A man walks through the remains of a factory that was bombed twice in September outside of Sana, Yemen, Oct. 29, 2016. AmericaÕs link with Saudi Arabia is leaving its mark on war-torn Yemen, where Saudi-led bombings are ravaging the country, leaving a disastrous economy and a humanitarian crisis on the brink. (Tyler Hicks/The New York Times)

Can Yemen be Pulled Back from the Brink?

As the world’s ‘worst humanitarian crisis’ festers, the local dynamics of the conflict remain overshadowed.

This piece was originally published on the USIP website https://usip.org

Yemen’s ongoing conflict began in 2014 when Houthi rebels stormed the country’s capital, Sana’a, which led Saudi Arabia to form a coalition in an attempt restore the internationally recognized government. Before the war, Yemen was already the Arab world’s poorest country and nearly four years later more than three-quarters of the country’s population is in desperate need of aid and protection, with millions displaced. Further complicating the situation, the conflict has become another battleground in the regional Saudi-Iran power struggle. USIP’s Dr. Elie Abouaoun and Sarhang Hamasaeed analyze the multi-layered nature of the conflict, Yemen’s dire humanitarian situation and the prospects for peace. 

The conflict in Yemen is often referred to as a proxy war. Who are the players involved and what are they fighting over? What about the local dynamics?

Abouaoun: It is true that the conflict has elements of a proxy war, however, that aspect of the conflict tends to be overemphasized. Indeed, the proxy war narrative downplays the reality that the primary sources of tension are homegrown and originally stemmed from deep divides along tribal, social, regional and political fault lines. 

Unresolved issues with the Houthis—a Yemeni Zaidi Shia sect—and the south of Yemen—which was an independent state from 1967 to 1990—paired with the threat of al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), economic despair and political instability post-2011, all contributed to the internal chaos that the Houthis ultimately exploited to expand their control over large parts of the country. Overstating the degree to which the conflict in Yemen is externally fueled is dangerous in that it may lead to miscalculations that underappreciate the local realties of the conflict. 

From a regional perspective, the growing influence of the Houthis raised red flags for Saudi Arabia, who feared an Iranian-backed group at their doorstep. As such, the Saudis have provided significant military support for the internationally recognized government of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. 

Further behind the scenes is the United Arab Emirates (UAE), who intervened alongside Saudi Arabia against the Houthis, but has also pursued an autonomous agenda in gaining control of maritime traffic in the Red Sea and supporting southern secessionist groups, often in contradiction with the Saudis. Several regional countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Jordan, Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea) have contributed to the Saudi-UAE supported coalition in one way or another. 

Making matters worse is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis—in the wake of a dispute with Qatar over its support for the Muslim Brotherhood—which has disrupted the unity of the coalition in the fight against the Houthis. This is especially true given that many tribesmen and soldiers who fight against the Houthis in Yemen are members of the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islah party.

Finally, Iran’s footprint is vastly smaller in Yemen than it is in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon; although Tehran has undoubtedly been a player in the Yemen conflict. The Houthis do not fully depend on Iran for arms and the Saudis have more at stake in Yemen than Iran does. Although the Houthis do receive a moderate level of support from Tehran, they are far from being the Hezbollah of Yemen. 

Hamasaeed: According to many Yemenis,, internal tensions in Yemen have deepened and grown even more complicated since the takeover of Sana’a by the Houthi-Saleh forces in September 2014. Alliances in both the pro-government coalition and the Houthi sides have shifted. Yemeni actors who have stood against the Houthis and AQAP have turned against each other in Aden and other parts of Yemen. Taiz, which is divided between Houthi and pro-Hadi government forces, has also suffered tensions between pro- and anti-UAE actors. Former republican guards loyal to ex-president Ali Abdullah Saleh turned against the Houthis, despite previously being allied, after they killed Saleh.

International attention has recently been focused on UAE efforts to reclaim the port city of Hodeida from the Houthis. Why is the Hodeida port such an important strategic location?

Hamasaeed: Hodeida is governorate on the western coast of Yemen on the Red Sea controlled by the Houthis since December 2014, when they seized it with support from forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. It is home to a key port, which is the point of entry for 80 percent of the country’s humanitarian assistance and food imports as well as 39 percent of fuel supplies. 

The Saudi-led Arab coalition maintains that the port supplies the Houthi’s war machinery with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue and it is where the group receives weapons used to attack cities in Saudi Arabia and ships in the Red Sea. The international community is concerned about threats to international trade stemming from Houthi attacks from the western Red Sea coast and that serious damage to the port could further complicate the already bleak humanitarian situation.

The United Nations has referred to the situation in Yemen as “the worst man-made humanitarian crisis of our time.” What makes the situation so dire? 

