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The Pope’s visit to Iraq & the future of Christians

it is worth exploring how to strengthen the existing constitutional guarantees in order to reassure Christians – and other constituents – about their fate and dignity.

This piece was originally published on the crcouncil website https://www.crcouncil.org

The visit of Pope Francis to Iraq this week happens in a context of despair felt across Iraq’s ethnic, provincial, and sectarian spectrum. The Christians in Iraq, victims of decades of oppression, look at this visit as a symbol of hope. They also hope it will help address some of their lingering fears. The Holy See’s priorities for Iraq’s Christians should be formulated in specific terms. While Christians in Iraq remain hemmed in how to deal with the past, while being optimistic about their future, most feel overwhelmed by the upcoming visit of His Holiness Pope Francis. As in many other cases, some of the expectations from the visit are indeed too high to meet.

Iraq, known for its diverse population, has failed to protect the human rights and freedoms of its indigenous communities of which the Assyrians – ancestors of today’s Christians – are the oldest and largest. After centuries of Ottoman oppression, they paid the high price of the post-colonial failed state and dictatorship. Estimated at around 1.5 million in the 1980s, today’s numbers range between 250,000 and 400,000 at best. Most are located either in the Kurdistan Region or in Hamdaniya district in the Northern province of Nineveh. While Hamdaniya was traditionally populated by Christians, most of those currently living in the Kurdistan Region landed there after fleeing from other parts of Iraq. In Nineveh specifically, the Christian population has plummeted by 80% since the “Islamic State” invasion. Other Christian population centers in Iraq (Baghdad, Basra, Kirkuk, Tikrit) host only a few families.Since 2003, religiously motivated bloodshed and the devastation caused by ISIS left many Christians dead or displaced. While some dared to return to their areas of origin, the majority is still weary of returning. Both returnees and displaced families look at their future with extreme anxiety. The massive emigration of Christian families in the last three decades does not help build the confidence of those remaining and who feel outnumbered and vulnerable. Many studies show that the primary concern of Christians – and other constituents in Northern Iraq – is safety and dignity. They are afraid from both physical elimination as much as other “identitycidal” measures through induced demographic change, dilution, or exclusion. As these communities fear at least as much – if not more – for their identity than livelihood, the Supreme Pontiff’s visit is an opportunity to advance some tangible ideas with the hope that decision makers in Iraq and the international community can adopt some of them and put them on track to implementation.

Beyond blessing and boosting the morale of Christians, there is a thirst to see some concrete ideas championed by Pope Francis. Many want to believe that this trip has the potential to change some paradigms and affect the pull and push factors of Christian emigration. As in other post-conflict settings where some communities feel under the threat of physical elimination, internationally tested mitigation measures could be relevant. In the specific case of Iraq, it is worth exploring how to strengthen the existing constitutional guarantees in order to reassure the Christians – and other constituents- about their fate and dignity.

Then comes the issue of security. The most effective security actors are either partisan or part of the pro-Iran ecosystem. Counting the disempowered Iraqi armed forces, none of the three types of actors inspire trust. If this perception of not being safe persists, it is very hard to expect the massive return of displaced Christian families, let alone reconstruction. This should encourage and push the Baghdad government to activate the process of creating local security units (at sub-district level) that would be in charge of internal security (within the boundaries of the sub-district) and assign to the other forces (Army, Federal Police, Popular Mobilization Forces) security roles outside of the city/population centers. This should come together with a well-trained and well-resourced civilian oversight mechanism to shield the local security units from partisan manipulation.

Another crucial element is the obsolete administrative units in the Nineveh Plains. The current boundaries take into account neither the current demographics nor the emerging post-ISIS political, economic, and social realities. The Christian community has come a long way on agreeing to the changes that are needed and stand ready to discuss these suggestions with other communities, and with decision makers. Using the visit as a catalyst to revisit the administrative boundaries in Nineveh is important. Constitutional guarantees, together with local security in administrative units that are reflective of today’s demographics and other realities will alleviate many fears but it will not be sufficient to stop the flow of migration. For this to happen, these measures should be complemented by massive investment in the areas where Christians live. This would start by identifying a number of clusters where Christians constitute a demographic majority and design long term twinship models with municipalities or regions in Western countries. Such collaborative constructs would allow large scale investment and development funds to flow to a specific cluster over a relatively long period of time, thus maximizing the impact of resources. This would also entail improving governance practices, a much-needed endeavor in Iraq. Last but not least, they might constitute a channel for hybrid Iraqi-Foreign Public and Private Partnerships (PPP) that could also involve guarantees for high net worth Iraqi individuals living abroad to contribute to the development of their own towns.

As in other MENA countries, the Christians – and other communities considered demographic minorities – will never be able to reverse the demographic advantage that majority communities enjoy. This advantage – caused by both natural and induced demographic change – will persist and, if anything, will only grow. Therefore, there is a need to look at other ways of re-establishing the balance. Today’s world is one of soft power. Amongst the most influential tools of soft power are money and knowledge. If one has both, many of the other traditional tools of power can be disposed of. Therefore, the brunt of investment would better be directed toward support and creating economic, industrial, educational, or technological poles out of the identified clusters. This would confer to the Christian communities a huge leverage that would substitute for the loss of influence resulting from the demographic imbalance.

In light of the above suggestions, it is worth highlighting the significant improvements to the situation of minorities in the Kurdistan Region. The region has successfully provided paths for inclusivity to the minorities, including the Christians. In fact, in 2015, the Kurdistan Region’s Parliament passed the “Law of Protecting the Rights of Components in Kurdistan-Iraq” which “guarantees efficient and full equality to all ethnic and religious minorities living in the Muslim-Kurdish dominated KRI”. The quasi-autonomous administration of Ankawa, the largest Christian agglomeration in Kurdistan – and probably in Iraq now – is a good example of how some measures can help. The types of investment in Ankawa, such as the Maryamana Hospital and the Catholic University of Erbil, both shepherded by the Chaldean Catholic Archeparchy of Erbil, foretell how a cluster can be built to become a pole of knowledge.

Despite these improvements, various factors such as the protracted conflict between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Central Government, the new realities in the disputed territories, and the continued political polarization impede the efforts to address all the concerns of the Christians. Some of the community’s leading figures continually express their dissatisfaction with the partisan influence over Christian representation in KRG institutions and the implications that the Baghdad-Erbil conflict has on the Christians in Nineveh. That said, the decision to have the Pope celebrate the Holy Mass in Erbil stems not just from security and logistics considerations – it is an acknowledgement of the Christian community’s status in the Kurdistan Region and the KRG’s efforts to ensure more inclusivity.

While a Papal visit might not offer opportunities to discuss specific recommendations in full detail, this Apostolic Visit should be different given the imminent threat of extinction that Iraq’s Christians view as being a quasi-certainty. Creating the momentum for such decisions and changes will allow Pope Francis to claim that he contributed to a better future for a beleaguered community.

Alakhbar-elie-geek

إن الحياة قصيدة… في معاني اغتيال هشام الهاشمي

This piece was originally published on the alhurra website www.alhurra.com

يقول الشاعر اللبناني إيليا أبو ماضي إن “الحياة قصيدة، أعمارنا أبياتها والموت فيها القافية متع لحاظك في النجوم وحسنها فلسوف تمضي والكواكب باقية”.

يأتي اغتيال الزميل والصديق هشام الهاشمي في العراق من قبل مسلحين بمثابة صدمة لمن عرفه ومن لا يعرفه. ليس لأن لغة الاغتيالات في العراق غير مألوفة بل لأسباب أخرى أهمها شخصية هشام وخبرته وأخلاقه وتفانيه لخدمة قضية السلام في بلده، كما وبسبب التفاؤل الذي شعره كثيرون بعد تولي السيد مصطفى الكاظمي رئاسة الحكومة والخطوات التي بدأ باعتمادها.

