia and several other GCC countries?

The recent diplomatic crisis between Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait is just another reflection of the tense and problematic relationship that most of the Gulf countries have had with Beirut over the last 10 years — a tension that was not always visible to the public as it has been since 2016.

The direct cause of this crisis is a media statement by Lebanon’s current minister of information, George Kordahi, about the war in Yemen months before he was appointed to the current government of Prime Minister Mikati. While many in the media attributed GCC anger to Kordahi’s description of the Yemen war as “futile and pointless,” the fact that Kordahi said the Houthis were “defending themselves against an external aggression” is what both Saudi Arabia and the UAE consider as prejudicial to them, given the Houthis’ military attacks against Saudi Arabia and the support they receive from Iran. The next day, Kordahi exacerbated the situation by saying that Lebanon should not remain “prone to blackmailing,” alluding to an alleged request from the Saudis for him to resign.

This diplomatic row comes less than six months after former Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Charbel Wehbeh’s impetuous statement in which he used derogatory terms to describe the Saudis. Although Wehbeh resigned immediately, many GCC countries are still convinced that Lebanon’s foreign policy is undermining the Gulf’s regional agenda, which looks at Iran as the primary threat. The distrust between Lebanon’s current legislative and executive bodies and some GCC countries is thus deeper than a mere statement by a Lebanese minister. It has to do with a profound disagreement about how to handle Iran’s influence in the Middle East.

Because these countries consider Lebanon’s executive and legislative powers to be fully under the control of Hezbollah, they have dropped their massive financial and political support for Lebanon in the form of grants, subsidized loans, long-term deposits in the Central Bank or through the job opportunities for hundreds of thousands of Lebanese economic migrants. This comes while Lebanon is facing what the World Bank has described as one of the worst economic crises in the world since 1850.

How does this dispute impact Lebanon’s economic and political crises?

If not contained, the crisis will have a significant impact on Lebanon’s collapsed economy and political fragility. According to the Lebanese Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, Saudi Arabia and the UAE ranked second and third, respectively, as export destinations for Lebanese goods, despite a significant drop in the total trade value in 2020 and 2021.

It is estimated that around 400,000 Lebanese work in GCC countries and send almost 60 percent of Lebanon’s total remittances. In terms of imports, Lebanon might find alternative sources for the few items imported from the GCC countries. But this will incur additional cost — and delays — at a time when Lebanon’s economy and competitiveness are at a historic low point.

At the political level, the crisis will widen the gap between the Sunni and Shia leaderships in the country. Irrespective of political positioning, no prime minister (who is Sunni per Lebanon’s constitution) can afford to be adversarial with Saudi Arabia. Some have been closer to the Kingdom than others, but no one in the premiership can come out publicly against Saudi Arabia for fear of losing their political legitimacy as the most senior Sunni government official. The fact that this diplomatic crisis comes only few weeks after a brief round of sectarian violence in the streets of Beirut — albeit Christian-Shia violence — will further exacerbate the grievances against Hezbollah’s behavior in Lebanon and its instrumentalization of Lebanon’s politics.

Last but not least, the paralysis of the government and its potential resignation will likely halt efforts to build a consensus around a financial recovery plan that is long overdue and a prerequisite to negotiate a bailout plan with international donors.

How can the Lebanon-Gulf dispute be resolved? Is there a role for the United States?

Unlike in Wehbe’s case in which he resigned immediately, the first official reaction in Lebanon to GCC’s outrage was untactful and outside customary diplomatic practices. Such stand-offs often happen between countries but are resolved through quiet, constructive diplomatic engagement, not by provocative statements such as the one made by Kordahi in the aftermath of the GCC’s reaction. Given that this latest row is just the emerging part of a much bigger iceberg, it behooves Lebanon to address the root causes of the distrust with some its indispensable allies.

While Lebanon does not need to agree with every single GCC countries’ political or military action, it is in Beirut’s best interest to avoid endorsing political positions that are considered adversarial by these countries. The United States and France enjoy good relations with all involved parties and can therefore play a facilitation role. However, I believe that the GCC heavyweights will not respond positively to such a solicitation, even if it led by Washington, given the deep level of mistrust they have in Lebanon’s political class. We saw a similar attempt some months ago when the U.S and French ambassadors traveled to Riyadh to discuss — to no avail — how Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries can help Lebanon mitigate its unprecedented economic and financial crisis. There are no reasons to expect a different outcome this time.

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As the US leaves Iraq, France sees a chance for growing influence

Macron hoped the Baghdad conference would launch his ambitions as a regional mediator. But Iraqi and US officials think the French just don’t have the clout

This piece was originally published on the middleeasteye website https://www.middleeasteye.net/

In Baghdad, the clock is ticking.

The United States has promised to pull its forces from Iraq by the end of the year, with several people wondering who will – or can – fill the void left by Washington.

Last weekend, while attending a regional summit in the Iraqi capital, Emmanuel Macron began to make the case for France.

The French president wants to present Paris as a supporter and strategic ally of the Baghdad government, Iraqi and US officials told Middle East Eye. A regional summit in Iraq’s capital was a perfect place to start.

Iraqi-French relations are considered good and stable.

‘Iraq is close to Turkey and France is looking for cards to pressure Turkey and strengthen its position in its ongoing conflict in the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa’

– Elie Abouaoun, analyst

France was among the first countries that recognised the new political system, despite its refusal to participate in the international military coalition led by the United States to topple Saddam Hussein in 2003.

And it comes second only to the US in the number of personnel deployed in Iraq as part of the international coalition against the Islamic State (IS) group, as well as being a key Nato member.

For France, the planned US withdrawal is a chance to dig its heels into Iraq and establish a launching pad to expand its influence in the Middle East, provide balance to Iranian influence, and compete with Turkey, a Nato ally it is often at odds with.

The French believe that after decades of war, weakness, and tumult, Iraq is ready to receive them, and will provide them with a base to build political and economic bridges with the countries of the region, Iraqi officials said.

The Baghdad Conference on Partnership and Cooperation, held last weekend, witnessed the launch of this plan. It was “the official gate” through which France entered Iraq to introduce itself as “a partner to the Iraqi government in its concerns and a sponsor of Iraq’s regional and international interests”, as one Iraqi official put it.

At the conference, Macron said in a televised press conference that France will maintain its presence in Iraq to fight against terrorism, “no matter what choices the Americans make”.

“It is clear that France sees the American retreat as an opportunity to gain political and economic influence in Iraq, after its failure in Lebanon,” Elie Abouaoun, director of Middle East and North Africa programmes in the United States Institution of Peace, told MEE.

Last year, Macron made a bold intervention in Lebanon following the August Beirut explosion, promising to find a way out of the country’s political and economic malaise, but instead found Lebanese leaders as intransigent as they were before the catastrophic blast.

Meanwhile, France has argued with Turkey on several issues, including the strategic and gas-rich eastern Mediterranean and Libya, where Ankara and Paris backed opposing sides during the recent war.

“Iraq is close to Turkey, and France is looking for cards to pressure Turkey and strengthen its position in its ongoing conflict in the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa,” Abouaoun added.

“France has an agenda and is pursuing its lines.”

The French project

According to Iraqi officials, the Baghdad Conference was originally a French project.

It was based on an idea adopted by former Iraqi prime minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi and was raised for discussion by Iraqi President Barham Salih during a visit to France in February 2019.

Although Abdul-Mahdi visited France three months later to mature the idea, he later abandoned it and pivoted towards China, “for fear of being accused of falling into the arms of France, as he has French citizenship and because he is not accepted regionally”, an Iraqi official familiar with the project told MEE.

“The original idea was to find an alternative strategic ally for Iraq to replace the United States after its withdrawal,” another senior Iraqi official told MEE.

Many political forces, including some backed by Iran, are concerned about the idea of a total US withdrawal from Iraq.

Iraqi leaders “were and still are looking for a force that could secure an objective balance against Iranian influence in Iraq and the region”, the senior official added.

“No one wants to fall completely into the Iranian quagmire. The Iranians themselves do not want to be responsible for everything that happens in Iraq and are looking for partners in the spoils and losses.”