Hamasaeed: According to U.N. estimates, 22.2 million (80%) of the country’s 27.4 million people need humanitarian assistance, representing a 15 percent increase in the last year alone. What’s more, 8.4 million people face the risk of starvation, a 20 percent increase over the same timeframe. The conflict displaced over three million people, of which two million remain internally displaced. 

Water shortages, driven by the conflict and climate change, have been another challenge that exacerbate conflict dynamics and make matters worse for Yemenis, such as the one million people who have contracted cholera. Disruptions of operations in the Hodeida port will only make matters worse by causing a drop in humanitarian assistance and imports.

What interests are at stake for U.S. national security? Why has Congress repeatedly tried to pull back U.S. engagement in Yemen? 

Hamasaeed: For years, the United States has been interested in Yemen for counterterrorism purposes, but in the past few years the stakes have increased to also protecting Saudi Arabia, curbing the influence of Iran, and ensuring the safety of trade through the Bab al-Mandeb strait. Yemen has been home to AQAP and ISIS has found a limited foothold. AQAP has posed threats well beyond Yemen’s borders, such as the 2009 Christmas bomber who attempted to blow up a commercial airliner over Detroit.

Congress is concerned about the U.S. engagement in Yemen because it doesn’t feel it has sufficient oversight, and the U.S. could be implicated in legal and humanitarian issues as a result of selling weapons to the Saudi-led coalition, refueling their aircraft, and providing intelligence.

Almost four years into the conflict, what are the prospects for peace? 

Abouaoun: The peace process in Yemen has been far from linear, as cease-fires have come and gone, and occasional momentum has been stymied by faulty assumptions about the local realities in areas that function as separate territories with their own internal political structures and external sources of support. U.N.-led peace efforts have too often excluded pertinent groups and placed too much emphasis on the terms of the internationally recognized government, which has led to unworkable solutions and only prolonged the conflict.

The agenda and the outputs of the U.N.-supported 2013 National Dialogue could serve as a foundation for future efforts toward peace. That relatively inclusive process convened youth, women, representatives of all political parties, tribal leaders and perhaps most significantly, members from the Houthi movement. With a more diverse group of stakeholders informing the agenda, the issues deemed most important to Yemenis were addressed, not simply those of the political elite. Taking into consideration the real dynamics of the conflict at the local level and developing a plan that respects and reflects these realities is the first step toward ending the world’s most dire humanitarian crisis. 

Hamasaeed: The key actors in the conflict remain on war footing—either through direct engagement or by playing a supporting role. The battle for Hodeida raised concerns centered on the potential further loss of life and displacement of survivors, which would likely deepen the conflict. If there was a silver lining, however, the situation gave an opportunity to the new U.N. special envoy, Martin Griffiths, to engage in shuttle diplomacy with Yemeni and international interlocutors to assess if a compromise could be found, which could be a positive step toward re-engaging in national peace talks. It is unclear if the efforts of Griffiths will prevent a fight at the city and port of Hodeida and create a breakthrough in the conflict.

Alternatively, the fighting factions could use any pause in hostilities to buy time and as an excuse to potentially escalate the conflict. The bottom line is that a victory in Hodeida for either side will not force an end to the conflict. For peace to be possible, factors at the national, sub-national and regional levels will have to align. International actors believe getting a national political process and agreement in place would set the stage for addressing the sub-national tensions and conflicts. Yemenis have been skeptical of the success of such approach even before the failed 2016 Kuwait talks. The constellation of local actors will need to see indicators that any process recognizes their interests and establishes ways to address them even if they are approached incrementally. Only a multi-layered strategy that corresponds to the complexity of the conflict could offer Yemen’s people a chance at breaking the cycle of violence and curbing extremist groups.

People vote in a referendum on independence, in a sports hall set up at a voting center in Irbil, Iraq, Sept. 25, 2017. Kurds across northern Iraq lined up Monday to vote in a referendum on whether to seek independence for an autonomous Kurdish region that has yearned for nationhood for more than a century. Officials said results would be announced within 72 hours. But Iraq considers the vote illegal, and Iran and Turkey are also opposed. (Ivor Prickett/The New York Times)

Iraq Danger Grows After Kurdistan Independence Vote

Iraq Danger Grows After Kurdistan Independence Vote

This piece was originally published on the U.S. Institute of Peace website usip.org

Iraqi political leaders in Baghdad and Erbil, the Kurdistan regional capital, have escalated their rhetoric this week, as Kurdish officials reported 92 percent approval of the Sept. 25 nonbinding vote on independence for the region. The verbal volleys and intensifying actions risk triggering another outbreak of violent conflict.

