The hardship confronting Tehran in Lebanon and Iraq could be an opportunity to contain its expansion.

This piece was originally published on the thearabweekly website https://www.thearabweekly.com/

Two of Iran’s vassal countries, Lebanon and Iraq, are witnessing acute political crises that could undermine Iran’s political gains of the last two decades. The hardship confronting Tehran in these two countries could be an opportunity to contain its expansion.

David Hume distinguishes in his 1740 essay “A Treatise of Human Nature”  between impressions and ideas. Impressions embrace, according to Hume, “all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will.” Thus, both the colour red and the feeling of anger are considered impressions. Ideas are what arise when we reflect upon our impressions, so the memory of seeing the colour red or a thought about anger are considered ideas.

So far, Iran has excelled at playing around with impressions to generate ideas that suit its political project in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. However, recent months have shown that Iran and its assets, in both Lebanon and Iraq, are having to deal with a different reality. In a way, they have become victims of their own success.

In 2016, Hezbollah consolidated its grip on Lebanon’s executive power by imposing its ally Michel Aoun as the president of the republic and Saad Hariri as a prime minister. In 2017, the improvised arrest of Hariri in Riyadh was used by Hezbollah to present itself as the premier’s saviour. Abandoned by his regional and local allies, Hariri was ultimately released from custody thanks to a French initiative with the blessing of Aoun and Hezbollah. With an overt ally as president of the republic, a covert sympathiser as a prime minister, along with considerable military might and a parliamentary majority, it was hard for Hezbollah to shield itself from responsibility for the financial calamity that was in the making after 2016. That calamity arrived in 2019 with the collapse of the banking system and the general deterioration of the already poor basic services. The Beirut port explosion in August 2020 solidified the public perception that Hezbollah was in large measure responsible for what Lebanon was going through, including the endemic corruption that was partly behind one of the most powerful artificial non-nuclear explosions in history. It was and still is very hard to convince any Lebanese, including those within the party’s own constituency, that Hezbollah’s robust intelligence network did not know of the presence and associated threats of such a large quantity of explosives in a strategic site such as the main port of Lebanon.

So despite all Hezbollah’s efforts to create a false perception that it did not control the executive power, for instance by simply appointing a couple of party-affiliated ministers in governments of 30 ministers, its rise to become the main power broker in Lebanon made it a major part of the problem in the eyes of the majority of the Lebanese. Obviously, its persistent attempts to obstruct the investigation into the port blast, which have included threatening the investigating judge and paralysing the government at a time when Lebanon needs every minute to negotiate a bailout plan with the IMF, has further damaged its public image.

One can argue that Iraq has witnessed a similar path overall, with significantly different nuances. First and foremost, Iran had to deal with a multitude of proxies in Iraq, unlike in Lebanon where they were able to silence, by fair means or foul, all Shia rivals for Hezbollah’s leadership.

As Iran’s proxies emerged victorious from the battle against ISIS in 2017, they were given enough room to infiltrate most of the government’s institutions including the Iraqi armed forces and to establish themselves as one of the main economic actors at the provincial level.

Most of these groups resorted to assassinations, extortion and criminal activities to boost their power and income. As in Lebanon, Iran’s assets in Iraq were also able to block and change any governmental decision with which they disagreed, even to the point of besieging the residence of the prime minister when some of their members were arrested by the security forces. In just a few years, these groups became the go-to brokers for getting a public works contract, being hired as a civil servant, challenging a judicial decision, getting a promotion or just evading accountability when accused of incompetence or corruption.

The 2021 elections showed growing resentment, especially among Shias in Iraq, at the behaviour of these groups, which led to a decrease in their popular support compared to their 2018 electoral performance. This translated into a significant drop in the number of parliamentary seats they won.

In both countries, Iran is far from being strategically threatened. It still withholds too many cards. However, the resentment against Iran’s proxies in Lebanon and Iraq is now unprecedented. Tehran’s level of support within the Lebanese and Iraqi Shia constituencies is at its lowest during the last two decades. By taking Iraq and Lebanon through a path of para-state military groups, of hollow and ineffective institutions as well as indirect but firm control through its allies, the “ideas” (referred in Hume’s theory) generated by the perception they wanted to create are placing them in a predicament, which they have created themselves.

As is commonly understood, Iran’s support in both Iraq and Lebanon is organic, not external, especially among Shias. Therefore, most of the theories about containing Iran in both countries were, quite rightly, built around the idea of reversing those factors and the processes by which Iran was able to suborn Shias in each country. There is no better timing to start this endeavour than now, given the growing negative public perception of Iran in Iraq and Lebanon. Such an endeavour would start by rebuilding a pool of local political groups that has the legitimacy to challenge, without violence, Iran’s regional behaviour and that of its proxies. Coupled with a heavy investment in soft power tools by the West along with maintaining deterrence and sanctions, the time is now ripe to start pushing back on what Iran has been doing in both countries for decades.