As Lebanon prepares for the upcoming legislative elections in May, the international community continues to consider Lebanon’s “deliberate depression” as inconsequential.
This piece was originally on the thearabweekly website https://thearabweekly.com/
Since 2019, Lebanon has been a topic of interest to many experts and institutions. Amongst diverse, often redundant, analyses of the situation, the most astute description of the country’s predicament came in the World Bank’s Economic Monitors published respectively in the autumn of 2020 and 2021. The first, “The Deliberate Depression” argued that Lebanon’s economic recession was imposed on the general public by the elite that has long ruled the country and captured the state and its associated economic rents”. The second, “The Great Denial” states that “the elite’s preference has been to hold onto power and its rents and this entails preventing a recovery by eluding fundamental reforms to the unsustainable and now failed post-civil war development model”.
There are not too many interpretations of the World Bank’s compelling classification of Lebanon’s crisis as being “potentially one of the top ten, possibly top three most severe economic collapses worldwide since the 1850s” and a direct threat to “the country’s long-term stability and social peace”.
The most prominent conclusion is that the usual technical solutions offered by international financial institutions will not work by themselves and that only a change in both executive and legislative powers will extricate the country from the elite’s criminal capture.
Amongst the common vehicles of political change are elections. So far, the ruling elite’s constant assurances that the legislative elections due in May 2022 will take place on time are not corroborated by sustained and transparent preparations from the government. For example, less than one hundred days from D-Day, many candidates are still unable to officially submit their application because of multiple administrative and banking hurdles. This alone poses a significant threat to an already narrow space for electoral competition.
As with any other conundrum which design theorist Horst Rittel described as a “wicked problem”, Lebanon cannot be fixed by one party; nor can it be fixed through one round of elections. However, having a number of reform-minded new members of parliament can help putting the country on the overdue recovery path. Obviously, addressing all the issues of the electoral process needs time, resources and a political will that is hard to find. Insisting that all reforms are prerequisites to holding elections is not an option because this will give a golden pretext for the ruling elite to postpone them quasi-indefinitely.
Nonetheless, there are a few reforms that are technically feasible in the short timeframe, with the potential for a significant impact on the outcome of the 2022 election.
Establishing an independent Electoral Management Body (EMB) to replace the ministry of interior in overseeing the vote is one of them.
Under the current law, the electoral process is managed by the ministry of interior, with a supervisory role through a Supervisory Electoral Commission” (SEC). Its function is limited to monitoring campaign spending and media coverage of the candidates. The SEC’s president warned recently that the committee will not be able to fulfil its mandate, not only because of financial and human resources but also because of legal constraints limiting its mandate to monitoring. Moreover, given the general distrust in government and the ruling parties, the continued control by the ministry of interior over elections will likely lead to a low voter turnout, a widespread boycott among non-affiliated voters and hence the re-election of the same political class.
As long as a government-appointed authority is in charge of overseeing elections, the credibility of the whole process will be undermined and it will remain subject to corruption, thus keeping many voters away from the ballot boxes. Entirely independent from the executive, the new EMB would enhance the integrity of elections in Lebanon, traditionally marred by massive corruption. In addition, an EMB will increase public trust in the vote and so lead to a higher turnout.
Counterarguments claiming there is not enough time to establish an independent EMB fall short, as past examples prove that in the presence of political will and international consensus, EMBs in South Africa and Tunisia were established in a few months.
The second proposed reform is to adopt Mega Voting Centres. Lebanese do not vote where they live. Instead, they must return to their birthplace, a requirement which has previously disenfranchised many citizens. The ongoing economic and fuel crises will discourage many Lebanese from voting. It is simply too expensive for citizens to exercise their right to vote by returning to where they were born. Mega centres would allow them to vote in their place of residence for MPs representing their place of origin. This will increase participation. It will also be a vital reform to enable citizens who face intimidation to vote freely, particularly in areas dominated by armed groups. Further, it reduces the ability of the ruling parties to influence voters, buy votes or coerce and intimidate candidates.
These two simple reforms do not require a major legislative overhaul as they can be carried through with expedited one-article laws. Yet they can significantly influence the outcome of the election by encouraging higher turnout and allowing voters’ free and fair exercise of their rights. They would mitigate, albeit partially, partisan pressure on voters and meddling in the management of the election process.
While many Lebanese political and civic groups, experts and specialised agencies have already highlighted the importance of these reforms, it is obvious that the ruling elite will never willingly adopt changes that will allow independent non-affiliated candidates to make their way into parliament. Only sustained international pressure, including conditionality on external funding, will persuade the Lebanese decision-makers to proceed with these reforms.
When approached by Lebanese opposition groups, some western diplomats based in Lebanon were reluctant to accept this. For them, such reforms remain a domestic issue. This position would have made sense in a country where the public space allows for change through citizen mobilisation. In Lebanon, this avenue is not available and as in 2005, mass mobilisation produces results only when it is boosted by international pressure. What is more, the donor countries are ignoring, or being misled by how much the SEC, which can only monitor media and electoral spending, can actually do to ensure free and fair elections.
As the government of Lebanon is looking desperately for external funding for both the elections and an overdue bailout package, there is no better timing to introduce this conditionality.
Another counterargument usually invoked is that the IMF is not entitled to impose political reforms while negotiating an assistance package. As much as this is accurate, this specific case is different because it is about fighting corruption not imposing political conditions. Moreover, the IMF limitation does not apply to donor countries, some of which have often had unconventional demands, way more controversial than a couple of electoral reforms. Therefore, the UN coordinated “Friends of Lebanon” group can and should make sure that the Lebanese government does not receive any assistance if the above-mentioned two electoral reforms are not adopted.
By simply supporting, politically or financially, the SEC and by reassuring local public opinion that its own monitoring will deter Lebanon’s ruling elite from manipulating the 2022 elections, the international community will be failing the Lebanese. Electoral Observation Missions (EOM), whether from EU or elsewhere will not have been formed before the electoral corruption begins. Knowingly or not, the outside world and its EOMs will be complicit in failing to provide assistance to a population in danger.