The danger will grow in the runup to the regional government elections on Nov. 1 and Iraq-wide parliamentary and provincial elections scheduled for April. Iraqi leaders and the international community need to act quickly to cool the incitement and facilitate a dialogue that prevents violence and produces a path forward.

When elections loom in Iraq, politicians tend to revert to form—hot rhetoric appealing to ethnic and sectarian divisions. In 2013 and 2014, the focus was on exploiting divisions between Sunnis and Shia. Today, it’s centered on Arabs and Kurds.

The Kurdistan region has enjoyed semi-autonomous status since 1992, and many Iraqis, including Shia and Sunni political leaders, might have been willing to part with some areas, other than oil-rich Kirkuk. But more recently, leaders in Baghdad oppose the region’s independence, fearing it would weaken their political standing with their constituents and with Middle Eastern neighbors such as Iran and Turkey.

Some have been particularly strident in condemning the vote. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who heads a powerful Shia bloc in parliament, called the referendum “a declaration of war on the unity of the Iraqi people.” Some factions of the Shia Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have threatened to go to war over the disputed city of Kirkuk. Terms such as “rebel” and “separatist” that Saddam Hussein and his Ba’athist party used against the Kurds the 1970s and 1980s are reappearing in Baghdad politics.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi is taking a tougher stance as well. A majority in the Iraqi parliament today directed him to send troops into disputed territories currently held by the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, including Kirkuk. Carrying out that instruction could lead to armed confrontation.

The 2013 and 2014 elections offer an ominous preview. Political leaders from the different communities of Iraq similarly promoted sectarianism to win their base. Some Shia leaders portrayed the Sunnis as terrorists or sympathizers and Sunni areas as incubators of terrorism. Sunnis, by turn, cast the Shia as oppressors and proxies of Iran.

These rhetorical campaigns inflamed the public on both sides, but especially the Sunnis, who felt their leaders had already been sidelined in Baghdad. The resulting loss of faith in the political system and in elections ultimately opened the door for ISIS and years of internal violence.

Today, with ISIS driven from most of Iraq—with help from the PMF and Kurdish Peshmerga— Baghdad and Erbil are maneuvering for control over long-disputed territories in Kirkuk, Diyala, Salahaddin and Nineveh. Armed units are positioned along hundreds of miles of front lines. Any spark—a single shooting, or troops crossing into territory held by other forces, for example—could ignite a battle.

The U.S. and others in the international community, while acknowledging the region’s right to hold a referendum at some point, almost unanimously opposed the timing as a threat to an already unstable Middle East. It’s even more critical in the aftermath of the vote that international supporters urge leaders in Baghdad and Erbil toward direct talks to de-escalate tensions and develop a political process for resolving the central issues.

170407-N-JI086-305 MEDITERRANEAN SEA (April 7, 2017) The guided-missile destroyer USS Porter (DDG 78) conducts strike operations while in the Mediterranean Sea, April 7, 2017. Porter, forward-deployed to Rota, Spain, is conducting naval operations in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations in support of U.S. national security interests in Europe. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Ford Williams/Released)

Q&A: Will U.S. Strikes on Syria Change Conflict’s Course?

On the Issues with USIP’s Elie Abouaoun and Nancy Lindborg

This piece was originally published on the U.S. Institute of Peace website usip.org

The United States launched its first air strikes against forces backing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since the country’s civil war began six years ago, in retaliation for a chemical-weapons attack that killed more than 80 civilian men, women and children. Elie Abouaoun, who is director of Middle East and North Africa programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace and is based in the region, examines the strategic implications, and USIP President Nancy Lindborg, who has worked for nearly 30 years on humanitarian crises and areas affected by conflict, comments on the factors that prompted the U.S. attack.

The American strikes with 59 Tomahawk missiles targeted Syrian aircraft, air defense systems, equipment and infrastructure at Shayrat Airfield in western Syria, the base in Homs Province where the planes responsible for this week’s chemical attack in Idlib are believed to have originated. The Russian military, which has backed Assad’s forces in the war, received advance warning of the U.S. air strikes, the Washington Post reported, citing American officials. Russia ostensibly joined the war to assist in the battle against the ISIS extremist group, which is among myriad discordant forces fighting to oust Assad and seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate across northern Syria and Iraq. But Russia’s operations frequently have hit opponents of Assad considered to be more moderate.

Were these U.S. strikes necessary?

Lindborg: These targeted air strikes were an appropriate response to the unacceptable war crime of using sarin gas on your own people, which is just the latest of a long list of war crimes the Assad regime has perpetrated against the people of Syria. We have limited international tools to stop this level of violence used by a state against its own people. Nothing to date has been effective, especially with the obstructionist role of Russia in the Security Council, where it has repeatedly denied years of barrel bombing, starvation or targeting of health clinics and medical personnel by the Assad regime or even the suffering and humanitarian need that the attacks have generated.