The French seized on Abdul-Mahdi’s idea, developed it, and then put it forward as an initiative entitled “Supporting Iraq’s Sovereignty”, which was announced by Macron during his previous visit to Iraq in September 2020.

This conference was supposed to be held in Paris, as the French wanted to be the event’s organisers.

However, after the conference expanded to include a number of regional rivals, it was moved to Baghdad and reworked as an event focusing on stability in the Middle East.

“Although France, practically, has nothing to do with the conference in its final form, and its participation was not justified, the Iraqis could not exclude them because they had the original idea,” a member of Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s team told MEE.

“Iraq wants to return to playing the role of mediator, and the French wanted this conference to be a ticket for their return to the region through Iraq, so it became a kind of servitude between the two parties,” he added.

“France was presented as a co-chair of the conference, but the truth is that the Iraqis were the ones who organised everything, and the gathering of all these [participating countries] was the fruits of Kadhimi’s efforts and relationships.”

The French foreign ministry did not reply to questions sent by Middle East Eye before the time of publication.

The anarchy

The dramatic US withdrawal from Afghanistan last month and the swift Taliban takeover have cast a heavy shadow over the political scene in Iraq and raised fears of a number of Iraqi political forces that a repeat scenario could appear in Iraq.

The worst-case scenario for most political forces not associated with Iran is what they call “numerous anarchy”. This would lead, they believe, to the outbreak of intra-Shia and intra-Kurdish fighting.

Such conflict would eventually lead to the country’s politics being divided strictly down sectarian and ethnic lines, they believe.

“The political system in Iraq did not derive its legitimacy from the elections. It derives it from the legitimacy that the international community bestows upon it,” another member of Kadhimi’s team told MEE.

“Threatening the legitimacy of this regime by bringing the United States and the international community to the conclusion that Iraq has become a lost cause and that there is no point in continuing to support it, will mean the collapse of this regime and the transformation of Iraq into a state of sects,” he warned.

‘The political system in Iraq did not derive its legitimacy from the elections. It derives it from the legitimacy that the international community bestows upon it’

– Member of Kadhimi’s team

“A complete American withdrawal, with Iran losing control of its proxies inside Iraq, will necessarily lead to massive political and popular chaos. This chaos means the outbreak of a bloody conflict between sectarian and political groups. The partition of Iraq may be the inevitable result of this level of conflict.”

The majority of Iraqi politicians and officials are nowhere near this pessimistic, however.

Such an anarchic scenario is deemed unlikely because most Iraqi political forces have been aware of the upcoming challenges a US withdrawal will bring and have been working to find alternative sources of power to create a balance.

Among the most prominent of these forces are Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement, al-Hikma Movement led by Ammar al-Hakim, former prime minister Haider al-Abadi’s al-Nassir Alliance, and a number of forces close to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, in addition to Kadhimi and Salih.

“These represent the nucleus of a major political alliance that may be formed after the October parliamentary elections to form the largest bloc and name the next prime minister,” an al-Hikma leader told MEE.

“These forces will lead Iraq towards consolidating its sovereignty and gradually getting out of the cloak of Iran, while trying to find an alternative to the United States to create the required balance in Iraq and the region.

“France is a regionally accepted international player, it is the second power in the European Union and is not rejected by Iran, which is very important.”

Baghdad is just one step on the road

Though Tehran and Washington have maintained a fierce grip on Iraq since 2003, they are no longer as popular and politically influential as before, officials and politicians said.

With the United States seemingly retreating from the region, Iraqi politicians and officials want to establish a state of equilibrium in their country, which they believe could be achieved by turning Iraq into “a meeting point” for the regional players. This could “enhance the strength and influence” of a number of regional and international powers by creating common interests with Iraq at the centre, US and Iraqi officials said.

“Iraq seeks to portray itself as a key player in the region. Many Iraqi governments have sought to take this role previously. Kadhimi made great efforts for Iraq to play a positive regional role,” Douglas A Silliman, US ambassador in Baghdad until 2019, told MEE.

‘Iraq seeks to portray itself as a key player in the region. Many Iraqi governments have sought to take this role previously.’

– Douglas A. Silliman, former US ambassador

“The stability of Iraq can be the basis for the stability and prosperity of the region.”

Kadhimi began preparing for the Baghdad Conference by making arrangements with Egypt’s President Abdel Fatteh el-Sisi and King Abdullah II of Jordan, then expanding to include Iran, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other countries.

“This role is very important for Iraq in terms of geopolitics,” Silliman said.

“The idea is for Iraq to be an area of consensus and stability for the countries of the region, instead of being an area of conflict, as happened over the past years.

“The most important thing that was achieved in this summit was the small bilateral meetings that took place on the sidelines of the Baghdad conference. The conference created the appropriate ground and atmosphere to start dialogues between the conflicting parties, and this is what is important.”

Too much control

The Taliban takeover and haphazard US retreat in Afghanistan have been hailed by Iran and its regional proxies as a blatant American defeat and a great victory for Islam. They have promised the same will be seen in Iraq once the US pulls out from there, too.

Publicizing such an outcome has alarmed many Iraqis. Yet Iraqi and US political leaders and officials have ruled out a repetition of Afghanistan and ridiculed the idea that Iran-backed factions will soon be in charge and pursue anyone deemed agents of the US and the West.

“Actually, the Iranian-backed armed factions can bring down the government and take control over Baghdad within days, if not hours, but they will not,” a prominent Shia politician close to Iran told MEE.

“The current situation serves Iran and its proxies more than anything else. Therefore they will not even repeat the experience of bringing a prime minister who is completely loyal to Iran, as happened with Abdul-Mahdi,” he added.

“The situation in Iraq is totally different compared to Afghanistan. The commanders of armed factions and politicians associated with Iran totally understand this, so they do not even seek to formally control the government or any other governmental departments.”

In fact, any full takeover by Iran and its proxies would immediately spell financial ruin for Iraq.

All Central Bank of Iraq reserves and funds obtained from oil sales have been deposited directly into special accounts in the US Federal Bank, and have been covered by US immunity since 2004, to prevent creditor countries from pursuing and seizing Iraqi funds.

The Iranian-backed forces fear that the United States could then freeze Iraq’s assets and impose financial sanctions that could topple any government they have established within weeks, politicians and officials said.

On top of that, Iraq has a hugely fractured political landscape, and growing conflicts between Iran-backed armed factions. So, finding some sort of unified position that could assume supremacy after the US pulls out – as the Taliban has done – is supremely unlikely.

Meanwhile, there is trepidation about what stance Sistani, the supreme authority of the Shia community in Iraq, would take, as he could end the paramilitaries’ hopes and much of their popular support in an instant.

Time to lower expectations

Quite simply, Washington’s withdrawal from Iraq will not resemble its pullout from Afghanistan.

The United States has agreed with the Iraqi government to withdraw all combat forces by the end of December, but Washington will still provide intelligence and air support to Iraq.

Most importantly, the agreement signed between the Kadhimi government and the Biden administration allows the US forces to carry out military operations inside Iraq if the Iraqi government so requests, US and Iraqi officials told MEE.

“All military operations in which US forces participate will cease by the end of 2021, but if the Iraqi government needs assistance, such as aviation or intelligence, it will be provided from outside Iraq,” a US official familiar with the details of the agreement told MEE.

“Analysis of intelligence, combat aircraft, and drones do not need to be physically on the ground… [Therefore] we accepted Kadhimi’s proposal to withdraw the remaining combat forces in Iraq, even though their numbers do not exceed dozens.”

For France, the future in Iraq is likely not to be as rosy as it wants to believe.

Politicians and officials told MEE that ultimately, Paris just doesn’t have the right ingredients for success in the short term.

The United States, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other countries that have real influence in Iraq have invested a lot of money and built strong relationships over the past two decades. Late entrant France cannot boast that it has done the same.

“The French will not succeed in filling the vacuum that the United States may leave in Iraq. They are only seeking to turn the available space into a foothold for expansion in the Middle East,” one of Kadhimi’s team members told MEE.

“The region, from the point of view of the French, is now ripe and ready to receive them because the Iraqis are exhausted and their country is in ruins, Syria is in ruins and Yemen is almost in ruins, and this means that there are about 250 million people who need to build politically and financially.”

