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The Implications of the Assassination of Husham al-Hashimi

The Lebanese poet Elia Abu Madi wrote, “Life is a poem of our ages, and death in it is a rhyme. Enjoy your senses in the stars and their grace, so, they will go on and the planets will remain.”

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.usip.org/

The assassination of our colleague and friend Husham al-Hashimi by unidentified gunmen in Iraq comes as a shock to those who knew him, and to those who did not. Not because assassinations in Iraq are unfamiliar, but rather for other reasons, the most important being Husham’s personality, his experience, ethics, and dedication to the cause of peace in his country; also because of the optimism felt by many after Mustafa al-Kadhimi took over as prime minister and the measures he undertook.

Husham is not the first activist to be killed and will not be the last, unfortunately. Death and separation are painful and tragic, but the consequences of physical elimination in politics are just as dire. The assassination of Husham, like other assassinations, holds layers of messages.

In addition to his role as an analyst, thinker, and researcher, Husham excelled at shedding light on corruption—in all its political, financial, and administrative forms—that is rampant in the political and security class (official and semi-official), from the far left to the far right. It is not surprising that one of the repercussions of his assassination is the silencing of voices committed to fighting corruption.

The approach adopted by Husham and others was based on rather liberal foundations. He promoted and practiced freedom of expression, advocated for inclusive politics, sound diversity management, equality, political freedom, and other elements of human rights. The assassination in this case is not just personal, it reshapes the landscape for freedom and political action in Iraq.

A Constructive Vision for the Country

Since the protest movement first broke out in Iraq in October of last year, Husham and some of his colleagues developed a constructive vision for the country, unifying the different messages and demands of the protest movement, and liaised between the protestors and authorities.

This assassination—in addition to the deliberate killings of some of the movement’s activists and demonstrators—is an effort to settle the score by some armed groups that are fed up with criticism and want their crimes to remain unexposed. Failure to hold the killers to account in the previous months encouraged some of these groups to pursue a policy of assassinations. Husham paid the price for the poor performance of the security agencies and the judiciary, something the martyr had long criticized publicly and privately.

Husham was known to be part of an informal and unstructured group of activists, intellectuals, experts, and media professionals. Over the past years, members of this group, individually or in small groups, have worked hard to maintain bridges of communication between the various components of Iraqi society and the political scene in Iraq. They have also played a role in providing space for dialogue, proposals, and ideas for decision-makers in Iraq and those interested in Iraqi affairs. The killing of Husham, or anyone else from this group, will discourage others from playing a positive role as a link between society and decision-makers.

The Loss of an Iraqi’s Perspective

Working and communicating with international organizations and foreign embassies in the Middle East is a controversial topic. It is used to slander politicians, journalists, activists, and others. Public opinion in our region often favors conspiracy theories. Husham was not spared from the accusations of treason; he was subjected to the most heinous and tendentious campaigns simply because he worked with non-Iraqi media organizations and cooperated, in an advisory capacity, with international organizations. His work and activism also evoked direct and implicit death threats against him, but that never deterred him from speaking the truth.

Husham’s work is particularly important. It has allowed many non-Iraqi diplomats and officials to access analysis from a strictly Iraqi perspective. His work highlighted nuances that a non-Iraqi person cannot observe or understand from the outside. His work contributed to the effectiveness and impact of some of the programs funded by the international community and gave more legitimacy to foreign initiatives that lacked that “local knowledge.” The elimination of Iraqi intellectuals and activists like Husham makes it less likely that others will continue communicating or working with the international community. The implementation of many projects will be hindered and they will lack the crucial element of local Iraqi knowledge. Thus, a purely foreign perspective will prevail in the discourse and analysis surrounding our countries.

Honoring His Memory

In reflecting upon Husham’s assassination, the most important consideration to bear in mind is the duty of the state to protect its citizens, especially when they are under attack. The country must undergo a shift in mentality, away from an approach of crime and violence, toward one that sanctifies human life and respects the dignity of the human being first and foremost.

In practice, this begins with a serious and impartial investigation of Husham’s assassination and a commitment by the government to prosecute the perpetrators, instigators, and accomplices of this crime, including the political sponsors of the killers. Any procrastination will raise questions about the government’s seriousness in carrying out its most basic role. The best response to Husham’s assassination is for the government to seize the opportunity to reform the deep-seated history of murderous practices in Iraq that have led to the killing, exile, and imprisonment of many innocent people who dared to question a structure that favors sectarian, political, tribal, and personal interests over public interest.

Iraq only enjoyed the light of Husham’s stardom for a short while. The government today—with the support of the international community—is required to preserve the other planets, otherwise, Elia Abu Madi’s premise that “the planets survive even if the stars go away” disintegrates. Let the martyrdom of Husham be the sunrise for the truth in a country whose people have suffered for decades from the rule of death over the will of life.

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أبو عون يفتح ملفات ليبية ساخنة في USL

This piece was originally published on the 218tv website www.218tv.net

يحل مدير برامج الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا في المعهد الأميركي للسلام، إيلي أبو عون، ضيفاً على برنامج Usl الليلة عبر شاشة 218NEWS عند تمام الساعة الـ10 مساء.

وتركزت نقاشات أبو عون حول أبرز القضايا الليبية الساخنة، في مقدمتها ملف المرتزقة وبرامج تفكيك المليشيات والمعطيات التي حوّلت ليبيا إلى أكثر مسرح تجلى فيه الانقسام الأوروبي، إضافة إلى رؤية حول تقسيم الأدوار داخل الإدارة الأميركية تجاه الملف الليبي.

ويفتح مدير برامج الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا في المعهد الأميركي للسلام خلال اللقاء 3 محاور رئيسية ترسم ملامح الصراع في ليبيا بداية من مخطط لتثبيت نظام سياسي معيّن له طابع إسلامي، وما يتعلق أيضا بالاقتصاد والنفط والوصول إلى سواحل البحر المتوسط، وعلاقة الصراع بأجندات ليبية خاصة حول النظام المركزي وتوزيع عائدات النفط

People search through rubble on Thursday, Aug. 6, 2020, in Beirut, resulting from an explosion two days earlier. Lebanon began an official period of national mourning on Thursday, two days after a powerful explosion in Beirut flattened whole neighborhoods in the bustling metropolis. (Diego Ibarra Sanchez/The New York Times)

After Beirut Blast, What’s Next for Lebanon’s Broken Political System?