هشام ليس أول ناشط يقتل ولن يكون الأخير مع الأسف. الموت والفراق أليم ومفجع ولكن تبعات التصفية الجسدية في السياسة أخطر من الفعل نفسه. واغتيال هشام ـ كما الاغتيالات الأخرى ـ يحمل رسائل متعددة الجهات.

بالإضافة إلى دوره كمحلل ومفكر وباحث، برع هشام في إلقاء الضوء على الفساد ـ بجميع أشكاله السياسي والمالي والإداري ـ المستشري في الطبقة السياسية والأمنية (الرسمية والشبه رسمية) من أقصى يسارها إلى أقصى يمينها. وليس غريبا أن تكون إحدى انعكاسات الاغتيال إسكات الأصوات التي آلت على نفسها محاربة الفساد.

أفضل رد على اغتيال هشام هو استغلال الظرف من قبل الحكومة لسد الطريق أمام الممارسات القاتلة التي اعتمدت لفترة طويلة في العراق

من ناحية أخرى، إن النهج الذي اعتمده هشام ـ وآخرون ـ يعتمد على أسس ليبرالية إلى حد ما. إذ أنه روج ومارس حرية التعبير ونشر مفاهيم عدم الإقصاء وحسن إدارة التعددية والمساواة وحرية العمل السياسي وعناصر أخرى من حقوق الإنسان. والاغتيال في هذه الحالة لا يطال الشخص فقط بل يؤثر على مساحة الحرية والعمل السياسي في العراق.

منذ بدء الحراك في الشهر العاشر من العام المنصرم، عمل هشام مع بعض زملائه على تظهير رؤى موحِدة وبناءة بين مكونات الحراك كما وبين الحراك والسلطة. وتأتي عملية الاغتيال هذه ـ بالإضافة إلى القتل المتعمد لبعض وجوه الحراك والمتظاهرين ـ كجزء من تصفية الحسابات من طرف بعض الأحزاب والمجموعات المسلحة التي ضاقت ذرعا بوجود من ينتقدها ويكشف عوراتها محليا وإقليميا ودوليا. 

إن عدم محاسبة القتلة في الأشهر السابقة ساهم في “تشجيع” بعض تلك المجموعات على المضي في سياسة التصفية الجسدية. وها هو هشام يدفع ثمن عدم قيام الأجهزة الأمنية والقضائية بدورها كما يجب وهو أمر لطالما انتقده الشهيد في العلن وفي الخاص.

من المعروف أن هشام هو جزء من مجموعة غير رسمية وغير مؤطرة مؤلفة من ناشطين وناشطات، مفكرين ومفكرات، خبيرات وخبراء، إعلاميات وإعلاميين…إلخ. جهد أعضاء هذه المجموعة ـ منفردين أو ضمن مجموعات صغيرة ـ خلال السنوات الماضية على إبقاء جسور التواصل بين مختلف مكونات المجتمع العراقي وبين المجموعات التي تشغل المشهد السياسي في بلاد ما بين النهرين. كما لعب هؤلاء ـ وهشام منهم ـ على توفير مساحات حوار ومقترحات وأفكار لصانعي القرار في العراق والمهتمين في الشأن العراقي. إن قتل هشام أو أي شخص آخر من هذه المجموعة سوف يثني الكثيرين عن الاستمرار بلعب دور بناء وإيجابي وصلة الوصل بين المجتمع وصناع القرار.

ها هو هشام يدفع ثمن عدم قيام الأجهزة الأمنية والقضائية بدورها كما يجب وهو أمر لطالما انتقده في العلن وفي الخاص

يعتبر العمل والتواصل مع المنظمات الدولية والسفارات الأجنبية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط موضوعا جدليا يستخدم لتسقيط سياسيين وإعلاميين وناشطين وغيرهم: إذ أن الرأي العام في منطقتنا غالبا ما يستسيغ نظريات المؤامرة ليبدأ بتركيب قصص وسيناريوهات عادة ما تكون خيالية. 

لم يسلم هشام من آتون التخوين فتعرض لأبشع الحملات المضللة والمغرضة فقط لأنه يعمل مع مؤسسات إعلامية غير عراقية ويتعاون ـ بصفة استشارية ـ مع منظمات دولية. كما وتسبب له عمله ونشاطه بتهديدات مباشرة وضمنية بالقتل لم تثنيه يوما عن المجاهرة بحقيقة الأمور. 

ويكتسب عمل هشام أهمية خاصة إذ أنه سمح للعديد من الدبلوماسيين والعاملين على الملف العراقي من غير العراقيين بالولوج إلى معلومات وتحاليل من زاوية عراقية بحتة ومفارقات محلية لا يستطيع الشخص الغير عراقي ملاحظتها أو حتى فهمها. هذا الجهد عزز فعالية وأثر بعض البرامج الممولة من المجتمع الدولي وأضفى مزيدا من المشروعية لمبادرات أجنبية كانت تفتقد إلى تلك “المعرفة المحلية”. 

إن تصفية مفكرين وناشطين عراقيين كهشام سوف يدفع البعض منهم إلى تجنب التواصل أو العمل مع المجتمع الدولي وبالتالي سوف يؤثر في تنفيذ العديد من المشاريع ويعيق إيصال عنصر “المعرفة المحلية العراقية” إلى من يهمه الأمر، فتهيمن عقلية “الاستشراق” التي تحلل الأمور في بلداننا من منظار أجنبي بحت.

إن عدم محاسبة القتلة في الأشهر السابقة ساهم في “تشجيع” بعض تلك المجموعات على المضي في سياسة التصفية الجسدية

تضاف هذه الاعتبارات إلى الاعتبار الأهم وهو واجب الدولة بحماية مواطنيها وإحقاق الحق عند التعرض لحقوقهم لتشكل أرضية صلبة ينبغي على رئيس ومكونات الحكومة اعتمادها لتقويض مقاربة الاجرام والتصفية الجسدية وإرساء إطار جديد يقوم على تقديس الحياة وكرامة الإنسان وحمايتهما من انتهاكات الأقربين والأبعدين. 

من الناحية العملية، يبدأ هذا الأمر بتحقيق جدي ومحايد والتزام من الحكومة بمحاكمة المرتكبين والمحرضين والمشاركين في هذه الجريمة بمن فيهم الرعاة السياسيين للقتلة. إن أي تسويف لهذا الملف سوف يؤدي إلى التساؤل عن مدى جدية الحكومة في القيام بأبسط أدوارها. 

أفضل رد على اغتيال هشام هو استغلال الظرف من قبل الحكومة لسد الطريق أمام الممارسات القاتلة التي اعتمدت لفترة طويلة في العراق وأدت إلى قتل ونفي وسجن العديد من الأبرياء فقط لأنهم تجرأوا على مساءلة تركيبة هجينة تمزج بين البعد المذهبي والسياسي والمصلحي والعشائري والشخصي وتبدّي المصلحة الخاصة على المصلحة العامة. 

لم يتمتع العراق بنجومية هشام إلا لفترة قصيرة ولكن الحكومة اليوم ـ وبدعم من المجتمع الدولي ـ مطالبة بالمحافظة على الكواكب الأخرى وإلا حتى نظرية إيلي أبو ماضي بأن “الكواكب باقية حتى لو مضت النجوم” تصبح ساقطة. فليكن استشهاد هشام بزوغا لشمس الحق في بلد عانى أهله لعقود من سطوة الموت على إرادة الحياة

20240626_iran-conflicts-explainer-3_nyt_ac

Lebanon’s Deepening Crisis

https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/06/elie-abouaoun-lebanons-deepening-crisis

Transcript

Tim Farley: Looking at numbers, we look at the Johns Hopkins University, about 7.2 million cases worldwide for coronavirus in Africa, Nigeria about 13,000, about 53,000 in South Africa, about 10,000 in Ghana. And these numbers, of course, are moving, and those are just a few of the places in Africa. The question is, what does this mean moving forward and how does it play out in some of the specific countries that our next guest is going to answer for us? Dr. Elie Abouaoun is director of the Middle East and North Africa programs at the United States Institute of Peace. Joining us in a moment from Tunisia, where the connection is a little bit faulty but we’re going to get through to him again, the fragmented political leadership in Lebanon, for example, he is saying has been unable to take meaningful measures to even mitigate the effects of the crisis. And there have been also some echo to protests, if you will, overseas in Africa related to George Floyd and the death.