What is the likely effect of the U.S. strikes on Assad and the opposition forces fighting to oust him?

Lindborg: One strike will not solve the wickedly complex conflict of Syria, with multiple terror groups, regional actors with a web of conflicting interests and an utterly destroyed country with nearly half its people displaced.  The biggest question is what’s next and next and then what.

Abouaoun: If the U.S. military attack is limited to launching 59 missiles, it is not likely to change the course of the conflict, at least not in the short term. It could improve the morale of the anti-Assad forces, but they are not likely to become any more united than they have been, unless the United States, Turkey and Saudi Arabia agree on a joint strategy to support them, leading to enough pressure on Assad to change his behavior or force him to negotiate more seriously. 

What would it take for Turkey and the United States to mend their strained relationship to cooperate more on Syria?

Abouaoun: The U.S. would have to persuade Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to halt his sprint towards the Russians and restore Turkey’s relationship with the U.S. That includes assuring Erdogan that Turkey will be able to influence Syria’s political transition and benefit economically from its reconstruction. He also would want a role in security arrangements in northern Syria. That includes guarantees that Syria’s Kurds, whom he sees as aligned with the Kurdish PKK militant group in Turkey and who have been among the best fighting forces in Syria against Assad, won’t be allowed to establish a mini-state on his border.  

How are the Russians likely to respond to the U.S. strikes in Syria?

Abouaoun: The Russians need to understand that the space they had to maneuver under President Obama has shrunk and that it is, therefore, time to bargain. But they also want certain guarantees, such as that Assad and his family will not to be killed like Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi or imprisoned, as in the case of Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak. The Russians want continued control of their Mediterranean naval base in Syria and, like Turkey, to ensure they can influence Syria’s political transition and benefit from the country’s reconstruction.

What reaction might we see from Iran to the U.S. strikes?

Abouaoun: The Iranians are known for their strategic patience. They are fairly unlikely to strike back against the U.S. directly outside of Syria. Iran has a clear agenda in Syria that goes beyond preserving the person or the regime of Assad. It is about access to parts of Syria.

How committed are the Iranians to backing Assad?

Abouaoun: Iran remains the major obstacle to Assad’s removal, contributing thousands of military advisors and support for pro-Assad militias such as the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi militias. Iran’s primary objective is to make sure any regime in Syria either accommodates the Iranian agenda or is too weak to thwart it.

170407-N-JI086-305 MEDITERRANEAN SEA (April 7, 2017) The guided-missile destroyer USS Porter (DDG 78) conducts strike operations while in the Mediterranean Sea, April 7, 2017. Porter, forward-deployed to Rota, Spain, is conducting naval operations in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations in support of U.S. national security interests in Europe. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Ford Williams/Released)

Q&A: Will U.S. Strikes on Syria Change Conflict’s Course?

On the Issues with USIP’s Elie Abouaoun and Nancy Lindborg

This piece was originally published on the U.S. Institute of Peace website usip.org

The United States launched its first air strikes against forces backing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since the country’s civil war began six years ago, in retaliation for a chemical-weapons attack that killed more than 80 civilian men, women and children. Elie Abouaoun, who is director of Middle East and North Africa programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace and is based in the region, examines the strategic implications, and USIP President Nancy Lindborg, who has worked for nearly 30 years on humanitarian crises and areas affected by conflict, comments on the factors that prompted the U.S. attack.

The American strikes with 59 Tomahawk missiles targeted Syrian aircraft, air defense systems, equipment and infrastructure at Shayrat Airfield in western Syria, the base in Homs Province where the planes responsible for this week’s chemical attack in Idlib are believed to have originated. The Russian military, which has backed Assad’s forces in the war, received advance warning of the U.S. air strikes, the Washington Post reported, citing American officials. Russia ostensibly joined the war to assist in the battle against the ISIS extremist group, which is among myriad discordant forces fighting to oust Assad and seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate across northern Syria and Iraq. But Russia’s operations frequently have hit opponents of Assad considered to be more moderate.

Were these U.S. strikes necessary?

Lindborg: These targeted air strikes were an appropriate response to the unacceptable war crime of using sarin gas on your own people, which is just the latest of a long list of war crimes the Assad regime has perpetrated against the people of Syria. We have limited international tools to stop this level of violence used by a state against its own people. Nothing to date has been effective, especially with the obstructionist role of Russia in the Security Council, where it has repeatedly denied years of barrel bombing, starvation or targeting of health clinics and medical personnel by the Assad regime or even the suffering and humanitarian need that the attacks have generated.

What is the likely effect of the U.S. strikes on Assad and the opposition forces fighting to oust him?