With the country already on the brink of collapse, the explosion will deepen the trust gap between citizens and the ruling elite.

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.usip.org/

A massive explosion ripped through the Port of Beirut on Tuesday, sending shockwaves through the Lebanese capital, killing over one hundred and injuring thousands. This comes with Lebanon already on the brink of economic collapse, struggling to address a COVID outbreak, and as the trust gap between citizens and the state is wider than ever. Although in the immediate aftermath of the explosion some suggested Lebanon had been attacked, the cause of the explosion is likely much more banal: government negligence resulted in thousands of pounds of explosive chemical material to be improperly stored in the port for years. USIP’s Elie Abouaoun and Mona Yacoubian examine what this demonstrates about the already beleaguered Lebanese government, the long-term implications for the country, and how the international community has responded so far.

Conspiracy theories have flourished about the incident. What do we know about what really happened and what does it say about the Lebanese government?

Abouaoun: Some eyewitnesses in Beirut were confused and provided contradictory or incorrect information about what happened on August 4, citing missiles or airplanes flying over the area. This fed into the conspiracy theories circulating in the media following the explosion. The source of the controversy comes from the fact that the explosive material (ammonium nitrate) in warehouse #12 of the Port of Beirut usually needs fuel and a detonator to explode, unless stored in very high temperature for long period.

So far, most indicators lead to the conclusion that the blast was an accident rather than resulting from an attack. Videos showing missiles hitting the warehouse were dismissed as fake. Some Lebanese politicians mentioned, in somewhat timid fashion, that there was the possibility of an Israeli attack, but only as part of a set of four or five other scenarios.

The key outstanding question is what acted as a detonator to trigger the explosion of the 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate? The speculative answers to this question range from a self-ignited fire as a result of the high temperature and poor storage conditions, a detonation in a nearby warehouse containing confiscated fireworks or ammunitions for Hezbollah, welding the door of the warehouse, and, as mentioned, an attack by Israel.

A clear answer to this question is necessary to end the speculation and controversy. It is equally crucial for the investigation to also uncover the responsibility of bureaucrats, military commanders, judges, and government officials who knew that such a dangerous stock of chemicals sat in the port for six years under precarious conditions.

In any case, the investigation will be a complex because both the legislative and the administrative structures in Lebanon are vague and confusing. Unless solid evidence of an attack emerges, the end result would probably attribute the incident to a combination of mistakes committed by several actors (e.g., customs, security agencies, port authority, etc.), reflecting an ineffective bureaucracy, negligence, incompetence, and corruption. In this case, reversing decades of impunity for Lebanese civil servants and politicians would be a major breakthrough.

It is worthwhile noting that however serious the investigation is, it will always be looked at by the public with a lot of skepticism given the lack of trust in the entire political establishment. This incident will further deepen the gap between the population and the establishment. In this context, the attempts to establish an international investigation committee of sort, if successful, will help containing the growing anger of a devastated population.

With Lebanon already facing existential political and economic crises, what could the long-term impact of the explosion be?

Yacoubian: As the magnitude of the August 4 Beirut explosions sets in—a rising death toll now at 154, more than 5,000 injured, hundreds of thousands now homeless, and billions of dollars in damage—the explosions’ aftermath could be even more significant. Coming amid a new COVID surge and the Lebanese economy’s meltdown, the fallout from the catastrophic blasts will exacerbate an already dire situation characterized by growing hunger and impoverishment. The blasts damaged at least three hospitals, raising questions about the Lebanese health sector’s ability to cope with a spike in COVID cases.

Many Lebanese are accusing their government of gross negligence. Government officials reportedly ignored repeated warnings of the dangers inherent in poorly securing volatile chemicals at the strategic port. Not surprisingly, anger is growing among ordinary Lebanese who view the explosions through the prism of years of government corruption and incompetence. Many point to the blasts as the most dramatic and destructive legacy of decades of cronyism embedded in Lebanon’s sectarian system of government. Some indicators suggest the explosions could catalyze rejuvenated popular demands for change. Protests demanding the Lebanese system’s overthrow have resumed across the city. When the Lebanese justice minister visited a hard-hit neighborhood, she was met with demands for her resignation.

How has the international community responded?

Yacoubian: In his visit to Beirut Thursday, French President Macron echoed the demands for change, pledging France’s support for Lebanon but only if accompanied by deep reforms. The U.S. Embassy in Beirut announced that United States would provide $17 million in emergency assistance including food and medical supplies. Numerous other countries including Britain, Canada, Turkey, and Qatar are providing humanitarian assistance. Israel has also offered aid to Lebanon.

Abouaoun: So far, there is a great momentum to help Lebanon. In addition to the visit of the French president and his pledge to provide massive aid to Lebanon—contingent on serious reforms—most countries have declared that they will be sending humanitarian aid or teams. Some countries, like Tunisia, went even further to offer hosting some of the wounded for treatment.

However, this international effort could be temporary and reversible. First, many countries—where taxpayers weigh in on national decisions—are wary of Lebanon’s widespread corruption and will—and should—give assistance only to non-state actors in civil society, the private sector, or faith-based groups. Others might channel it though the intergovernmental organizations like U.N. agencies. Second, any significant economic and financial assistance will remain conditioned on a recalibration of Lebanon’s foreign policy and by the implementation of structural reforms. Short of this, Lebanon will only receive ephemeral humanitarian aid.

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Nach dem Macron-Besuch in Beirut: “Französische Lösung” für den Libanon?