The source noted that Kadhimi allowed French participation in the Baghdad Conference out of respect for France’s role in setting it up in the first place. But essentially the conference was more about establishing Kadhimi as the regional mediator and winning him a second term in power, not Macron.

“To what extent will any of them succeed, this is what the coming days will answer.”

هل يهدد وصول طالبان للحكم الأمن في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال افريقيا !؟

بعد إعلان الرئيس الأمريكي جو بايدن في 14 أفريل2021انسحاب قوات الولايات المتحدة وقوات حلف الناتو من أفغانستان، بدأت صفحة جديدة في تاريخ افغانستان.

تسارعت مواقف الدول و المنظمات الدولية منذ إعلان حركة طالبان انتهاء الحرب في أفغانستان وسيطرتها على القصر الرئاسي في كابول في 16 أوت 2021،و سارع هؤلاء الى التعبير عن موقفهم تجاه الوضع الجديد في افغانستان خصوصا وأنه من الممكن أن تتحول أفغانستان مجددا إلى معقل للإرهاب وتكون بداية لعودة الجماعات والتنظيمات الجهادية.

وازداد القلق عربيا، من عودة حكم حركة طالبان مجددا إلى أفغانستان، مع ما يحمله ذلك من مخاطر تتمثل في عودة كابول لاحتضان جماعات متطرفة، مثل القاعدة وما يعرف بتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية، داعش.

كما أصبحت هذه الحركة تسيطر على الحدود مع إيران وباكستان وطاجيكستان وهو ما خلق نوعا من القلق خاصة مع إيران التي كانت لها خلافات عديدة مع طالبان أثناء حكمهم لأفغانستان 1996-2001 وقد كانت المحطة الأبرز في هذه العلاقة مقتل عشرات الأرواح.

فماهي تداعيات وصول حركة طالبان للحكم على إيران وعلى الشرق الأوسط عامة؟؟

تحذر التجربة السابقة لسيطرة حركة طالبان على مقاليد الحكم في أفغانستان بالعديد من المخاطر على المصالح الإيرانية خاصة وأنه من المحتمل أن تتشكل اضطرابات عديدة على مقربة من الحدود الأفغانية-الإيرانية التي تصل إلى 945 كلم، مثل: تهريب المخدرات والهجرة غير النظامية ومهاجمة النقاط الأمنية الحدودية هذا فضلا على التداعيات السياسية والاقتصادية والاجتماعية والأمنية المتعددة الأخرى خصوصا وأن كلا البلدين لا يملكان نفس الإيديولوجيا إذ تتمتع طالبان بأيديولوجية إسلامية متشدّدة جدا، وهو ما يهدد إيديولوجية ولاية الفقيه في إيران.

وفي هذا السياق قال الدكتور ايلي ابو عون مدير برامج الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا في معهد الولايات المتحدة للسلام في حديث له مع “الصباح نيوز” أنه على الرغم من الافتراض السائد بأن سيطرة طالبان على السلطة تشكل تهديدًا استراتيجيًا لإيران، فإن الحقائق على أرض الواقع تظهر أن النظام في إيران أقام علاقة براغماتية مع طالبان على مدى السنوات القليلة الماضية.

لذلك، قد تشكل طالبان تهديدًا تكتيكيًا لإيران ولكن ليس تهديدًا استراتيجيا، لأن هيكلية قيادة طالبان لامركزية مع فجوة بين القيادة السياسية والوحدات العسكرية.

وواصل ابو عون في تحليله للمشهد :” من المحتمل أن تشن بعض الوحدات العسكرية التابعة لطالبان من الناحية التكتيكية هجمات متفرقة ضد إيران لكن من غير المرجح أن تخوض طالبان مواجهة شاملة مع الدولة الشقيقة اذ اعتبر أنه من الصعب أن تصل طالبان إلى دول المشرق حيث استثمرت إيران سياسيًا وعسكريًا في السنوات الأخيرة وبالتالي مدى قدرة طالبان على إلحاق الضرر بإيران محدودة.

هل يمثل وصول طالبان للحكم خطرا على الشرق الأوسط؟

يتمثل الخطر الأكبر عند دول منطقة الشرق الأوسط في عودة طالبان للحكم في عودة المد الأصولي إلى المشهد العربي من جديد بعد الهزائم المتتالية للجماعات والتنظيمات الإسلامية والجهادية، في العراق وسوريا.

كما تعتري الدول العربية عدة مخاوف من تصعيد للعنف داخل الأراضي الأفغانية الذي ربما يمتد أثره إلى منطقة الشرق الأوسط، لذلك أعلنت البحرين، بصفتها الرئيس الحالي لمجلس التعاون الخليجي، أنها ستبدأ مشاورات مع دول الخليج الأخرى بشأن تطوّرات الوضع في أفغانستان باستثناء قطر التي لعبت لسنوات دور الوسيط بين الحركة وواشنطن(للتذكير لعبت قطر دوراً محورياً في السياسة الأفغانية واستضافت مكتب حركة طالبان منذ عام 2013 بالتنسيق الضمني مع واشنطن وجولات عدة من المفاوضات على مرّ السنين الماضية)

وبخصوص هذا الجانب يقول مدير برامج الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا في معهد الولايات المتحدة للسلام أن التهديد الكبير الذي يلوح في الأفق هو انعكاسات سيطرة طالبان على دول الخليج بشكل عام، والأهم من ذلك تلك التي جعلت الحرب على الإسلام السياسي على رأس أولوياتها في السنوات الأخيرة(دولة الامارات و المملكة العربية السعودية) لأن سيطرة طالبان الكاسحة على أفغانستان ستزيد قوة مؤيدي الإسلام السياسي، مؤكدا أن تركيا وقطر ستستفيدان من تعزيز الإسلام السياسي والتي دعمتاه بقوة في العقد الماضي.

وأضاف الدكتور إلي عون أن الإمارات والسعودية وحلفائهما سوف يستعينون بقطر وتركيا م لحث طالبان على عدم شن هجمات على أراضيهم أو ضد مصالحهم.

وواصل قائلا: “بالتأكيد ستفكر طالبان في ابتزاز الإمارات والسعودية بتهديد أمنهما، لذلك لن يتمكن البلدين وحلفائهم من تأمين حماية مصالحهم من خلال أدوات مكافحة الإرهاب التقليدية كما كان الحال في الماضي، بل سيلجأؤن الى المساومة السياسية مع طالبان”.

كما أكد أنه، بغض النظر عن ما اذا اختارت المملكة العربية السعودية والإمارات العربية المتحدة التحدث مباشرة إلى طالبان ام عبر وسطاء كتركيا و قطر ، سيتعين عليهما التفكير بجدية في التسويات السياسية لطالبان وبعض حلفائهم الإقليميين، بما في ذلك تغيير نمط الحملات ضد الإخوان في مصر وتونس وليبيا و غيرها.

وأما بالنسبة لبدأ طالبان بعمليات خارجية علق محدثنا أنها قد تستغرق بعض الوقت لبدء عملياتها “الخارجية” لأن السبب الرئيسي يكمن في أن أفغانستان بلد معقد، وأن الاستيلاء على العاصمة شيء وتثبيت البلاد واستقرارها شيء اخر “وقصة مختلفة” وبالتالي سوف يحتاجون إلى حد ادنى من الاستقرار الداخلي لبدء عمليات عبر الحدود أو في الخارج.

لذلك اعتبر الدكتور إيلي أبو عون في ختام حديثه لموقع “الصباح نيوز” اعتبر “أنه قد لا يكون التغيير في بعض الديناميكيات في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا (أي ليبيا وتونس …) وشيكًا ولكنه شيء يجب الاستمرار في مراقبته”.

2021-06-20T150752Z_570549925_RC2F4O94DQ1G_RTRMADP_3_LIBYA-SECURITY

Libya’s new interim government is facing an arduous task

The country’s path to elections and sustainable peace is full of unspoken obstacles.

This piece was originally published on the aljazeera website https://aljazeera.com/

The parliamentary and presidential elections planned for the end of the year give the long-suffering people of Libya reason to be hopeful about their country’s future. Nevertheless, their optimism is tempered by the ongoing struggles to achieve transitional justice, the fears about possible election violence, and the many other challenges the North African country’s newly formed interim government is facing.