Lindborg: One strike will not solve the wickedly complex conflict of Syria, with multiple terror groups, regional actors with a web of conflicting interests and an utterly destroyed country with nearly half its people displaced.  The biggest question is what’s next and next and then what.

Abouaoun: If the U.S. military attack is limited to launching 59 missiles, it is not likely to change the course of the conflict, at least not in the short term. It could improve the morale of the anti-Assad forces, but they are not likely to become any more united than they have been, unless the United States, Turkey and Saudi Arabia agree on a joint strategy to support them, leading to enough pressure on Assad to change his behavior or force him to negotiate more seriously. 

What would it take for Turkey and the United States to mend their strained relationship to cooperate more on Syria?

Abouaoun: The U.S. would have to persuade Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to halt his sprint towards the Russians and restore Turkey’s relationship with the U.S. That includes assuring Erdogan that Turkey will be able to influence Syria’s political transition and benefit economically from its reconstruction. He also would want a role in security arrangements in northern Syria. That includes guarantees that Syria’s Kurds, whom he sees as aligned with the Kurdish PKK militant group in Turkey and who have been among the best fighting forces in Syria against Assad, won’t be allowed to establish a mini-state on his border.  

How are the Russians likely to respond to the U.S. strikes in Syria?

Abouaoun: The Russians need to understand that the space they had to maneuver under President Obama has shrunk and that it is, therefore, time to bargain. But they also want certain guarantees, such as that Assad and his family will not to be killed like Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi or imprisoned, as in the case of Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak. The Russians want continued control of their Mediterranean naval base in Syria and, like Turkey, to ensure they can influence Syria’s political transition and benefit from the country’s reconstruction.

What reaction might we see from Iran to the U.S. strikes?

Abouaoun: The Iranians are known for their strategic patience. They are fairly unlikely to strike back against the U.S. directly outside of Syria. Iran has a clear agenda in Syria that goes beyond preserving the person or the regime of Assad. It is about access to parts of Syria.

How committed are the Iranians to backing Assad?

Abouaoun: Iran remains the major obstacle to Assad’s removal, contributing thousands of military advisors and support for pro-Assad militias such as the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi militias. Iran’s primary objective is to make sure any regime in Syria either accommodates the Iranian agenda or is too weak to thwart it.

Syrian soldiers and children at a checkpoint in the besieged and devastated city of Homs, Syria, March 23, 2014. For both sides of Syria's civil war, Homs, a central Syrian crossroads with a diverse prewar population of one million, is crucial to the future. (Sergey Ponomarev/The New York Times)

Will ‘Array of Wars’ Persist in Iraq and Syria After ISIS?

Will ‘Array of Wars’ Persist in Iraq and Syria After ISIS?

This piece was originally published on the U.S. Institute of Peace website usip.org

The prospect of wresting the last territorial strongholds from the self-styled Islamic State extremist group—within weeks in Iraq and possibly within months in Syria—lends urgency to the question of how to address the lingering swirl of internal, regional and global conflicts. In a discussion today on Facebook Live, USIP Middle East and North Africa Director Elie Abouaoun, Distinguished Scholar Robin Wright and Senior Policy Scholar Mona Yacoubian explored the multiple factors that will continue to keep the region off balance without comprehensive efforts tailored to conditions on the ground.

“The ideology will not go away,” Abouaoun said. “What we know from our field observation is the radicalization and the ideology is increasing – in Iraq and Syria but also in other places. So what we need to do is think about how to address the drivers of this radicalization.”

They vary from one place to another depending on political grievances, social and economic exclusion, lack of education and religious discourse, among other factors, he said.

Wright noted that the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, at its peak held territory in each country about the size of the U.S. state of Indiana or the country of Jordan.

“The grave danger, of course, is that, if there isn’t the kind of policy in place, the solutions developed by both countries … that we could beat ISIS but still lose the war, still not make the peace,” Wright said.

The U.S. State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development and other international agencies and organizations can help Iraq and Syria recover security, basic services and governance, Yacoubian said.

“In the absence of those things, you really create fertile ground for a re-emergence of ISIS 2.0,” she said.

Some 50,000 foreign fighters joined ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and 20 percent to 30 percent have returned home as it lost ground, creating new problems for their countries of origin, as well. Almost half of those who came from the U.K., for example, have returned, Wright said.

In the meantime, ISIS has become a global movement, responsible for or inspiring attacks from Europe to the Philippines, and in the U.S. from Florida to California, Wright said.

Wright noted that a USIP study published in December found that, with each generation, the time it takes to mobilize a force such as ISIS—recruiting fighters and getting them onto the battlefield—is halved, and these forces represent a wider array of countries and the agenda becomes more ambitious.