This piece was originally published on the DW website https://www.dw.com/

Emmanuel Macron war am Donnerstag nicht zufällig als erster westlicher Staatsmann in den Trümmern Beiruts unterwegs. Frankreich hat lang zurückreichende Bande in den Libanon. Als nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg das Osmanisch Reich zerfiel, erhielt Frankreich ein Mandat des Völkerbundes, um den Aufbau des Libanon zu verwalten. Die Verbundenheit blieb auch nach der Unabhängigkeit des kleinen Landes im Jahr 1943 bestehen. Noch heute spricht ein Teil der Eliten französisch. Viele Schulen unterrichten auf Französisch. Viele reiche Libanesen haben einen Zweitwohnsitz in Frankreich. Die christlichen Volksgruppen (39 Prozent der Bevölkerung) betrachten Frankreich noch immer als eine Art Schutzmacht. “Keine post-koloniale Einmischung” Bei seinem Besuch in Beirut versprach Macron den Menschen direkte Hilfen. Er forderte aber auch ein neues politisches System. Mischt sich hier eine ehemalige Mandatsmacht unzulässig ein? Nein, meint Maximilian Felsch, Professor an der Haigazian Universität in Beirut: “Frankreich hat ein Interesse, gute Beziehungen zu frankophonen Ländern im Nahen Osten und auch Afrika aufrecht zu erhalten.” Wenn Frankreich jetzt bereit sei, dem Libanon in dieser Krise zu helfen, dann werde das im Land sicherlich begrüßt, sagt Felsch. “Ich höre jetzt keine Stimmen, die das als post-koloniale Einmischung interpretieren.”
Präsident Macron vor Beiruts rauchenden Trümmern: Forderung nach einem neuen politischen System Macron sagte nach seinem Besuch vor Journalisten, es gehe nicht um “eine französische Lösung”, sondern um eine “neue politische Ordnung” für das angeschlagene Land. Der französische Präsident kündigte eine internationale Geberkonferenz für das Land an. Drei Flugzeuge aus Frankreich mit Hilfsgütern waren bereits eingetroffen, ein Kriegsschiff mit Medikamenten und Helfern ist unterwegs. Schon am 1. September will Macron nach Beirut zurückkommen, um die Lage zu überprüfen. “Eine Macht von außen” Die Regierung im Libanon sei auf allen Ebenen unfähig, meint Politologe Felsch, dessen Wohnung in Beirut von der verheerenden Explosion am Dienstagabend schwer beschädigt wurde. Die Ämter seien nach Religionsgruppen besetzt, die sich gegenseitig bekämpften. Der Staat sei pleite. Strom- und Wasserversorgung sowie die Müllentsorgung funktionierten nicht. Die Inflation galoppiere. Die Wirtschaft liege am Boden. “In dieser Situation ist es nur allzu verständlich, wenn man hofft, von dieser politischen Führung befreit zu werden. Alles andere ist besser als das. Deshalb verstehe ich, dass die allermeisten Libanesen, wenn es denn möglich wäre, sich erhoffen, dass irgendeine Macht von außen hier die Kontrolle übernimmt.”
Dass nun aber Frankreich diese Macht sein könnte, hält der Nahost-Experte Elie Abouaoun für eher unwahrscheinlich. Abouaoun ist Leiter des Tunis-Büros der Friedensforschungseinrichtung “United States Institute of Peace”. “Ich denke, Frankreich hat eine Menge Einfluss verloren, verglichen mit dem Zustand vor zwanzig oder dreißig Jahren. Das hat viele Gründe und trifft nicht nur auf den Libanon, sondern auf die gesamte Region zu.” Es gebe immer noch eine emotionale Verbindung zwischen Franzosen und Libanesen, die die öffentliche Meinung im Libanon beeinflussen könne. “Aber wir haben bei vielen Gelegenheiten gesehen, dass die Entscheidungen der libanesischen Regierung nicht mehr davon beeinflusst werden, was die Franzosen sagen.” Hisbollah wichtiger als Frankreich Viel wichtiger, so Abouaoun, sei der Einfluss der shiitischen Hisbollah, die vom Iran gestützt wird und von der Europäischen Union als Terrororganisation angesehen wird. Sie ist an der Regierung beteiligt, unterhält eigene Milizen und kontrollierte auch den Hafen von Beirut, in dem Jahre lang das hochgefährliche Ammoniumnitrat gelagert wurde. Viele Libanesen seien der Auffassung, das gesamte korrupte Establishment des Landes müsse fortgejagt werden, meint der Nahostexperte in Tunis. “Ich sehe nicht, dass Frankreich sich hinter die Forderungen einer wachsenden Mehrheit in der Bevölkerung stellt, die das korrupte Establishment überwinden will. Frankreich hat dort Alliierte und Verbindungen in diese Eliten hinein. Das schränkt die Möglichkeiten ein, wirklich der wichtigste ‘Influencer’ dort zu werden”, beschreibt Elie Abouaoun die französische Rolle.

Die Anti-Establishment-Kräfte in der Bevölkerung hätten die “kritische Masse” noch nicht erreicht. Die etablierten Parteien entlang der religiösen Linien hätten immer noch Rückhalt, der aber kleiner werde. Schiiten machen wie Sunniten jeweils 27 Prozent der Bevölkerung aus, alle christlichen Konfessionen rund 39 Prozent, Drusen fünf Prozent. Viele Staaten wollen mitmischen Von den regionalen Mächten habe sicherlich der Iran durch die Hisbollah den größten Einfluss im Libanon, ist sich Elie Abouaoun sicher. Saudi-Arabien habe in den vergangenen Jahren Einfluss verloren. Die USA versuchten seit einigen Monaten ein Comeback, Russland und die Türkei seien mit ihren Bemühungen bis jetzt nicht erfolgreich. Die Initiative des französischen Präsidenten werde diese Gewichte kaum verschieben, vermutet der Nahost-Experte. “Das könnte seinen Einfluss im Libanon ein wenig erhöhen, aber ich sehe keine grundlegende Veränderung.” Neben Frankreich haben viele andere Staaten wie die USA und Deutschland Hilfen zugesagt. Auch die Europäische Union hat bereits Millionen Euro an Hilfen mobilisiert. Am Samstag reist der Präsident des Europäischen Rates, Charles Michel, als Vertreter der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten nach Beirut. Ihm wäre es am liebsten, wenn alle Europäer, auch Frankreich, ihre politischen Initiativen koordinieren würden und nicht wie Macron vorpreschten.

Die weitere politische Entwicklung des schwer angeschlagenen Libanon sieht Maximilian Felsch von der Haigazian-Universität in Beirut skeptisch. Konflikte zwischen den Religionsgruppen könnten aufbrechen, da offenbar die schiitische Hisbollah für die Lagerung des explosiven Materials verantwortlich sei und vor allem christliche Wohnviertel am Hafen zerstört wurden. “Es ist zu befürchten, dass diese Krise schnell in so eine Art Religionskonflikt ausartet”, sagt Felsch: Auf der einen Seite die Christen, die sich jetzt Frankreich als Schutzpatronin wünschen, auf der anderen Seite die Schiiten, die den Einfluss der Hisbollah bewahren wollen, und damit auch den direkten Einfluss des Iran.