Indeed, without a coordinated international and domestic effort to prevent election violence, deliver transitional justice, and consolidate the legitimacy of the new government, Libya can easily plunge back into conflict.

In March 2021, a new interim executive was established in Libya. The Government of National Unity (GNU), selected through a United Nations-supported process, replaced the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) and the parallel eastern cabinet based in the Cyrenaica region and not recognised by the international community.

While the GNU was formed only a few months ago, the obstacles it is currently facing in its efforts to unify the war-torn country and steer it towards elections are old. Indeed, most of these challenges stem from historic divisions between Libya’s three regions.

The GNU’s efforts to unify Libya’s long divided government institutions are hindered primarily by the huge trust deficit between key actors. As the issue is more political than technical, the unification process needs to be sustained by a more intense political dialogue. Some of Libya’s key stakeholders expected the process to be an automatic, straightforward merger of decentralised administrations and teams.

However, the unification requires a thorough assessment of the needs in each of Libya’s three regions, as well as their existing functions and structures. Only after such an assessment, national ministries can be restructured in a sustainable way that is acceptable for all regions and that prevents the concentration of all decision-making powers in Tripoli.

The GNU is also facing many obstacles in its efforts to hold free, fair and legitimate elections before the end of the year. Many of these obstacles are technical – the authorities are struggling to register voters, to secure polling places and, most crucially, to agree on a legal framework for the election.

However, while these technical issues are undoubtedly causing much anxiety, the primary challenge in the electoral process is still mostly political: election security.

Numerous local and foreign security actors operating in various parts of Libya, and the absence of a centralised system to oversee the election, are leading many to question whether Libya can hold peaceful and truly inclusive elections that would deliver legitimate results.

And even if the GNU resolves these issues in time and holds elections that are accepted as legitimate by the majority of the Libyan people and the international community, it may not be able to prevent post-election scenarios that may hinder the peaceful formation of a new government or undermine its legitimacy. Indeed, current officials may try to maintain their positions against the will of the people after the election, or foreign troops in the country may make moves to undermine the election results to further the interests of their own governments.

Unresolved transitional justice matters may also hinder the prospects for sustainable peace and stability in Libya.

For instance, internally displaced people – 278,177 at the end of 2020 – need to be registered as voters in the regions they are currently residing in, and this is proving to be a challenge. Moreover, there are tens of thousands of people who consider themselves Libyans, but do not have the proper documentation to prove their citizenship, register as a voter, or access services. If these issues are not resolved, and all Libyans given an opportunity to exercise their most basic rights, the legitimacy of the election will always be questioned and stability will prove elusive.

The inability to deliver justice to those who have been subjected to violence and abuse during the country’s revolution and consequent multisided civil war is another big problem facing Libya. The government needs to establish accountability mechanisms to uphold victims’ rights to access justice and an effective remedy, including reparations, to unify the country and prevent new episodes of violence in the future. It will also need to resolve longstanding land disputes, deliver justice to those who have been victimised by the Gaddafi regime, and take steps to prevent regional and ethnic marginalisation to bring stability and security to Libya.

While these challenges are daunting, the prospects for sustainable peace in Libya are still stronger today than ever before.

If all local political actors encourage their supporters to vote in the upcoming election, prime them to accept its outcome, and promise to participate in representative governance after the election, they can put the country on a direct path to peace and stability. Listening to the voices and concerns of women and youths, who can play a key role in the country’s stabilisation and development, will also help get Libya on the right track.

But the local actors alone cannot deliver the bright and prosperous future Libyans are yearning for – the international community also needs to play a role.

Global powers need to offer the GNU the support it needs to hold free and fair elections. In addition, the United States and its European allies must create the necessary conditions for the countries that currently have troops in Libya to see it in their interest to retreat. If the US and its allies cannot achieve this, they should start directly pressuring these countries to withdraw their troops from Libya.

Without strong and legitimate leadership, and meaningful international support, people can lose their trust in the newly emerging political system and once again turn to violence. The resulting chaos can give foreign powers renewed justification to keep their troops in Libya and continue intervening in the country’s internal affairs. All this can cause a new surge in violence and result in continued instability.

Today, Libyans are optimistic about the future, but they know from their experiences in the past decade that promises, commitments and good intentions mean nothing without constructive action.

The GNU, with international support, can stabilise the country and put the nation on a path towards true reconciliation. It can help create a country where all citizens are free from violence, marginalisation and discrimination. Holding free and fair elections is undoubtedly an important step towards achieving this. But it is equally important to create a national consensus that violence is not the answer to Libya’s problems. If the GNU can convince a majority of Libyans to permanently denounce violence, the nation can finally forge a new social contract, leave the past behind, and start rebuilding. And this would be welcome news not only for Libya, but the entire region.

Libyans celebrate in the afternoon during elections in Benghazi, Libya, July 7, 2012. Determined to conceive a new nation after the overthrow of Moammar Gadhafi, Libya braved sporadic gunfire and threats of violence to cast ballots Saturday. (Tomas Munita/The New York Times)

On the Road to Peace, Libya Makes Progress but Hits Pitfalls

Reconciliation must go beyond politics, address issues of transitional justice and set a new vision for a shared future.

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.usip.org/

After a decade of war and division, Libya has made progress toward peace this year. In March, a Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed to unify the warring Western-based Government of National Accord and the Eastern-based authorities supported by Gen. Khalifa Haftar, who commands forces known as the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (or Libyan National Army). The GNU is a provisional body meant to lead the country to long-delayed elections on December 24. While some progress has been made — a cease-fire agreement has been signed and the executive has been unified — many challenges remain. Chief among those challenges is developing a framework for national reconciliation and addressing the destabilizing role of foreign powers.

Fresh off a recent trip to Tripoli and Benghazi, USIP’s Nate Wilson and Elie Abouaoun discuss their conversations with government authorities and civil society, the GNU’s performance and how Libya’s diversity impacts its conflict.

What were the top priorities that government authorities and civil society mentioned in your conversations?

Wilson: The elections slated for December are seen as critical to ending a decade of chaos and war in the country. Beyond that, completing the unification of national institutions across the East-West divide remains a top priority. This has begun in some cases, and while largely a positive step forward, it seems that sometimes the symbolic unification has not been met with associated administrative integration. For instance, some key positions in the Benghazi branch of the Ministry of Justice have not been filled, causing an inability to receive and utilize funding because there is no authority to do so.

The Commission of Civil Society — responsible for, among other things, registering and authorizing work of international and domestic organizations — also has a key role to play in supporting these organizations’ work on the ground. However, there is still an administrative divide between the official body in the East and a parallel one that was formed in the West, which has recently tried to put onerous restrictions on how civil society can work. Not only are civil society organizations critical for different sectors that the government is challenged in reaching, but they also represent a part of society that can support fundamental freedoms. The administrative challenges hamper this possibility.

This is the latest manifestation of the ongoing debate surrounding centralization versus decentralization in Libya. It is a complex issue, with roots in Libya’s three historical regions of Cyrenaica (East), Tripolitania (West) and Fezzan (South). With the seat of government and the majority of national institutions in the West, other regions have perceived being marginalized.

In addition, reconciliation as an issue is becoming more and more prominent. The newly established GNU has formed a commission to implement “comprehensive national reconciliation.” This was a topic at the second Berlin Conference, which took place on June 23. While a valuable endeavor, it is clear that this portfolio is a point of contention between different governmental bodies and regions, while there is no clear idea of what the reconciliation will lead to. Ideally, reconciliation should touch on more than politics to include matters of transitional justice and how to set a new vision for a shared future, a point that civil society partners stressed as a priority.

What have been the challenges and successes of the new Government of National Unity so far, and what should it focus on?

Wilson: The government was welcomed with high hopes, but the context in which it is operating is quite challenging. It should be remembered that the GNU has only been in power for three months; even so, it has named numerous priorities — such as reconciliation — all of which cannot be implemented before December elections. Moreover, foreign military involvement in the Libyan conflict has added layers of complexity. While removal of foreign troops is a priority, the interim GNU is not equipped to deal with this by itself, and there are still fundamental questions about who controls the armed forces.