The experts also took questions from Facebook and Twitter on issues such as the implications of a planned independence referendum by Iraqi Kurdistan, how to reintegrate returning fighters and what happens to the diversity that once characterized the rich cultures of Iraq and Syria.

FILE -- Men arrive for prayers at a mosque in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, May 3, 2015. There is a broad consensus that the Saudi ideological juggernaut, which exports a fundamentalist strain of Islam known as Wahhabism, has disrupted local Islamic traditions in dozens of countries — the result of lavish spending on religious outreach for half a century, estimated in the tens of billions of dollars. (Tomas Munita/The New York Times)

Can Trump Revive Saudi Peace and Anti-Terror Role?

Can Trump Revive Saudi Peace and Anti-Terror Role?

This piece was originally published on the U.S. Institute of Peace website usip.org

President Donald Trump’s upcoming meetings in Riyadh with Saudi King Salman could spur a renewal on two critical fronts for both leaders: the Saudi role in the region’s military conflicts and the extremist threat on its own turf.

Saudi Arabia’s shift in recent years to active military involvement in Middle East conflicts broke with its tradition of seeking influence as a peacemaker and intermediary. The Kingdom’s hand in regional politics in the past included facilitating the Taif accord that ended the Lebanese civil war in 1989, proposing an Israeli-Palestinian settlement in 2002 and brokering a 2011 deal for a peaceful transition in Yemen, an agreement supported by the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The swing to armed conflict in Yemen, Syria and to a degree in Iraq, basically was a Saudi reaction to what its leaders saw as President Barack Obama’s failure to contain the widening influence of Iran. But the Kingdom’s military meddling has produced far less than it hoped. The Iranians have consolidated their political and military reach in Lebanon and Iraq, shored up Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, co-opted the Houthi rebels in Yemen and increased the threat to Saudi security by militarizing the Saudi-Yemeni border.

The Trump administration’s approach toward Iran, both in threatening rhetoric and in proposed sanctions, might help ease the concerns of Saudi leaders enough to give them room to re-emphasize regional diplomacy. It is a path more aligned with the country’s own longer-term foreign policy interests anyway.

Stronger U.S. pressure on Iran also may allow Saudi leaders to focus more intensively on another mutual objective—the peril posed by terrorist groups. Al-Qaida, ISIS and others networks have increased their ability to operate across the Persian Gulf and the Middle East in recent years. The same groups eventually could menace the royal family’s control of the Kingdom.

So it behooves Saudi Arabia to redouble its efforts to thwart extremism at home that fuels terror groups there and abroad. The challenge is economic and ideological.

During his visit, Trump plans to sign a $100 billion deal for the Saudis to buy weapons from the U.S., even as oil, the source of almost all Saudi government revenue, remains at the lowest price since 2004. Amid such military spending, Saudi Arabia’s political establishment still will need to find ways to meet the social and economic expectations of a growing cohort of disillusioned young Saudis. Allowing the discontent of youth to fester is a perfect recipe for spreading radicalization—and weakening the royal family.

Weaker political leadership, in turn, strengthens religious influence in Saudi Arabia, where the state was founded on an alliance between the royal family and Wahhabi clerics. Tackling this problem should start by empowering Saudi institutions—both political and religious—that can undercut the sources of extremist doctrine inside and outside the Kingdom. A conservative society like Saudi Arabia needs more religion, not less, for this work—specifically an invigorated body of internationally supported scholars powerful enough to promote a rejuvenated and inclusive Islam.

The starting point for discussions by Trump and King Salman should be a premise that much of the region—and the U.S.—could embrace: A stronger Kingdom that reclaims its role as peaceful facilitator in conflicts, rather than a participant, is indispensable to countering terrorism and pursuing regional stability.

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The US should not just watch North Africa slip into chaos

The Ameri­cans’ withdrawal will almost certainly foster a level of disorder likely to pull the United States back in later and at a greater cost.

This piece was originally published on the U.S. Institute of Peace website usip.org

Curbing US involvement abroad was a signal campaign promise of the new US adminis­tration. Anything that smacked of nation-building drew the sharpest criticism. The appeal to many voters of such disengagement is understandable and the view is woven into an evolving foreign policy.

The problem is that the Ameri­cans’ withdrawal will almost certainly foster a level of disorder likely to pull the United States back in later and at a greater cost, damag­ing American interests that can only be advanced by peace and stability.

Nowhere is that more clearly the case than in North Africa. From Egypt to Morocco, the region’s countries are struggling with terror­ism, radicalisation, socioeconomic stagnation, ineffective governance and corruption.

Obviously, building the resil­ience of those societies must be an indigenous effort first and foremost but the role of the United States is indispensable in supporting local, regional and international efforts to break existing and prospective cycles of violence. Even where local actors are most effective in driving changes that deter extremism, they generally lack the capacity to do so without international support, the cornerstone of which comes from the United States.