So, there is much to be discussed. Let us note also, according to, well, let’s get him back on the show, then, Dr. Elie Abouaoun, director of the Middle East and North Africa programs at the United States Institute of Peace, as I said, joining us from Tunisia, tweeting at @elie022, Dr. Abouaoun, welcome. Thank you for being here.

Elie Abouaoun: Good morning. Thank you very much. Thank you for hosting me.

Tim Farley: I was giving some numbers a moment ago about coronavirus and the cases that we’ve seen in the deaths, et cetera. How would you describe that emerging situation just in general in Africa and what are your concerns about particular hotspots?

Elie Abouaoun: Well, I mean, I cover North Africa. I don’t have too much information about the rest of Africa, but I do know, for example, that in Tunisia, the situation proved to be much better compared to what was forecasted before. So, the situation is more or less under control while we have seen a different evolution of COVID and both Libya and Egypt where the numbers are a bit worrisome. So, this is in a nutshell, North Africa, and as I said, I don’t have too much information about the rest of Africa.

Tim Farley: Is there a sense that there has been a government crackdown on, are we seeing social distancing, for example, enforced, are we seeing people having to stay at home? How is it different from the United States’ experience?

Elie Abouaoun: Well, it depends on the countries. There are some countries where the government indeed used this pandemic to, you know, to enforce additional repressive measures. And then in other countries, we didn’t see this, like in Tunisia, for example, the government, I think, took the appropriate measures and the behavior of the security forces was good in general. I mean, there are always incidents, but the number and the nature of the incidents were within the acceptable range of this thing.

Tim Farley: Let us, Dr. Abouaoun, speak specifically of one area that you are very closely watching and that is Lebanon. How can you, what should we be concerned about in the United States?

Elie Abouaoun: I think that the situation in Lebanon is unfortunately going in the wrong direction. And one of the main issues is that there’s no acknowledgment at the top leadership levels that the situation requires a completely different approach. So, we’re still seeing, you know, some sort of political bickering between, for example, the central bank and the government, and this is reflecting into actual significant differences in the figures provided to the International Monetary Fund. And this is jeopardizing the whole possibility and relevance of seeking assistance from the IMF.

This is one example of how the fragmentation of the political leadership level is affecting the situation. In parallel, we’ve seen a continued, you know, arbitrary practice by the target banks depriving people from accessing their money and basically providing services just to the happy few who have access to the board members of banks or otherwise. But the general population is suffering because they don’t have access to their money. All of this is compounded by the, you know, the economic crisis that was already, you know, thriving in Lebanon, but now with the COVID and its aftermath, this crisis will become even more acute. So, these are the main elements I would say of Lebanon’s situation today.

Tim Farley: Dr. Abouaoun, in Lebanon with this protest movement, is this a general sense of a disorganized protest against the government, or is there a concerted effort by one group or united groups to try to change things?

Elie Abouaoun: Unfortunately, the protest movement is as fragmented as the government and there are no concerted efforts to develop, I mean, it’s very hard to develop, you know, one agenda. I think it’s hard, not only in Lebanon, but in in any other country to have really one agenda whereby different civil society groups and political groups coming from different ideological backgrounds to agree on this agenda. But at least, I think, where the protest movement in Lebanon is missing the point, is to agree on a short-term agenda, like for example, I don’t know, early elections, not early elections. So, there are a few actions that can actually help move the needle and that the protest movement should agree on and this is not happening. And this is unfortunate because it’s contributing significantly to the, I wouldn’t say paralysis, but it became really weak. And it requires some sort of an energizer actually at this stage.

Tim Farley: Again, Dr. Elie Abouaoun is with us, director of Middle East and North Africa programs at the United States Institute of Peace. What can you tell us about Hezbollah, which obviously has wielded its influence in that region and I wonder what its standing is right now?

Elie Abouaoun: Yes. Well, basically I think I wrote not long ago that Hezbollah today is, you know, is worried at several levels. And I think that the party is trying to project force in its public statements or some of the political decisions that the party is making, but in general, the party is under a lot of pressure from, as I said, from different sources. Well, first of all, they are still you know, investing a lot of resources in Syria. The conflict in Syria is not over yet and the role of the party over there to protect the regime is still needed. The second source of tension or pressure is that the constituency of the party in Lebanon has been affected by the financial crisis, by the banking crisis, and that the upcoming the upcoming economic crisis will hit them even harder.

Iran, which is the main sponsor of the party, is experiencing very serious economic challenges and the ability of Iran to provide them with financial support will be hindered in the next few months as a result of the economic crisis, but also of the sanctions. So, all in all, the party is really in a tough spot at this stage. I’m not saying that, you know, they are going through an existential crisis. I’m just saying that at this stage, they are under a lot of pressure from different sides. And their main concern is to avoid a civil war in Lebanon between Sunnis and Shia. So, they are really keen on avoiding this scenario from happening. And we’ve seen, in the weekend, you know, an attempt to basically drag Lebanon into the Sunni Shia confrontation that was rapidly contained by the major Shia leaders, political leaders, including those from the parties.

Tim Farley: Although you do not see it as an existential crisis, I wonder if you see the possible erosion of Hezbollah influence as a good thing or are you concerned that it might be replaced by something even more militant?

Elie Abouaoun: No, I think that the erosion of the party’s influence and, you know, in the Lebanese political scene is important. I think that the role of Hezbollah is, is oversized at this stage and one of the reasons why it’s oversized is because they have the military wing within the party. So, any kind of erosion is good.

However, what is important for the international community is to make sure that this process is being monitored and there are substitutes, you know, prepared to be put in place because the worst thing that can happen, as it happened, actually in Iraq is that you remove, you know, one regime, or in this case, you erode the influence of one party and then you don’t have a proper replacement, and then you get into a more dangerous situation. So, I think that the international community has a vested interest in monitoring what’s happening in Lebanon and in supporting, you know, some of their allies, basically political allies or institutionalized allies, like the Lebanese Armed Forces, for example, to make sure that there’s no vacuum in the world.

Tim Farley: Dr. Abouaoun, thank you for joining us on POTUS today.

Elie Abouaoun: Thank you very much. Have a good day. Thanks.

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Amid tensions with the United States, the COVID-19 pandemic and a lagging economy have contributed to the slow pace of change. Now what?