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The Situation in Syria

https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/02/dr-elie-abouaoun-situation-syria

After direct military confrontations between the Assad regime and Turkey in Syria’s Idlib province, USIP’s Dr. Elie Abouaoun explains how the Turkish and Russian governments are trying to contain the fallout, saying “I do not think any party has an interest right now in provoking a full-blown escalation.”

https://61fc1d25b22247-60938955.castos.com/player/971892

On Peace is a weekly podcast sponsored by USIP and Sirius XM POTUS Ch. 124. Each week, USIP experts tackle the latest foreign policy issues from around the world.

Transcript

Tim Farley: There’s been some developments over the last couple of days. Turkey, for example, deploying F-16 fighter jets against government forces in northwestern Syria on Monday, which is an escalation of the conflict there. This is after six Turkish soldiers were killed by artillery strikes. The president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, said that as many as 35 troops had been neutralized. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which is a monitoring group based in Britain, said the number of military personnel killed is at least 13, but Mr. Erdoğan is warning Russia, which backs the Syrian government and which controls the airspace in western Syria, not to prevent Turkey from retaliating.

Tim Farley: That is just one part of the ongoing saga in Syria where President Bashar al-Assad remains in power despite the fact the protestations, or at least the assertions, from the United States for a long time that his days were numbered. Let’s get some perspective with Dr. Elie Abouaoun, who’s the United States Institute of Peace Middle East [and North Africa] director from the Middle East/ North Africa Tunisia hub of the USIP. The Twitter handle is @elie022. Elie Abouaoun, welcome back to POTUS. Thank you for being here.

Elie Abouaoun: Thank you very much. Good morning, sir.

Tim Farley: Explain to us the status of right now, because I get a little confused, because one moment it seems like Turkey is working with Russia and the next moment it seems like they’re at odds. And of course, Bashar al-Assad is still in power. What is it we need to most understand about this?

Elie Abouaoun: Yeah, thank you. Well, yes. I mean, there was a high level of cooperation between the Turkish armed forces and Russian armed forces in northern Syria, and we’ve seen even joint patrols in some areas. What happened in Idlib in the last few days, from my perspective at least, is that there was this incident where Turkish soldiers were injured. Basically that. And this triggered the whole chain reaction from the Turks to make sure that the Syrian regime is not crossing the border of whatever they agreed on with the Russians. Previously, there was some sort of an arrangement between the Russians and the Turks about how to at least contain what was happening in Idlib, and it seems that the Syrian regime has crossed some borders set by this arrangement, which basically triggered this reaction from the Turks.

Tim Farley: Where does this lead, then?

Elie Abouaoun: I think what’s happening now is that there is an attempt by the Russians and the Turks to contain the situation and to basically ask the Syrian regime to go back to the status quo. It will depend on the outcome of these diplomatic efforts between the Russians and the Turks. I do not think that any of the parties has an interest right now in provoking a full-blown escalation. There is a likeliness that these diplomatic efforts will succeed in at least containing the situation.

Tim Farley: As I said at the outset of this interview, Dr. Abouaoun, the United States for years under President Obama had said, that’s when it started saying, that Assad’s days were numbered there. The number just keeps growing. Is there any sense that there is a change in the offing in the leadership in Syria?

Elie Abouaoun: It depends on how you look at the regime in Syria. There is Assad himself as a person that is the family and the clan, and there are the institutions of the regime. We all know that the Russians have invested heavily in maintaining the institutions. Of course, the person of President Assad and his family were important at some point to maintain these institutions at least from the perspective of the Russians, so they showed him up. But I don’t know how viable this option is. We have indications from different communities within Syria that there is kind of a grievance against the person of the president and the family specifically. But these groups would not go as far as undermining the whole regime because they are afraid of a vacuum.

Elie Abouaoun: They’re afraid that if a vacuum happens, then there will be a situation that basically creates an existential threat to them. They still prefer to deal with Assad even though they don’t like him, rather than finding themselves in a complete chaos. The moment the Russians would find a formula to reassure these communities that even if Assad goes, the institutions are now able to contain or to maintain stability. I don’t think that Assad will stay long after that point.

Tim Farley: Oh really? Wow. Okay.

Elie Abouaoun: I mean, yeah, it’s not about his person. It’s about the institutions. This is what the Russians are trying to work on is basically to rebuild the institutions of the regime in a way that even if Assad goes away, Syria doesn’t fall into chaos.

Tim Farley: Again, Ellie Abouaoun is with us, United States Institute of Peace Middle East/North Africa director. A story from Reuters, and this is fairly new, the U.S. has evidently halted a secretive military intelligence cooperation program with Turkey that for years had helped Turkey target Kurdish PKK militants, that according to four military officials, not on the record, but telling Reuters the decision to indefinitely suspend the program, which has not been previously reported, was made in response to Turkey’s cross-border military incursion into Syria in October, the U.S. official said, revealing the extent of the damage to ties between NATO allies from the incident. If true, what is the significance of this?

Elie Abouaoun: Honestly, I don’t have enough information about this matter, so I need to know more in order to answer the question.

Tim Farley: Okay. No, that’s okay. I prefer your being able to say that you can’t answer the question rather than come up with something just off the top of your head. I am curious about where the U.S. relationship with Turkey stands right now in your opinion.

Elie Abouaoun: I mean, it is fluctuating. I mean, Turkey and the U.S. reached a point where both parties realized that they cannot stay on a hostile trajectory. I mean, there were attempts by parties in Turkey and in the U.S. to mend at least part of the relationship, and I think they succeeded in mending parts of the relationship. I don’t see a whole strategic alliance between both countries or a full alignment as it was before on several issues in the region, but I can definitely see that in some areas the corporation has survived somehow. I think this is in the best interest of both countries.

Tim Farley: Finally, is there a role that the United States should play in either intercession or at least somehow influencing the conflict in Syria, especially with reference to Turkey and Russia?

Elie Abouaoun: Well, five years ago I would have said yes. Today, I think that the Syrian conflict is at the stage where the influence of the U.S. became minimal, at least directly on the conflict. There are always possibilities for the U.S. to leverage their influence in shaping the discussion about reconstruction of some areas in Syria, about the issue of the Syrian refugees in the neighboring countries. But directly on the conflict itself and the fate of the regime, I think that there is much less influence.

Tim Farley: Dr. Abouaoun, thank you for joining us on POTUS today.

Elie Abouaoun: Thank you very much. Thank you sir. Have a good day.