Libya’s collapse illustrates how an internal violent conflict can affect regional and international security.

As multiple militias and factions vie for power in the absence of a working central government, a safe haven opened for terrorists fleeing Iraq and Syria, who join extrem­ist groups in Libya. Although the Islamic State (ISIS) was largely sup­pressed by recent military action, this diverse array of militants is establishing a pattern of operations that seems designed to expand their activities beyond Libya’s borders, posing a threat to US interests and counterterrorism efforts in Africa.

The lack of a focused US invest­ment in Libyan politics, which predates the new administration, encourages Russia to bolster its existing diplomatic and military presence — and later, no doubt, an economic one. Just as Syria has provided a gateway for Russia’s re­turn to the Middle East, Libya may open the way to North Africa. Last, but not least, the military conflict in Libya will add to uncertainty in energy markets for the foreseeable future.

More uncertainty could arise from developments in Egypt, the primary supplier of natural gas to American ally Jordan, and Algeria, the world’s 18th largest oil producer. Both are on the verge of a metastatic instabil­ity. A laissez-faire policy towards the two countries will help precipi­tate their descent into communal violence. Expanding radicalisation, economic hardship and the divisive policies of authoritarian leaders are causing irreversible damage, fuel­ling grudges and deepening vertical social fractures.

This offers a golden opportunity to ISIS and other extremists. The conditions are in some ways similar to Iraq in 2014 when grievances of many ordinary Iraqis bred the perception of ISIS as a valid alterna­tive to a repressive government. Most Iraqis, of course, regretted tolerating ISIS but it was too late. The world is acknowledging the high price of ignoring early warn­ings persistently conveyed by many experts, agencies and civil society organisations in 2012-14.

Tunisia has taken a more positive and constructive path than its North African peers. Certainly, the country faces colossal political, economic and social challenges that feed the scourge of home-grown and transnational terrorism. However, Tunisia’s unique example in the Middle East and North Africa of an indigenous national dialogue dif­fusing a political crisis, as occurred in 2013, presents a model for how locally owned conflict-management mechanisms contribute to peace and security.

Likewise, Tunisia’s combined secular-Islamist government and parliament demonstrates the suc­cess of inclusive political settle­ments, a relevant lesson to coun­tries in North Africa and beyond on how to manage political, religious or ethnic diversity. Consistent and generous support for Tunisia’s ailing economy is crucial to the country in maintaining its political direction and its efforts to counter violent extremism.

In a country where 1.4 million of the 3 million citizens under 25 years of age are out of school and work, it is little wonder that thousands of young people have joined extrem­ist groups. Radicalisation is a social disease with multiple roots. It will take US leadership of an interna­tional effort to support Tunisian strategies to cure it. The challenge posed by North Africa’s instability and extremism leaves the United States with only one sound policy option to protect its interests: Increased, determined and steady political and economic support. The alternative is watching the region slip into chaos that may be impossible to reverse no matter what resources the Americans bring to bear.

Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis meets with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in Baghdad, Iraq, Feb. 20, 2017. (DOD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Brigitte N. Brantley)

How Iran May Use Iraq to Deflect New U.S. Pressure

This piece was originally published on the U.S. Institute of Peace website usip.org

Iraq’s grinding war to dislodge the Islamic State from its last Iraqi strongholds has obscured a simmering — and in some respects equally important — political battle in Baghdad. At stake is Iranian influence in Iraq and how it might be used by Tehran to counter any increased pressure from the new U.S. administration in Washington. The latest maneuvers involve murky motives, foreign influence and multiple leaders of divergent constituencies.

The moves start with former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s mostly quiet outreach to the leadership of Shiite political parties, in direct or indirect discussions seeking a common platform. Maliki was pressured not to seek a third term in 2014 by U.S. and world leaders who were concerned that he was exacerbating unrest among Iraq’s Sunni minority. He is now a heavyweight in the push to construct a political framework for the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) — a group of government-sanctioned, predominantly Shiite militias helping Iraq’s army in its campaign against ISIS.

There are two interpretations of Maliki’s actions. The first sees Maliki seeking to build a bloc in Parliament that would allow him to regain office as the sole significant voice of the Shia in Iraq. That would effectively eliminate three potential rivals for Shia leadership: the current prime minister, Haider al-Abadi; the cleric Ammar al-Hakim, leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq party; and the cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, an early, potent foe of the U.S. after the 2003 invasion. Proponents of this view believe Maliki is trying to marginalize the other leaders who are seen as somewhat more independent from Iran.