This piece was originally published on the thearabweekly website https://thearabweekly.com/

Iraqis hit the streets in unprecedented numbers last October, calling for political and economic reforms, greater job opportunities for youth and better government services. In the year since, the country has been rocked by a number of developments, including growing US-Iran tensions playing out on Iraqi soil, the COVID pandemic and increasing citizen disenchantment with the country’s political system and its sectarian foundation. Sarhang Hamasaeed and Elie Abouaoun of United States Institute of Peace (USIP) look at where Iraq’s protest movement stands today, the economic impact of COVID-19, the prime minister’s call for early elections and US-Iraq relations.Protests broke out in Iraq in October 2019. What is the state of the protest movement today and has it achieved any of its demands?Hamasaeed: Many of the grievances propelling protesters into the streets last October have yet to be addressed and in some cases have become more complicated. While the movement has lost momentum in terms of number of protesters on the street and fragmented some, its spirit and key pressure factors remain. With considerable public support from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the supreme Shia cleric, the protest movement managed to make important, but provisional gains:

  • The protests signified a deep societal desire for change, primarily represented by youth. The youth took their peaceful resistance to the religious space during Shia religious ceremonies and rituals like Arabaeen, which commemorates the 40th day of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. These Iraqi youth are presenting themselves as representing Imam Hussein’s symbolism of standing up to oppression and injustice in an effort to supplant Islamic religious parties’ legitimacy.
  • The movement forced Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi to resign last November, paving the way for Mustafa al-Kadhimi to become the new premier. Despite many obstacles and exasperation with the slow pace of change, Kadhimi has shown he is serious in wanting to address the grievances of the people and the international community.
  • Last fall, the Council of Representatives voted on a new election law, which was meant to break the control of the traditional power-holders. A key component of that law remains to be finished, requiring an annex that would set the electoral districts — a contentious issue in its own right. How those districts will be set up will have significant implications for the balance of power within and among Iraq’s communities, political parties and beyond.
  • Judges have been appointed as commissioners in Iraq’s High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to replace the commission that was perceived as representing partisan and confessional interests. However, the IHEC’s bureaucracy has legacy issues and other concerns that are yet to be addressed.
  • Kadhimi has set June 6, 2021 as the date for early elections.

These changes have kept the international community engaged—even those who thought Iraq was a completely lost cause. Sistani met with the UN special representative in Iraq twice, and his most recent statement in September stressed, among other things, the importance of monitoring and supervision of the election in coordination with the UN.

The protest movement is gearing up for a strong showing on October 25, a key anniversary date. However, there is scepticism that they will be able to muster up the kind of crowds that they had last year. That’s because of several factors: continued violence against the protesters and assassination of civic leaders; coronavirus restrictions; fragmentation among the protesters, some wanting to give the Kadhimi government a chance while others are sceptical that protests will yield results; and concerns that political parties and armed groups have infiltrated or co-opted the movement or parts of it. Although there is a perception the movement has lost momentum, Iraq’s financial crises could once again ignite mass protests—and political parties may exploit them to undermine Kadhimi, if not fully aim to unseat him.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the attendant drop in global oil demand have decimated Iraq’s economy. What role does this play in unrest in the country and how can the economy be brought back from the brink?

Abouaoun: Iraqis have largely embraced a minimalist view of their future, hoping at this point to just slow down the deterioration of living standards. This priority is currently overshadowing many other equally important political and social issues that Iraq must fix. Iraq’s deep recession is not only caused by COVID and low oil prices; it is the result of years of excessive spending, an archaic economic model, widespread corruption, a bloated public sector, and the lasting impacts of the multiple political and security crises the country has gone through.

The implications for everyday Iraqis are profound: disrupted electricity and water services, defective infrastructure, poor education and health care, among other things. This has led to a decreasing faith in state institutions and their ability to perform effectively. Furthermore, the whole social contract is controverted. The visible triggers of the demonstrations are issues like inconsistent electricity or corruption, but the underlying reasons have more to do with this agnosticism about the idea of an Iraqi state. Accordingly, there is no doubt that a better economic outlook will contribute to changing this intense disenchantment.

However, it will not be enough. Iraq needs a colossal effort to mend the social contract; rebuild trust in the capacity of state institutions to uphold people’s rights; address the loss of state exclusivity over the use of violence that is now decentralised among parties, militias, religious institutions and tribes; and to foster collaborative intra- and intercommunal relations. Fixing Iraq’s economic woes is just one treatment for a patient with multimorbidity.

Iraq’s prime minister has called for early elections to be held in 2021. Is Iraq prepared for any early election and what could cause delay?

Abouaoun: I see the question of the elections as a dilemma for the prime minister. On one hand, there is no chance to have any significant reform passed without a substantial pro-reform, non-corrupt bloc in parliament. On the other hand, rushing to elections in the current political and economic context will most likely lead to the reelection of almost the same parties (albeit with different candidates) and could open new flashpoints for conflict. Therefore, expectations for snap elections should be tempered: they will stir the pot a bit, but not radically change the landscape. It will be just one step in the long journey of political change in Iraq. I tend to believe that, despite the obstacles ahead, the best bet for Iraq now is nevertheless to go for early elections to disrupt the status quo.

Having relatively fair elections now will encourage some promising leader to consider running in the future. It will also trigger a new dynamic that will partially overrule the practices set by the current political forces. It may also inject a high dose of legitimacy with a government that is less influenced by the same political and religious actors. So, all in all, the benefits of early elections outweigh the potential downfalls.

US-Iraq relations have been rocky over the last year, with Washington recently threatening to shutter the Baghdad embassy. What issues have caused turmoil in the bilateral relationship and what can be done to strengthen ties?

Hamasaeed: The news about a possible shutdown of the US embassy in Baghdad surprised many Iraqis and Iraq watchers. The US-Iraq strategic dialogue, Kadhimi’s visit to Washington in August and meeting with President Trump, and positive messages from both governments suggested that relations were strengthening. Of course, there were those who were sceptical that these events alone would lead to better relations. Many see the news about the embassy as a precautionary move in advance of the US presidential elections, while others fear it may be preparation for United States to use force against Iran-backed armed groups.

US-Iraq bilateral relations hit a low point under Abdul-Mahdi over a number of issues, some which have deteriorated while others witnessed some progress under Kadhimi. The United States and others know that Kadhimi and members of his government value the US and international community and recognise the hurdles they face in making progress on key issues, but that will not be sufficient over the longer term without real change on the ground.

A key area of tension has been Iraq’s inability to reign in elements of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), who are not fully controlled by the state. Despite the Kadhimi government’s efforts, attacks by armed groups against US military personnel hosted on Iraqi bases and the US embassy in Baghdad have increased. Attacks have expanded to new targets too, including convoys carrying US military equipment, an IED-attack on a British embassy convoy, and rocket attack on Erbil International Airport, which houses US military facilities.

The risks attached to a US embassy closure and 25 ambassadors and charges d’affaires (from Australia, Egypt, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Kingdom, among others) communicating their concerns to Kadhimi and Iraq’s political leadership seems to have resulted in an announcement of a conditional suspension of attacks. This is occurring in the broader context of US-Iran tensions, especially after the US killed Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani and the deputy head of the PMF and Iranian military retaliation against US troops in Iraq.

Another area of grievance has been the Baghdad government not doing enough to protect and facilitate the return of ethnic and religious minorities, especially Christians and Yazidis displaced by the conflict against ISIS. Kadhimi has visited Nineveh Province, the ancestral land of these communities, and committed to help them, but also asked for their patience. On October 9, the government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) reached a long overdue agreement on governing Sinjar and providing security, which is necessary to open the door for stabilisation initiatives and facilitating the return of the displaced. Sinjar is home for many Yazidis, continues to suffer from significant physical destruction after ISIS and is entangled in a web of security actors and competing regional interests.

On Iraq not working enough to set itself free from reliance on energy imports from Iran, the Kadhimi government has indicated that it wants to initiate reforms and investments that could address this issue, but it will take a longer time to make progress here.

Washington also became increasingly vocal about Iraqi security forces’ and armed groups’ violent response to peaceful Iraqi demonstrators. The Kadhimi government has not been able yet to bring perpetrators of violence to justice, including in cases like Hisham al-Hashemi, whom he knew and received his advice on matters of security.

Iraqi leaders and political forces need to come together to apply political pressure and put in place security measures to counter armed groups and Iran’s influence that result in attacks against the diplomatic and security interests of Iraq’s allies. The Iraqis cannot do this alone and will not do it if they see if they see the United States already has a foot out of the door.

20201015-nyt-lebanon_govt_explainer_11-ac

The Beirut Blast Has Yet to Spark Political Reform

As political leaders fail to form new government, public faith in the blast investigation and handling of the COVID outbreak is waning.