Tim Farley: Elie Abouaoun is the United States Institute of Peace Middle East/North Africa director, Middle East/North Africa Tunisia hub for the USIP and his thoughts on Syria and the developing story there. He is tweeting @elie022.

FILE -- Iraqi demonstrators shout slogans during anti-government protests in Baghdad on Friday, Jan. 10, 2020. In his first comments upon accepting the nomination for Iraq's prime minister, Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi paid homage to the anti-government protesters who have been out on the streets since October. (Sergey Ponomarev/The New York Times)

Using Smart Power to Counter Iran in Iraq

How the U.S. can build a stronger, more independent Iraq—while reducing the risk of overt conflict with Iran.

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.usip.org/

Beginning with the early January killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani, the first months of 2020 have seen a spike in long-simmering tensions between the U.S. and Iran. Those tensions have largely played out within the borders of Iran’s western neighbor, Iraq, just as they have for much of the last 17 years. Still bearing the battle scars from years of war, few in the region want to see an escalation to more overt conflict. And after nearly two decades, the American public has clearly demonstrated its own fatigue with endless wars. The question remains, then, how can the U.S. achieve its objectives in regard to Iran and Iraq without military action?

The direct use of military force, often called hard power, can instill confidence at home and fear and intimidation abroad—which in turn leads to deterrence. But as the beginning of 2020 has shown, deterrence only goes so far. With tensions ratcheting up between the U.S. and Iran, hard power alone will not advance U.S. objectives in the region, and if left unmitigated, the situation could lead to further conflict.

Rather than strictly an expression of military might, General Kenneth McKenzie, commander of U.S. CENTCOM, has said that “deterrence is not a military concept, but a diplomatic and political construct.” In order to deescalate tensions with Iran and build effective, durable institutions in Iraq, the U.S. will need to complement its hard-power deterrence with an increased investment in soft power—the use of positive, and often mutually beneficial, exchanges of culture, values, and policies.

Together, this combination forms what American political scientist Joseph Nye called “smart power.” “Smart power is neither hard nor soft. It is both,” Nye wrote. By leveraging the deterrence from hard power with the relationship building of soft power, the result is not only less costly in terms of monetary value and human toll—it can also yield more sympathetic attitudes toward the U.S. among Iraqi leaders, youth, politicians, and businesses and can ultimately result in a deeper and better-founded relationship between the two nations in the longer term.

Iraq is Primed for a Smart Power Intervention

There are questions about whether this approach can truly work. But recent examples from Iraq and Lebanon show that it can. Specifically, in Iraq, there is still a significant constituency for a friendly relationship with the U.S., whether by conviction, convenience, or fear.

In 2018, an Iraqi civil society leader who solicited, but did not get, support from the U.S. Embassy during the legislative elections told us, “I have been working closely with U.S. organizations since 2003, risking my reputation and often my life, and did not get minimal support. Had I done the same with the Iranians for the last 15 years, I would have been now a deputy prime minister.”

This satirical statement reflects a common state of mind among many Iraqis: The U.S. does not care to build proper political alliances, but at best works on occasional and timebound partnerships.

With the decline of U.S. political engagement in the country, many Iraqi politicians—while less ideologically aligned with Iran than the U.S.—have found themselves having to deal with Iran as the new major power broker in the region. Politically, the U.S. needs to make a considerable investment in order to reverse this perception. Signaling to key Iraqi political figures that the U.S. is indeed investing in the next generation of political leaders in Iraq will certainly push many of these figures to shift their allegiances back to the U.S.

Investing in All Aspects of Iraqi Society

Beyond the macro-political approach, an effective U.S. strategy for countering Iran in Iraq involves strengthening social, economic, and cultural ties with key figures and communities in the country.

Revisiting economic arrangements with Iraq, beyond acting essentially as the guardian of the country’s oil revenue, is also an essential step forward. Although tightening the U.S.’s grip on the fate of Iraq’s economy might persuade Iraqi officials to appease the U.S., this kind of relationship does not inspire trust or good will in the long term or among the citizenry.

Iraq is full of economic opportunities, and a coordinated and focused U.S. approach can highlight the scope of investment and the impact of bilateral economic cooperation. Selecting a few capital infrastructure projects, such as airports, or specific sectoral investments like health care that involve a high number of workers and contractors will certainly be a pathway to the hearts and minds of thousands of families—and at the same time, serve as an investment that later generations will see and use.

Additionally, promoting massive academic, cultural, and language exchanges between the U.S. and Iraq, a classic soft power initiative, would go a long way in bringing the two nations closer. Although programs such as Fulbright and Humphrey exist, they are massively overshadowed by the U.S. overemphasis and over-reliance on military might. Hosting Iraqi scholars at American universities—and vice versa—would be a bargain investment in the long-term relationship with the country. By establishing substantial and long-term cooperation mechanisms with a few major Iraqi universities, the U.S. could touch the lives of thousands of families, students, personnel, and faculty.

Envisaging a large-scale education cooperation strategy will also produce a whole generation of Iraqis who not only share a language but also the values of their U.S. counterparts. Of course, these efforts alone are not enough, but they contribute to an overall message that American and Iraqi interests and values are congruent.

COVID-19 and Smart Power

Literature surrounding public health diplomacy alludes to the possibility that international cooperation on medical fronts can lead to strengthened relationships in political and security areas down the road. Despite all its horror, if the coronavirus pandemic leaves us with any silver lining, perhaps it is that nations can revisit their relationships with each other and find common interests where there were previously believed to be none.

With the global COVID-19 pandemic throwing a set of additional challenges at Iraq, the U.S. has an opportunity to showcase true friendship and partnership against a common enemy. If the U.S. wants a better framework for a rejuvenated partnership with Iraq, it could start with massive tactical measures to support the ailing Iraqi health care system during and after the pandemic. This sends a message that the U.S. cares for the lives of Iraqis and could help build toward a broader discussion about other avenues of collaboration.

The U.S. needs to be more convincing when relaying a message to the Iraqi people about the significant overlap between the U.S. and Iraq in order to change the perception that the U.S. engages in relationship building in an ad hoc manner prone to fits and starts. These times of big structural shifts on the world stage must invite and inspire leaders to break out of negative, dysfunctional patterns and embrace new ways of achieving positive change through smart power.