Moreover, it needs to make additional substantive progress on unifying institutions. Toward that end, there has been progress unifying the Central Bank of Libya (CBL). One of the underappreciated reasons that the GNU was able to form at all was that the national government would take on the debt of the parallel governmental institutions in the East in exchange for those bodies halting their use of alternative revenue sources and relying on the CBL in Tripoli instead. Recently an audit was conducted under U.N. auspices and delivered to GNU Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh and other officials to catalyze the CBL unification. But whether that momentum will translate into one CBL that operates transparently is uncertain.

The legitimacy the GNU should be shored up through delivering services to all three regions as equally as possible. This is important not only symbolically — and should be accompanied by very public campaigns — but also because Libyans have suffered after years of war. Deteriorated infrastructure, liquidity crises, lack of health care and other problems have all been commonplace in recent years. With summer here, electrical cuts will likely sap Libyans’ energy literally and figuratively along with their patience with a new government. Services should be delivered with and through local officials to help strike a reasonable approach to decentralization between central, regional and local authorities. This would help move forward a new social contract that needs to be negotiated.

The other task the government needs to deliver on is elections themselves. Administering them so they are free and fair, and so that people want to and are able to participate, is the main goal. In line with this, they need to be as free of violence as possible, because violence will diminish the legitimacy of any outcomes.

A core element of any discussion about Libya is the security landscape. What are the latest developments on that front?

Abouaoun: There are multiple security challenges in Libya right now and resolving them will certainly require a solid and legitimate political foundation. First and foremost among these challenges is the presence and active role of a multitude of foreign military actors who are in Libya to defend the interests of specific regional and international powers, which is a major obstacle to stabilizing Libya. However, these actors are now tied to local political groups and addressing the issue requires an intense trust-building exercise between Libyans themselves.

On another hand, Libya also suffers from the proliferation of armed non-state actors, some of which have even embraced semi-official roles. The main issue with these groups is that they operate outside the command and control mechanism of the government. In the last year or so, many have promoted a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) plan to resolve the issue of non-state armed actors. Absent a legitimate political framework that would address the security concerns of the majority of Libyans, the concept of DDR is not feasible in Libya. Last but not least is the issue of who commands Libya’s armed forces, which remains a very divisive issue between the East and West.

Security issues in Libya cannot be looked at in isolation from the political developments and the level of trust among the various Libya constituencies. Both the security and political tracks should go hand in hand.

Libya is known to be a diverse country. How is this diversity playing out in the ongoing conflict?

Abouaoun: Although Libyans are primarily of Arab and Berber origins, the country is home to non-Arabized Berber groups and other groups all structured along 20 major tribal lines. As many other Middle Eastern and North African countries, Libya has not managed its diversity well. Under longtime dictator Muammar Qaddafi, Libyans were forced to deny this diversity and instead focus on a national identity imposed by the regime itself. Moreover, they were forced to believe that their own ethnic or linguistic identity is mutually exclusive with their identity as Libyans.

After 2011, ethnic and linguistic groups faced the same exclusion practices by the new power holders in Tripoli and Benghazi. At best, these groups, such as the Tuaregs and the Tebus, were instrumentalized in the East-West confrontation. In many cases, they were persecuted both physically and politically. These groups look now at the window of opportunity created by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum and the upcoming election in December 2021 as the last chance to be part of Libya’s future. It is therefore essential for the international community to encourage and support Libyan authorities to implement a rights-based framework for political and social inclusivity. Short of this, the grievances of these groups will continue to grow and the appetite of regional and international powers to instrumentalize these grievances will persist, thus impeding stabilization efforts.

الخارجية الأميركية لـ«الشرق الأوسط»: نرغب في عراق قوي أمام الجماعات المسلحة

واشنطن: معاذ العمري

This piece was originally published on the aawsat website https://www.aawsat.com/

أكدت الولايات المتحدة أنها لا ترغب أن ترى في العراق «دولة هزيلة» لا يمكنها تحمل مسؤولياتها ومسؤوليات شعبها، ولا يمكنها السيطرة على السلاح المنفلت في أيدي «الجماعات المسلحة»، وذلك في الوقت الذي يتهيأ العراق لإجراء الانتخابات البرلمانية المبكرة الأحد.
وشدد متحدث في وزارة الخارجية لـ«الشرق الأوسط» على موقف الإدارة الأميركية في الوقوف مع الشعب العراقي، الذي يعاني من سوء الخدمات، ويطالب بمستحقاته من العيش في ظل دولة يحكمها القانون، مشيراً إلى ضرورة ضبط السلاح المتفلت في البلاد، وتقوية دور الدولة.
وأكد المتحدث على أن العراقيين لا يريدون أن يروا دولة تسيطر عليها الميليشيات، مضيفاً: «نحن نقف مع الشعب العراقي… نريد رؤية دولة عراقية قوية وموحدة ومرنة وذات سيادة».
وأشار إلى أن الولايات المتحدة تضم صوتها إلى صوت الشعب العراقي في رؤية أهداف تحققها الانتخابات العراقية المبكرة، وتتمثل تلك الأهداف في توفير الأمن، والوظائف، والكهرباء والمياه، والرعاية الصحية لجميع مواطني العراق.

وتواصلت «الشرق الأوسط» مع عدد من المسؤولين السياسيين الأميركيين الذين عبروا عن قلقهم من الوضع العراقي الحالي، ووجود قناعة بأن الانتخابات القادمة «لن تغير شيئاً»، بعد أن انخفضت حماسة الشعب العراقي عن السابق، لافتين إلى أن الجماعات المسلحة ستحظى بفوز الأغلبية في الانتخابات، فيما سيعاني المستقلون في الحصول على اختراق كبير في الانتخابات.
وأفاد مسؤولون (فضلوا عدم الإفصاح عن هويتهم) بأن المشهد في العراق بدا واضحاً بعدم وجود أي بوادر تغيير في المشهد السياسي، لأن الجماعات المسلحة «تسيطر على كل مفاصل الدولة»، ولأنهم أيضاً سيدخلون الانتخابات عبر بوابة الأحزاب السياسية بأسماء مختلفة، معبرين عن وجود «قلق كبير» من هذا السيناريو في العراق، وأن «الدولة في العراق شبه مختطفة من الحشد الشعبي».
وأضافوا: «إيران لا تزال لديها اليد الكبرى في العراق، ولن تقدم أي تنازل سياسي حتى يتم عليها ضغط دولي منسق من الدول الكبرى، وهذه الطريقة الوحيدة لدفعها إلى تقديم تنازلات، ولكن للأسف لا توجد رغبة دولية في اتخاذ هذا الأمر، والسبب أن الجو الحالي هو مقاربة وصبر من الإدارة الأميركية الحالية والأوروبيين، وكل هذه المعطيات دفعت الدول الإقليمية إلى إيجاد طرق تعايش مع إيران».
ولفتوا إلى عدم وجود «لهجة شديدة» مع الجماعات المسلحة وإيران الداعمة لها من الإدارة الأميركية الحالية، والسبب أن إيران لم تذهب إلى «مفاوضات فيينا» إلا بعد التأكد من أن دورها في الإقليم لن يكون على طاولة المفاوضات، وأميركا لا ترغب في «إفشال المفاوضات»، فقبلت بذلك.
وفي سياق آخر، استطاع معهد الولايات المتحدة للسلام تحقيق اختراق «شعبي ديمقراطي»، وذلك بإبرام اتفاقية دعم سلطة القانون في العراق، واحترام حقوق الإنسان والذي يهدف إلى تعديل فقرات القانون العشائري التي لا تتماشى مع مبادئ حقوق الإنسان، وكذلك الاتفاق على احترام سيادة الدولة، بألا يغلب دور القبيلة على دور الدولة.
وأوضح الدكتور إيلي أبو عون مدير برامج الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا في معهد الولايات المتحدة للسلام، لـ«الشرق الأوسط»، أن الاتفاق العشائري القبلي ضم حضوراً قوياً من السنة والشيعة، وكان الهدف منه هو تعديل بعض فقرات القانون العشائري التي لا تتماشى مع مبادئ حقوق الإنسان، وخاصةً ما يتعلق بحقوق المرأة.
وقال أبو عون لـ«الشرق الأوسط»: «الوصول إلى الاتفاق خطوة كبرى ومهمة، ومرحلة التنفيذ ما بعد الاتفاق هي الأهم، وسوف نعمل على حث شيوخ العموم بالدفع لتنفيذ الاتفاق. وأساس الفكرة نبعت من الشركاء المحليين العراقيين العاملين مع معهد السلام الأميركي، وتم التأكد من وجود مباركة لها من السلطات العراقية وكذلك المرجعيات الدينية. وبعد ذلك تم التنفيذ بتمويل من وزارة الخارجية الأميركية – مكتب حقوق الإنسان، واستراتيجيتنا في العراق مستمرة وليست متوقفة وتحتاج إلى مرونة وعمل مستمر».