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.usip.org/

Over two months later, there are still more questions than answers regarding the Beirut explosion that killed over 200 people and damaged large swaths of Lebanon’s capital city. Meanwhile, the fallout from the explosion has forced the resignation of Lebanon’s government, which had already been under fire after months of protests over corruption and a deteriorating economy. USIP’s Elie Abouaoun and Osama Gharizi look at where the blast investigation stands, what’s holding up the formation of a new government, and what a new outbreak of COVID-19 means for Lebanon.

Where does the investigation into the blast stand, and what has been done to hold those responsible accountable?

Abouaoun: Apart from the arrest of a few top bureaucrats and some junior officers involved in the port and customs management and security—as well as other arrest warrants against the ship operators—there are no indications about progress made so far or the next steps. There also hasn’t been an official statement about the status of the investigation. The only reference so far was a distinction made by the caretaker Minster of Justice Marie-Claude Najem about the difference between the “administrative investigation” and the “judicial investigation.”

It is worth mentioning here that there is very little public faith that the process will lead to anything meaningful. The reality is that Lebanon’s bureaucracy is complex, mostly relying on obsolete paper-based processes, and is characterized by general impunity and a lack of rigor and documentation. Therefore, it is very likely that the investigation will be lost in the labyrinth of multiple reporting lines, processes, and blurred mandates. Some of this confusion already emerged when the media published copies of letters sent from some of the port officials to judges recommending action to get rid of the ammonium nitrate shipment.

After the previous government resigned, in part due to the explosion, a French-led effort to form a new government has stalled. What’s preventing the formation of a new government, and what can be done to overcome it?

Abouaoun: The visible reason for designated Prime Minister Mustafa Adib’s (who has since stepped down) failure to form a government is the obstinacy of the two major Shia political parties, the Amal movement and Hezbollah, as they declined to nominate a minister of finance while Adib was trying to form an apolitical, technocrat government in which political parties were not represented.

However, and despite the importance of the Ministry of Finance to the two parties, the invisible part of the iceberg is Hezbollah’s rejection of some amendments introduced to the French-led initiative.  Sources close to the pro-Iranian party claim that when Hezbollah expressed no resistance to President Macron’s plan in early August, the initiative did not include anticipated elections or the mandate for strictly apolitical ministers. Moreover, both Hezbollah and Amal felt that Sunni political leaders did in fact select Adib as the designate prime minister, and that they should be entitled to do the same when it came to the Shia ministers.

Ironically enough, the government formation is now contingent upon a new consensus among the same political players that both the majority of Lebanon’s population and the international community—including President Macron himself—consider responsible for Lebanon’s current crisis.

Given that the U.S. elections are near, Iran and its proxies feel that they are less compelled to consent to major concessions. They would rather buy some time until November through some sort of “filibustering,” unless of course they are able to form an obedient government.

Cases of COVID-19 have begun spiking again in the country as hospitals near full capacity. How has the pandemic impacted the country’s political and economic crises, and what can be done to mitigate the spread before the medical system becomes overwhelmed?

Gharizi: COVID-19 cases have been steadily increasing since the government began easing lockdown measures in June. Following the August 4 port explosion, the number of positive cases per day increased exponentially as thousands of injured were rushed to local hospitals, forcing medical personnel to circumvent COVID-19 protocols, and multiple hospitals were damaged to the point they were no longer functional.

However, increased transmission of the virus can also be blamed on a loss of confidence in the government to manage the political, economic, and health crises afflicting the country. Political leaders have been quick to revert to the closure of the country as the main measure to contain the pandemic; yet this has not been accompanied by any substantive initiative or program to help ease economic suffering that would accompany such as move. The private sector, already reeling from a prolonged economic downturn, has pushed back on the shutdown, with Beirut’s Trade Association and the syndicate of restaurants, cafés, and club owners openly defying a government order to abide by lockdown measures at the end of August.

There’s also a view among many activists and those involved in the protest movement that the lockdown measures are more about preventing street demonstrations than about keeping the country safe from COVID-19. Confidence has also been eroded due to the fact that the same government representatives calling on the public to remain home and socially distance are often seen in large public gatherings. Given these developments, the government has tried a different approach to contain COVID-19: putting specific towns and villages under lockdown for a week at a time, a step that so far hasn’t provoked the same type of reaction from the public as the closure of the country. It’s too early to say if this approach will be successful in managing the health crisis, especially given the government’s historical inability to fully enforce laws in more provincial areas and a looming drug shortage. And with the one-year anniversary of the protest movement on the horizon, demonstrations are being organized that could result in a spike in cases afterwards.

Developments that could help mitigate a health care disaster include the formation of a government that’s responsive to the citizenry and is able to a provide a short-term economic safety net while pushing through key reforms that can spur an economic revival.

20201015-nyt-2020_yearend_news_034-ac

Iraq One Year After its Seismic Protests Began

Amid tensions with the United States, the COVID pandemic and a lagging economy have contributed to the slow pace of change. Now what?

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.usip.org/

Iraqis hit the streets in unprecedented numbers last October, calling for political and economic reforms, greater job opportunities for youth, and better government services. In the year since, the country has been rocked by a number of developments, including growing U.S.-Iran tensions playing out on Iraqi soil, the COVID pandemic, and increasing citizen disenchantment with the country’s political system and its sectarian foundation. USIP’s Sarhang Hamasaeed and Elie Abouaoun look at where Iraq’s protest movement stands today, the economic impact of COVID, the prime minister’s call for early elections, and U.S.-Iraq relations.

Protests broke out in Iraq in October 2019. What is the state of the protest movement today and has it achieved any of its demands?

Hamasaeed: Many of the grievances propelling protesters into the streets last October have yet to be addressed and in some cases have become more complicated. While the movement has lost momentum in terms of number of protesters on the street and fragmented some, its spirit and key pressure factors remain. With considerable public support from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the supreme Shia cleric, the protest movement managed to make important, but provisional gains:

  • The protests signified a deep societal desire for change, primarily represented by youth. The youth took their peaceful resistance to the religious space during Shia religious ceremonies and rituals like Arabaeen, which commemorates the 40th day of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. These Iraqi youth are presenting themselves as representing Imam Hussein’s symbolism of standing up to oppression and injustice in an effort to supplant Islamic religious parties’ legitimacy.
  • The movement forced Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi to resign last November, paving the way for Mustafa al-Kadhimi to become the new premier. Despite many obstacles and exasperation with the slow pace of change, Kadhimi has shown he is serious in wanting to address the grievances of the people and the international community.
  • Last fall, the Council of Representatives voted on a new election law, which was meant to break the control of the traditional powerholders. A key component of that law remains to be finished, requiring an annex that would set the electoral districts—a contentious issue in its own right. How those districts will be set up will have significant implications for the balance of power within and among Iraq’s communities, political parties, and beyond.
  • Judges have been appointed as commissioners in Iraq’s High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to replace the commission that was perceived as representing partisan and confessional interests. However, the IHEC’s bureaucracy has legacy issues and other concerns that are yet to be addressed.
  • Kadhimi has set June 6, 2021 as the date for early elections.

These changes have kept the international community engaged—even those who thought Iraq was a completely lost cause. Sistani met with the U.N. special representative in Iraq twice, and his most recent statement in September stressed, among other things, the importance of monitoring and supervision of the election in coordination with the U.N.

The protest movement is gearing up for a strong showing on October 25, a key anniversary date. However, there is skepticism that they will be able to muster up the kind of crowds that they had last year. That’s because of several factors: continued violence against the protesters and assassination of civic leaders; coronavirus restrictions; fragmentation among the protesters, some wanting to give the Kadhimi government a chance while others are skeptical that protests will yield results; and concerns that political parties and armed groups have infiltrated or coopted the movement or parts of it. Although there is a perception the movement has lost momentum, Iraq’s financial crises could once again ignite mass protests—and political parties may exploit them to undermine Kadhimi, if not fully aim to unseat him.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the attendant drop in global oil demand have decimated Iraq’s economy. What role does this play in unrest in the country and how can the economy be brought back from the brink?