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Time has come for France to revamp its obsolete model

France’s drive to separate state and religion is inherent to the country’s construct. However, the rigid and extreme interpretation of this principle while France was going though successive waves of migration impeded a smooth integration of most newcomers and their offspring.

This piece was originally published on the thearabweekly website https://thearabweekly.com/

As France is going through a crisis, some analysts do not consider it the right time to assess the reasons for the country’s failure to deal with the integration of immigrants and diversity. However, a proper reflection today will allow France to better manage the crisis and get out of the current predicament with a better system.

The law on “separation of church and state” was voted in in 1905, but France’s path to a secular system started during the Age of Enlightenment and solidified during the years that followed the French Revolution in the 19th century. Back then, the concept was mostly about severing ties between the church and state. In the 20th century, as immigration to France boomed, French policy and opinion makers assumed – naively enough – that the secular system would guarantee a smooth integration of enough non-Christian immigrants. What France is going through today proves the opposite.

The key to understanding the failure of the secularists’ “Fata Morgana” is the fact that Islam is not like any other religion. Islam is a social code and a religion. Even the most moderate interpretation of Islam finds it difficult to alter this precept. Dealing with Islam as France dealt with the church one century ago is a colossal mistake.

Instead of adapting to the new reality — demographic change to the advantage of non-Christians — France has continued with the same rigid and extreme interpretation of the famous “laicity.” French social and political figures ignored the fact that the bulk of the newcomers were forcefully brought to France during the industrialisation period and later after the first world war, or actually came voluntarily to France in pursuit of prosperity (job opportunities), certainly not because they were attracted by France’s values of liberty and equality. Therefore, they entered the job market but did not integrate into society.

As the ratio of immigrants from French colonies or former colonies was significant, it is no surprise that they came with underlying grievances against the model itself. Although they were able to hold jobs, they nevertheless found themselves at odds with the society. This resulted in ghettoised communities, religious schools, youth clubs, associative groups and (until recently) control-free mosques.

While non-Christian immigrants were implicitly given the space to “manage their own affairs,” state institutions continued dealing with Christianity based on the 1905 law, creating a double standard. As such, we have seen the same municipalities that use public funds to offer Iftar meals at the end of the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan prohibit nativity scenes from being set up during Christmas season because they “infringe on the principles of laicity.” This has created a sense of entitlement among some non-Christian communities. The perception today that the French government is after these same communities is fuelling the frustration of Muslims in France. They don’t understand why the way secularism was applied to society has suddenly changed. Why is it that what was allowed twenty years ago has suddenly become incompatible with France’s secular vocation?

In parallel with secularism “à la carte,” the French system ignored its own flaws in terms of integration, instead engaging in a series of reactive measures (bans and otherwise) that deepened the gap between Muslims and non-Muslims. It is therefore not surprising to see this chain of events lead to a high level of communal tension and open the door for terrorism-inclined individuals or groups to thrive. The natural backlash has been the radicalisation of non-Muslims against Islam and the exertion of pressure on politicians to take further restrictive measures.

What France is going through today requires it to take a step back and think about both short-term mitigation and more long-term structural remedies. First and foremost, it is essential to avoid falling in the trap of generalisations. As Islam is going through a significant existential crisis at the global level, many Muslims living in Europe, North America or other similar countries are amenable to considering a social compromise, whereby they would accept adjusting to the reality of living in non-Muslim majority societies. A generic judgement of all Muslims would certainly alienate those on the side of accommodation and push them to radicalisation.

One should not forget that, at the end of the day, most of the victims (casualties of violence, refugees, displaced populations…) of terrorist groups in the Middle East are Muslims (Sunnis, more specifically). So, differentiating between radical elements and movements, on the one hand, and peaceful innocent Muslims, on the other, is essential.

It is also essential to break the vicious circle of actions and reactions. So far, France has failed to come up with a holistic strategy that can address the gloomy legacy of the last seven decades, mend the social contract between French Muslims and the state, design a selective immigration programme that pre-assesses candidates’ abilities to integrate into a Western society, strike a balance between protecting freedom of expression and preserving communal peace and, last but not least, adjust the paradigm of secularism.

This last element is fundamental. France’s laicity should stop legitimising a witch-hunt against the church and adjust to the fact that more than 60% of its population identifies with a religion. Among them, around 90% identify as Christians. Therefore, the “raison d’etre” of secularism in this case should not be to demonise religion but to make sure that it remains within the realm of private life or, more accurately, protect the public space from any and all religious characterisations.

There is no defence or justification whatsoever for the horrible acts committed against innocents in France and elsewhere. These cannot by any stretch of the imagination reflect on all Muslims, but they do highlight the need to look at the issue of Muslim immigrants from the prism of the mutation that this religion is going through worldwide. France’s values are inherently connected to human dignity and should be preserved. But France should get rid of the obsolete model of “laicity” and come up with a new innovative notion that recognises the country’s Christian roots while providing enough space for atheists, agnostics and people of all other religions to privately practice their beliefs without blaspheming others or violating the existing constitution and laws. This is not an easy task but it remains an imperative endeavour.

Thousands of people protesting corruption and the government's inability to provide basic services in Beirut on Oct. 23, 2019. The country's government is rooted in an agreement that ended Lebanon’s civil war nearly 30 years ago and has enriched the political elite while failing to build a stable economy or provide basics like reliable running water or consistent waste management. (Diego Ibarra Sanchez/The New York Times)

Lebanon’s Protests Set to Pick up Despite Coronavirus Pandemic

COVID-19 has exacerbated the country’s economic woes as protesters’ long-held demands remain unaddressed.

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.usip.org/

Protests erupted in Lebanon last year over the country’s lagging economy and sclerotic, sectarian-based political system, but slowed amid the global pandemic. The small Mediterranean nation’s economy is in free fall, with the World Bank estimating more than half the population living below the poverty line. Protesters were forced to switch tactics amid the coronavirus and the lock down measures have forced even more Lebanese into poverty. But protesters are planning to return to the streets as COVID precautions ease. USIP’s Elie Abouaoun and Osama Gharizi discuss how the government has responded in the months since protests erupted in October 2019, how the protesters adapted during the pandemic, and the role of Hezbollah.

Has the government done anything to either cooperate or push back on protesters’ demands?

Abouaoun: The nature of the political system in Lebanon undermines the conventional role of the “government” as the holder of the executive power and shifts the decision making to a pool of leaders who can be inside or outside the executive branch. Neither the caretaker government, in power from October 2019 to January 2020, the successor government of Prime Minister Hassan Diab, nor the other power holders in Lebanon showed a good understanding of the many issues that triggered the protest or demonstrated they have political will to address even one concern.