Biden looks for continuity in Iraq as US hosts strategic dialogue

Two sides will address security issues and role of US forces in Iraq

This piece was originally published on the thenationanewsl website https://thenationalnews.com/

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein will tackle security and economic co-operation on Wednesday in the first strategic dialogue between Baghdad and Washington since President Joe Biden entered office.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al Kadhimi was the first Arab leader to receive a call from Mr Biden in February.

The dialogue, which will happen online because of Covid-19, was prompted by a request from Iraq to clarify critical issues in the relationship.

The White House said that trade, culture and climate are on the agenda, as well as security and the role of US forces in Iraq.

Perhaps more urgent for Iraq is discussing the US military role amid increasing attacks by pro-Iran militias on joint bases and in the Green Zone, home to the American embassy.

“The meetings will further clarify that coalition forces are in Iraq solely for the purpose of training and advising Iraqi forces to ensure that ISIS cannot reconstitute,” White House press secretary Jen Psaki said.

James Jeffrey, a former US ambassador to Iraq, told The National that Baghdad and Washington disagree on how to counter these militias, which are calling for US troops to be withdrawn.

“Differences remain on how to combat Iranian influence, especially through Iraqi Shiite militias under Tehran’s sway,” said Mr Jeffrey, who is now the chairman of the Middle East Programme at the Wilson Centre.

Mr Al Kadhimi has been under pressure from Iran-backed factions and the Sadrist movement to push for the withdrawal of the 2,500 US troops in the country as part of the US-led coalition fighting the remnants of ISIS.

“Our security and military co-operation is essentially tied to Iraq’s war against ISIS and our request for help from the international coalition led by the US in 2014,” Mr Al Kadhimi told The National in an exclusive interview published on Tuesday.

He said the next phase of US-Iraq military co-operation was linked to “training, equipping and providing intelligence support for the Iraqi forces”.

“We believe the Iraqi forces are ready for this transition,” Mr Al Kadhimi said.

Bilal Wahab, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said: “The Iraqi top brass says that the readiness of the Iraqi military today is worse than it was in 2014, which means that the prime minister cannot say we don’t need the Americans.

“We can’t stand on our feet and fight ISIS.”

But Mr Wahab said that Mr Al Kadhimi “is under tremendous pressure, direct pressure from Iran and indirect pressure from the militias, that he must call or he must put an end to all US military presence in Iraq”.

He said Mr Al Kadhimi’s deal with the Trump administration to cut the US presence in Iraq from 5,000 to 2,500 military advisers after last year’s strategic dialogue “wasn’t much of a win” for him, as it did little to placate the pro-Iran factions.

A series of attacks from Iran-backed militias on US forces in Iraq prompted Mr Biden to launch a strike on two Iran-backed Iraqi militias stationed in Syria this year.

And while Mr Al Kadhimi did not single out any militia by name, he did outline a plan to tackle “armed groups” that he referred to as “outlaws” and “organised criminal groups”.

The US has been pushing Baghdad to crack down on these militias and arrest those behind attacks on the joint bases and against activists.

But more broadly, Mr Jeffrey said there was agreement on deepening the ties between the two countries.

“Both agree on the diplomatic, security and economic centrality of the bilateral relationship, including in the effort against ISIS terrorism,” he said.

Other experts have cautioned the US against making big concessions in any new framework with Baghdad.

Elie Abou Aoun, director of Middle East and North Africa programmes at the US Institute of Peace, said the US should not limit its diplomatic presence in Iraq.

“The Iranian influence in Iraq is obviously strong but remains reversible,” Mr Abou Aoun told The National.

“It is essential for the United State to make sure that any coming agreement with Iraq does not limit the space of American soft power as it is critical to continue deploying soft power tools to counter the Iranian expansion in Iraq and the region.”

The expert praised Mr Al Kadhimi for, with the help of the US, making “bold decisions” that curtailed the influence of some Popular Mobilisation Forces groups in his first year in office.

Mr Abou Aoun said that included better performance in Customs fees collection, amounting to an increase of $120 million in 2020.

“This increase in Custom fees collection happened at a time when an empowered Iraqi government exercised better control in just two border crossings: Mandali and the port of Umm Qasr,” he said.

Mr Wahab said both sides should focus on economic matters and reforms in the messages they send to the public.

“The thing for both sides to do is benchmark the presence of Iraq’s advisers to Iraq’s [military] capacity, which is more measurable, and then focus on the non-security aspect,” he said.

“Focus on the economy, focus on reforms, focus on electricity, some of the things that Kadhimi has been doing well.”

What could make or break Lebanon’s 2022 general election

The only remaining possibility for Lebanon to transition out of its current decayed situation to a reform path is to elect a critical mass of reform-minded figures to the parliament in the 2022 general election who are not subject to the intimidation or limitations of the largest political parties.

This piece was originally published on the thearabweekly website https://thearabweekly.com/

BEIRUT – Lebanon, unlike many other countries, is actually ruled by a conglomerate of political figures and business elites and organisations. Therefore, a change in Lebanon can neither be about a single politician or party nor can it be led by one political group. In the past fifteen years, there were several attempts to alter the governance model and practices in Lebanon. All of them proved unsuccessful for various reasons including the toxic manipulation of identity-based politics by the majority of politicians and clerics, deep-seated corruption, twisted social norms, regional power competition and the absence of an organised, competent and capable political alternative.

At this stage in Lebanon’s history, all possible ways of triggering change; voluntary reforms, foreign intervention, sweeping change, military coup have either been exhausted, are out of reach or will lead to even worse outcomes

The only remaining possibility for Lebanon to transition out of its current decayed situation to a reform path is to make sure that the 2022 general election allows a critical mass of reform-minded figures who are not subject to the intimidation or limitations of the largest political parties to make it to the parliament.

With two notable gaps (1972-1992 and 2009-2018), Lebanon has held periodic elections since its independence in 1943. Because of Lebanon’s history and system, all elections have resulted in a political landscape characterised by shifting alliances in which former foes often become allies in defence of private interests, collective or individual. The notion of public interest and how this informs the electoral behaviour is almost absent.

The successive international electoral observation missions to Lebanon since 1996 have more or less confirmed that the votes in the last two decades are considered to be relatively fair and transparent. Despite the fact that all of the observers’ final reports highlighted irregularities and shortcomings, they concluded that these shortcomings did not have a significant influence on the outcome of the election. However, many of these reports did highlight that the main issue in Lebanon is the “reduced level of electoral competition” which practically means that a large proportion of the seats is somehow pre-determined for specific political groups or leaders. Obviously, addressing this issue requires looking at the systemic causes that range from the nature of the electoral system, the practice of pre-electoral agreements between parties and candidates, loose electoral funding framework and vague, or lack of definition of conflict of interest and abuse of power.

In a nutshell, the issue with Lebanon’s general election is political and not technical and therefore, it requires an independent electoral management body to create a conducive environment for reform-minded candidates to be able to compete and win in 2022. Regular election monitoring will not be sufficient to do so. On the contrary, it will lead to the same outcome: the monitors unable to highlight the main issues and thus “clearing” the 2022 election as “relatively fair and transparent”.

According to the law, the ministry of interior and municipalities is the primary body responsible for administering elections, in coordination with other officials at the ministries of justice, foreign affairs, information, education and finance. The interior ministry prepares the voter list, produces national ID cards, trains poll workers, produces and distributes election materials, organises polling stations and coordinates security on election day.