Abouaoun: Iraqis have largely embraced a minimalist view of their future, hoping at this point to just slow down the deterioration of living standards. This priority is currently overshadowing many other equally important political and social issues that Iraq must fix. Iraq’s deep recession is not only caused by COVID and low oil prices; it is the result of years of excessive spending, an archaic economic model, widespread corruption, a bloated public sector, and the lasting impacts of the multiple political and security crises the country has gone through.

The implications for everyday Iraqis are profound: disrupted electricity and water services, defective infrastructure, poor education and health care, among other things. This has led to a decreasing faith in state institutions and their ability to perform effectively. Furthermore, the whole social contract is controverted. The visible triggers of the demonstrations are issues like inconsistent electricity or corruption, but the underlying reasons have more to do with this agnosticism about the idea of an Iraqi state. Accordingly, there is no doubt that a better economic outlook will contribute to changing this intense disenchantment.

However, it will not be enough. Iraq needs a colossal effort to mend the social contract; rebuild trust in the capacity of state institutions to uphold people’s rights; address the loss of state exclusivity over the use of violence that is now decentralized among parties, militias, religious institutions, and tribes; and to foster collaborative intra- and intercommunal relations. Fixing Iraq’s economic woes is just one treatment for a patient with multimorbidity.

Iraq’s prime minister has called for early elections to be held in 2021. Is Iraq prepared for any early election and what could cause delay?

Abouaoun: I see the question of the elections as a dilemma for the prime minister. On one hand, there is no chance to have any significant reform passed without a substantial pro-reform, non-corrupt bloc in parliament. On the other hand, rushing to elections in the current political and economic context will most likely lead to the reelection of almost the same parties (albeit with different candidates) and could open new flashpoints for conflict. Therefore, expectations for snap elections should be tempered: they will stir the pot a bit, but not radically change the landscape. It will be just one step in the long journey of political change in Iraq. I tend to believe that, despite the obstacles ahead, the best bet for Iraq now is nevertheless to go for early elections to disrupt the status quo.

Having relatively fair elections now will encourage some promising leader to consider running in the future. It will also trigger a new dynamic that will partially overrule the practices set by the current political forces. It may also inject a high dose of legitimacy with a government that is less influenced by the same political and religious actors. So, all in all, the benefits of early elections outweigh the potential downfalls.

U.S.-Iraq relations have been rocky over the last year, with Washington recently threatening to shutter the Baghdad embassy. What issues have caused turmoil in the bilateral relationship and what can be done to strengthen ties?

Hamasaeed: The news about a possible shutdown of the U.S. embassy in Baghdad surprised many Iraqis and Iraq watchers. The U.S.-Iraq strategic dialogue, Kadhimi’s visit to Washington in August and meeting with President Trump, and positive messages from both governments suggested that relations were strengthening. Of course, there were those who were skeptical that these events alone would lead to better relations. Many see the news about the embassy as a precautionary move in advance of the U.S. presidential elections, while others fear it may be preparation for United States to use force against Iran-backed armed groups.

U.S.-Iraq bilateral relations hit a low point under Abdul-Mahdi over a number of issues, some which have deteriorated while others witnessed some progress under Kadhimi. The United States and others know that Kadhimi and members of his government value the U.S. and international community and recognize the hurdles they face in making progress on key issues, but that will not be sufficient over the longer term without real change on the ground.

A key area of tension has been Iraq’s inability to reign in elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), who are not fully controlled by the state. Despite the Kadhimi government’s efforts, attacks by armed groups against U.S. military personnel hosted on Iraqi bases and the U.S. embassy in Baghdad have increased. Attacks have expanded to new targets too, including convoys carrying U.S. military equipment, an IED-attack on a British embassy convoy, and rocket attack on Erbil International Airport, which houses U.S. military facilities.

The risks attached to a U.S. embassy closure and 25 ambassadors and charges d’affaires (from Australia, Egypt, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Kingdom, among others) communicating their concerns to Kadhimi and Iraq’s political leadership seems to have resulted in an announcement of a conditional suspension of attacks. This is occurring in the broader context of U.S.-Iran tensions, especially after the U.S. killed Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani and the deputy head of the PMF and Iranian military retaliation against U.S. troops in Iraq.

Another area of grievance has been the Baghdad government not doing enough to protect and facilitate the return of ethnic and religious minorities, especially Christians and Ezidis (Yazidis), displaced by the conflict against ISIS. Kadhimi has visited Ninewa Province, the ancestral land of these communities, and committed to help them, but also asked for their patience. On October 9, the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government reached a long overdue agreement on governing Sinjar and providing security, which is necessary to open the door for stabilization initiatives and facilitating the return of the displaced. Sinjar is home for many Ezidis, continues to suffer from significant physical destruction after ISIS, and is entangled in a web of security actors and competing regional interests.

On Iraq not working enough to set itself free from reliance on energy imports from Iran, the Kadhimi government has indicated that it wants to initiate reforms and investments that could address this issue, but it will take a longer time to make progress here.

Washington also became increasingly vocal about Iraqi security forces’ and armed groups’ violent response to peaceful Iraqi demonstrators. The Kadhimi government has not been able yet to bring perpetrators of violence to justice, including in cases like Husham al-Hashimi, whom he knew and received his advice on matters of security.

Iraqi leaders and political forces need to come together to apply political pressure and put in place security measures to counter armed groups and Iran’s influence that result in attacks against the diplomatic and security interests of Iraq’s allies. The Iraqis cannot do this alone and will not do it if they see if they see the United States already has a foot out of the door.

20200710-al-hashimi-news

In Memoriam: Husham al-Hashimi

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.usip.org/

The U.S. Institute of Peace mourns the death of Husham al-Hashimi, a leading expert on extremist groups who devoted his life to building peace in Iraq. Al-Hashimi, 47, was shot dead near his home in Baghdad on July 6 by motorcycle-borne gunmen. No group has so far claimed responsibility for his murder.

Al-Hashimi was “an intellectual, a thinker, an expert, a strategist, someone who was respected, loved, and appreciated by everyone who worked with him,” said Sarhang Hamasaeed, director of Middle East programs at USIP. “To target someone like Husham is a huge shock and a dangerous indicator of the political and security situation in Iraq,” he said, adding, “It undermines the belief that change is possible through peaceful means.”

The fact that al-Hashimi was killed in Baghdad “amid all the layers of security, goes to show that civilians and intellectuals are not safe there,” said Hamasaeed. “It signals the weakness of the state and undermines trust in its ability to bring criminals to justice,” he added. One of the demands of the protesters who have been demonstrating in Iraq since last year is that the government hold accountable those responsible for violent crimes.

“Given Iraq’s vulnerability [al-Hashimi’s murder] could push frustrated young Iraqis in the wrong direction,” Hamasaeed warned.

A Political Message

Al-Hashimi’s murder is seen by some as a message to Iraq’s new prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who has promised to get tough with Islamic State militants and armed groups with ties to Iran. Al-Hashimi served as an informal adviser to Al-Kadhimi and often publicly goaded the government to do more to stamp out extremism. 

Husham al-Hashimi
Husham al-Hashimi

“It sends a very clear political message,” said Elie Abouaoun, director of the Middle East and North Africa programs at USIP.

Al-Hashimi’s murder is a “political assassination even though he was not a politician because it happened as a consequence of his work and because he was considered to be close to and representing what the current government of Iraq is doing and what the protesters in Iraq are demanding,” said Hamasaeed.

Al-Kadhimi blamed groups “outside the law” for al-Hashimi’s murder and vowed to “pursue [the killers] so they are justly punished.”

Al-Kadhimi’s government has recently cracked down on armed groups aligned with Iran that have attacked U.S. targets in Iraq. One such group, Kataib Hezbollah, was the target of a raid by Iraqi security forces in June.