While Lebanon is going through an existential financial crisis, the only noticeable achievement so far is an economic recovery plan adopted by the government. Although the main elements of the plan seem relevant, its feasibility is seriously challenged by the lack of political will. As much as a plan is needed, the authorities in Lebanon failed to work on basic and necessary measures to regulate capital controls, impose stricter oversight over private banks, launch investigations and audits into specific sectors known to harbor corruption, or determined the losses resulting from the skewed practices of the Central Bank since 2016, among other things.

The icing on the cake remains, however, a deep rift between the government and the Central Bank. The bank has kept a close hold on key information, preventing Lebanon from providing a clear picture about its current financial situation, complicating efforts to negotiate a bailout package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Further, and perhaps most worrisome, are reports of clashes between members of Lebanon’s team negotiating with the IMF.

How have the protests adapted to being under lockdown, without the option for public demonstrations? With the lifting of lockdown measures, will we see renewed protests?

Gharizi: The protests never fully disappeared. After an initial lull due to the lockdown measures imposed by the government to combat the spread of COVID-19 in March, protesters have taken to the streets on various occasions over the past three months. Though not as large as previous gatherings, demonstrators continued to rally against a litany of issues that have caused day-to-day hardships for citizens, including electricity cuts, corruption, a free-falling currency, and the inability of the government to effectively respond to a rapidly deteriorating economic situation, one that has been compounded by the impact of the public health crisis. Anger against banks and the banking system has been particularly acute the past two months, as capital controls and other measures have severely curtailed citizen access to their accounts.

It’s important to note that the demonstrations are not monolithic in nature and, unlike the early days of the protest movement, have been politicized in certain ways: some opposition political parties have been quick to mobilize supporters to score political points against those in government, while others in government have encouraged the targeting of the architects of the failing economic order to redirect popular anger toward their political adversaries. This does not mean the protest movement has been cajoled or drowned out by political partisans but merely that the movement that initially broke out in October 2019 has been exploited by the political establishment to pursue narrow parochial objectives. Illustrating the divide is the fact that there have been clashes between protesters and the partisans of some political leaders as the former have begun to protest outside the residences of those in power.

Protesters have also taken to online forms of opposition, using Twitter, Instagram and Facebook to monitor and hold accountable the political establishment. With the gradual lifting of lockdown measures and in the absence of tangible solutions to the myriad ills afflicting the country, more targeted and focused demonstrations are expected. Already, protesters have called for street demonstrations to begin again on June 6. In anticipation of this, some political leaders have been vocal in stating their opposition to demonstrations that block roads or that target the residences of politicians. In the case of the latter, one minister of parliament even went so far as to call on protesters to be attacked and shot at if they do so.

What role has Hezbollah played?

Abouaoun: Hezbollah must keep several balls in the air. On the one hand, the party’s involvement in the Syrian conflict is still significant. On the other, the collapse of the banking sector in Lebanon affected Hezbollah’s constituency—despite the fact that the party itself manages its own parallel and informal financial system.

The demonstrations that happened in Hezbollah strongholds since October revealed that part of its constituency and many of its core allies—while aligned to the party’s policy on Israel, Syria, and Iran—are fed up and ready to take the streets to protest what they consider the party’s cover up of corrupt political practices.

The U.S. maximum pressure campaign on Iran, compounded with the protracted conflict in Syria, the financial crisis in Lebanon and the aftermath of COVID-19 are already weighing heavily on the party and pushing its leadership to be cautious and pragmatic. They know that any major political or security shakedown will drag Lebanon—with the party and its constituency—into the Sunni-Shia conflict prevailing in the region. So far, Hezbollah considers this scenario an existential threat and is investing a lot to prevent it from happening. This has translated into unconditional support to the government, a surprising lack of objection to approaching the IMF to help stave off an economic collapse, and a very opportunistic use of the pandemic to assert its role as a social support system for its constituency.

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Hezbollah faces scrutiny over release of SLA commander

This piece was originally published on the thearabweekly website https://thearabweekly.com/

TUNIS – The dramatic departure of a dual US-Lebanese citizen from the US Embassy in Lebanon provided Beirut with an uncomfortable reminder of its difficult past and an unforgiving insight into its troubled present.

Awaiting retrial on charges of human rights abuses, Amer Fakhoury, 57, was reported to have fled the US Embassy March 19. The accusations against Fakhoury date to his time as an administrator of Khiam detention centre in Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon, a facility notorious for its torture of dissidents and militants in the 1980s and 1990s.

Fakhoury, a commander in the Israel-backed South Lebanon Army (SLA) was called “the butcher of Khiam” for allegedly orchestrating torture sessions in which prisoners were whipped with electric cables.

Fakhoury fled Lebanon for Israel shortly before the withdrawal of Israeli forces in 2000. He went to the United States where he tried to claim political asylum. He won US citizenship through one of his children last year.

Fakhoury, said to be undergoing treatment for late-stage cancer, returned to Lebanon last September. He was arrested but then released in March after a military tribunal ruled the statute of limitations for the torture charges had expired.

However, following public outcry led by Iran-backed Hezbollah, a judge imposed a travel ban and asked the Military Court of Appeals to strike down the earlier ruling.

The circumstances of Fakhoury’s release are unclear. While US President Donald Trump thanked the “Lebanese government,” the US ambassador was summoned by Lebanese Foreign Minister Nassif Hitti to explain how Fakhoury left the country, despite suspicions that Lebanese officials may have colluded in the plan.

Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah sought to establish as much distance as possible between Hezbollah and Fakhoury’s flight. He claimed he learnt of the incident “on television and then made calls to inquire about it,” adding that, “There was American pressure and some people were weak.”

A bipartisan call for sanctions against officials involved in Fakhoury’s detention would have further punished a government straining under the US policy of “maximum pressure” against Iran and its allies, including Hezbollah.

The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that the United States threatened to freeze assistance to the Lebanese Army, totalling more than $100 million annually. US support for Lebanon’s application for assistance from the International Monetary Fund was also said to have been made conditional on Fakhoury’s release.

“This is not the first time that actual decisions or actions by the Lebanese government or by Hezbollah contradict the usual anti-US rhetoric embraced by the party and some of its allies,” said Elie Abouaoun of the United States Institute for Peace.