An electoral management body should be politically independent, financially autonomous, competent, inclusive, transparent, accountable and have full authority over the electoral process. The current conditions in Lebanon do not allow for the existing body to fulfil these criteria without close and strong international oversight. A sweeping change by 2022 that would reverse this situation is not realistic.

The Supervisory Commission on Elections, established in 2009, is a regulatory body that falls under the authority of the interior ministry. The minister has the right to supervise the work of the commission and chair all meetings but cannot vote. The eleven-member commission is primarily responsible for the development of media and campaign finance regulations, as well as the oversight of candidate registration and campaign compliance. In 2018, the commission was under-staffed and under-resourced for this broad mandate. Its budget was limited and the release of funding from the interior ministry was severely delayed. As a result, its involvement in election administration was relatively limited and it provided little guidance to candidates or media about their role. The commission identified and documented a number of violations, particularly on the part of the media. However, an unclear legal framework, provisions with insufficient details, as well as a lack of power and resources to investigate complaints made monitoring candidates and list compliance with campaign and expenditure regulations extremely difficult.

One could argue that, technically, the government of Lebanon can just move the electoral management body from being under the interior ministry to become a standalone independent public organism and thus solve the problem. In reality, this option is not even a possibility. In the last two decades, Lebanon established and appointed the members of several entities that are on paper independent, for instance the Lebanese Petroleum Administration, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, National Council for Scientific Research, High Council for Privatisation and PPP and Economic and Social Council. In practice, these entities ended up with the same clientelist and corrupt approach that characterises Lebanon’s public administration in general.

To optimise the results of the 2022 general election and pave the way for a group of reform-minded figures to be elected as members of parliament it is essential to have an internationally-supervised independent electoral management body.

Ideally, such an effort should be part of a broader initiative that aims at reforming the entire electoral system, including the law, electoral districts, funding, accountability. However, such a wide-angle discussion will be a gift to the politicians in Lebanon as it will help them divert the attention from the 2022 election to the controversial issues of political system, power-sharing, sectarian quotas and other endless discussions, hence leading to the postponing of elections.

Therefore, the international community should pressure the Lebanese authorities to have the 2022 general election on time, using the existing legislation, ensuring the participation of the diaspora and under an internationally-supervised independent electoral management body. Otherwise, the country will further entrench itself in a dire situation of decay and demoralisation.

USIP, KRG foreign relations sign MoU on bilateral ties

“Through strategic and technical assistance, USIP supports the Kurdistan Regional Government, including in the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution (1325)”

This piece was originally published on the kurdistan24 website https://www.kurdistan24.net/

ERBIL (Kurdistan 24) – The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) Department of Foreign Relations (DFR) signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on Tuesday.

Dr. Elie Abouaoun, USIP’s Director of Middle East and North Africa Programs, and Safeen Dizayee, Head of KRG’s Department of Foreign Relations, signed a memorandum of understanding on Tuesday that provides a framework for all relations between USIP and the KRG.

“Through strategic and technical assistance, USIP supports the Kurdistan Regional Government, including in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (1325) on Women, Peace, and Security,” Abouaoun told Kurdistan 24 on Wednesday.

“My pleasure to receive Dr. @elie022 Director MENA Programs at @USIP & sign MoU for extension of their mission in KRI,” Dizyaee tweeted. “We had an excellent exchange of views on promoting inter-religious & political dialogue, advocating for peace and confidence building measures within communities.”

Abouaoun told Kurdistan 24 that the USIP and its partners have helped mend sectarian and inter-tribal divides in communities torn apart by extremist violence, including the Iraqi districts of Mahmoudiyah, Tikrit, Hawija, Hamdaniyah, Yathrib, and Tal Afar.

“We are currently leading a dialogue in Northern Sinjar,” Abouaoun said. “Together with our partners, our work has halted violent feuds, saving lives and re-stabilizing communities.”

Through a specialized tool called the Conflict and Stabilization Monitoring Framework, the USIP collects data directly from conflict-affected communities in minority-rich areas to understand barriers to peace and stabilization needs.

“USIP supports a locally driven research and training initiative in Anbar and Basra, two provinces where tribal dynamics dominate, to address the drivers of community-based conflicts, mitigate violence, and strengthen stabilization efforts through facilitated dialogues,” Abouaoun said.

“This initiative also explores how broadening tribal practices might promote peace and help strengthen state institutions.”

Regarding the Strategic Framework Agreement between the United States and Iraq, through which US agreed to end its combat mission in Iraq by Dec. 31, 2021, Abouaoun said that the complex premise that led the U.S. to end its combat mission makes a reversal of the decision quite inconceivable.

“At this stage, the US is determined to maintain its ‘train and advise’ mission, and will therefore provide the necessary protection for this mission to operate safely,” he said. “If this becomes a mission impossible, the easiest way forward is to withdraw the mission rather than change its nature to a combat one”

“On another hand, the protection of this kind of missions is not only achieved through military means,” he added. “The U.S diplomacy plays an important role in this case, and can negotiate, directly or indirectly, some sort of rules of engagement with the armed actors in Iraq.”

Regarding the most urgent problems that the next Iraqi government, after October elections, should deal with first, Dr. Abouaoun told Kurdistan 24 that security sector reform and law enforcement come as top priorities.

“The confusion about who does what amongst the security actors, the criminal intrusiveness of some armed groups, the lack of accountability, the weak law enforcement and an undermined rule of law are major challenges to an overdue healing and recovery roadmap,” he said. “Without having these fixed, it will be very hard for the incoming government to crack down on corruption, provide basic services, encourage the return of IDPs, address the local drivers of the terrorist resurgence, plan and implement an economic recovery plan, including attracting more investment, and Iraq will remain a theatre for cross border military actions by neighboring countries.”

Any step in the direction of strengthening local governance, according to Dr. Abouaoun’s perspective, is an important milestone. That is because several examples from around the world show that decentralized governance structures can deliver better services to their constituencies.

Dr. Abouaoun described Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s decision to make Ankawa a district as one step in the right direction.

“From a purely governance angle, I think the decision is one step in the right direction, and in the specific case of Ankawa, there is one additional ‘political’ angle; given that Ankawa is mostly inhabited by Christians, the change of status from a suburb to a district will create a positive momentum whereby the Ankawans feel more ownership about their geography and role.” Abouaoun said.

Regarding his expectation about the upcoming Iraqi elections, Abouaoun said that he doesn’t see any indications that there will be major changes in the power dynamics of the elected parliament.

“The problem in Iraq is that politics has become so monopolized by a well-defined establishment to the extent that one can predict the result of an election ahead of time,” he said.

He sees no indication that there will be “major changes in the power dynamics of the elected parliament.”

“Therefore, I don’t see how the outcome of October 10 popular consultation will lead to significant changes in how the prime minister, Speaker and President of the Republic are (s)elected for example, nor do I see how a parliament that is composed to large extent of the same political formations will be able to tackle the deep-rooted problems that the country suffers from,” he said.

“My expectations from next week’s elections are therefore very modest.”

Despite the changes made to the electoral law, Abouaoun also doesn’t expect to see many candidates who are not supported by the mainstream parties to win. “The obstacles preventing fair electoral competition are not only legal,” he said. “There are other political and security related factors that would impede non-affiliated candidates from competing with well-resourced electoral bulldozers.”

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) will most likely gain more votes than any other Kurdish party in the election.

“I am not an election expert, and therefore cannot predict how many seats any given party might get,” Abouaoun said. “However, every indication at this stage shows that the KDP will get more than any other Kurdish party.”

The United States Institute of Peace is a national, nonpartisan, independent institute, founded by the US Congress. USIP has continuously worked in Iraq, and the Kurdistan Region, since 2003. Its initiatives aim to strengthen institutions and communities’ capacity to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflicts without violence.

Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, the prime minister of Iraq, during a meeting with President Donald Trump in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, Aug. 20, 2020. The meeting continues months of negotiations between the two governments over the presence of American troops in the country. (Anna Moneymaker/The New York Times)

Where Is Iraq a Year After Prime Minister Kadhimi Took Office?