In a Facebook post, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad said it was “deeply shocked and saddened by the cowardly murder” and called on the Iraqi government to “bring those responsible for his murder to swift justice.”

Al-Hashimi the Peace Builder

Al-Hashimi’s research focused on jihadi groups, including ISIS, and armed groups in Iraq that have ties to Iran. He is remembered by those who knew him as down-to-earth, gracious, and ever ready to share his wealth of knowledge with journalists, intellectuals, and politicians.

Abouaoun first met al-Hashimi in Iraq about a decade ago. In their more recent exchanges, al-Hashimi mentioned receiving threats to his life. Rumors of al-Hashimi’s murder had circulated many times in the past, including once when he and Abouaoun were sitting together in a hotel in Baghdad. “This time … my immediate response was, ‘OK, this is not the first time,’” Abouaoun said. This time, however, the news was true.

Between 2016 and 2019, al-Hashimi joined the Network of Iraqi Facilitators, a USIP-supported network in Iraq. He also advised Sanad for Peacebuilding, USIP’s strategic partner in Iraq. He provided invaluable conflict assessments and analysis about areas in Iraq where USIP has led reconciliation work.

Abouaoun said al-Hashimi’s murder could have a chilling effect on other, lower-profile individuals who are working toward peace in Iraq. “Some of them will think twice about venturing into some of the topics Husham covered,” he said.

An Enormous Legacy

Hamasaeed recalled al-Hashimi as being a “relationship builder” who “helped bring good actors into the conversation.”

Both Hamasaeed and Abouaoun noted that al-Hashimi’s lasting legacy will be the enormous body of work he leaves behind—his meticulous research on extremism.

Hamasaeed recalled being struck by al-Hashimi’s apparent omnipresence. “You felt at any given day he was everywhere—sharing his views on television, meeting people, participating in events, and working on his research. It made me wonder where he found the time,” he said.

Last, but not least, Hamasaeed recalled al-Hashimi’s bravery. “He had the opportunity to leave Iraq. Many organizations outside Iraq would have offered him a high-paying job. Yet he chose to stay in Baghdad and work in plain sight and say what he had to say in the most moderate way,” he said.

Al-Hashimi was active on Twitter where he had a huge following. In a tweet in June he wrote: “Baghdad … neither you are you nor home is home.” Hamasaeed said the threats to his life that al-Hashimi was facing at the time were probably weighing heavy on his mind.

Hamasaeed last met al-Hashimi while in Baghdad to speak at a conference. As they chatted, al-Hashimi cautioned him against becoming complacent about his security. “He advised me to take care because … there are limits to what can be said and lines that should not be crossed,” Hamasaeed recalled. “It is unfortunate that the person who gave me that advise lost his life in this way.”

58-271-lbnn-op-ed

Lebanon’s inevitable mutation

In its one hundred years of existence as a state, Lebanon has gone through — and survived — a lot. However, future storms cannot be weathered unless a “genetic” mutation happens.

This piece was originally published on the thearabweekly website https://thearabweekly.com/

Lebanon’s population — across the spectrum — is in an utter disarray. In the last few years, most of the paradigms about their country, which the Lebanese thought to be set in stone, have been challenged, if not proven fictive. But the blow, “which they were expecting from the east, came from the west,” as some said.

After the financial and banking collapse and the COVID-19 pandemic, many Lebanese – all pessimistic about the prospects of a quick recovery — thought at least that the time of bad surprises was over. Some of them speculated about a war with Israel or were contemplating the verdict of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, initially scheduled for August 7, 2020.

Depending on who you talk to, some considered it a manifestation of grace while others looked at it as a disgrace. In both camps, sceptical analysts tried to imagine how the pro and anti-Hariri constituencies would react to the verdict. No one, however, knew or saw that the hardest blow in Lebanon’s modern history would come from an uncharted hangar in Beirut’s seaport, in the form of the fifth most powerful non-nuclear explosion in history.

Undoubtedly, the reasons behind the failure of the state building process in Lebanon are numerous.  However, a question stands out as essential to the exercise: How has a country of brilliant individuals, who have achieved so much both in terms of education and professional advancement, failed to produce and agree on a social contract that would have allowed it to build a proper state? Conspiracists blame it on external powers: colonialists, imperialists, Ottomans, Zionists, Syrians, Arabs and others. The negationists claim that Lebanon as a country is an illusion and that its population should belong to a larger pan-Arab entity. Looking at the history of the current “up- and-running” countries, it is easy to refute both theories. Many countries came out of occupation or colonial rule stronger than before. Other countries, which did not exist only decades ago, are now solid nations. What Lebanon actually needs is to avoid invoking history, stop overstating geography and just embrace a dose of “result-oriented realism.”

A solid country can emerge and prosper only when its constituents agree transparently about what they have in common and on how to manage what they disagree about. It is unimaginable to have a country in which everything is consensual.  Therefore, being honest about differences is fundamental. Lebanon’s DNA is mostly about non-inclusive “transactional agreements” (1920, 1943, 1958, 1989, 2005, 2008, 2016…) drafted by the “happy few” aiming to quickly fix the visible issues while keeping the real ones concealed.

The realist approach requires a good understanding of Lebanon’s socio-cultural history, its demographics and how all of this allowed the subnational identity to overshadow the national one. While this situation is not ideal, addressing the paradox should not be done by creating another one in which the different layers of ones’ identity are necessarily antithetical. The emphasis should be put on how all these layers are actually complementary and should be preserved and protected.

Another important “mutation” is relinquishing double standards. Many Lebanese would be furious about something happening to them but excel in finding justification for why the same thing could happen to others. Accountability is the first space in which we need to stop using double standards. Accountability is not only when a minister is put in jail for abuse of power. It is also when an ordinary citizen accepts that s/he or his/her siblings, cousins, leader or whoever from their “clan” should be held accountable for the mistake they have committed, whether they work in the public or private sector. It can be sanctioning a physician for medical malpractice, an engineer for a failed structure built, a judge for a misdeed, an army officer for a violation of the law or a faith leader for unethical behaviour.

“Intellectual” courage and “critical thinking” have been missing for a while. Most Lebanese political and community leaders do not go beyond the “accepted norms.” Even when they assign advisers or collaborators, they don’t dare to go outside the circle of blind supporters. The Lebanese grew up on immutable theories about “horrible sectarianism,” “traitorous federalism,” the “hideous Zionist enemy,” the “vocation of Lebanon as a bridge between the East and West” and the “Lebanese model of co-existence.”

In the few instances when some leaders have dared to question these notions, they either lacked the necessary leverage or did so at the wrong time, using an immature strategy or one that is embedded in violence — or all of the above.

Last but not least is the sense of “collective interest.” This is where most Lebanese, no matter how smart they are, fail to see how stronger collective interest reflects – in the long term – on their own individual interest. It is neither mutually exclusive nor a zero-sum game.

But to grasp this, one needs to get rid of the tunnel vision acquired through Lebanon’s awkward, ugly, poor and uselessly competitive education, which focuses only on what one should achieve, irrespective of how s/he does it. This is the main reason why, while most people blame Lebanon’s current dismay on others, external factors, political or economic ones, the bitter reality is that it is essentially about the lack of purposeful education.

Lebanon’s educational system is not only archaic but designed only to build a body of knowledge with little or no attention to values, attitudes and collective efforts. The ministry of education is one of the least coveted portfolios by political parties. Anything related to education, including the profession of teachers, is underrated and not competed for.

That in its 100 years of existence Lebanon did not come across as a viable model is not a difficult conclusion. What will be arduous, however, is finding a way to agree on and implement an onerous mutation process without which the prospects of a “dignified life” for the Lebanese in their own country will remain tenuous.