In the second interpretation, Maliki is spearheading an Iranian attempt to forge a useful and all-inclusive Shia coalition for overdue provincial elections. Its proponents see Maliki’s overtures to well-known rivals, and to Abadi through the Daawa party channels, as a sign all Shia leaders including Abadi and Maliki are disposed to reach some kind of agreement that will satisfy Iran and allow it to have stronger influence through a unified Shia bloc.

Historically, Iran has sought to provide enough support to keep multiple actors in play and reduce the possibility that Iraqi Shia would unify around a single leader and develop more independence from Iran’s influence.

Maliki’s comeback as a prospective head of a coalition of the increasingly political PMF may reflect Iran’s preparation for responding to the potential for increased U.S. pressure under the administration of President Donald Trump. From that position, Maliki could possibly engineer the end of Abadi’s government.

Abadi already faces mounting opposition in Parliament. If Maliki can ally with smaller Shia blocs, a vote of no-confidence could put Maliki, and a more Iran-friendly government, in office.

On the military level, the Iranian-supported PMF have expanded and strengthened enough to challenge the government and potentially the American-led coalition forces, probably through insurgency-style operations rather than direct confrontation.

While the details and precise tactics remain hard to discern, Iran’s strategic plan for Iraq right now appears clear: Create the option for a military and political confrontation with the U.S. if Tehran comes under any form of attack.

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La Liberte d’expression encore et encore

https://magazine.com.lb/2017/01/04/la-liberte-dexpression-encore-et-encore

Le 12 mai 2000, j’ai écrit, dans les colonnes d’un quotidien libanais, un article intitulé Ne touchez pas à la liberté d’expression. Il s’agissait de défendre le droit de l’avocat et activiste Me Mohammad Moghrabi à la libre expression, dans un contexte de chasse aux sorcières, menée par une justice et un appareil sécuritaire entièrement assujettis au tuteur syrien. Plus de seize ans après, le débat sur les limites de la liberté d’expression reste hautement polémique.
Il y a quelques semaines, il a suffi qu’un étudiant, Bassel el-Amine, affiche sur Facebook un commentaire insul-tant à l’égard des Libanais pour que se déchaînent les passions… contre ou pour la liberté d’expression. Comme dans la plupart des cas, la majorité des internautes n’ont vu que noir ou blanc, traitant Bassel soit de démon soit de héros.
La liberté d’expression, de par sa nature inhérente à la «Personne Humaine», mérite quand même une réflexion qui transcende un contexte particulier. Que Bassel ait insulté une grande partie des Libanais doit être reconnu sans l’ombre d’un doute. Dans tout autre pays, même ceux se prévalant d’un respect poussé des droits et libertés, ce genre d’insultes aurait engendré une procédure. La dignité de la collectivité n’est pas inférieure à celle de l’individu. La question qui se pose, c’est: «quelle autorité doit prendre en charge un cas pareil?».

Un despote clérical
Le Bureau pour la lutte contre les cyber-crimes, créé il y a quelques années au sein des Forces de sécurité intérieure (FSI), joue un rôle important dans un monde de plus en plus informatisé, où l’espace criminel croît autant que de nouvelles innovations technologiques sont introduites presque tous les jours. Mais est-ce qu’une équipe d’officiers et de policiers (de ce bureau ou de toute autre agence de sécurité) ou bien d’un despote clérical comme le RP (Abdo) Abou Kasm peuvent-ils se prévaloir d’un rôle aussi sensible que de déterminer si une insulte publique mérite d’être criminalisée et faire l’objet d’une arrestation? N’est-ce pas le rôle de l’autorité judiciaire de la faire?
Le cœur du débat n’est pas si Bassel a le droit de s’exprimer ou pas. Toute personne doit pouvoir s’exprimer librement, tout en sachant que l’exercice de la liberté exige aussi de rendre compte en cas d’infraction. A cette fin, il faut que le pouvoir législatif bouge, enfin, pour que la Loi définisse plus clairement les atteintes à la liberté d’expression passibles de poursuite. Le rôle de l’appareil judiciaire, et non pas des agences de sécurité, est de s’assurer que ce que tous les «Bassel» du monde disent ne porte pas atteinte à la dignité des autres, individus ou collectivités, présidents, ministres ou citoyens ordinaires. Simultanément, le rôle de la Justice est de s’assurer que les personnes qui, à travers l’expression de leur point de vue, transgressent la dignité des autres, ne sont pas soumises à des poursuites excessives, des arrestations arbitraires ou autres formes de mesures répressives, dont la seule conséquence est de restreindre encore plus l’espace de la libre expression dans un pays dont la seule planche de salut reste son respect (relatif) des libertés, en comparaison avec son entourage bouillonnant et autocrate.

Elie Abouaoun
Secrétaire général d’ALEF-act for Human Rights
Enseignant universitaire