Faced with a host of vexing challenges, the Iraqi premier is prioritizing holding credible elections this fall.

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.usip.org/

Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi came to power a year ago today after a protest movement toppled the previous government and successive attempts to establish a new one failed. Inheriting a country deep in the midst of political and economic crises, Kadhimi has spent the last year trying to put Iraq back on the path toward stability all while navigating U.S.-Iran tensions playing out on Iraqi soil. USIP’s Elie Abouaoun and Sarhang Hamasaeed look at what Kadhimi has done to attempt to placate protesters, the importance of Iraq’s October national elections and how the prime minister has dealt with U.S.-Iran tensions.

Has Kadhimi’s government been able to meet protesters’ demands? How has the economy faired under his stewardship?

Abouaoun: As a leaderless, cluster-like movement, protest groups have actually asked — over time — for a lot of things, most of which would require a long-term, multi-layered approach and extensive resources. The wide array of protester demands could be categorized as falling under political reform (e.g., a power-sharing system and fair elections), economic reform (to address economic and financial crises and create more job opportunities), improving access to basic services (e.g., electricity), curbing corruption and last, but certainly not least, holding accountable those involved in using lethal force against demonstrators.

Although Kadhimi promised he would meet many of the protesters’ demands, the prime minister has not achieved many concrete results, despite putting in a laudable effort. However, given the nature of the demands, it’s unrealistic to expect any government to meet them in just a year or two. On the political end, elections are scheduled for October 2021 but there is an overwhelming skepticism about the extent to which free and transparent elections are possible. Reasons for this include that the same political parties continue to have access to state resources and maintain their armed groups; law enforcement agencies are hampered by corruption, a lack of resources and intimidation from armed groups, among other things; and last year’s political assassinations remain unpunished, opening the door for further intimidation.

On the economic front, Kadhimi’s government attempted to introduce significant reforms through the “White Paper for Economic Reform,” which includes solid ideas but will require several years to implement — not to mention the unrealized political will and social buy-in needed to engage in painful structural reforms. The inability to kick-start economic reform obviously impedes the creation of employment opportunities and the improvement of basic services such as electricity.

Last but not least, despite the government’s attempts to prioritize the investigation into the shooting incidents that killed hundreds and injured thousands of protesters since October 2019, no serious action was taken to identify, arrest or prosecute perpetrators.

Having said this, attributing this failure to the government alone is unfair. For such an investigation to lead to concrete results, it is essential to have a functioning and transparent judiciary as well as efficient and mission-driven security agencies. While Kadhimi provided the political will, other essential institutions did not deliver.

How has Kadhimi handled the divisive political environment in Iraq?

Hamasaeed: It really depends on whose perspective you take. From a glass half-full view, one can say Kadhimi has handled the political situation as well as he could given the circumstances. However, the views of the Iraqi public and political actors vary, and for many depend on the day you are asking that question. For example, during the Pope Francis’ historic visit to Iraq, there was much positive rhetoric about Iraq and its diversity. Yet, on a different day, if protesters are killed or there is an attack by an armed group, negative perspectives tend to come to the fore.

A highly complicated and divisive political environment existed before the Kadhimi government took office and has continued since. Key players remain the same, but with ebbs and flows of calm and tension on some issues among certain actors (e.g., Kadhimi versus groups that perpetrate or condone attacks against foreign diplomatic facilities and military personnel, Erbil versus Baghdad on budget issues, as but a few examples). Kadhimi was able to form a government a year ago, which put a badly needed end to the failure of successive efforts to form a government after the previous prime minister, Adel Abdul-Mahdi, resigned in November 2019. Not coming from a political party of his own helped Kadhimi stay unshackled by party politics, but also undermined him as he did not have a strong parliamentary bloc of support. Despite his assurances that he will not run in the upcoming elections, political parties have always viewed him with suspicion as a potential political threat.

While the opposition has been steady, it has not been able to totally stymie his agenda. On issues such as better control of border crossings, coordinating with the Kurdistan Regional Government on some issues, restructuring and replacing leadership in security agencies, devaluating the Iraqi dinar and passing a budget, Kadhimi’s government has been able to overcome the opposition. However, the term and mandate of Kadhimi’s government is very limited, even if his aspirations may not be. The best he could do is lay some of the groundwork for reforms and strengthening the state with the hopes that the next government, whether he is at the helm or not, will build upon them. Ultimately, the trajectory of Iraq’s political divisions rests not just with internal actors, but also external ones, including the United States and Iran.

Kadhimi has prioritized elections, originally announcing parliamentary elections for June before postponing them at the behest of the election commission. What has been the response to the delay, and what does Iraq need to ensure the polls are free and fair?

Hamasaeed: A key mandate for the Kadhimi government is to facilitate holding early national parliamentary elections. Despite delays, the vote is now set for October 10, 2021. Key building blocks have been put in place to hold the elections: electoral commission judges have been appointed, an election law passed, a budget allocated, and the supreme federal court law amended and members confirmed. The mechanics of the electoral process — building coalitions and updating voting registration, among other things — are underway. Despite these steps, there are those who suspect that another delay is still possible, given the deficit of public trust in political elites. Others think the elections should be delayed until armed groups are brought under state control.

Iraq deals with a great public deficit of trust in the electoral process and political elites. To hold free and fair elections, the country needs proper institutional building blocks to be in place and work properly, with sufficient Iraqi and international monitoring throughout the entire electoral architecture and process. The Iraqi government has formally requested technical support from the United Nations, which may do some observation, but likely not the level of monitoring needed to engender Iraqis’ trust in the process and results. There is a need for improved security for candidates so they are willing and able to run, for people to go out and vote freely, for polling stations and ballots to not be tampered with, and for winners to be safe and able to deliver for the people. Yet, even if the elections are free and fair, translating that into effective governance is a tall order.

When Kadhimi came into office, U.S.-Iran tensions were at a boiling point, with both jockeying for influence in Iraq. How has Kadhimi navigated these tensions, and where do they stand now?

Abouaoun: No one would envy Kadhimi for being at the helm of Iraq during these troubled times in the region. Despite strong U.S support in some sectors, he knew that U.S. backing would remain limited to certain areas and, most importantly, that Washington would avoid an all-out war with Iran. With this in mind, Kadhimi used the opportunity provided by the previous administration’s approach to Iran and tried to curb the influence of pro-Iran armed groups in Iraq. He improved the government’s control over Iraq’s multiple border crossings, generating an additional 60 million U.S. dollars just from the port of Um Qasr in 2020. This move deprived access to millions of dollars for armed groups and other criminal rings that had controlled these crossings.

Furthermore, Kadhimi appointed new commanders to some of the most sensitive security positions, sidelining the ones considered as pro-Iran. He engaged in intense outreach to Arab countries, improving relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and worked on bilateral and multilateral agreements with Jordan, Egypt and others. While these gains are not negligible, Kadhimi’s efforts to reduce Iran’s influence hit a wall when he tried, on more than one occasion, to arrest elements affiliated with some Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) units known to be close to Iran. Ultimately, in these cases, Kadhimi either had to release these PMF actors days later or drop the mission altogether.

The momentum for downsizing Iran’s influence in Iraq slowed in early 2021 as the new administration took over in Washington. At a time when Tehran was preparing to resume indirect talks with Washington over the Iran nuclear deal, its leadership and allies in Iraq (and other countries as well) displayed a high level of confidence that the scope of these talks would remain exclusive to the conditions of the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — meaning Iran’s regional activities and proxies could resume their mode of operation as before 2018, when the Trump administration withdrew from the deal.

Kadhimi would have benefited greatly from a more intense and better focused “soft power” approach from the international community. But support remained sporadic and not proportionate with Iran’s non-military investment in Iraq, which ranges across social, educational, economic and cultural sectors. Kadhimi or his successor will only be able to restrain Iran in Iraq if the international community — including the United States — reestablishes deterrence and exerts intense pressure until Iran agrees to discuss and reconsider the nature and the scale of its regional activities. Without such an effort, it is very likely that Iran will use some of the billions of dollars made available from lifting or easing sanctions to shore-up its support to allies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Gaza and elsewhere.