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Tunisia’s parliamentary speaker survives confidence vote

Tunisia’s parliamentary speaker survives confidence vote

This piece was originally published on the thenational website https://www.thenational.ae/

Tunisia’s parliamentary speaker Rached Ghannouchi narrowly survived a confidence vote after being accused of having exceeded the authority of his position.

The closed vote showed 97 members in favour of the speaker’s removal, 12 votes shy of the 109 needed.

The motion, which had been championed by the secular Free Destourian Party (PDL), accused Mr Ghannouchi, the Ennahda party co-founder and self-styled Muslim democrat, of overreaching the limits of his office in his contact with foreign powers and of violating the neutrality required of his position as parliament speaker by favouring his own party’s interests.

The PDL, which positions itself as the continuation bloc of former autocrat Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, were subsequently joined by four other parliamentary blocs, the Democratic Group (Democratic Movement and Echaab Movement), the National Reform group, Tahya Tounes and Al Watania,

Despite narrowly winning the vote, with the defection of many of its former parliamentary backers Ennahda is now expected to turn to the Islamist Karama coalition and Ennahda’s previously bitter electoral rivals, Qalb Tounes (Heart of Tunisia), as it seeks to shore up its support in parliament.

Under Tunisia’s constitution, the conduct of foreign policy is the sole preserve of the president. However, Mr Ghannouchi’s visit to Turkey in January, where he met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, led some parliamentarians to question his role. In addition, his congratulatory message in May to the leader of the UN-recognised government in Tripoli, Fayez Al Sarraj, following a battlefield victory in a conflict where Tunisia remains neutral, raised doubts about Mr Ghannouchi’s position.

Thursday’s vote was the latest instalment in the long-running parliamentary feud between Ennahda and the PDL. The dispute has led to extraordinary scenes in parliament, including a lengthy sit-in by PDL deputies and the literal confiscation of Mr Ghannouchi’s chair by opposition MPs.

The vote comes barely two weeks after a previous tally forced Elyes Fakhfakh to resign as prime minister over allegations of corruption. His designated successor, interior minister Hichem Mechichi, will likely have been watching the latest vote carefully as he weighs Ennahda’s place in any future government.

However, Mr Ghannouchi’s survival of the no-confidence motion will at least give policymakers within Ennahda some respite. “I think he is safe for now – it will be hard to justify doing anything like this again anytime soon,” Sarah Yerkes, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Programme, told The National. “But, such a narrow vote could give Mechichi reason not to include Ennahda in his government,” she said.

Given the internecine warfare that has dominated parliamentary proceedings throughout this session, it seems likely the parties will try to reach some for of compromise.

“Irrespective of the political positions, all parties have an interest in agreeing on a formula of sorts that can allow some stability,” said Elie Abouaoun, the Tunis-based director of the Middle East and North Africa programme of the United States Institute of Peace.

“This is even more important given the dire economic situation and the need for both the executive and legislative powers to commit to a serious and visionary reform plan,” he said.

Comparing the current crisis to that of 2013, when the country teetered on the brink of a second revolution following the assassination of two key opposition MPs, Dr Abouaoun said “a national dialogue of sorts” was needed.

“However, this time it has to be tied to the grass roots level so that the expectations of ordinary citizens are taken into account,” he said

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Threat to Kakai Community Poses Broader Challenges for Iraq’s Democracy

The country’s diversity must be protected as ISIS continues its onslaught against minority communities.

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.usip.org/

Amid the global pandemic, ISIS and the havoc it still wreaks have largely fallen out of the headlines. Nonetheless, the terrorist group’s genocidal march against Iraqi minorities has continued. In Iraq’s eastern Diyala province, ISIS has targeted the Kakai minority with multiple, vicious attacks. The plight of the Kakai community in Iraq is a microcosm of the larger existential challenges Iraq faces. Ethnic and sectarian divides have been a flash point for conflict and division for decades. For Iraq to move past the wreckage of ISIS, prevent the terrorist group’s resurgence, and advance its struggling democracy, the Kakai must not only be protected but woven more meaningfully into the diverse tapestry that is Iraq—and the United States has the opportunity to help.

Kakai Face Repression for Decades

The Kakai community practices Yarsanism, a syncretic religion mostly practiced in Iraq and Iran. In Iraq, they number between 100,000 and 250,000 and are mostly found in Kirkuk, Diyala, Erbil, Ninewa, and Sulaymaniyah provinces. Since early 2020, mortar strikes and targeted assassinations have pushed many Kakais to flee their homes and seven of their villages been abandoned. In late March, Kakai tombs in the Ninewa and Kirkuk governorates were destroyed by unknown persons. Dozens were murdered or wounded in May and June when gunmen reportedly connected to the Islamic State slaughtered defenseless civilians.

But the Kakais’ suffering did not begin with ISIS—their status as non-Muslims with Kurdish affiliation (although disputed by a minority of Kakais) exposed the community to persecution. Saddam Hussein’s infamous Arabization campaigns saw Kakais’ land confiscated and distributed to Arabs and Muslim Kurds. The conflict over land that followed continues to be a root driver of conflict between Arabs, Muslim Kurds, and the Kakai community. Like all Iraqi minorities, the Kakais continued to suffer after 2003, facing the repression of their culture, language, and identity to near extinction.  

The decades-old repression of Kakais demonstrates their acute vulnerability and lack of protection by any security actor in Iraq. This is due, in part, to the fact that these attacks have occurred in territory disputed by the Iraqi central government and Kurdistan regional government, where the resulting security void was exploited by ISIS to build up its presence.

Increasing Representation

The lack of Kakai representation and co-optation by larger actors in the political sphere has further crippled the small community. Although there is Kakai representation on local councils and the Kurdistan parliament has one Kakai member, there is no quota in either the Iraqi or Kurdistan parliament for the community as for other minority groups such as Christians or Sabean-Mandaeans.

Kakai activists know that increased representation will not solve all their community’s issues overnight; however, they hope that an elevated platform to raise their concerns could bring attention to their ongoing plight and lead to discussions on how to prevent their extinction, a concern many Christians and Yazidis in Iraq have as well. Knowing that resolving the status of the disputed territories—through permanent or temporary arrangements—is a long way off, activists have sought to pick lower hanging fruit.

Given the United States’ commitment to religious freedom and desire to deny ISIS the possibility to re-emerge, it should work with the Iraqi government to prioritize the rehabilitation, preservation, and representation of the country’s vulnerable religious and ethnic minorities. Prime opportunities to discusses these issues are coming up, including during the upcoming U.S.-Iraq Strategic Dialogue and visit of Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi to Washington, D.C.

In addition to pushing for increased Kakai representation in the Iraqi and Kurdistan parliaments, the United States can offer its support to the government to increase police or army presence around Kakai settlements and farms that are frequently targeted by ISIS or push for increasing recruitment of Kakais into formal armed groups to defend themselves. The United States can continue to offer assistance and push for the implementation of joint security mechanisms between Iraqi and Kurdish forces at patrols, checkpoints, and headquarters, previously implemented by the U.S. military in 2009-11. Several Kakai activists believe this could undercut ISIS’s ability to target their community.

Building Democracy Through Diversity

Although Iraq and the Kurdistan region are grappling with several existential struggles, numerous studies have shown how diversity bolsters both democracy and economic growth. Cultural diversity and tolerance can drive economic progress by preventing stagnation in civil institutions and the intellectual sphere. To be sure, Iraq and the Kurdistan region also have a national security imperative in helping minorities—including Kakais—as supporting and involving them in the search for solutions can ensure social cohesion and deny ISIS safe havens to expand their operations.

The international community, Iraqi central government, Kurdistan region, provincial and district governments, and armed groups would be wise to work with the Kakai community, and other minority communities, to seek solutions to their issues in order to preserve one of Iraq’s key characteristics and untapped advantages. By preserving its diversity and protecting its minorities, Iraq might be also capable of addressing its existential problems: ethnic and sectarian divides.