“It happened before when some municipal councils politically close to Hezbollah were tacitly authorised to receive or be part of [US government]-funded projects. There were other examples cited by previous US diplomats about requests made to senior Lebanese officials that were surprisingly honoured while going at odds with Hezbollah’s mainstream discourse.”

How much choice Hezbollah or the Lebanese government had is open to scrutiny. Battered by years of graft and mismanagement, Lebanon’s economy is nearly bankrupt while the coronavirus pandemic applies additional pressure on the country’s institutions. In early March, Beirut announced it would default on a $1.2 billion Eurobond payment while it sought to restructure its $90 billion debt.

In mid-March, with coronavirus threatening to engulf Lebanon’s health-care system, the government ordered the country into lockdown, closing its international airport, ports and land border crossings.

In any negotiation with the United States, Lebanon was always playing with a weakened hand.

“We do not know how this happened in terms of the prior negotiations, which started a few months ago, and the terms of the release but I believe that the Lebanese foreign minister’s summoning of the US ambassador is just a charade,” said Hanin Ghaddar, a visiting fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy think-tank.

“They all knew what was going on and this was only to assuage public discontent. The White House thanked the Lebanese government because the Lebanese government cooperated, probably under pressure and Fakhoury wouldn’t have been released without the government’s and Hezbollah’s approval.”

Ghaddar said, given the sensitivity surrounding the Fakhoury case, it was unlikely that anyone would have taken such a fundamental decision without consulting Hezbollah.

“I believe not only Nasrallah approved but also took the decision himself,” Ghaddar said. “He is saying that he didn’t know because the Shia constituency couldn’t believe it.

“At one point, clashes erupted in the south between former communists who also served in the Khiam prison and Hezbollah. They needed to distance themselves. That was part one.

“Part two: Fakhoury’s former aide, former prison guard and SLA member Antoine al-Hayek, was assassinated and observers in Lebanon believe that this was another attempt to calm down the street and give it some ‘revenge’ satisfaction.”

A Syrian TV news program broadcasting from Istanbul, Feb. 25, 2019. Istanbul has become the hub for dissidents from around the Arab world, who broadcast opposing views back into their homelands. At the same time, many local Turkish journalists remain jailed. (Tara Todras-Whitehill/The New York Times)

Rethinking Media’s Role in Conflict and Peace in the Middle East

How can the power of media be better employed to resolve conflict in the region?

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://www.usip.org/

In 2014, the world watched in disbelief, as global news networks covered the stream of gruesome and horrific beheading videos released by the so-called Islamic State. For the first time, by bringing the terror of the Islamic State directly to the devices in the palm of our hands, it felt personal and close by, rather than across the world in a mysterious land.

Without question, the role of the media in peace and conflict is becoming ever more important. While terror groups like IS have been proven effective in their use of media for their sinister agendas, has the rest of the world caught up?

As media technologies advance, so too must our strategies to responsibly and effectively harness their power. Sadly, in some cases in the Middle East and North Africa, media have been employed, by both regimes and terrorists, as a tool to cause harm, incite violence and fuel dangerous narratives.

With conflict and seemingly unending turmoil ravaging the region today, the role of media is as important as ever in documenting and exposing citizens around the world to the realities on the ground. However, strict requirements and seemingly impossible lists of legalities and compliances imposed by authoritarian regimes result in the suppression of ideas and stories that run counter to the official narrative.

This is especially true in states where the government has cracked down on publications that are critical of their policies, which they describe as “fake news.” Too often journalists are targeted for illuminating injustice at the hands of harsh regimes in the region; regimes that are finding it more and more difficult to keep the world in the dark in the modern technological era.

It is not surprising then that the region suffers from a lack of access to credible and reliable information; the result of amateurs taking up journalism as part of “democratization” combined with the unfortunate reality that serious journalists are co-opted by regimes to spread disinformation that aligns with official narratives. It is also challenging to decipher fact from fiction, as competing political agendas and international interests try to direct narratives and sway public opinion in their favor.

The mix of digital technology, unscrupulous politics and commercial exploitation of the new communications landscape highlights the need for a revised framework of ethics, essential for rebuilding public trust in journalism and media; a framework that reasserts that the core values of accuracy, independence and responsible reporting that have evolved over the past 150 years remain as relevant as ever.

The Media’s Power to Build Peace

In a recently co-hosted conference in Tunis, Tunisia, the United States Institute of Peace and Al-Hurra Television partnered to address this complex issue and discuss recommendations for how the power of the media can be better employed to promote peacebuilding initiatives and resolve conflict in the region.

By enhancing cooperation and coordination among local, independent media outlets in the region to create networks for knowledge sharing, their influence and strength would be consolidated and magnified.

Additionally, by educating media practitioners in the region about the critical role they can play in building peace, promoting solidarity and understanding among communities in conflict with one another, they can challenge narratives of hatred and the use of violence as legitimate means to an end. Empowering media practitioners to embrace this role is essential, and there is a great opportunity for the international community to play a role here.

With ever advancing media technologies, there are countless creative ways to elevate moderate voices and promote positive chronicles of peace and conflict resolution to change harmful narratives.

Looking at the long-term, the region would benefit from developing and delivering media education to communities, beginning from an early age with a focus on using such skills for peacebuilding initiatives and innovatively combatting hate speech. With ever advancing media technologies, there are countless creative ways to elevate moderate voices and promote positive chronicles of peace and conflict resolution to change harmful narratives.

Finally, and most essentially, governments of the region must provide the space for peace journalism to flourish to mitigate conflict and reduce tension, embracing the positive role that peace journalism can play in bridging divides. Getting violent and paranoid regimes to provide greater space for independent voices is a major challenge, as the trend line has tended to go in the opposite direction since the so-called “Arab Spring,” toward greater control and even intelligence service dominance over the media.

Certainly, media alone cannot reverse decades of deep-seated conflict and turmoil in the region, but it can in fact catalyze modest strides toward understanding, empathy and humanizing the “other.”

Restless masses throughout the Middle East are deeply unhappy with the status quo, as demonstrations from Algeria to Iran have made abundantly clear. Despite massive repression and regime media manipulation, many of the old lies don’t seem to work anymore. The region is indeed hungry for truthful representations of its own history with conflict and for accurate depictions of the consequences and human toll of the violence that has devastated the region. Without it, future generations are likely to repeat it.